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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) has a developing economy and the Government controls three 
quarters of it. Control, in a way, provides the Government with power to give effect to the 
aspirations of the people enshrined in the National Goals and Directive Principles. State 
Owned Enterprise (SOE) is one of the means that the Government utilizes to participate 
in the economy, particularly delivering goods and services to the people. SOEs are 
established as separate legal entities and intended to be independent of the government so 
that they can be efficient and/or profitable, replicating the private sector, in their role in 
production of goods and delivery of services. There is a principal and agent relationship 
in an SOE. On the one hand the government is a shareholder with multiple interests, 
including public interest considerations and on the other hand there is the management 
that is responsible for strategic decisions and operations, creating a principal and agent 
relationship. The important question in this relationship is to what extent the government, 
as principal, should be involved in the business and affairs of SOEs.  
 
The use of SOEs by government creates controversies. Since Independence in 1975, 
SOEs have been increasingly facing problems in corporate governance. Some of the 
problems identified in PNG include situations where procedures are not complied with in 
appointing and terminating directors and chief executive officers (CEOs), most of which 
end up in court; responsible ministers, directors or CEOs involved in self-interested 
activities; and appointment of political associates and family members as directors and 
managers who do not have skills, knowledge or experience. These are issues in corporate 
governance; however they are not looked at from that perspective because corporate 
governance is a new concept that has never been substantively discussed in PNG. Thus, 
this study examines and records the law and practice of corporate governance, and 
identifies deficiencies and ways in which the corporate governance regime in SOEs can 
be improved. 
 
Given the fact that corporate governance is a new phenomenon in PNG, the thesis made 
use of case study methodology. There were five SOEs selected for case studies. Two are 
under the category of statutory corporation and three under state company. These SOEs 
were selected for purposes of comparing and contrasting under their individual category 
and between the two categories. The data was collected through documents and semi – 
structured interviews. The participants in the interviews were senior managers, former 
and current directors and CEOs, and consumers of SOEs. 
  
The research found many flaws of corporate governance in SOEs. These flaws were the 
consequence of lack of understanding and appreciation of corporate governance. Further, 
they were the consequence of inconsistencies between different laws, between laws and 
the practice, and deficiencies in the laws. The result of the research suggests first that the 
Government controls SOEs and is involved in both operational and policy matters of 
SOEs. Second, boards of SOEs are ineffective. Nearly all directors are on a part-time 
basis and lack understanding of the business and affairs of SOEs and their own roles and 
responsibilities. Third, the role of public institutions such as Ombudsman Commission 
and Public Accounts Committee is unclear among the participants interviewed. 
Consequently, the Government that controls SOEs is not held to account for its conduct in 
relation to them. Finally, the majority of consumers from each SOEs interviewed, stated 
that the quality and efficiency of services in SOEs are poor. This can partly be related to 
lack of good corporate governance. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Good corporate governance does not guarantee good performance but its 
absence usually indicates present or future problems.”1 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Professor John Farrar succinctly emphasises the importance of corporate 
governance in society in the prologue stated above and that sheds light on the 
nature and the purpose of this study. This study is intended to identify the laws 
and practices of corporate governance in state owned enterprises (SOEs), 
document and identify factors that contribute to its problems, and suggest 
measures and guidelines for a good corporate governance framework. In doing so 
the study is not intended to be a blue-print for a lasting solution to corporate 
governance woes, but it is intended to address problems identified through case 
studies and also be a guide to solving future problems. Over the last 20 years, 
corporate governance has gained prominence and its discourse has become 
prevalent in both private and public sectors around the world due to globalisation 
and the collapse of large corporations.
2
 This study generally focuses on corporate 
governance with particular emphasis on governance in SOEs in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG). It discusses the nature and definition of corporate governance, 
corporate governance in private and public sector corporations and corporate 
governance in SOEs in PNG.  
 
In this chapter, SOE is defined to provide clarity to the nature and the type of 
organizations that are the subject of this study. This is followed by the discussion 
on the rationale for the research, objective of the research and the research 
questions. Then, the significance of the study is highlighted, what it means for 
PNG society and particularly SOEs in the country. Next, the overview of the 
                                                          
1
  Farrar, J. H., Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles and Practice, (3
rd
 edn., 2008)  
xxxix. 
2
  Erik Banks gave examples of corporations that have collapsed due to corporate governance 
problems around the world. That does not include corporate collapse after 2004 and cases in 
Australia such as HIH. See Banks, E., Corporate Governance, Financial Responsibility, 
Controls and Ethics, (2004) 4 – 8. 
3 
 
thesis is discussed setting out various chapters and reasons for their inclusion, 
followed by the conclusion. 
 
1.2 THE NATURE OF STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE 
 
This section discusses the definition and categories of SOEs and the types of 
SOEs whose corporate governance is the subject of this research. SOEs are also 
known by other names. In Queensland, they are known as government owned 
corporations and New South Wales, state owned corporations. Throughout this 
study the name SOE is used, however other names are used where appropriate. 
There are also different corporate forms of SOE. The type of corporate form 
adopted can influence their flexibility, degree of commercialisation and impact on 
the overall performance of SOE.  
 
The definition of SOE varies. Aharoni identified three characteristics of SOEs.
3
 
First, an SOE is an enterprise and involved in production of goods and services 
for sale. Second, an SOE is part of the public sector and owned by government 
and thirdly an SOE has sales revenue that bears relation to costs. These 
characteristics apply to commercial SOEs where the government has 100 per cent 
shareholding and not a controlling interest of 51 per cent or above.  
 
Bottomley stated that SOEs are those entities incorporated under general company 
legislation with substantial government control. He excludes statutory 
corporations, which are the subject of specific statutes and have potential for 
government and parliamentary input and scrutiny.
4
 This implies that statutory 
corporations have similar status as government departments despite their character 
of separate legal personality.  
 
SOEs can also be classified according to their legal structure. The three main 
corporate types are departmental enterprises, statutory corporations and state 
companies.
5
 First, departmental enterprises are part of the government department 
and the minister has direct responsibility in its affairs. Its business affairs are run 
                                                          
3
  Aharoni, Y., The Evolution and Management of State Owned Enterprises, (1986) 6.  
4
  Bottomley, S., “Regulating Government-Owned Corporations: A Review of the Issues,” 
(December 1994) 53(4), Australian Journal of Public Administration, 521 at 521. 
5
  See discussions above n 3 at 13 – 16. 
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like a normal government department and managed by public servants. The 
management in this organization usually lacks flexibility and creativity and 
therefore cannot achieve reasonable economic success.
6
  
 
Second, statutory corporations or public corporations are set up by a special Act 
of parliament and they are one hundred per cent state owned. Enabling legislation 
gives these organizations separate legal personality. This means that they can sue 
and be sued, own and dispose of property, and enter into contractual relationships 
under their corporate names. Since they are a hundred per cent owned by the state, 
the state has the onus of providing capital and covers any losses.  Statutory 
corporations are subject to public control and accountability even though some 
employees of the organization may not be civil servants. The accountability takes 
the form of annual reports submitted to the relevant minister, to be presented 
before the parliament and subject to public law.
7
 
 
And third, state companies are incorporated under company legislation and the 
state owns the majority shareholding. These organizations are subject to company 
legislation, constitution of the company, memorandum of association and other 
related laws. This means that managers are accountable to the board of directors, 
which is the proxy of the shareholders, and the board in turn is subject to the 
general meeting where their performance is measured on the basis of efficiency 
and profitability. State companies face the threat of winding up on application by 
creditors.
8
 
 
The issue of whether an entity is an SOE is avoided when legislation specifically 
defines it. The PNG Electricity Commission (Privatization) Act 2002 defines SOE 
as a company incorporated under the Companies Act 1997 and has shares issued 
to ministers in trust for the state, a statutory body established by state, or a trust 
where the State or the Minister as trustee for the State owns all the beneficial 
interest in the assets of the trust.
9
 Similarly, Queensland‟s Government Owned 
Corporations Act 1993 defines a government owned corporation as a statutory 
                                                          
6
  Hanson, A. H., Public Enterprise and Economic Development, (2
nd
 edn., 1965) 337 – 342. 
7
  Ibid at 342–351. 
8
  Ibid at 351–356. 
9
  Electricity Commission (Privatisation) Act 2002, s 2 (PNG). 
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corporation or state company.
10
 In contrast section 617 of the Indian Company Act 
of 1976 defines SOE as an entity “in which no less than 51 per cent of paid-up 
share capital is held by the Central Government and partly by one or more State 
governments”. The definition excludes statutory corporations and the government 
does not necessarily have to have 100 per cent shareholding. 
 
The definition of SOE varies with different jurisdictions depending on the 
legislative provisions and the extent to which government participates in it. The 
common view is that an entity will be an SOE if the government has a controlling 
interest and direct influence on the entity. For purposes of this study SOEs are 
entities established by statutes or incorporated under company legislation, with 
separate legal personality with government having substantial control. Therefore, 
the categories of SOE that are the focus of this study are statutory corporations 
and state companies. 
 
1.3 RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH  
 
The PNG Government controls a large part of the country‟s economy, and SOEs 
are utilized as its agents to perform an important role of production and delivery 
of goods and services to the people. Many of the SOEs in PNG were the legacy of 
the colonial administration, and were inherited by the Government immediately 
after Independence. Government provided services with the use of SOEs either 
because the services were important for the people of PNG, there was no capitalist 
class of indigenous Papua New Guineans to obtain ownership of the corporations 
immediately after Independence, or the Government felt that it could not leave 
certain activities in private hands for the reason that the pursuit of profit 
maximization would leave many rural populations lacking vital services.  
 
PNG has experienced the situation where services are withdrawn in rural areas 
when they are left in private hands. In 2000, the Government tested privatisation 
policy on the PNG Banking Corporation. The Bank of South Pacific (BSP) bought 
PNG Banking Corporation.
11
 Consequently, many branches in rural townships 
such as Angoram, Maprik and Tari in PNG closed, and people either had to travel 
                                                          
10
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 7(2)(3) (Qld). 
11
  This was the first time in the short history of the country that a major state institution was 
privatised. 
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by air or long distance by road to the main towns to do banking. In areas where 
BSP was conducting business, many who were once customers of PNG Banking 
Corporation lost their accounts with the bank. Some of the reasons given by BSP 
were that these people could not sign signatures, maintain a minimum amount in 
their account or present some form of identification. My brothers in Angoram 
travel two hours by road to do banking in Wewak (the capital town of East Sepik 
Province). My mother was denied an account with BSP because she does not have 
an identification card.
12
 Private companies cannot operate in rural areas because 
of fear of making a loss. Given the prevailing economic and social circumstances, 
SOEs are vital in PNG.  
 
To date, Government continues to use SOEs. During the last thirty-five years 
since independence many government activities were corporatised.  Despite 
corporatisation, SOEs are still affected by political interference. Successive 
governments seem to have the view that because the boards are appointed by them 
it gives them the right to direct or exert political influence on them. The following 
cases are cited as just some of the examples to identify corporate governance 
issues. 
 
First, during my field trip to PNG from April to September 2008, the chief 
executive officer (CEO) of the National Housing Corporation was suspended from 
the position. When the CEO was on suspension all his loyal associates at the main 
office at Tokara, Port Moresby were sacked. The suspended CEO went to the 
National Court questioning the legality of his suspension. Second, in 2007, the 
son of the current Prime Minister was appointed to the board of directors of PNG 
Power Ltd. There was public outrage over the appointment, in which the 
Government was accused of nepotism. Third, in January 2008, the term of 
members of the board of the National Broadcasting Corporation expired and there 
was no appointment of new members for nearly a year. When I was in PNG for 
data collection I was only dealing with former directors, and even when I left 
towards the end of September 2008 new directors had not been appointed. Finally, 
people express, nearly every day, complaints and frustrations on the street and in 
                                                          
12
  The bank was particular about identification cards. It must be a driver‟s license, passport or 
identification from a recognised organisation. My mother does not drive, does not have a 
passport and she is not formally employed. 
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the national newspapers of SOEs providing low quality and inefficient services. 
These are only some of the examples. 
 
Many of these issues are corporate governance issues; however they are never 
seen from that perspective. Jonathan O‟Ata, the Secretary of the PNG Institute of 
Directors (a newly established body) noted that:  
 
There are…corporate governance issues of banks, family owned firms and state owned 
firms which are not well understood, nor are the nature and detriments of enforcement.
13
  
 
This summarises the state of affairs of corporate governance in SOEs in PNG. 
Hence, this is the first study of its kind on corporate governance in PNG. This 
study is important, as it will initiate and contribute to the understanding, 
discussion, and greater awareness of corporate governance discourse in PNG. 
 
1.4 OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The main objective of this study is to look into, and document, the law and 
practice on corporate governance in SOEs in PNG. Therefore, the main question 
is: what is the position of corporate governance in law and practice? In tune with 
the objective and the main question, the following specific questions are posed for 
further examination: a) how are shareholders held accountable in SOEs? b) how 
are directors and CEOs held accountable in SOEs? c) is lack of good corporate 
governance a factor contributing to ineffective delivery of goods and services to 
the people? In addressing these questions the study looks at the internal and 
external accountability mechanisms, particularly the hierarchical structure in 
SOEs, the role of public institutions, and roles and responsibilities of stakeholders 
in governance of SOEs. In addition, it examines the objectives that SOEs pursue 
and whether the public are satisfied with the efficiency and quality of the services.  
 
1.5 IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Corporate governance is a new concept in private and public sectors in PNG. 
Since PNG‟s Independence in 1975, public enterprises have played a pivotal role 
                                                          
13
  O‟ata, J., Fostering Corporate Governance through a Strategic and Constructive Partnership 
for 2008 and Beyond, [page 2] < 
http://www.pngid.org.pg/downloads/Fostering_Corporate_Governance_through_Startegic_&
_Constructive_Partnership.pdf > at 19 February 2009. 
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in the development of the country and yet corporate governance is never discussed 
in public enterprises, even though they are corporations with boards, directors and 
management, and have many features similar to that of private sector corporations 
and its concomitant problems. This research is the first major piece of work that 
contributes to an understanding of corporate governance practice and law 
generally, and particularly on corporate governance in SOEs in PNG.  The study 
re-examines the theory of agency under the doctrine of separation of ownership 
and control, and traces its relevance and application in private and public sectors 
generally and particularly in SOEs in PNG. 
 
The research is important in several respects. First, it contributes to the empirical 
evidence on corporate governance in SOEs in PNG with respect to governance 
and accountability of relevant ministers, boards, directors and CEOs. Second, the 
study attempts to identify the laws on corporate governance in SOEs in PNG, and 
compare and contrast them against the practice to identify inconsistencies, 
deficiencies and lack of enforcement. Concurrently, an awareness can be 
established on some of these issues that may have caused problems in corporate 
governance, so that government and all stakeholders in the governance of SOEs 
can take appropriate actions to address them through various guidelines, rules, 
policies and legislations. 
 
Third, the study can be used as a guide for policy and law makers such as the 
directors of SOEs, the Independent Public Business Corporation of PNG, relevant 
Ministers, Government and the Parliament, to make informed decisions about how 
to improve corporate governance in SOEs. The study would enable corporate 
governance to be considered and prioritized to ensure that SOEs become efficient 
and effective in order to realize their objectives. As a step forward some of the 
solutions are proposed in chapter 15 to address the issues of corporate governance 
identified in the study.  
 
Finally, this study can also assist relevant Ministers, directors and CEOs and 
public institutions responsible for accountability such as the Public Accounts 
Committee, the Ombudsman Commission and the Department of Treasury to 
distinguish and change, where necessary, characteristics and practice of 
governance to ensure good corporate governance practice in SOEs.  
9 
 
 
1.6 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
 
The thesis is divided into six parts. Part I focuses on stakeholder theory and theory 
of agency, particularly the doctrine of separation of ownership and control, and 
the nature of the corporation and corporate governance. The whole study is about 
corporate governance, and corporate governance is at the heart of the doctrine of 
separation of ownership and control. Chapter 2 focuses on the stakeholder theory 
and agency theory and the doctrine of separation of ownership by discussing the 
reasons that gives rise to the separation of ownership and control. Particularly, it 
focuses on defining the concept of control as it would determine who controls 
corporations in the private sector discussed in Part II, the public sector in Part III 
and SOEs in PNG in Part V. Chapter 3 discusses the nature of the corporation and 
corporate governance. It focuses on the brief history of company law from the 
common law perspective, followed by the definition of corporation and different 
theories that explain the rationale of corporations. Chapter 3 ends with a 
discussion of the definition and principles of corporate governance. Corporate 
governance is about governance in a corporation, making discussion of the history 
of the corporation and the definition and various theories explaining the concept 
of the corporation essential to provide a foundation in further understanding the 
concept of corporate governance, hence they are discussed together in chapter 3. 
 
There would be deficiency in the whole thesis if governance in private sector 
corporations is not discussed before looking at corporate governance in SOEs. 
This is because much of the discussion on corporate governance in SOEs is about 
SOEs emulating characteristics of efficiency and accountability similar to that of 
the private sector. Therefore, it is useful in any discussion of corporate 
governance in SOEs to begin with an examination of governance in private 
corporations to understand the characteristics and intricacy of corporate 
governance and its adoption in the public sector. Chapter 4 in Part II discusses 
corporate governance in private sector corporations, focusing on New Zealand 
(NZ) and Australia, including other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom 
(UK), Germany and Japan for comparative purposes. Information in chapter 4 is 
compared and contrasted in Parts III and VI. 
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Part III discusses the concept of the state and corporate governance in the public 
sector. Any discussion of SOEs involves the state, therefore chapter 5 focuses on 
the concept and personality of the state, particularly the role that the state 
performs in the society and its use of SOEs. Many government activities are 
separated from government departments, and they are now managed separately 
either under SOEs that are created by special Act of parliament or incorporated 
under company legislation, however the government still maintains ownership in 
them. Corporatisation is the process that creates the separation of these activities. 
Chapter 6 discusses the definition and rationale for corporatisation and 
experiences of corporatisation in NZ. Discussion of corporatisation is important as 
all SOEs are corporatised entities, and it is important to highlight the definition 
and the fundamental reasons that underlie the undertaking of the corporatisation 
process. Chapter 7 ensues with a discussion on corporate governance in the public 
sector. It discusses corporate governance in SOEs in NZ, Queensland and New 
South Wales (NSW), looking at various laws that provide for corporate 
governance. Further, the chapter raises some of the issues, and compares 
corporate governance in the public sector with the private sector as discussed in 
Parts I and II. Importantly, chapter 7 further provides the basis for comparing and 
contrasting corporate governance in public enterprises in NZ, Queensland and 
NSW with corporate governance in SOEs in PNG, in Part VI. 
 
The study of corporate governance in SOEs hinges on understanding the political 
structure and socio–economic circumstances of a country. In order to understand 
corporate governance in SOEs, an understanding of the role of the state and the 
socio-economic circumstances of a country are crucial. The state is the majority 
shareholder in SOEs and its focus is not on profit maximisation alone but also on 
public welfare. Chapter 8 discusses the State of PNG and its political 
circumstances, followed by chapter 9, which discusses major dilemmas of 
development and the role of the State in advancing socio-economic goals of the 
country. Chapter 10 discusses different types of corporations, SOEs and corporate 
governance in PNG. It highlights the history of corporations in PNG, the status of 
corporate governance and the rationale for state use of SOEs. 
 
To improve corporate governance, it is important that the practice on the ground 
must be identified and compared with the regulatory framework to establish its 
11 
 
position in order for propositions to be made for improvement. Part V presents the 
case studies. It discusses the methodology of data collection and analysis, and the 
empirical data collected on selected SOEs on a field trip - undertaken between 
April and September 2008 in PNG. The selection of SOEs for the case studies was 
made to cover various government activities ranging from housing, broadcasting, 
telecommunication, and water supply, to production of and supply of electricity. 
Of the five SOEs studied, two are statutory corporations whilst others are state 
companies that are incorporated under PNG Companies Act 1997 or its 
predecessor. These SOEs have different corporate forms depending on whether 
they are incorporated under the Companies Act or established by a special Act of 
parliament. These different types of SOEs are studied to identify generally the 
corporate governance framework and particularly the extent of the role of the 
Government. Chapter 11 presents the methodology of data collection; chapter 12 
presents the case studies in statutory corporations, while chapter 13 presents the 
case studies in state companies. 
 
For my research in PNG I was ably assisted by senior managers, directors and 
CEOs, both current and past, who generously gave time for interviews and 
provided written responses to interview questions. I had the assistance of three 
law students from the University of PNG. In addition, I was allowed to have 
access to some of the documents of SOEs such as annual reports, corporate plans, 
annual returns and company constitutions. A set-back was the lack of any 
literature on corporate governance in SOE in PNG and hence I could not compare 
primary data with the secondary data. However, the difficulty is outweighed by 
my curiosity in researching an area that has not been studied before. Also, it is 
interesting to be working on the thesis at the time when the PNG Government‟s 
focus in its “Medium Term Development Strategy” is on reforming the state‟s 
structure to focus on delivery of services to the rural populace. Ten million kina 
(an increase from 1.5 million kina) is allocated to each district through members 
of the electorate to provide services to the people. Members of the parliament are 
encouraged to use state agencies and institutions to deliver services to the people. 
SOEs are and will become vital in the delivery of goods and services to the 
people. 
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Finally, Part VI summarises the discussions in the thesis and recommends a way 
forward for corporate governance in SOEs in PNG. Chapter 14 of Part VI 
establishes the position of corporate governance looking at practice in Part V and 
the laws, and compares and contrasts the corporate governance in PNG with NZ, 
Queensland and NSW to identify the deficiencies in PNG. Chapter 15 looks at 
how corporate governance in SOEs can be improved in PNG by looking at 
external and internal accountability mechanisms, followed by the conclusion in 
chapter 16.  
 
1.7 CONCLUSION 
 
I have defined SOEs and pointed out the types of SOEs that are the subject of this 
thesis, and outlined the research questions, and discussed the rationale, the 
importance and the aim of the research. Then I have outlined various chapters and 
their relevance and contribution to an understanding of the research aim and 
questions. SOEs are important for PNG given its political and socio-economic 
circumstances, and the fact that it is a developing country going through a 
transitional stage. If SOEs are to be successful in terms of being efficient and 
achieving their objectives, then corporate governance framework must be 
examined and if need be, improved. Hence, this study is carried out with the aim 
of documenting, analysing and identifying problems in corporate governance in 
SOEs, and makes recommendations for improvement. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
 
THEORY OF AGENCY – SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP 
AND CONTROL 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this thesis as introduced in chapter 1 is generally to discuss agency 
theory and examine its relevance and application in state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in Papua New Guinea (PNG). The theory of agency, like the theory of the 
firm, attempts to explain diverse organizational and governance structures 
observable in a private sector corporation. It further argues that the relationship 
between management and the shareholder is contractual and that the management 
must serve the interests of the shareholder. The focus of this theory is on the 
management and the shareholders – the management is the agent and the 
shareholders are the principals, creating a fiduciary relationship between the 
principal and the agent. Generally, the focus of company legislation is geared 
towards maintaining fiduciary relationships through aligning the interest of 
management and shareholders. This is true for the Companies Act 1993 (New 
Zealand), Corporations Act 2001 (Australia) and Companies Act 1997 (PNG). 
 
This chapter provides a theoretical foundation for discussion of corporate 
governance in chapter 3 and other chapters in this study. It begins by looking at 
the theory of agency and the theme of separation of ownership and control, which 
includes discussion of the concept of control and agency costs, followed by 
discussion of recent studies that dispute the concept of separation of ownership 
and control as having any universal applicability. Then the concept of agency cost 
is discussed followed by the conclusion. 
 
2.2 AGENCY THEORY 
 
In agency theory, the principal is a person who delegates, through contract, to 
another person, the agent, to perform a service on behalf of the principal. The 
agent binds the principal on any contract undertaken within the scope of any 
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express, implied or apparent authority of the principal.
1
 There are three 
assumptions that are at the core of agency theory.
2
 They are that: a) all 
individuals, as human beings are self-interested and given the opportunity they 
will maximize their interests, b) human social life consists of exchanges, deals and 
agreements that are governed by the competitive self-interest of individuals, and 
c) “monitoring contracts is costly and somewhat ineffective, especially in 
organizations, thus encouraging self-interested behaviour, shirking, and 
cheating.”3 The theory of agency is applied in a corporation to explain the 
relationship between the management and the shareholders. The result from the 
discourse is the doctrine of separation of ownership and control. 
 
Agency theory applies in a corporation, but with some modification. The 
shareholders as owners in a corporation are the principals but they delegate the 
control of the company to the board. This delegation, which creates a separation 
of ownership and control, also creates agency problems. Where there is separation 
of ownership and control an attempt is made to ensure that the principal is 
faithfully served and the agent is properly compensated in order to align his or her 
interests, especially in situations where the agent‟s interests do not coincide with 
those of the principal.
4
 Hence, the theme of separation of ownership and control is 
parallel to the question of how directors can be made accountable to the 
shareholders. Corporate governance focuses on these issues. 
 
2.3 SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
 
The fundamental debate on corporate governance in the private sector is the 
relationship between management and the shareholders, (the owners
5
) of the 
company. The issue that surrounds the relationship is the separation of ownership 
                                                          
1
  Farrar, J. H., Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles and Practice, (3
rd
 edn., 2008) 59; 
Jensen, M. C. and  Meckling, W. H., “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structure,” (October 1976) 3(4), Journal of Financial Economics, 305 
at 309; Fama, E.F., “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm,” (1980) 88, Journal of 
Political Economy, 288; Fama, E.F. and Jensen, M., “Separation of Ownership and Control,” 
(1983) 26(2), Journal of Law and Economics, 301. 
2
  See Perrow, C., “Economic Theories of Organization,” in Wheeler, S., (ed.) A Reader on the 
Law of the Business Enterprise, (1994) 208 at 209. 
3
  Ibid. 
4
  Jensen and Meckling, above n 1. 
5
  In strict legal terms shareholders are not owners of the company, but having ownership right 
in the shares. See Grantham, R., “The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of the Company 
Shareholders,” (November 1998) 57, Cambridge Law Journal, 554. 
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and control of the company. Prior to 1932, there was a general assumption that 
directors were sufficiently accountable to shareholders. Accountability is ensured 
through appointment by shareholders at the general meetings and number of 
duties imposed on directors by various laws. In their seminal work on 
corporations in 1932, Berle and Means
6
 highlighted, in their analysis that 
shareholders are owners of the company but the control of the company lies with 
the board and senior managers. Shareholders put finance into the company as 
investment and consequently obtain certain rights and powers, but they surrender 
their right of control of the corporation to qualified managers to act on their 
behalf.
7
 As corporations grow large, more shares are sold, leaving large 
corporations with dispersed ownership of shares. 
 
The dispersed ownership of shares is created by the need for capital. The 
increased trading activities and large size of the company is met by capital from a 
large, fractured and dispersed group of shareholders. Shares are not owned by a 
person in large numbers, such as a person owning one hundred per cent in a 
company, but in small portions by individual persons across the society. This 
inevitably leads to the control of the company passing from the shareholders to 
the managers. This separates ownership from control;
8
 the separation creates a gap 
in control, which is filled by directors and managers.
9
 As Thomas J noted “it is 
because of the separation of ownership from management in corporate theory and 
practice that directors are appointed to manage the company in the absence of the 
owners.”10 Directors then appoint a chief executive officer to administer the day-
to-day business and affairs of the company.
11
 The management exercises the 
                                                          
6
  Berle, A. A. and Means, G. C., The Modern Corporation and Private Property, (1932); 
compare Edward, E. S., Corporate Control, Corporate Power, (1981) ch 3, and Zeitlin, M., 
“Corporate Ownership and Control: the Larger Corporation and the Capitalist Class,” (1973 – 
74) 79, American Journal of Sociology, 1073. 
7
  This may be different in a small to medium size company where shareholders can also 
become directors, strategising and managing the affairs of the company. 
8
  Separation between ownership and control maybe true for developed countries like UK and 
USA but may not be true for some developing countries like Indonesia and Malaysia where 
there is concentration of shareholdings. See Daniel, W.E., “Corporate Governance in 
Indonesian Listed Companies: a Problem of Legal Transplant,” (July 2003) 15(1), Bond Law 
Review, 318 at 327; Singam, K., “Corporate Governance in Malaysia,” (July 2003) 15(1), 
Bond Law Review, 288 at 292 – 293. 
9
  Salim, M. R., “Legal Transplantation and Local Knowledge: Corporate Governance in 
Malaysia,” (December 2006) 20(1), Australian Journal of Corporate Law, 55 at 61. 
10
  Dairy Containers Ltd v NZI Bank Ltd (1995) 7 NZCLC 260 783 at 260 794. 
11
  Dine, J., Company Law, (5
th
 edn., 2005) 153. 
16 
 
delegated power and is therefore subject to the board‟s scrutiny.12 The board 
becomes the proxy of the shareholders who control the company.  
 
Corporations characterized by separation of ownership and control strictly focus 
on the economic interest of shareholders or on maximizing interest of the 
shareholders. Thus, in a traditional company the sole objective of management is 
to increase the value of the company, which in turn increases the value of the 
shares and therefore a healthy dividends payment. The primary goal of 
shareholders is profitability and accordingly as agents, management is required to 
pursue profit maximization. Consequently, laws are developed which strictly 
focus on shareholder primacy.
13
 The interest of broader constituents, sometimes 
referred to as stakeholders, becomes secondary. 
 
2.3.1 Control of the Corporation 
 
Understanding of corporate control is vital in parallel to an understanding of 
ownership in a corporation. Control is a vague concept and is synonymous to 
power. Like power, vagueness lies in the probability that one can execute one‟s 
will regardless of resistance or probability, that by virtue of habituation, one‟s 
command will be obeyed by other persons.
14
 Control is broadly defined as “the 
power to influence [OR] direct peoples‟ behaviour or cause of events”.15  Section 
50AA (1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Australia) defines control as the capacity 
to determine the outcome of decisions about financial and operational policies. In 
a narrow and explicit term the American Law Institute‟s “Principles of Corporate 
Governance” defines control as: 
 
The power, directly or indirectly, either alone or pursuant to an arrangement or 
understanding with one or more other persons to exercise a controlling influence over the 
management or policies of a business organization through the ownership of, or power to, 
vote equity interests through one or more intermediary persons, by contract, or 
otherwise.
16
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  Dairy Containers Ltd v NZI Bank Ltd (1995) 7 NZCLC 260 783 at 260 794. 
13
  See general discussion in Roe, M.J., “The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and 
Industrial Organization,” (2001) 149, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2063. 
14
  Weber, M. and Parsons, T., The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (1947) 152. 
15
  Oxford Dictionary of English, (2
nd
 edn., 2005) 377. 
16
  American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and 
Recommendations, (vol. 1, 1994) 13, para. 1.08. 
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This definition applies in small to medium sized companies and proprietary 
companies and not in large listed companies where there is fractured and 
dispersed ownership of shares in which effective control is by a board of directors. 
James McConvill stated that “…the assumption that shareholders had ultimate 
control over directors due to the power to elect which directors they wanted was a 
myth, as the board had effective control over proxies and the agenda of general 
meetings and therefore had the „real‟ say as to who were to be elected as 
directors”.17 Berle and Means argued that those who own large corporations do 
not control them and those who control them have less interest in their ownership. 
They further highlighted the attributes of control as follows: 
 
Since direction over the activities of a corporation is exercised through the board of 
directors, we may say for practical purposes that control lies in the hands of the individual 
or group who have the actual power to select the board of directors, (or its majority), 
either by mobilising the legal right to choose them – „controlling‟ a majority of the votes 
directly or through some legal device – or by exerting pressure which influences their 
choice. Occasionally a measure of control is exercised not through the selection of 
directors, but through dictation to the management, as when a bank determines the policy 
of a corporation seriously indebted to it.
18
  
 
Therefore, control in a corporation refers to persons who have the power to 
appoint a board or management, or direct management. In a private corporation 
ownership does not necessarily determine control. Thus, control can be through 
selection of directors to the board or influence exerted on the management‟s 
decisions. These roles are exercised primarily by two entities – shareholders and 
directors. Shareholders select directors to the board and the board exercises 
control through the appointment of management. Control can also be through 
legal device, such as legislation which delegates power to control to certain 
stakeholders in a company. Further, Berle and Means identified five forms of 
control pertaining to a private corporation.
19
 McDonough
20
 summarises their 
discussion of control as follows:  
 
a. Private Ownership – this gives rise to control through complete ownership of the 
corporate form; 
b. Majority control – control that arises as a result of ownership of majority of shares; 
                                                          
17
  McConvill, J., Shareholder Participation and the Corporation: a Fresh Inter-Disciplinary 
Approach in Happiness, (2006) 75. 
18
  Berle and Means, above n 6 at 69–70. 
19
  Ibid at 70–90. 
20
  McDonough, D. D., “Corporate Governance and Government Owned Corporations in 
Queensland,” (1998) 10(1), Bond Law Review, 278 at 292. McDonough was quoting from the 
revised edition of Berle, A. A. and Means, G. C., The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, (revised edn., 1968) 66.  
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c. Control through a legal device – the person who exercises the control does not own a 
majority of the issued shares but is nonetheless able to control the entity through for 
example the use of non – voting shares, super shares (as proposed in a relatively 
recent case of News Corporation Limited), or shares with weighted voting rights etc; 
d. Minority control – this is where the particular group only holds a small number of 
shares, however able to control the corporation. This can particularly be the case with 
public companies that have a large but scattered shareholder base such that the holder 
of perhaps as low a figure as 10% is able to exercise control. 
e. Management control – this occurs where the share is widespread and there is no 
single group that has minority control. Often this can be the case in public 
companies, the majority of shares in which are held by institutions. Management is 
left to control by default. 
 
In Farrar’s Company Law21 the distinction was expressed in percentage terms of 
voting rights. This shows clearly how much control is exercised in a corporation. 
In percentage terms control is: 
 
a. Absolute                                   99 – 100% 
b. Substantial                                75 – 99%  
c. Simple majority                         51% 
d. Negative                                   26%  
e. Minority                                    up to 25% 
 
A person with absolute and substantial control can pass any resolution, including 
both an ordinary and a special resolution at the general meetings. An ordinary 
resolution can be passed where there is simple majority control. A special 
resolution, in situation where the company legislation requires it, may only be 
passed with the support of other shareholders. Management control usually occurs 
in circumstances where there is no relationship between the shareholders and the 
management, and the control of the corporation is vested in the management. 
Minority control occurs in exceptional circumstances in corporations that have 
dispersed ownership where an individual or a small group having interest between 
20 to 50 per cent, which is sufficient to control a company.
22
 The control of a 
corporation may not necessary fall into the above category and can be determined 
by different circumstances in a particular society. 
 
2.3.2 Universal Application of the Doctrine of “Separation of Ownership and 
Control”  
 
The doctrine of separation of ownership and control is not a common 
phenomenon experienced in corporations around the world. In some jurisdictions 
persons that have ownership of a corporation also have control of it. The 
                                                          
21
  Farrar, J. H. and Hannigan, B., Farrar's Company Law, (4
th
 edn., 1998) 564. 
22
  See Farrar, above n 1 at 46 – 49. 
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separation of ownership and control depends on the type of corporation, how large 
or small the corporation is and the jurisdiction that the corporation is in. For 
example, it is observed in the United States and other similar economies that 
separation of ownership and control has ceased to exist.
23
 Although the term 
“cease” may not describe the reality, what is clear is that separation of ownership 
and control is not universal. In a paper Corporate Ownership around the World
24
 
the three Harvard economists argued that separation of ownership and control 
observed by Berle and Means is far from universal. The following features, 
amongst others, of ownership are observed in other parts of the world:
25
 
 
a. The widely held corporation is most common in countries with good regimes of 
shareholder protection.
26
 
b. Corporations with controlling shareholders rarely have other larger shareholders. 
c. Many of the largest firms are controlled by families. 
d. Family control is more common in countries with poor shareholder protection. 
e. In family-controlled firms there is little separation between ownership and control. 
f. State control is common, particularly in countries with poor shareholder protection. 
 
In a developing economy one finds concentration of ownership; control is usually 
by majority shareholders.
27
 The reasons for control by majority shareholders can 
be identified with safeguarding of property rights, quality of the law that exists in 
that jurisdiction and the efficiency of legal institutions.
28
 Cultural factors also 
determine control of a corporation. For example, shareholders may surrender their 
right of control only to family members or relatives whom they trust and rely on 
to diligently perform their duties in a company.
29
 Many jurisdictions like Australia  
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  Observation was made dated back to 1976. See Eisenberg, M.A., The Structure of the 
Corporation: A Legal Analysis, (1976) 64; Stapledon, G.P., “Share Ownership and Control in 
Listed Companies,” (1999) 2, Corporate Governance International, 17. 
24
  La Porta, R., Lopex-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., “Corporate Ownership around the 
World,” (1999) 54, Journal of Finance, 471. 
25
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26
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27
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29
  Singam, above n 8 at 296 – 297; In China, culture has very much influenced the way 
companies are managed. They do not see the concept of a separate legal personality and man 
being separate from a corporation but connected and imbued with overtones of reciprocal 
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and New Zealand have a mixture of control types.
30
 
 
In recent years there has been a large increase in institutional shareholdings.
31
 The 
trend is toward a shift from fractured and dispersed ownership to concentrated 
ownership in shares.
32
 The institutional shareholders now own a large stake in 
companies, forming concentrated ownership hence separation of ownership may 
appear to be no longer problematic. The number of institutional shareholders 
within a corporation is able to apply collective monitoring to ensure directors 
comply with their duties and achieve the objectives of the company, thereby 
reducing managerial agency problems.
33
 However, many corporations around the 
world still have the phenomena of separation of ownership and control; even in 
institutional investment companies there is separation of ownership and control 
and passive shareholders. The point is that institutional investment does not 
completely end separation of ownership and control phenomena. 
 
In public enterprises, a government controls through either majority ownership or 
through legal devices. The shareholders in public enterprises are the public. It is a 
strange situation that the people who have provided equitable interests through 
their taxes and for whose benefit the enterprise is established cannot have 
influence over the board. But insofar as democratic principles are concerned, the 
government holds shares as representatives on behalf of the people. Hence, 
shareholding ministers are primary shareholders by virtue of their office and they 
exercise control over public enterprises. The public does not exercise any form of 
direct control but indirectly through voting for representatives in general 
elections. To have a controlling interest in public enterprise can mean that a 
government:  
 
a. controls the composition of the board of directors;  
                                                          
30
  See for example Shapira, G., “Corporate Control of New Zealand Listed Companies,” (2006) 
24(6), Companies and Securities Law Journal, 393 at 393 – 394; the same result in the earlier 
study in Shapira, G., “Ownership and Foreign Control of NZSE,” (February 2003) 20(1), 
Company and Securities Law Journal, 56 at 57. See also Stapledon, above n 23. 
31
  Farrar, above n 1 at 361 – 362. 
32
  Coffee, J. C., “Liquidity Verses Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor,” 
(1991) 91, Columbia Law Review, 1277 at 1288. 
33
  Roe, M. J., Strong Managers, Weak Owners: the Political Roots of American Corporate 
Finance, (1994) 182. 
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b. casts or controls the casting of more than half of the votes that might be 
cast at a general meeting of the body; or  
c. controls more than half of the body‟s issued share capital.34  
 
If the three situations mentioned above are present in a SOE it would be 
concluded that the government has control over the SOE. In addition other factors, 
such as whether the government participates in formulating a corporate plan 
and/or intervenes in directing the board and management in the implementation of 
government policies, or pursues self-interested activities from time to time, would 
be considered along with the three situations to determine whether the 
government has control over SOEs thereby establishing a situation where there is 
little or no separation between ownership and control. In identifying whether the 
state controls SOEs, corporate governance practices and the legal framework of 
the particular jurisdiction have to be examined. This is the object and focus of this 
thesis, which will document corporate governance practices and identify the 
extent to which the government controls SOEs. 
 
Like SOEs, usually there is no separation of ownership and control in small to 
medium sized companies and proprietary companies.
35
 However, where there is 
distinct separation of ownership and control, this creates concerns about how to 
align the interests of the shareholders and the management. Consequently the 
attempt of aligning two interests incurs agency costs. 
 
2.4 AGENCY COSTS 
 
The separation of ownership and control inevitably raises questions of 
governance.
36
 The concern is that if management is given complete discretion to 
run the affairs of the company, it will not be accountable to shareholders.
37
 This 
                                                          
34
  Bottomley, S., “New Legislation for Commonwealth Government Owned Companies – Is it 
sufficient,” (August 1995) 13(5), Company and Securities Law Journal, 331 at 332. 
35
  Farrar, above n 1 at 53. 
36
  Hansmann, H. and Kraakman, R. H., “What is Corporate Law?” in Kraakman, R. H. (ed.), 
The Anatomy of Corporate Law: a Comparative and Functional Approach, (2004) ch 1. 
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creates a need to establish mechanisms to address the issue of governance; but this 
comes at a cost. The agency cost is the cost incurred to address the governance 
problem between the shareholders (principals) and the management (agent).
38
 In 
any situation where one party is entrusted with the power to act on behalf of 
another agency costs will always be incurred.
39
 The general assumption in agency 
cost theory is that owners and managers do not have the same interest. On one 
hand shareholders would like to see managers maximizing profit for the company, 
and on the other hand managers have their own objectives to pursue. Adam Smith 
explained that: 
 
The directors…of companies…being the managers of other peoples moneys and not their 
own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private co – partnery frequently watch over their 
own…Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a company.
40
  
 
The end result is that shareholders make a loss if the managers are pursuing their 
own agendas apart from maximizing profit for the company. This calls for certain 
measures to be in placed to align the interest of shareholders and managers, 
concurrently reducing agency costs. As Posner warned: 
 
Where there [is] no competition in product markets, no market for corporate control, no 
governance by directors and shareholders, and no law of fiduciary obligations, corporate 
managers would not be constrained to maximize corporate profits.
41
 
 
Hansmann and Kraakman
42
 gave a detailed discussion of the strategies to be 
adopted to combat agency problems. Three of the main strategies adopted to 
address agency costs are: monitoring through external markets; bonding devices; 
and monitoring management performance through corporate governance rules. 
 
2.4.1 External Markets 
 
The use of external markets for monitoring is a comparatively low–cost option 
among the three devices. The market performs a significant role in reducing  
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agency costs between the shareholders and the managers.
43
 It is through the 
external market that assessment is made on the performance of the management 
and if necessary shareholders can take action accordingly. The judgment 
presented by the market can enable shareholders to inquire further into the dismal 
performance of the company, or discipline the management where necessary. The 
three main markets that perform a useful function for shareholders are the product 
market, capital market and market for corporate control.
44
 
 
First, goods and services are sold in the product market in which companies 
compete with one another to sell their goods and services. The company that 
survives delivers to customers‟ demand “at the lowest price while covering 
costs”.45 The competition in the product market ensures that managers are focused 
on the objective of maximizing profits for the company.
46
 The success of the 
company will depend on the productive and allocative efficiency of the 
company.
47
 The demand for efficiency will ensure that management must not 
underperform. The product market provides useful and up to date information for 
shareholders to assess whether managers are controlling the company efficiently 
and at the same time pursuing its proper goals. 
 
Second, capital market refers to a share market where shares are bought and sold. 
If a company is inefficiently managed, or managed in such a manner that the 
objectives of the company are not pursued, the value of the company will decline 
and instantaneously the decline in value will be reflected in the share prices.
48
 The 
reduced share price would make it difficult for the company to raise capital. The 
reduced share price and the public reluctance to purchased shares reflect the 
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performance of the management and is sufficient evidence that shareholders can 
use to discipline the management. 
 
Thirdly, the market for corporate control is an avenue whereby a predator 
company, the acquirer, takes over a target company that is inefficiently managed 
and whose share prices “fall below the break up value of the company”.49 The 
acquirer takes over the company with the conviction that it can efficiently manage 
the company.
50
 The effectiveness of the takeover largely depends on the 
governments‟ involvement in the takeover, and the managers‟ defensive tactics to 
militate against the takeover in a market for corporate control.
51
 For example, the 
government may legislate to prohibit the takeover, or directors may issue to 
themselves additional shares to enlarge their voting numbers so as to outweigh 
votes for a takeover. The predator company takes over the control of the company 
by removing the old management, which is under-performing; hence a takeover 
will, in a way, put a blemish on the reputation of the managers and will affect 
their future engagement as directors and managers. The threat of removal is a 
greater incentive for the management to pursue the proper goals of the company 
and manage it efficiently. 
 
2.4.2 Bonding 
 
In bonding, shareholders enter into arrangements or deals with management as an 
incentive to maintain their loyalty. Generally, managers who control the company 
are not entitled to profits or to have other interests in the company,
52
 and may 
resort to slacking, shirking or theft.
53
 The bonding arrangements align the interest 
of the shareholders and the management. This can either be in the form of 
promotions, pay for performance, incentive-based remuneration packages or by 
allowing managers to own shares in the company.
54
 These options have their 
disadvantages. For example, stock options as a form of incentive contracting may 
create substantial opportunities for self–dealing by managers. Managers may use 
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information asymmetry between management and shareholders to maximize their 
own benefit.
55
 Studies have also shown that even though performance-based 
compensation is seen as an efficient way of solving conflict between shareholders 
and management, in reality its effects are limited.
56
  
 
These incentives act as motivation for managers to pursue the interests of the 
company. Bonding cost will be unnecessarily incurred if it cannot counterbalance 
“a reduction in residual cost, leading to a reduction in overall agency cost”.57 This 
is a matter that parties have to assess. 
 
2.4.3 Monitoring 
 
In monitoring, shareholders scrutinize the performance of management. 
Monitoring by shareholders is difficult in companies where there is disperse 
ownership of shares. Large blockholders or concentrated shareholders tend to 
reduce agency costs and have power to influence management.
58
 Large 
blockholders are relatively uncommon in countries like the US and the UK,
59
 
whereas they are dominant in large companies in Germany
60
 and Japan
61
. Some 
corporations around the world have controlling shareholders. This is a typical 
phenomenon in Eastern Europe, Africa, East Asia and Latin American countries.
62
  
Evidence has shown that the relationship between blockholders and firm value is 
both positive and negative or sometimes not significant.
63
There is no significant 
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relationship between the type of blockholder, (whether institutions, corporations 
or individuals) and firm value.
64
  
 
In addition, shareholders can use many different monitoring devices without a 
direct presence, even in companies with concentrated shareholding. The adoption 
of monitoring devices would depend on either the cost of establishment and 
coordination or a system that would ensure good corporate governance within 
respective organizations. The main device is the board of directors. The board 
looks after the interests of shareholders. Studies show a mixed reaction to 
relations between a board‟s composition and size, a firm‟s performance and the 
quality of decisions. Studies have shown that when a board increases in size, 
agency problem increases.
65
  
 
Other monitoring devices include the independent audit, the directors‟ annual 
report to the general meeting, the appointment of non-executive directors to the 
board and internal monitoring such as the internal audit.
66
 The former two, as 
discussed in chapter 4, are compulsory as they are required under company 
legislation. Non-executive directors are important as they bring independence and 
expertise to the board,
67
 nonetheless they are optional for some companies but 
compulsory for listed companies.
68
 Evidence has shown there is little relationship 
between firm performance and board composition, using a portion of outside 
directors as a measure.
69
 Directors also have fiduciary duties of good faith. Their 
breach can attract civil and criminal liabilities. These issues are further discussed 
in chapter 4. 
 
2.4.4 Agency Cost in a State Owned Enterprise 
 
Generally, SOEs are not exposed to external markets nor do they have bonding 
devices. They depend on monitoring mechanisms provided through legislation, 
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government and public institutions responsible for accountability that scrutinize 
the performance of the management. They are further discussed in chapter 7. 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The shareholders and the management are in a principal/agent relationship, as a 
result of the separation of ownership and control. Where there is separation of 
ownership and control in a corporation there will always be problems relating 
generally to governance, and particularly to aligning the interests of shareholders 
and management. Directors and managers who do not have a direct interest in 
corporations have an opportunity to pursue self-interest. The important struggle is 
how to align their interests. Apart from laws that monitor managers in performing 
their functions; aligning the interests of owners and managers through bonding or 
exposing them to external markets are some of the measures that try to align their 
interests. In doing so an agency cost is incurred. Usually the owners adopt devices 
that are costless. The whole exercise is an attempt to ensure that the board is 
accountable to the shareholders. Corporate governance, in a restricted sense, is 
trying to figure out how the board and management should be made accountable 
to the shareholders. The phenomenon of “separation of ownership and control” is 
not universal given different factors that exist in different jurisdictions. These 
factors may include cultural influences, protection of shareholders, legal 
protection, etc. In jurisdictions where there is a weak economic base or a 
developing economy there is poor shareholder protection. State control is 
common. Usually, there is little separation between ownership and control in state 
controlled enterprises. Many of the features in private sector corporations 
discussed in this chapter with regard to separation of ownership and control are 
absent in public sector corporations. These issues are further discussed in chapter 
7. 
 
This chapter establishes a theoretical foundation for discussions of corporate 
governance in chapter 3 and other chapters in this thesis. Corporate governance 
has become a fashionable concept in recent years and the issues surrounding it are 
prompted by the phenomena of separation of ownership and control. Hence, the 
discussion of agency theory and separation of ownership and control is essential 
28 
 
in this thesis to set the foundation for other discussions in relation to corporate 
governance. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
 
THE NATURE OF THE CORPORATION AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A company refers commonly to an association of individuals for a common or 
some common purpose
1
 and when used in an economic sense it refers to an 
association of people with a common commercial purpose.
2
 Corporations are an 
important medium through which businesses are conducted in different societies 
and it is an undeniable fact that corporations are important for the economic 
prosperity of a country.
3
 The type of corporate form to be used is determined by 
prevailing ideology, political and socio-economic circumstances of a particular 
society. With the collapse of corporations and corporate failure becoming a global 
phenomenon, corporate governance has become a topical issue.  
 
The basic aim in discussing corporate governance in this chapter is to identify its 
definitional ambit and further identify a system of governance that would ensure 
corporate efficiency. The discussion of corporate governance requires examining 
the history and nature of corporations, whose interest a corporation should serve, 
and how a corporation should be governed. This chapter focuses on these issues 
by looking at the nature of corporations in which the history of corporations and 
different theories explaining nature of a corporation is discussed, followed by the 
nature of corporate governance, in which the discussion is mainly based on the 
definition and principles of corporate governance. It has to be re-emphasized that 
this chapter is intended to discuss corporate governance. In order to understand 
corporate governance it is necessary to first understand the history of the 
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corporation and different theories explaining the concept of a corporation. They 
provide the basis in understanding corporate governance.  
 
3.2 THE NATURE OF THE CORPORATION  
 
The idea of the concept of a separate legal entity applying to an association of 
individuals has its genesis in the family unit dating back to Ancient Greece. 
Family units were used as a corporate form to trade with other families. 
Gradually, as occupations and means of production extended outside of the 
family, specialized responsibilities were vested in individual members of the 
family. The separate juristic entity moved from family unit to communities, towns 
and cities. Trade between towns and cities was organized at the municipal level. 
When specialized crafts developed within towns and cities, trade was then 
allocated to a craft guild. This was the commencement of the formal corporate 
entity.
4
 Trading, using the corporate form, spread through the Greek and Roman 
Empires. The most advanced degree of development reached by corporations in 
Rome was similar to the status of corporations in England in the early part of the 
15
th
 century.
5
 When the Roman Empire gradually collapsed, the notion of a 
corporation had already spread across Europe where the modern era of 
corporations began.
6
 Hence, it can be generally stated that the concept of a 
separate legal personality can be traced to Roman law. Corporations were not 
used as a common business vehicle in England until the 19
th
 century. The 
common heritage of the corporation from Roman law shared by English and 
continental laws is reflected in the fundamental resemblance of their corporate 
laws.
7
  
 
During the Middle Ages corporate status was granted through Royal Charters 
upon petition only to public bodies such as boroughs, guilds of merchants and 
religious associations upon petition. From 1688 onwards, an auxiliary form of 
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incorporation by Act of parliament was initiated.
8
 Like incorporation by charter, a 
group had to petition for incorporation by Act of Parliament. Incorporation was 
not of right as such: parliament applied discretion in conferring it.
9
 The increased 
use of corporate form in trading activities from the 16
th
 century and onwards 
increased, and this ostensibly led to demand for capital
10
 and increase in 
solicitation of funds from the public.
11
 This led to the creation of joint stock 
companies, which consisted of members who agreed to certain conditions, one of 
which was the freedom to transfer shares in the company. The structure and aims 
of the corporation then were dissimilar to modern corporations today.  
 
The term “company” is misleading. The joint stock company was really a large 
partnership arrangement.
12
 Those that were incorporated had perpetual existence, 
their acts were distinguished from members, their shares were easily transferable 
and they had a monopoly over trade. The members had unlimited personal 
liability where there was business failure.
13
   
 
During the industrial revolution there was an increase in business and trading 
activities, which created need for capital. Corporations began seeking capital from 
the public to assist with funding the expansion of trading activities; however 
unlimited personal liabilities of members in corporations discouraged members of 
the public from investing in them. Many unincorporated corporations were 
established. Government realized that there were inherent dangers in raising 
capital from the public using unincorporated companies. There was concern that 
new companies were created to capture the rise in stock prices without underlying 
investment prospects.
14
 The Bubble Act 1720 came into existence with an 
objective of preventing the use of unincorporated associations as a medium of 
trading by investors and traders, and to, at the same time, “circumscribe the use of 
joint stock companies as they had led to widespread speculative public trading in 
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the shares of those companies”.15 It brought to an end unincorporated associations 
and encouraged incorporation through Royal Charter and by special Act of 
parliament.
16
 The Act did not fulfil the intended purpose.
17
 The rise in commercial 
pressure required an alternative corporate form of trading. 
 
With lawyers‟ ingenuity and the assistance of the Court of Chancery a medium, a 
“deed of settlement” was developed based on the concept of trust and partnership. 
The deed enabled the funds of the subscribers to be controlled by trustees, and 
contained mutual agreements between investors, the committee of directors and 
trustees, and was used as a separate juristic entity that could carry out commercial 
activities. Even though its usage was contrary to the requirements of the Bubble 
Act it met the economic needs of the country, hence it was tacitly allowed to be 
continued. The Bubble Act was the law (nonetheless it remained dormant for 
much of the 105 years) until 1825 when it was repealed by the Bubble Repeal Act 
1825.
18
 
 
The Gladstone Report on joint stock companies in 1844 resulted in the enactment 
of the Joint Stock Companies Registration and Regulations Act 1844. This Act is 
the ancestor of modern company law, but it was deficient in some important 
respects as it was missing important characteristics of modern company laws like 
limited liability.
19
 The absence of limited liability can be understood from looking 
at business structure before the mid 19
th
 century. The sole trader and partnership 
were the common corporate forms being used. Members were personally 
responsible for any business failures. The unlimited liability of the business 
restricted the public, especially those having no entrepreneurial experience, skill 
and knowledge from investing in business because of the fear of losing their entire 
wealth. In order to attract investment, business structures had to be reconsidered 
and an alternative needed to provide for it. Public demand compelled parliament 
to enact the Limited Liability Act 1855, which essentially limited the liabilities of 
members.
20
 The provision of limited liability was incorporated under the reshaped 
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company law, the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856.
21
 Although provided in the 
statute, the concept of the “corporation having a separate legal personality” was 
not given effect or recognized until the decision in Salomon v Salomon & Co. 
Ltd
22
 by the House of Lords.  
 
The amendments after 1856 were consolidated in a new amended Act of 1862. 
The consolidated Act has the short title Companies Act 1862 and had much more 
depth and detail than the 1856 Act. The Act achieved a lot by encouraging 
capitalists to invest, and it removed the anxiety of incurring additional liability. 
The Act provides for memorandum and articles of association, which replaced the 
deed of settlement. The roles and responsibilities of directors and shareholders 
were clearly highlighted, and it enabled non-trading associations for philanthropic 
or social purposes to register.
23
 The Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 and the 
Companies Act 1862 became the company legislation model for British colonies. 
Today‟s corporations can either be incorporated under company legislation or Act 
of parliament. Upon incorporation, a corporation becomes a separate legal entity 
and can either be a public or private corporation, depending on whether the state 
has a shareholding. The separate legal personality creates debates on whether an 
inanimate and abstract entity can be endowed with personality. This leads to the 
different theories that attempt to explain the nature of corporation.  
 
 3.2.1 Legal and Economic Theories of the Corporation 
 
Legal and economic theories of the corporation were developed in an attempt to 
explain the nature of a corporation. These theories explain the powers and 
functions that different stakeholders have in a corporation and provide 
justification for vesting power in corporate management. They also provide 
general understanding of the function of the corporation. Although discussions of 
these theories are in the province of jurisprudence, it is relevant in this thesis. 
Their discussion provides understanding of the nature of the corporation and the 
basis for vesting of powers in either the shareholders or the management. Legal 
theory encompasses fiction/concession, organic and contractual theories.  
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First, fiction theory is the first main doctrine that tries to explain a company under 
the common law system.
24
 Under the theory, the corporation is a fictitious entity. 
A corporation is where human beings act in concert for a common purpose, create 
a fictitious entity that is separate and independent and that survives on its own.
25
 
Professor John Farrar explains that a corporation is “a fictitious person 
representing a group of persons but not identical with them. It is treated in law as 
a separate person”.26 Originally, corporate legal personality is granted by the state 
and as such it can only be used for legitimate public purposes. Therefore, the state 
jealously guarded the companies through supervision and regulation by 
developing common law rules such as ultra vires to ensure the company performs 
within the requirement of statutes or charter of incorporation.
27
  
 
Today, incorporation of a company is flexible, and formalities of incorporation 
are simple and easy. Further, corporations are incorporated not only for public 
purposes, but private purposes. Hence, to state that incorporation is a privilege or 
concession from the state may seem irrelevant today. The irrelevance of 
concessionary argument was recognized as early as the beginning of the 20
th
 
century.
28
 The theory, however contributes valuable insight into understanding the 
nature of a company. It proposes that a corporation is a fiction, having legal 
capacity as if it were a real person. Consequently, it recognises a human side to 
corporation. The doctrine is analogous to a formula that commences with the 
natural concept of personality and adds certain groups and institution through law 
as persons having life and will as if they were human persons.
29
 In this sense a 
corporation can be treated as either human or non-human depending on whether 
one of the representations is necessary and addresses a practical problem. The 
advantage in this approach is to discard unwanted consequences of legal 
personality that personify ethical elements of a legal person.
30
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Second, contract theory which is an offshoot of fictional theory, agrees that the 
corporation is a fictitious entity and suggests in addition that it is in reality a 
private contractual arrangement between parties. In other words a corporation is a 
“nexus of contract”.31 Through contract, power is granted to the management 
creating the agent principal relationship. However, to say that a company is a 
consensual agreement between shareholders is purely fictitious, as companies 
today are large and have dispersed ownership. Many of those owners are passive 
shareholders. Further, the contractual conception is in direct conflict with the 
common law concept of a company as a separate legal person independent of 
shareholders.
32
  
 
Third, the organic theory regards a corporation as a natural person possessing the 
characteristics of a human being.
33
 A corporation is “just as alive and just as 
capable of having a will as a human person”.34 The theory attempts to humanize 
the corporation. The defect in organic theory is its unscientific approach to 
bequeathing an inanimate person with life, and it treats an analogy with human 
being as the basis of parallel reality. It is easy to borrow a biological concept, but 
difficult applying it to reality. Applying a biological concept make sense in some 
instances. For example, a company that resolves to dissolve commits suicide. On 
the other hand, generic terms such as life cannot be subdivided in two. It is 
inexplicable.
35
  Further, the contention that a company can acquire its own shares 
and become its own member has no parallel correlation to a human person. How 
can a living body become its own member? Not only has it defeated logic, it has 
no parallel to a natural person. These and other issues have tormented organic 
theory, largely due to its lack of parallel realities.  
 
Clearly, these different legal theories have positive and negative aspects in 
identifying the nature of a company. The contractual concept of a company 
legitimises the hierarchical structure within the company and vesting of powers on 
the board and management. In other words it is through freedom of contract that 
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management is endowed with these powers. Difficulties experienced with contract 
theory lead to organic theory, which regards the company as a natural person. 
This justifies shareholders having limited liability and a board as an organ of the 
company. Fiction theory also regards the company as a separate person and 
supports the institution of limited liability; however its support of a company as a 
concession or privilege from the state is not necessarily a reflection of current 
realities.
36
 Unlike organic theory, fiction theory is more cautious, and its profound 
advantage is in its elasticity, in treating certain bodies as a person or a non-person, 
and can easily reject the consequence of a non-legal person. All these theories 
namely contractual, organic and fiction theories have theoretical deficiencies 
however often they are pursued to an extent necessary to achieve a practicable 
outcome. In other words so long as the legal personality achieves a favourable 
outcome for investors and can easily resolve practical problems, theoretical 
deficiency is a non-issue. In addition, new writings in economics were developed 
to address the deficiencies not addressed by legal theories. 
 
Ronald Coase, in his article, The Nature of the Firm,
37
 examines the nature of the 
firm, particularly the question of why a firm exists. A firm is a team method of 
production that exists within an economic system. A normal economic system 
works itself through a process that is automatic, elastic and responsive. The 
process ensures that “supply is adjusted to demand and production to 
consumption”.38 In an imperfect market a person would incur costs when making 
transactions. This cost is referred to as a “transaction cost” and it is incurred in 
“negotiating, monitoring and enforcing exchanges between parties”.39 By 
definition a transaction cost refers to costs incurred participating in the market or 
“cost of effecting an exchange or other economic transactions”40. Transaction cost 
is naturally the result of the fact that in any market transactions there are 
uncertainties caused by the lack of information or opportunisms. To reduce the 
                                                          
36
  Above n 27 at 90 – 93. 
37
  Coase, R.H., “The Nature of the Firm,” (November, 1937) 4(16), Economica, 386; Coase, R. 
H., The Firm, the Market, and the Law, (reprinted edn., 1990) 33; see also Coase R.H., “The 
Nature of the Firm,” in Buckley, P.J. and Michie, J., (eds.) Firms, Organizations and 
Contracts: a Reader in Industrial Organization, (1996) 40. 
38
  Coase was quoting Robertson D.H., The Control of Industry, (1928) in Coase, R.H., “The 
Nature of the Firm,” (November, 1937) 4(16), Economica, 386 at 387. 
39
  Jones, G.R., “Towards a Positive Interpretation of Transaction Cost Theory: The Central 
Roles of Entrepreneurship and Trust,” in Hitt, M.A., Freeman, R.E. and Harrison, J.S., (eds.) 
The Blackwell Handbook of Strategic Management, (2001) 208 at 209. 
40
  Rutherford, D., Routledge Dictionary of Economics, (1995) 467. 
37 
 
transaction costs of market exchanges firms establish long term relationships 
between parties, centrally control information in the firm and establish an 
entrepreneurial coordinator. In expressing Ronald Coase‟s proposition, Gareth 
Jones stated that “forming an organization and allowing an entrepreneur to control 
and direct resources, the costs of making transactions in the market or transaction 
costs are avoided”.41 In other words, having an entrepreneurial coordinator within 
a team (firm), replaces market transactions and market structure, and the 
coordinator directs production. This approach internalises market transaction in a 
firm, consequently reducing transaction costs. 
 
There are also intensive discussions in economics on separation of ownership and 
control (as discussed in chapter 2),
42
 the supervisory role of external markets and 
management role in control of corporation.
43
 They concentrate on the issue of 
regulation and how firms can achieve economic efficiency.  The reality is that 
firms face competition in a market and, in order to survive and grow, they must 
improve economic efficiency. To achieve economic efficiency is not only to 
improve technology in order to reduce costs of production, but improve corporate 
governance so as to provide transparency and accountability at the management 
level and reduce agency costs.
44
 The disadvantage in a firm is having team 
members with divergent interests, and the firm has to incur costs in aligning these 
different interests. A firm is a team which consist of individuals; unfortunately it 
is more concerned with the overall productive outcome of the team as a whole and 
not individual performance. Consequently, a lack of emphasis on an individual‟s 
performance reduces incentives to motivate performance, and increases difficulty 
in supervising their work. It is important to have mechanisms in place to reduce 
the costs incurred by individuals in a firm. These mechanisms can be in the form 
of incentives, monitoring by external markets, and a hierarchical internal 
control.
45
 Control structure within a firm ensures accountability of corporate 
actors and resultant corporate efficiency. 
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The fundamental argument in economic theory is pointing out the fact that 
corporations are mediums through which transaction costs are reduced. But, 
equally important is ensuring proper accountability, through internal and external 
accountability mechanisms in a firm with a divergence of interests in order to 
reduce agency costs. Hence, the overall emphasis must not only be on team 
production to reduce transaction costs, but also on persons in the team to avoid 
agency costs. Corporate governance addresses the latter in focusing on the issues 
of governance and accountability of team members such as the directors and 
managers in a firm.  
 
3.3 THE NATURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Corporate governance became a topical issue in the 1990s and 2000s with the 
collapse of large companies around the world.
46
 It is not only a topical issue for 
companies, lawyers, academics and regulators, but also international institutions 
such OECD, IMF, World Bank and UNDP. It is now the buzzword of the 21
st
 
century. Professor John Farrar
47
 explains its origin in his book Corporate 
Governance: Theories, Principles and Practice. The term “governance” has its 
genesis in the Latin words gubernare and gubernator “which refer to steering a 
ship and to the steerer or captain of the ship” and the French term gouvernance, 
which means “control and state of being governed”. Combining the definition of 
the three terms with the definition in the Oxford English Dictionary
48
 means 
control in a good, orderly manner. Taking into account the term “corporate”, 
means that it is governance within a corporate entity. 
 
Richard Eells used the term “corporate governance” for the first time in 1962.49 
Since then it has gained prominence and became a fashionable concept 
contributed to by a number of factors:  
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a. the separation of ownership and control as stated by Berle and Means50, 
causing the managerial revolution;
51
  
b. the fact that countries are heavily dependant on corporate forms to create 
prosperity for them; and  
c. the colossal effect that corporate collapse has on the stakeholders and 
society.
52
  
 
Further, in recent years the whole perception of the “company‟s sole objective of 
maximising profit for shareholders and company”53 has changed. Society begins 
to see corporations from a different perspective; as representing the interests of 
other stakeholders apart from the shareholders.
54
 The notion of corporate 
governance has changed to adopt the new concept of corporate management, 
concentrating on the internal relationship between groups and individuals.
55
 
 
Corporate governance is a broad topic that extends to all relationships of corporate 
actors.
56
 While there are volumes of literature, there is no one set definition.
57
 
Attempts made to set a working definition, have created numerous definitions, 
varying from one another, with none of them collectively accepted.
58
 Corporate 
governance can be given both a narrow and a broad definition.
59
 First, in a narrow 
sense corporate governance is defined as “the management of business enterprises 
organised in corporate form, and mechanism by which managers are 
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supervised”60, “the system by which companies are directed and controlled”61 or 
“corporate governance deals with ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporation assure themselves of getting a return on their investment,”62. The two 
former focus on management and how it is to be directed in such a way for the 
benefit of the company, whilst the latter focuses on the shareholders and how the 
managers are to work towards meeting their expectations.  
 
Secondly, the broad perspective of corporate governance is widely accepted and 
followed.
63
 Broad definition is given in recent corporate governance reports and 
best practice recommendations. For example, the ASX‟s Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations (see Appendix U) defines corporate governance 
as “the framework of rules, relationships, systems within and by which authority 
is exercised and controlled in corporations.”64 In other words corporate 
governance is a framework by which companies are directed and managed, and 
accountability in directing and managing the company. The HIH Royal 
Commission Report gave the following definition: 
 
At its broadest, the governance of corporate entities comprehends the framework of rules, 
relationships, systems and processes within and by which authority is exercised and 
controlled in corporations. It includes the practices by which that exercise and control of 
authority is in fact effected. The relevant rules include applicable laws of the land as well 
as the internal rules of a corporation. The relationships include those between the 
shareholders or owners and the directors who oversee the affairs of the corporation on 
their behalf, between the directors and those who manage the affairs of the corporation 
and carry out its business, and within the ranks of management, as well as between the 
corporation and others to whom it must account, such as regulators. The systems and 
processes may be formal or informal and may deal with such matters as delegations of 
authority, performance measures, assurance mechanisms, reporting requirements and 
accountabilities.
65
  
 
Similarly the OECD, through “OECD Principles of Corporate Governance” gave 
a broad definition of corporate governance as involving: 
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a set of relationships between a company‟s management, its board, its shareholders and 
other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides structure through which the 
objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined.
66
 
 
Different definitions of corporate governance reflect a division on the issue of 
whose interest a corporation should serve, however the differences do not 
undermine the fact that corporate governance plays a significant role in ensuring 
the economic efficiency of a corporation. Importantly, different definitions reflect 
divergences of views on how to evaluate economic efficiency. There is a broader 
interpretation that focuses on different stakeholders and corporate actors, 
particularly employee welfare and public relations. On the other hand a restrictive 
view focuses on the shareholder as primary stakeholder, proposing that a company 
should be directed and controlled to maximise shareholders‟ economic interests.67 
 
The broader interpretation is adopted in contract and stakeholder theories. These 
theories fundamentally justify corporations assuming more social responsibilities. 
As discussed above, contract theory provides that a corporation is a “nexus of 
contract” or is composed of a network of contractual relationship, which is either 
implicit or explicit between different participants such as shareholders, managers, 
bondholders, employees, suppliers and consumers.
68
 In a contractual relationship 
there is a win/win situation or reciprocity of treatment. Due consideration must be 
given to all participants in a corporation. In contrast stakeholder theory focuses on 
corporate actors, but not on contract. Stakeholders are, either internal or external 
persons who have direct interest in the survival of the company and without their 
support the corporation would collapse. Internal stakeholders include shareholders 
and employees; external stakeholders are members of the public, government or 
consumers.
69
 Society is a stakeholder, therefore a corporation cannot survive 
without its support.
70
 A broad definition of corporate governance not only focuses 
on a company and its shareholders but other stakeholders, both internal and 
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68
  Gordon, J.N., “The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law,” (1989) 89 (Part 2), Columbia 
Law Review, 1549. 
69
  Carroll, A.B. and Buchholtz, A.K., Business & Society: Ethics and Stakeholder Management, 
(6
th
 edn., 2006) 23. 
70
  Alkhafaji, A.F., A stakeholder Approach to Corporate Governance, Managing in a Dynamic 
Environment, (1989) 3. 
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external, who are affected by the activities of the company in one way or 
another.
71
  
 
The narrow interpretation of economic efficiency is advanced under shareholder 
theory and it focuses on shareholders. This is the capitalist economic view that a 
corporation must be governed to maximise shareholders economic interests (see 
chapter 2).
72
 The shareholders are investors and their primary concern is to 
maximise value on their investment. The economic efficiency of a corporation 
must be measured on whether there is an increase in the shareholders‟ profit and 
that means the primary aim of corporate governance must be about how a 
corporation should be governed to maximise profit for shareholders. It follows 
that corporate failure is the consequence of diverting from the main focus of 
maximising return for the shareholders investment. The narrow definition of 
corporate governance focuses only on the relationship of the company with its 
shareholders, and accountability of management to the shareholders.
73
 
 
In the final analysis corporate governance can be defined as a process in place to 
ensure management behaves responsibly and accountably in pursuing the 
objectives of the company, concurrently giving equal treatment to the interests of 
all stakeholders of the corporation.
74
 The definition takes account of voluntary 
measures adopted by corporations today to balance social wellbeing for people, 
ecological quality for the planet and profit for economic prosperity.
75
 James 
McConvill et al re-emphasises the definition through identifying the components. 
Corporate governance: 
  
a. is a process of controlling management;  
b. takes into consideration the interests of internal stakeholders and other parties who 
can be affected by the corporation‟s conduct;  
c. aims at ensuring responsible behaviour by the corporations; and  
d. has the ultimate goal of achieving the maximum level of efficiency and profitability 
for a corporation.
76
 
 
                                                          
71
  Solomon, J. and Solomon, A., Corporate Governance and Accountability, (2004) 12 – 15. 
72
  Thompson, A. A. and Formby, J. P., Economics of the Firm: Theory and Practice, (6
th
 edn., 
1993) 241. 
73
  Above n 71 at 12 – 15. 
74
  See above n 55 at 6 -7. 
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(2006) 14. 
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In recent years principles of corporate governance were developed to provide for 
good corporate governance in individual jurisdictions and organisations. Attempts 
have been made to distinguish and explicate the core principles of good corporate 
governance practice at both a national and international level. At the national level 
corporate governance principles can be seen in the Cadbury Report, 1992 ,
77
 the 
UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance (see Appendix V),
78
 Australian 
Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Council‟s Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations (see Appendix U),
79
  and the South African 
King Report (2002)
80
. At the international level the OECD exhaustively lays out 
corporate governance principles for private corporations and guidelines for public 
corporations, however they are non–binding (see Appendices R and S).81 The 
OECD member countries or others are not compelled to adopt these principles and 
guidelines; nevertheless it is important for them to do so to ensure good corporate 
governance practice. Endeavours made by various organizations to formulate a 
single corporate governance formula for all organizations failed. Generally, in life 
there is no “one size fits all” and this is also true for corporate governance 
principles. The objective at the end, with these principles is to achieve efficiency 
and/or profitability in a particular jurisdiction or organization. Concerned parties 
must choose and apply principles, which can help solve corporate governance 
woes in their respective jurisdictions or organizations. 
 
Achieving efficiency is not analogous to achieving profitability; however 
successful achievement of the former would have a follow on effect on the latter. 
Hence, the emphasis in corporate governance is to achieve both. Diversion in 
pursuing these objectives is largely caused by a shift in control from shareholders 
to the board and management as a direct consequence of separation of ownership 
                                                          
77
  Above n 61 at 16, para. 3.2. 
78
  Financial Reporting Council, Combined Code on Corporate Governance, (June 2006) < 
http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/combinedcode.cfm > at 22 February 2008. 
79
  Australian Securities Exchange, Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
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 edn., 2007) < 
http://www.asx.com.au/about/corporate_governance/index.htm > at  18 January 2010. 
80
  Institute of Directors in South Africa, Executive Summary of the King Report 2002, (March 
2002) < 
http://www.corporatecompliance.org/Content/NavigationMenu/International/SouthAfrica/Ki
ngCommitteeCorporateGovernanceExecutiveSummary2002.pdf > at 22 February 2008. 
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and control. The shift in control inevitably creates an agency cost (see chapter 2), 
which is incurred in an attempt to align the interest of the owners and the 
managers. 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Discussion of the nature of corporation traces the important highlights in the 
history of the corporation. It is clear looking at the history that public investment 
was limited, so too was the market in which corporations operated and corporate 
governance problems were less serious. With the increase in commercial activities 
and the unrestricted excess to a wider market the demand for capital increased and 
different corporate forms were adopted; inclusive in involving the public, and 
limiting their liability encouraged more investment. This encourages large 
investment by the public. The Common law history of the corporation highlights 
the prominent role that law has performed in developing the concept of the 
corporation, particularly through adopting models to enhance corporate value, 
concurrently safeguarding social values of fairness, justice and social good. Legal 
justification of its nature left theoretical deficiencies. Economic theory provides 
an interesting insight to the nature of the firm. However, the doctrine does not 
fully explain that nature. 
 
The corporation is a fictitious entity and it is controlled through human agents. 
The collapse of corporations brings focus on different actors involve in 
controlling and directing them. This brings to prominence discussion of corporate 
governance by lawyers, academics, governments and international organizations, 
thus making it a fashionable concept. Extensive discussion in the literature and 
other forums have not identified a concrete definition collectively accepted, 
however it is clear that corporate governance is about how a corporation is 
controlled and directed to achieve optimal economic outcome. Good corporate 
governance framework requires establishing proper mechanisms to ensure 
transparency, accountability and integrity. However, “good corporate governance 
does not guarantee good performance but its absence usually indicates present or 
future problems.”82 
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45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II: 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
 
 
 46 
CHAPTER 4: 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PRIVATE SECTOR 
CORPORATIONS 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A corporation is an abstraction and can only act through two primary organs; 
namely shareholders and the board of directors. Shareholders invest in a company 
through the purchase of shares. They are regarded as proprietors of the company.
1
 
As persons with vested interests in the company they have the right of control of 
the corporation, however they surrender that right to directors to act on their 
behalf (see chapter 2). The law recognizes this fact through conferral of certain 
powers and functions on them to protect their personal interests and to ensure that 
directors are accountable to them through the company.  
 
Corporatised entities, namely state owned enterprises (SOEs) are intended to 
replicate the characteristic of private sector corporations (see chapter 6). 
Therefore, understanding corporate governance in the private sector must be a 
prerequisite to understanding corporate governance in the public sectors (see 
chapter 7), hence this chapter. Discussion in this chapter forms the basis on which 
the role of government as shareholders and management of an SOE, as outlined in 
chapter 7, is compared and contrasted. Further, this chapter is important as it 
forms the basis on which the role of the government in SOEs in Papua New 
Guinea is analyzed in Part VI. This chapter discusses corporate governance in the 
private sectors in New Zealand (NZ), Australia and other jurisdictions. Corporate 
governance structure can be categorized into hard laws, hybrid laws and soft 
laws.
2
 This chapter focuses on hard laws but also makes references to the other 
two categories of laws. 
 
                                                          
1
  Many writers and commentators still state that shareholders have ownership right over a 
corporation because of their shareholding in the company. For example Christopher Bevan 
stated that “ownership of a company, being an inanimate personality, is by a shareholding in 
a company”. See Bevan, C., Corporations Law, (5th edn., 2002) 77. 
2
  Farrar, J.H., Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles and Practice, (3
rd
 edn., 2008) 3 – 
4. 
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4.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NEW ZEALAND 
 
New Zealand‟s Companies Acts of 1933 and 1955 were based on the versions of 
English Companies Acts of 1929 and 1948, respectively. In 1978, the country 
decided to follow the Australian Uniform Companies Act. Later, despite its 
economic relations with Australia, NZ opted for the Canadian models of the 
Canada Business Corporations Act 1985 and Ontario‟s Business Corporations 
Act 1990.
3
 Following the proposal of the NZ Law Commission, the Companies 
Act 1993 was enacted,
4
 reflecting the North American model.
5
 
 
Amongst other things, the Companies Act provides for the corporate governance 
structure, which comprises of shareholders, a one tier board and management. The 
directors are proxies of the shareholders and they are delegated with the 
responsibility of supervising and managing the company through a board of 
directors, headed by the chairperson. In some companies, depending on size, 
directors delegate their managerial responsibilities to the management, which is 
headed by a chief executive officer (CEO). The Companies Act provides for the 
powers and functions of directors and the rights and remedies of shareholders. 
Further, private sector corporations are subject to external markets (see chapter 2). 
 
4.2.1 Directors  
 
A director is not only a person who is validly appointed through an appointment 
process but also other persons who perform the functions of a director.
6
 Section 
126(1)(a) of the Companies Act defines a director as “a person occupying the 
position of director of the company by whatever name called”. This definition 
implies that it is the function that determines who a director is and not the name.
7
 
The definition is wide covering the de facto controller of the company, a person 
                                                          
3
  See McDermott, J., Understanding Company Law, (2005) 3 - 4; Grantham, R. and Rickett, C. 
E. F., Company and Securities Law: Commentary and Materials, (2002) 38 – 44. 
4
  New Zealand Law Commission, Company Law Reform and Restatement, (Report No. 9, June 
1989) para. 20. 
5
  New Zealand Law Commission, Company Law Reform: Transition and Revision, (Report 
No. 16, September 1990) xvii. 
6
  See the discussion in the following cases: Dairy Containers Ltd v NZI Bank Ltd [1995] 2 
NZLR 30 at 90 – 91; Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (1995) 18 ACSR 1 
at 65 – 71. 
7
  Bruce, M., Rights and Duties of Directors, (7
th
 edn., 2005) 3. 
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who is acting under the delegation of the board, a shadow director and, in some 
cases, a shareholder of a company.
8
  
 
Society is now increasingly placing demand on directors to perform; hence 
government demands a greater accountability from directors through legislation 
such as the Companies Act and the Takeover Act 1993. The Companies Act 
particularly, provides for how the directors should conduct themselves whilst 
doing business and controlling the affairs of the company. The Act provides for 
individual director‟s duties, amongst others, to: 
 
a. act in good faith and in the best interest of the company;9 
b. exercise power for proper purpose;10  
c. exercise the care, diligence and skill of a reasonable director in the same 
circumstances;
11
 and 
d. disclose certain interests of directors.12 
 
The directors are also required to comply with duties that are expressed to apply 
to the whole board. For example, the duty to prepare annual reports and send them 
to shareholders.
13
 The Companies Act is not intended to be a code of directors‟ 
duties and does not mention that it abrogates common law duties. Hence, the 
common law on directors‟ duties still applies.14 Given the wide and complex 
nature of the powers and functions of directors, they need to be educated on them. 
The NZ Institute of Directors conducts courses for chairpersons and directors. 
This at least informs the directors of their roles and responsibilities, and trains 
potential directors.  
 
Unlike the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), the NZ Stock Exchange (NZX) 
does not have corporate governance standards, but its listing rules requires 
companies listed on NZX to provide in their reports “a statement of any corporate 
                                                          
8
  In Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 180 at 182 – 184, Millett J discusses the test for 
determining different kinds of directors. 
9
  Companies Act 1993, s 131. 
10
  Companies Act 1993, s 133. 
11
  Companies Act 1993, s 137. 
12
  Companies Act 1993, s 140. 
13
  Companies Act 1993, s 209. 
14
  Benton v Priore (2003) 9 NZCLC 263,055 at 263,063. 
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governance policies, practices and processes, adopted or followed by the issuer”15. 
The directors are required to comply with this requirement. NZ‟s Securities 
Commission published a report in a handbook, Corporate Governance Principles 
and Guidelines (see Appendix W)
16
 which requires all companies which have an 
economic impact in NZ, especially listed companies, to comply with the 
principles and guidelines provided in the handbook. The report provides for: 
 
a. ethical standards;  
b. board composition and performance; 
c. board committees; 
d. reporting and disclosure; 
e. remuneration;  
f. risk management;  
g. auditors; 
h. shareholder relations; and 
i. stakeholder interests. 
 
Further, companies and their directors are required to comply with standards of 
corporate governance under the Companies Act, company constitutions and 
company charters.  
 
4.2.2 The Board and Management 
 
As stated above, NZ has a one tier board structure that is hierarchically above the 
management. The board is the proxy of the shareholders and is given the power to 
manage the company. The chairperson, who is appointed from non-executive 
directors, heads the board. Section 128(1) of the Companies Act provides that the 
business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction or 
supervision of the board of the company. The provision is broad and clearly points 
out the fact that the board has both supervisory and management responsibilities. 
Usually, the board performs a supervisory role, and managerial functions are 
delegated to the management. A board can have executive directors, but NZ 
                                                          
15
  New Zealand Exchange, NZAX Listing Rules, [Listing Rule Number 10.5.5(h)] < 
http://www.nzx.com/market-supervision/rules/nzax-listing-rules > at 18 January 2010. 
16
  Securities Commission, NZ., Corporate Governance in New Zealand, Principles and 
Guidelines – A Handbook for Directors, Executives, and Advisers, (16th March 2004) < 
http://www.sec-com.govt.nz/publications/list.shtml > at 20 January 2010. 
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practice is inclined towards reducing their numbers and having non–executives 
directors serving on the board.
17
 A company may have all non-executive directors. 
The issue with having all non-executive directors is the fact that their power may 
not be complemented by a corresponding knowledge of the company. 
 
Directors act through the board, and the resolution of the board becomes the 
resolution of the company on a matter in question. The board acts where directors 
are required to act collectively. The directors must comply with the duties where it 
is expressed to be applied to the whole board of the company. For example: 
 
a. the duty to prepare an annual report and send it to individual shareholders; 
b. the duty to deliver an annual return to the registrar;18 
c. the duty to ensure that the auditor has access to records and receives notice 
of meetings;
19
 
d. the duty to ensure proper accounting records are kept;20 and 
e. the duty to ensure that adequate measures exist to prevent and detect the 
falsification of records.
21
 
 
In companies that have constitutions, the boards‟ powers and functions are 
provided in them. Many companies in NZ are beginning to have a formal 
corporate governance charter that sets out the powers and functions of the board. 
This is influenced by the trend of companies being required to report corporate 
governance account in the annual reports.  
 
The Companies Act does not provide for powers and functions of the chairperson 
and CEO. This is where the company constitution, company charters and the NZ 
Securities Commission‟s Corporate Governance Principles and Guidelines 
become important, especially where there are deficiencies in the Companies Act 
or other laws. The NZ Best Practice Statement, following the Cadbury Report 
(1992) set out the role of the chairperson and the CEO and recommended the 
separation of CEO and chairperson so that there is an independent element on the 
                                                          
17
  Korn/Ferry International, Boards of Directors in Australia and New Zealand 2000, (2000). 
18
  Companies Act 1993, s 214. 
19
  Companies Act 1993, ss 206 and 207. 
20
  Companies Act 1993, s 194. 
21
  Companies Act 1993, s 190 (2). 
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board with a leading director.
22
 The tendency in NZ today is to reduce the number 
of executive directors on the board.
23
 
 
4.2.3 Shareholders 
 
Ownership of shares confers certain rights and powers within the company that 
give rights against the company, directors and other shareholders.
24
 Ownership of 
shares enables shareholders to become owners of the company, however it does 
not enable absolute ownership over the company and its assets. Dixon J explained 
that “[p]rimarily a share in a company is a piece of property conferring rights in 
relation to distributions of income and of capital”.25 The Companies Act provides 
for the rights of shareholders and remedies where either the company or directors 
breach the requirement of the company‟s constitution or the Act. Under s 104 
shareholders exercise many of their rights and powers through annual general 
meetings or special meetings or pass special resolutions in lieu of the meeting.
26
 
Section 36(1)(a) provides that ownership of shares in a company confers the right 
to one vote at a company‟s meeting on any resolution that includes right to:  
 
a. appoint or remove a director or auditor; 
b. adopt a constitution; 
c. alter the company's constitution, if it has one; 
d. approve a major transaction; 
e. approve an amalgamation of the company under s 221 of the Companies 
Act; and 
f. put the company into liquidation. 
 
The rights vested in shareholders under s 36(1) are not absolute and can be 
“negated, altered, or added to by the constitution of the company or in accordance 
with the terms on which the share is issued”.27 Further, the company or the 
shareholders cannot alter some rights vested in the shareholders by the Companies 
Act. These are, in other words, mandatory rights. The mandatory rights are:  
                                                          
22
  Above n 2 at 347. 
23
  Above n 17. 
24
  Wotherspoon, S., “Property by any other Name: The Trouble with Shareholder Claim in 
Australia,” (February 2007) 81, The Australian Law Journal, 75.  
25
  Peters’ America Delicacy Co. Ltd v Heath (1939) 61 CLR 457 at 503 – 504. 
26
  Companies Act 1993, ss 120, 121 and 122. 
27
  Companies Act 1993, s 36 (2). 
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a. the right to be given reasonable opportunity to deliberate on the 
management of the company that requires questioning, discussing or 
commenting on any issues about the management;
28
 
b. the right to be given the “minority buy-out rights”;29 
c. the right to be served with notice of a meeting;30 
d. the right to be given annual reports and financial statements;31 
e. the right to request information held by the company;32 
f. the right to inspect records;33 and 
g. the right to seek a  remedy in court. 
 
The important right of shareholders is to seek remedies in court. The shareholders 
can resort to court if there is unfair prejudice or to take personal action for breach 
of duty owed to them by directors
34
 or company
35
. An unfair prejudicial action 
can be taken by a shareholder for “courses of conduct amounting to an unjust 
detriment to the interests of a member or members of the company”.36 
 
Personal action may be taken to ensure compliance and payment of 
compensation.
37
 Section 169(1) allows shareholders to bring personal actions, 
particularly under s 169(3), for breach of duty to supervise share register,
38
 duty to 
disclose interests
39
 and duty to disclose share dealings
40
. This is not exhaustive, as 
stated under s 169(3) that it is not “limiting” subsection one, which means that 
personal actions for duties owed to the shareholders provided in the Companies 
Act applies. A shareholder can also take derivative action on behalf of the 
company, however in order to do so the shareholder must meet the requirement 
under s 165(2)(3) of the Companies Act. A derivate action is only taken if the 
board decides against bringing an action on behalf of the company. Further, other 
                                                          
28
  Companies Act 1993, s 109 (1). 
29
  Companies Act 1993,s 110. 
30
  Companies Act 1993, s 125. 
31
  Companies Act 1993, ss 209 (1) and 211 (1) (b). 
32
  Companies Act 1993, s 178. 
33
  Companies Act 1993, s 216. 
34
  Companies Act 1993, s 169. 
35
  Companies Act 1993, s 171. 
36
  Thomas v H W Thomas Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 686 at 693. 
37
  Beck, A. and Borrowdale, A., Guidebook to New Zealand Companies and Securities Law (7
th
 
edn., 2002)  293. 
38
  Companies Act 1993, s 190. 
39
  Companies Act 1993, s 140. 
40
  Companies Act 1993, s 148. 
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remedies where a shareholder can seek an order from the court include putting the 
company into liquidation,
41
 or applying for an order for injunction to prevent the 
company or a director undertaking an act.
42
 The right to pursue court action 
against the company, and other rights, come to an end if the company becomes 
non – existent.43 
 
The rights of the shareholders can also be enforced by NZX for those companies 
that are listed on NZX. NZ has the NZ Shareholders Association (NZSA), which 
was formed to uphold shareholders‟ interests and to raise the quality of corporate 
governance. NZSA engages in shareholder activitism and that can raise the 
performance of directors and the overall quality of corporate governance in NZ‟s 
private sector. 
 
The Companies Act focuses solely on the interest of shareholders, with the 
exception of creditors when the company is in liquidation. Although, there have 
been debates on sustainable development
44
 and discussions on ethics and 
stakeholders‟ interests,45 in which business and corporations were asked to take 
into account stakeholder interests, there are no debates or any substantial 
discussion on corporate social responsibility (CSR).
46
 NZ is lagging behind 
Australia in terms of taking full notice of CSR. 
 
4.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRALIA 
 
Prior to Australia‟s Federation in 1902 each of its colonies had their own 
company legislation that was modeled on the British Companies Act 1862. There 
was no uniform company legislation for the Commonwealth of Australia. This 
was largely prevented by the High Court decision in Huddart Parker & Co. v 
                                                          
41
  Companies Act 1993, s 241(4)(d). 
42
  Companies Act 1993, s 164(2) b). 
43
  Above n 24 at 76. 
44
  The sustainable development is promoted by New Zealand Business Council for Sustainable 
Development.  See Boston, J., “Post – 2012: Towards a new Global Climate Treaty,” in 
Boston, J., (ed.) Towards a new Global Climate Treaty: Looking beyond 2012, (2007) 3 at 
31; See generally Chapman, R., Boston, J. and Schwass, M., Confronting Climate Change – 
Critical Issues for New Zealand, (2006). 
45
  New Zealand Securities, Corporate Governance in New Zealand, (18
th
 February 2004) 
[Guidelines One and Nine] < 
http://www.seccom.govt.nz/publications/documents/governance-principles/index.shtml > at 
12 January 2009. 
46
  Above n 2 at 498 – 502. 
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Moorehead
47
. The court gave a narrow interpretation to s 51(xx) of the Australian 
Constitution by stating that Commonwealth does not have power to legislate with 
respect to the creation of corporations.
48
 Lack of any uniform legislation creates 
inexpediency and inefficiency in interstate commerce, hence prompting the need 
for reform. Consequently, a co-operative scheme between the Commonwealth and 
the states was arranged with the Uniform Companies Act 1961 that was adopted 
by each state between 1961 and 1962 based on Victorian model.
49
 From the co-
operative scheme, the Corporations Act was passed by the Federal Parliament in 
1989. However, Corporations Act incorporated many of the practices of the co-
operative scheme and it was detailed and complex. Several challenges were made 
to those practices on the basis of constitutional validity.
50
 Faced with increasing 
uncertainty on the validity of the key provisions of the Corporations Act, the 
states surrendered to the Commonwealth power to enact corporation law, in 
August 2000. The following year the new Corporations Act came into effect in 
July 2001, becoming the first national corporate law.
51
 
 
Compared to NZ, Australia has a well-developed self-regulatory system. ASX has 
its listing rules, code standards of good corporate governance and statements of 
accounting practice for listed companies.
52
 Further, there are a number of reports 
on “corporate practice and conduct” that review the functions of boards, giving 
advice on corporate governance with regard to listing requirements and providing 
general advice and guidelines to directors.
53
 Furthermore, there are organizations 
such as the Investment and Financial Services Association that provide proposals 
on sound corporate governance practice for its members.
54
 These arrangements 
make Australia much more developed in self-regulation. This is to be expected as 
                                                          
47
  Huddart Parker & Co. v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330 at 354. 
48
  See discussion of s 51 (xx) and Huddart parker & Co. v Moorehead  in Corcoran, S., 
“Corporate Law and the Australian Constitution: A History of Section 51 (xx) of the 
Australian Constitution,” (1994) 15(2), Journal of Legal History, 131. 
49
  Cassidy, J., Corporations Law: Text and Essential Cases, (2
nd
 edn., 2008) 4. 
50
  See Re Wakim (1999) 163 ALR 270; R v Hughes (2000) 171 ALR 155. 
51
  Above n 49 at 5 – 7. 
52
  ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations, (2
nd
 edn., August 2007) in ASX < 
http://www.asx.com.au/about/corporate_governance/revised_corporate_governance_principl
es_recommendations.htm >  at 26 January 2010. 
53
  See Hilmer, F.G., Strictly Boardroom, (2
nd
 edn., 1998); Bosch, H., (ed.) Corporate Practices 
and Conduct, (3
rd
 edn., 1995). 
54
  Investment and Financial Services Association (IFSA), Guidance Note No. 2 – ‘Blue Book’ – 
Guidelines on Corporate Governance for Fund Managers and Corporations, (October 2004) 
in IFSA <http://www.ifsa.com.au/public/content/ViewCategory.aspx?id=619 > at 5 January 
2009. 
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private companies are more significant in Australia and it has larger private 
companies operating than NZ. 
 
Like NZ, private companies in Australia are exposed to external markets. That 
means they are subject to the managerial market, the market for corporate control 
and the share market, for those listed on ASX. Private companies can also be 
subject to bonding and monitoring devices. Monitoring mechanisms established 
under the Corporations Act are discussed below with references, from time to 
time, to other rules, guidelines and reports. 
 
4.3.1 Directors  
 
Section 9 of the Corporations Act defines the term “director” widely, embracing 
persons who perform the functions of a director. The definition extends to any 
officer of the company. Hence, the senior employees and senior executives and 
officers within the middle management come under the definitional ambit of s 9. 
Justice Owen, in the HIH Royal Commission Report, was surprised to find that 
middle-management were making governance decisions and yet could not be held 
accountable under company legislation.
55
 Section 9 basically attempts to address 
that reality to ensure that these officers do not escape liability under the Act. 
 
The duties of directors are provided for far more comprehensively under the 
Corporations Act. They are clearer, to the extent that cases or common law and 
equity are not necessarily required. Some of the main duties of a director provided 
under the Corporations Act are: 
 
a. duty of care and diligence;56  
b. duty of good faith;57  
c. duty not to use a position or information to gain personally or cause 
detriment to corporations;
58
  
 
                                                          
55
  HIH Royal Commission, Vol.1: The Failure of HIH: A Corporate Collapse and its Lessons, 
(April 2003) [Part 3, para. 6.4] < http://www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/finalreport/index.htm > at 7 
January 2009. 
56
  Corporations Act 2001, s 180. 
57
  Corporations Act 2001, s 181. 
58
  Corporations Act 2001, ss 182 and 183. 
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d. duty relating to related party transactions;59  
e. duty relating to requirements for financial reports;60  
f. duty to prevent insolvent trading;61 and  
g. duties relating to continuous disclosure.62  
 
These duties ensure that individual directors perform to certain standards, 
irrespective of whether they are executive or non-executive directors. Breaches of 
these duties attract civil liability. In addition, s 184 of the Corporations Act 
creates a criminal offence for reckless or intentional dishonesty in exercising a 
duty of good faith. 
 
4.3.2 The Board and Management 
 
Like NZ, Australian companies have a one tier board that comprises of executive 
and non-executive directors. The tendency in Australian private companies has 
been to reducing the number of executive directors on the board so that there is an 
equal number of executive and non-executive directors.
63
 Non-executive directors 
include independent directors. Directors make decisions through the board. 
Resolutions of the board are based on the collective and majority decisions of the 
directors, and take effect as the resolution of the company on a matter in 
question.
64
 
 
The role of the board is provided under s 198A (1) of the Corporations Act 2001, 
which states that business of the company is to be managed by or under the 
direction of the board. The provision leaves open the issue of specificity of the 
role of the board and how they are different from the management. In the NSW 
case of AWA Ltd v Daniels
65
 at first instance Rogers J stated that a board only 
deals with matters of high policy and non-executive directors only meet once a 
month to consider major policies. As a result “senior management is, in the true 
sense of the word, exercising the powers of decision and of management which in 
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less complex days used to be reserved for the board of directors”.66 Further Justice 
Rogers outlined the duties of a board as follows:
67
  
 
a. to set the goals of the corporation; 
b. to appoint the chief executive of the corporation; 
c. to oversee the plans of managers for the acquisition and organization of 
financial and human resources towards attainment of the corporation‟s 
goals; and 
d. to review at reasonable intervals the corporations progress towards 
attaining its goals. 
 
Although he was criticized for mingling the responsibilities of the board with that 
of the management,
68
 Justice Rogers was stating the reality in large corporations 
in Australia and around the world where managements of large companies are 
also performing a supervisory role. What is important to point out about roles of 
the board and the management is that the board must not meddle in the affairs that 
should be dealt with by management and the management must not deal with 
matters that the board should deal with.
69
 This is not necessarily stating that the 
board should exclusively perform the responsibility of the board. In certain large 
corporations the company‟s constitution may delegate to the management the 
supervisory or management role traditionally performed by the board.  
 
Clarity is required for the roles and responsibilities of board and management. 
Usually company constitutions and other company documents such as company 
charters provide for them. In addition, reports,
70
 guidelines,
71
 books,
72
 and  
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corporate governance principles and recommendations
73
 greatly assist by 
providing clarity to the roles and responsibilities of the board and management. 
The commonalities that appear from these documents are the key roles of the 
board that include: supervision and monitoring; strategic thinking; policy 
formulation; accountability; and monitoring the board‟s own effectiveness.74 
 
The Corporations Act does not clearly provide for the roles and responsibilities of 
CEO. The Act did provide for the role of the chairperson, but merely states that 
the role of the chairperson is to preside over meetings.
75
 A chairperson in a 
modern company does a lot more than presiding over meetings. In ASIC v Rich
76
 
Austin J stated that the special responsibilities of the chairperson were to: 
 
a. ensure that the board addressed the soundness and the underlying financial 
position of the company; 
b. require there to be a functioning and effective finance and audit committee 
independent of the executive directors; 
c. require the board to establish a process of internal review and the 
accounting and financial systems; and 
d. assess whether information supplied to him [the chairperson] and the 
board was accurate. 
 
Further, there are books,
77
 rules and best practice guidelines
78
 that assist with 
explaining the distinctive roles and responsibilities of the chairperson. The CEO 
and the chairperson have a distinctive role that is different from each other, and 
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both are embedded with delegated power from the board to administer the 
company and board, respectively.
79
 
 
4.3.3 Shareholders 
 
The Corporations Act recognizes the rights of shareholders as investors and 
owners of shares in a company. Increasingly, many companies in Australia have 
institutional shareholders, such as pension funds, insurance companies and 
investment companies, which hold a significant stake in a number of companies. 
These shareholders play a greater role in influencing the management in its many 
decisions, and they influence the company to focus on the short-term interest of 
shareholders. Generally, shareholders‟ rights are provided under the Corporations 
Act.   Some of the main rights of shareholders are: 
 
a. the right to vote;80  
b. the right to appoint and remove directors;81  
c. the right to requisition and call general meetings and propose resolutions;82 
and  
d. the right to information and accounts.83 
 
Many shareholders‟ rights are exercised through voting and resolutions in the 
annual general meetings.
84
 Where there is a breach of their rights, shareholders 
can enforce them through courts of law. Like NZ, court actions can be by virtue of 
prejudicial, derivative or personal action.
85
  
 
The Corporations Act, like the Companies Act is shareholder oriented, except in 
liquidation where creditors‟ interests are taken into account. This means that the 
company‟s main objective is to advance the interest of shareholders through profit 
maximization. However, recent debates on a company‟s CSR were triggered by 
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the case of James Hardie Ltd.
86
 The “Corporations and Markets Advisory 
Committee” and the “Joint Parliamentary Committee” considered the CSR of 
companies, however decided that corporations should take appropriate measures 
themselves on the matter.
87
 Companies, therefore have an option of adopting a 
code of conduct that provides for CSR.
88
 Consequently, CSR has yet to be 
recognized under legislation to be given effective enforcement. 
 
4.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS  
 
This part considers corporate governance in other jurisdictions. The discussion 
below covers UK, Germany and Japan. The UK model of corporate governance is 
similar to NZ and Australia but not identical. The German and Japanese models 
are significantly different to that of the UK; however they are also not similar to 
one another. 
 
4.4.1 The United Kingdom Model 
 
The UK was the first country to be industrialized. It developed the first corporate 
economy and the resulting corporate law was adopted by its colonies around the 
world, and influenced the development of corporate law in the US and Germany. 
The hallmark of its economy is a belief in individualism and freedom of 
contract.
89
 This, in essence, defines its corporate law and governance systems. 
The governance system is about the relationship between owners and the 
managers and how managers can maximize profit on behalf of the shareholders. 
Directors are given the task of maintaining accountability. When corporations 
grew bigger, ownership became dispersed and the separation of ownership and 
control became inevitable, creating agent and principal relationships.  
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Consequently, the main characteristics of corporate governance in the UK are the 
separation of ownership and control and how the interests of owners can align 
with that of the management. 
 
Corporate governance in UK relies heavily on self-regulation. An earlier example 
is the City of London Takeover Code. After 1990 there were several reports that 
recommended self-regulation. The Cadbury Report (1992)
90
 was set up to address 
the financial aspect of corporate governance. The report recommended three 
corporate governance principles of transparency, accountability and integrity. The 
principles were criticized as broad and not specific in addressing particular issue. 
The Greenbury Report (1995)
91
 was established to examine executive 
remunerations. Amongst other things, it made policy recommendation to be 
adopted by listed companies. The Hampel Report (1998)
92
 re-visits the two 
reports above, and focuses on their positive contributions to date. The report was 
particular in its emphasis, and instead of “box ticking” it focused on corporate 
governance guidelines and principles. The Higgs Report (2003)
93
 examined the 
role and effectiveness of non-executive directors and amongst other things, 
recommended equal numbers of executive and non–executive directors on boards. 
These reports were highly influential documents that emphasized the importance 
of self-regulation and also recommended corporate governance principles that 
must be adopted by companies to avoid threat of legislation. The 
recommendations from these reports and others are reflected in the UK Combined 
Code, which was published in 1998 and revised in 2003 following the Higgs 
Report, and lately revised in 2009 (Appendix V).
94
 The Code currently serves as a 
norm for good corporate governance in listed companies. 
 
Like NZ and Australia, corporations in the UK have a one tier board that consists 
of executives and non-executive directors, but in the UK a board usually consists 
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of more than 50 per cent of non–executive directors.95 A non-executive director is 
a chairperson for all three jurisdictions. This is different to the USA where the 
CEO is often the chairperson.
96
 The role of the non-executive members have 
become broader and more onerous, with greater importance placed on corporate 
governance. The UK has taken a step further towards recognizing CSR.
97
 It is not 
archetypal of a country that emphasizes and upholds individualism and sanctity of 
contract; however given the current reality, a change in focus from shareholders to 
other stakeholders is necessary. CSR provision in the legislation raises many other 
legal issues.
98
 
 
4.4.2 The German Model 
 
The German model of corporate governance is different from the Anglo-American 
model in that it is an insider system or relationship based system of corporate 
governance. There is a high level of ownership concentration in the hands of 
families, banks and other companies.
99
 Banks are the biggest lenders and investors 
in companies,
100
 and hold seats on supervisory boards as shareholders or as 
proxies.
101
 This enables banks to have close ties and great influence over the 
companies. Under the German Constitution the government allows banks some 
freedom not only from lending but also other important services to the 
companies.
102
  
 
The hallmark of the German model of corporate governance is a two-tier board 
structure with a supervisory board and management board. The supervisory board 
consists of the representatives of shareholders and employees. Its main function is 
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to supervise the management board, including the power to appoint and remove 
its members, call shareholders‟ meetings and provide a report to shareholders on 
the auditor‟s report. On the other hand the main function of the management 
board is to manage the company.
103
  
 
Further, co-determination is also an important aspect of corporate governance in 
Germany.
104
 The employees and unions elect their representatives to the 
supervisory board to be involved in decision-making on their behalf.
105
 This 
ensures companies are not only maximizing profit but also taking into account the 
interest of employees, and other stakeholders.
106
 The number of employee 
representatives on a board can be one third or half of the members on the board. 
In some industries where there is an equal number of shareholder and employee 
representatives, the shareholders are given the right to appoint a chairperson, 
hence tilting power slightly toward the shareholders.
107
 
 
Concentrated ownership restricts the “free rider” problem of corporate control 
experienced in jurisdictions with dispersed ownership of shares, ensures active 
corporate control,
108
 and provides private benefit. However, private benefits can 
be at the expense of corporate efficiency. Further, if the laws of the jurisdiction do 
not protect minority shareholders, concentrated ownership would be at the 
disadvantage of minority shareholders.
109
 Strong market forces are gradually 
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forcing changes in German corporate governance to a market based system,
110
 to 
meet commercial globalization and importantly to attract investment from global 
markets as the “system could not ultimately provide German companies with the 
capital they needed to compete in a global marketplace”111. Thus, changes were 
made to transform Germany‟s fragmented, small and high cost market into a 
transparent and liquid market to attract institutional and corporate investment 
from outside Germany. Further, the financial market reform was in tune with the 
European Single Market, and to attract direct foreign investment.
112
  
 
4.4.3 The Japanese Model 
 
The Japanese model of corporate governance is a distinctive and successful model 
in its own right. The governance structure emulates the German model on 
corporate law and USA on securities regulation.
113
 First, the board structure of 
Japanese companies is a hybrid of one-tier and two-tier board structure. All 
members of the board are insiders, appointed from the management ranks. They 
are either lifetime employees or ex-employees of banks, affiliated companies or 
government ministries. The companies have a statutory auditor who is appointed 
by shareholders, and performs a similar role to that of Germany‟s supervisory 
board.
114
 
 
Second, the companies are identified within a corporate group with a leading 
bank. Within the corporate group there is a relationship with a leading bank, 
trading relationships between the companies and interlocking shareholdings and 
directorship.
115
 The bank lends and invests in the companies within the 
conglomerate and also performs a significant role of disciplining the managers. 
The investment by banks creates substantial ownership in the companies and this 
                                                          
110
  See general discussion in Gordon, J.N., “Convergence of Shareholder Capitalism,” in 
Milhaupt, C.J., (ed.) Global Markets, Domestic Institutions, (2003) 214; see also Schmidt, 
above n 98 at 416. 
111
  Monks, R. A. G. and Minow, N., Corporate Governance, (3
rd
 edn., 2004)  231.  
112
  Borsch, above n 103 at 53 - 55. 
113
  Above n 2 at 528; Milhaupt, C.J., “Historical Pathways of Reform: Foreign Law Transplants 
and Japanese Corporate Governance,” in Hopt, K.J., Wymeersch, E., Kanda, H. and Baum, 
H., (eds.) Corporate Governance in Context: Corporations, States, and Markets in Europe, 
Japan, and the US, (2005) 53 at 55 – 58. 
114
  Charkham, J.P., Keeping Good Company: a Study of Corporate Governance in Five 
Countries (1995) 92 – 93. 
115
  Sheard, P., “Interlocking Shareholdings and Corporate Governance in Japan,” in Aoki, M. 
and Dore, R.P., (eds.) The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive Strength, (1994) 310. 
 65 
creates a special relationship between the banks and the corporations. As a result, 
banks see themselves in long-term relationships with corporations and feel 
obliged to rescue them when they are in trouble.
116
 The advantage of a corporate 
group is the increase in information flow and reduction in incentive problems 
faced by arms‟ length contract dealings and it therefore increases the efficiency 
and reduces the cost of corporate governance.
117
  
 
Thirdly, Japanese companies have passive or stable shareholders.
118
 Having a 
bank and corporate group system with cross shareholding between companies 
creates an incentive for the main shareholders to be stable.
119
 Stable shareholders 
include other companies in corporate group, major creditors and customers and 
suppliers. Shares in a company do not only ensure control of the corporation, but 
also maintain relationships within the group.
120
 Stable shareholders look at long-
term interest. The environment for long-term interest is also created by distinctive 
characteristics of the Japanese corporate system of lifetime employment, and the 
reality of companies being treated as social institutions provides incentives for 
managers to consider their strategic priority to be in their company‟s long-term 
interest rather than short term.
121
  
 
Like Germany, Japan has been moving towards a market-based system of 
corporate governance.
122
 Since 1980, the roles of banks in corporate governance 
have become less important as there was deregulation of financial markets and as 
corporations accrue internal funds. Further, corporations extended their 
production network outside of Japan, which changes the relationship between 
customers and suppliers, hence their representation on the board.
123
 However, 
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many of the important features such as the corporate group, and interlocking 
shareholding and directorship, are still present in Japanese corporate governance 
framework, making it still unique. 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Like the UK, NZ and Australia establish companies to pursue interests on behalf 
of shareholders. Companies are shareholders‟ companies and they are known as 
the owners of the company. The directors are appointed to control the company as 
stewards and agents of the shareholders. The appointment of directors creates 
separation of ownership and control. As a result, the focus of corporate 
governance in the three jurisdictions is on how to align the interests of 
shareholders with that of the managers. These jurisdictions have corporate 
governance structures that consist of one-tier boards and the management. Much 
corporate governance is left to self-regulation. The UK has gone a step further by 
giving statutory recognition to CSR. On the other hand the German and Japanese 
models of corporate governance are stakeholder orientated. The German model 
has a two-tier board structure, with concentrated shareholding. Employees, 
creditors, suppliers and customers monitor the performance of the corporation. 
The Japanese model of corporate governance is typically known for its lifetime 
employment and corporate group. Within the corporate group there is cross-
shareholding and cross-directorship, and the leading bank monitors companies in 
the group. The objectives of companies in Germany and Japan are advancing the 
interests of shareholders and other stakeholders and the long-term viability of 
companies. 
 
The corporate governance of each country is influenced by ideologies, history 
and/or their culture. These factors have defined whether the focus of the company 
should be on shareholders only, or shareholders and other stakeholders of the 
company. Corporate governance is changing in jurisdictions that are discussed 
above. Given the changing environment of commercial globalization and 
economic integration, pressured convergence in some jurisdictions, however 
variations in corporate governance still remain. The corporate governance system 
of one jurisdiction is not superior to another. Each system is established to address 
problems experienced in that society. These different corporate governance 
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systems share some commonalities despite major differences. For example, non-
executive directors on boards of companies in the UK, Australia and NZ perform 
similar roles to the supervisory board in Germany. Also, there is ownership 
concentration in large companies in these jurisdictions in the form of institutional 
shareholding like Germany and Japan. 
 
SOEs have a similar structure to private sector corporations and they draw upon 
many traditional corporate governance principles. However, their compositions, 
objectives and accountability processes are different. Corporate governance issues 
relating to the public sector are discussed in chapter 7. 
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PART III: 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
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CHAPTER 5: 
 
THE ROLE AND PERSONALITY OF THE STATE 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The term “state” is easy to use and yet difficult to define. Although legal and 
political theorists have views of what the concepts of state are, they are 
nonetheless not conclusively and collectively accepted. At the international level, 
international lawyers have set out guidelines to distinguish a state from a non-
state. At the domestic stage, the use of the term is not explicit and at times 
overlaps with other terms such as nation and the Crown. This chapter provides a 
prelude to chapter 7 on the role of the state in a state owned enterprise (SOE), 
chapter 8 on the role of the state in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and chapter 10 on 
the role of state in SOEs in PNG. The chapter discusses the rationale of state, 
history and personality of the Crown, followed by the relationship of Crown and 
SOEs. Then discussion of state and Crown follows with the conclusion.  
 
5.2 RATIONALE OF THE STATE 
 
Society like any contrivance is subject to endless progression. It developed from 
the nomadic way of life to primitive community, city-state, empire, nation, and to 
the modern state today. At various stages of development the state acquired 
different characteristics that vary in structure, composition and power networks. 
Feudalism was essentially the characteristic of societies in Europe where land was 
given in return for military service. Feudal kingdoms had a hierarchical structure 
where people were servants of lords. The servants promised faithfulness in service 
to the lords in return for protection. This created a mutual relationship of service 
in return for protection and justice. Out of feudalism emerged monarchies with a 
very tight grip on powers. Monarchies evolved into either revolutionary republics 
or constitutional monarchies. Absolute monarchism went through an evolutionary 
process that involved confrontation and negotiation, sometimes by a gradual 
process, to obtain the status of constitutional monarchy.
1
 Different theories, such 
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as social contract, were enunciated to explain how the state is created, and to 
justify the power structure and composition of the state.
2
  
 
Social contract explains how people establish a state and maintain social order. 
Social contract refers to a fictitious agreement between citizens and the state. The 
agreement obliges citizens to obey the laws and authority of the ruler. The ruler in 
turn agrees to protect the rights of the citizens.
3
 The result is a state with a ruler, 
who protects the rights of the people and maintains peace and order. John Locke 
applied social contract to advance the liberty of individuals in the society. 
According to Locke important rights of individuals are the right to life, liberty and 
private property. Social contract enables men to create a political society and 
surrender their power to the government. The government agrees to protect 
individuals within the society. Locke further advocated the notion of democracy 
whereby the majority can elect to strip certain rights of individuals, including 
property rights of people within the society.
4
 This must be done in the best interest 
of the society. Locke related sovereignty with the people – government is made by 
and for the governed (that is the people).
5
 
 
Thomas Hobbes also advocated the notion of social contract. However, he saw 
men living in a state of nature, where predominantly they were in a state of war in 
which everyone is at odds with each other. Reason dictates that there was the need 
for peace and avoidance of unending insecurities of war. Men agreed with the 
ruler to obey her unconditionally and surrendered all their natural rights to her. 
The ruler agreed to rule and maintain peace and order in the society. If the ruler 
does not fulfil her obligation she can be overthrown and new ruler inaugurated. 
Allegiance is then shifted to the new ruler. Hobbes saw the sovereign as an 
individual, a ruler or a monarch whilst society is similar to state.
6
 Hobbes 
advocated authority. 
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6
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Jeremy Bentham and John Austin supported Hobbes‟ theory without the fiction of 
social contract.
7
 They argue that people are in the habit of obedience to the 
command of the common superior. A person who is habitually obeyed is a 
sovereign and the law is a command from those who are habitually obeyed. 
Therefore government is a sovereign. The state on the other hand is a collegiate 
governing entity with a sovereign and subordinates with delegated powers and 
functions. This recognises the aggregate nature of the state. In addition, Hans 
Kelsen identified the state as analogous to a corporation. He argues that the state 
is really a territorial legal order personified, and is used as a point of imputation of 
public legal acts. In this sense the state is akin to a corporate entity composed of 
government and its subordinates in representative form.
8
  
 
These different theorists justify centralized authority, the state, and the reasons for 
people‟s allegiances. But in the UK, constitutional principles have dispensed with 
the notion of state and instead predominantly use the Crown.
9
 As stated by 
Bentham and Austin, the Crown is a sovereign. Legal personality is imposed on 
the Crown and it serves as a central organizing principle of government. The 
Crown “personifies the executive government of the country”10. Legal personality 
is encapsulated with constitutional history, and particularly associated with the 
monarch.
11
  However, over the years the Crown‟s public powers (that is 
legislative, executive and judicial power) were curtailed when they were at odds 
with the society‟s interest, leading ultimately to a representative government 
based on citizens voting for a member of parliament. 
 
5.3 HISTORY OF THE CROWN 
 
The history of the monarchy goes back to the medieval era. The King was the 
ruler of the people and not the territory. Kingship subsisted as long as strength, in 
the sense of military strength, and control was maintained.
12
 Gradually, the 
position of the Crown changed from an all-powerful active participant in 
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governance to a passive by-stander. From 1215 onwards in England, the Crown‟s 
role was dramatically extinguished by some major events – some of which are 
discussed below. 
 
Under King Richard 1 and his brother King John, England was committed to 
unnecessary wars. While the wars advanced the influence of the kings abroad, 
they heavily affected the ministers and the barons who had to work hard to 
provide funding, and the public who had to contribute heavily in taxes and levies 
to support the wars. The barons were bitter over the burden of taxation and feudal 
obligations. They began preparations for revolt if the King did not accede to laws 
and liberties that they demanded. Realizing that there were no other options, the 
King assented to their demands (Articles of Barons), which then were reduced to a 
charter.
13
 In 1215, the charter was formally recognized and called Magna Carta. 
Some see the Magna Carta as the result of an attempt to reach consensus with the 
rebellious minority.
14
 Regardless, two important principles were enunciated in this 
document. First, the sovereign was as much under the rule of law as his or her 
subjects, and secondly, the rights of individuals took precedence over the personal 
wishes of the sovereign. The Magna Carta was the general declaration of the rule 
of law.   
 
Then there were some major events from the 17
th
 to the 18
th
 centuries. These 
major events affected the relationship of the monarch and parliament. This period 
is referred to as “Glorious Period” and it lasted from 1688 – 1714.15 During the 
“Glorious Period” King William III and Queen Mary II like their predecessors, 
committed Britain to unnecessary wars that were of no direct benefit to the 
country. This incurred debts and caused great anxiety amongst members of 
parliament. In response, the parliament enacted the Act of Settlement 1701, which 
amongst other provisions prohibited Britain from defending foreign territory for 
foreign princes.
16
 The actions of the parliament protected the national interest, and 
concurrently curtailed the powers of the King. 
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By the 18
th
 century the monarchy could only influence parliament. Ministers 
became powerful and their role was seen as more than advisors to the Crown. The 
sovereign‟s obligation was to accept their advice despite how unpalatable it 
appeared to the sovereign.
17
 By the 19
th
 century the sovereign was no longer in a 
position to oppose a determined government. First, such a situation was 
contributed to by rising power and influence of the press and various interest 
groups focused on different issues and causes, which began shaping political 
agendas and gradually dividing Britain between reformers and conservatives.  
These dynamics developed into the party system which further restricted the 
powers of the sovereign. A government enjoying a parliamentary majority and 
maintaining discipline over its members was able to make a sovereign accept its 
resolution. Second, when the Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867 were passed, they 
changed the electoral system, created more seats in the House of Commons, and 
enabled more individuals to vote. The focus of the representatives was on their 
constituency and party politics. As stated above, when a powerful political party 
or parties were determined and resolute on issues, it was difficult for the Crown to 
exercise discretion in terms of decision-making. Consequently, this drastically 
undermined the sovereigns‟ power.18  
 
At the dawn of the 20
th
 century Queen Victoria became the longest serving 
monarch, eclipsing 63 years when she died in 1901. During her reign the 
monarchy went through a major functional transformation from one of having a 
major role in the national politics to that of performing a symbolic role.
19
 The 
historical reasons for curtailing the powers of the Crown lay in the fact that these 
continuously exercised powers were not in the best interest of the people. Hence, 
gradually there was a change from reference to, and recognition of, the Crown as 
a sovereign to the government. Logically, a government is the representative of 
people making people the ultimate sovereigns. The constitutional principles in the 
UK and other Commonwealth countries, which are not republic or which do not 
have their own monarchies, still use the Crown instead of the state. The Crown 
has two political personalities.  
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5.4 PERSONALITY OF THE CROWN 
 
A human person possesses two personalities, namely human and legal 
personalities.  These personalities do not necessarily coincide with each other.
20
 
The Crown also has these personalities. A king or queen is a human having the 
natural capacity on one hand, and being both the head and representative of the 
state on the other. This highlights the distinction between the natural and political 
capacity of the Crown. The natural capacity refers to the mortal body that is 
subject to infirmities that come by nature or accident, and imbecility of infancy 
and old age.
21
 This refers to the attributes of the Crown as a human person. The 
Crown also has political and legal attributes, which are categorized as corporation 
sole and corporation aggregate. 
 
5.4.1 Corporation Sole 
 
The body politic nature of the king is invisible, indivisible, illimitable and cannot 
be born or die of old age or be affected by natural defects and imbecilities of the 
natural body. The king, who is a natural person, is invested with this body politic 
that magnifies and perpetuates its person and identity.
22
 This identity was 
described as a corporation sole. The corporation sole is a concept that originated 
in the 16
th
 century from ecclesiastical law to protect the proprietary interest of the 
church.
23
 The concept establishes a permanent subject and created “an enduring 
estate in parish”.24 The status of corporation sole was adopted and conferred on 
the king or queen in the 17
th
 century to prevent vacancies on the throne and to 
preserve the possessions of the Crown.
25
 Consequently, the transposition of the 
concept to the king provided a permanent metaphysical entity that enabled 
devolution of the king‟s public estate to his successors in office.26 
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A corporation sole is not a formally incorporated entity that arises through 
prerogative or parliamentary grant, but is recognized by the common law of 
England.
27
 The concept was formally recognized in 1861 when the House of 
Lords in A-G v Kohler
28
 explicitly identified the Crown as corporation sole as 
having perpetual succession. A king or queen as corporation sole can own 
property, give orders and impose sanctions. These must not be interpreted as acts 
of a human person but of the Crown. When the king or queen dies, property 
passes to the successor and the successor is also bound by the acts of the 
predecessor. It becomes problematic when colonized territories become 
independent and yet retain the Crown as head of state.
29
  
 
The Crown was previously thought to be indivisible, and the same Crown was 
applied throughout British empires and colonies. Therefore to use corporation sole 
to refer to the king or queen makes sense. Independence of former British 
territories raises the question of whether the Crown, the corporation sole, can be 
separated and divided. Courts have established that once a local government is 
established, the Crown‟s responsibility is devolved to that government.30 This 
recognizes the divisibility of the Crown. But the enduring metaphysical concept of 
corporation sole could not provide for the monarch‟s role that was removed from 
the person of Crown to other persons such as the executive government and the 
parliament.
31
 
 
5.4.2 Corporation Aggregate 
 
The government's obligation to provide appropriate services to the people came 
about through the emergence of society as it gradually changed from that of 
controlled state to provider state,
32
 from a discrete law and order state to a welfare 
state, which involves public service, especially with indeterminable functions of 
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providing health, education, social security and infrastructural services.
33
 The 
exercise of the Crown‟s power that was transferred to other bodies that did not 
deserve the analogous privileges and immunities, began causing problems.
34
  
There was a need for an all embracing concept.  
 
Maitland, in 1900, in an attempt to address the theoretical vacuum, stated that the 
term Crown not only referred to royal corporation sole but also to the King and 
the Commonwealth.
35
 He regarded the Crown as a corporation aggregate. The 
idea of a corporation aggregate was suggested to include public bodies that 
conduct themselves like the Crown or carry out activities that were supposed to be 
performed by the Crown. The corporation aggregate refers to an incorporated 
group having several members as oppose to corporation sole that refers to “an 
incorporated series of successive persons having a sole member”.36 The difficulty 
with the concept of corporation aggregate, is determining whether an entity is a 
public body. 
 
Different criteria are used to determine a public body under common law. Public 
function is one of the tests being used to assess whether an entity is a public body. 
In essence, the test determines whether an entity performs a public function. 
Although seen to be problematic,
37
 the public function test is still being applied 
today to determine whether an entity is a public body. Further, courts under 
common law also apply a “control test” to determine the nature and degree of 
control that a minister or government department exerts over a body to determine 
whether it comes under the umbrella of the Crown.
38
 Usually, a body that is able 
to exercise significant discretion which is independent of ministerial discretion, or 
discretion of a government department, is not a public body. Control in this 
context refers to a de jure and not de facto control.
39
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Many private sector entities that are performing public functions or are controlled 
by a government department, can easily qualify as public bodies applying the two 
tests. Consequently, the Australian High Court went further by taking a pragmatic 
and yet restrictive approach by asking the question of whether “a body performing 
a particular function enjoy the privileges and immunities of the Crown”.40 In 
actuality the Crown immunity test merely complements the two common law tests 
to determine whether an entity is a public body. To prove whether an entity is 
entitled to “Crown immunity” or is subject to public scrutiny, the two common 
law tests are to be applied to determine whether it is a public body. This is further 
discussed below. 
 
5.5  RELATIONSHIP OF THE CROWN AND STATE OWNED 
ENTERPRISE 
 
The three tests, namely, the control and public purpose tests and whether a body 
enjoys immunities of Crown must be examined in their context. First, Crown 
immunity or protection does not only apply to public bodies but private persons. 
That means that Crown immunity is not a conclusive test to determine whether an 
entity is a public body. For example private contractors who are not servants or 
agents of the Crown are entitled to Crown immunity.
41
 The protection is given in 
these situations where the interest of the Crown would be prejudiced if the act of 
private persons, acting on behalf of the Crown, are held to be subject to 
legislation. 
 
Legislation may specifically provide whether an SOE is entitled or not entitled to 
Crown immunity, or provide that an SOE represents or not represents the Crown. 
For example, legislation in Queensland and New South Wales clearly declares 
that SOEs do not represent the state.
42
 NZ‟s State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 is 
silent on the matter. Even with a clear stipulation, Crown immunity in Australia 
would not take an immediate effect in the light of the decision in Bropho v 
Western Australia
43
. The decision of the court made it no longer necessary for 
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statutes to provide that the state is bound to a particular declaration on state 
immunity. This therefore means that in considering state immunity in the light of 
statutory provisions different circumstances including the content and purpose of 
the legislative provisions and the characteristics of the body must be identified in 
determining whether an entity is entitled to the Crown‟s immunity.44  
 
It logically follows that even if an entity is subject to the Crown‟s immunity it 
would not be considered to be a public body unless other circumstance are taken 
into account to recognize the entity as a public body before the Crown immunity 
applies. In such circumstance the degree of control and the nature of the function 
of the SOE would determine whether SOEs are public bodies and therefore 
entitled to Crown immunity. It is clear with government departments that they 
attract immunity when they are exercising the powers of the government. SOEs 
however are not automatically entitled to Crown immunity even with the 
expressed provision of their immunity. Whether they are entitled to Crown 
immunity would depend on the degree of control by government or the nature of 
function that they perform. 
 
In looking at the degree of control by government one is substantially determining 
the extent of control that government has over an SOE and the independence that 
the SOE has in performing its function. The government‟s substantial control over 
an SOE is significant in determining whether an SOE is a public body and 
therefore entitled to Crown immunity. Control by government includes (chapter 
2): 
 
a. the power to appoint directors of SOEs; 
b. the extent of powers of shareholding ministers; 
c. the ability of government ministers to direct the board of SOEs; 
d. exemption of the entity from paying tax; 
e. the obligation to execute functions of public character; and 
f. the power to pass by-laws. 
 
Further, the nature of an SOE‟s function may also determine whether an SOE may 
be entitled to Crown immunity, which may be attracted to some activities but not 
                                                          
44
  Bropho v Western Australia (1990) 171 CLR 1 at 23.  
 79 
all. SOEs that are involved largely in business and commercial activities may not 
attract Crown immunity. Commercial undertakings are within the ambit of the 
private sector where competitive neutrality is a norm. The success of an SOE 
would depend on effective competition. Extending Crown immunity would 
disrupt the forces of free market that ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of an 
organization.
45
 This is true in situations where SOEs are exposed to external 
market forces and do not have a monopoly over the market. SOEs may also 
undertake several government services under community service obligations, not 
for profit under the direction of the government with government subsidization. It 
is still arguable whether an SOE is entitled to Crown immunity when performing 
community service obligations. The issue here is whether the entire SOE‟s 
activities are focused on commercial or community services and not sporadic 
community service obligations performed once a year. 
 
An SOE that has substantial control by government and has a major part of its 
activities “public purpose oriented” meets both the common law control test and 
the public purpose test respectively, and therefore it is a public body. As a public 
body it is subject to public scrutiny by public institutions such as an ombudsman 
commission and public accounts committee (unless being excluded by expressed 
provision in a statute). However, a statutory provision making an SOE entitled to 
Crown immunity does not in itself necessarily make the entity a public body and 
consequently subject to public scrutiny. 
 
SOEs are difficult to determine even after applying the above tests. For example, 
in NZ, an SOE is not an emanation of the Crown or state, however it is publicly 
owned. Applying the concept of control as discussed above (and chapter 2) it is 
clear that the government controls SOEs. Understandably, the Court of Appeal in 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Medical Council of NZ
46
 considered an SOE 
as part of the Crown.  This is further confirmed by the fact that SOEs are subject 
to the Public Finance Act 1975, the Ombudsman Act 1975 and the Official 
Information Act 1982. Conversely, it may be argued that SOEs are commercial 
entities and have operational independence; therefore they are not public bodies. 
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Further, the fact that they are subject to public laws is a policy decision and must 
not be taken into account to determine its categorization as a public body.
47
 The 
opposing arguments are cogent, leaving the issue of whether an SOE is a public 
body in a conundrum. However, what is clear is that corporatisation puts SOEs on 
a commercial footing while maintaining public ownership (chapter 6). Hence, 
SOEs are required to perform the public function of providing services to the 
people.  
 
5.6 THE CROWN AND THE STATE  
 
Many commonwealth countries use the term state instead of the Crown. Hence, 
legal personality is imposed on the state and not the Crown, and the state serves as 
a central organizing principle of government. According to Article One of 
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 1933 the state must 
possess four characteristics of a permanent population, a defined territory, a 
government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
48
 What is a 
state in the context of a society? As noted earlier, social contract theory states that 
people surrender their rights to the state and the state becomes a sovereign. 
Sovereign is identified with the common interest and will of the people, and this 
means it is infallible, indivisible, illimitable and unrepresentable. Government 
therefore is not a sovereign.
49
 Consequently the Crown, the head of the 
government, is not a sovereign but a part of the state. The government, as an agent 
of the state, has a fiduciary duty to protect the rights and interests of individuals.
50
 
By submitting their will to the state, individuals inculcate in the state public power 
to protect their rights and therefore they legitimize the state‟s intervention in the 
life of a society. Thus, the state serves as a central organizing principle of 
government. For example, section 99 of PNG‟s Constitution provides that the 
authority and jurisdiction of the people shall be exercised by the national 
government. The representative of the Queen is part of the government and 
performs only the ceremonial role (see chapter 8). Therefore state in PNG is a 
                                                          
47
  Joseph, above n 24 at 594.  
48
  Bishop, W. W., International Law: Cases and Materials, (3
rd
 edn., 1971) 301. See also 
discussion in McCorquodale, R. and Dixon, M., Cases and Materials on International Law, 
(4
th
 edn., 2003) 136 – 138. 
49
  Above n 4 at 125 - 125. 
50
  Freeman, M. D. A., Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence, (8
th 
edn., 2008) 107  - 109. 
 81 
collegiate governing entity that represents people and functions through the 
government and its agents. 
 
The use of the term state instead of Crown solves problems that are associated 
with the application of corporation sole personality of the Crown in a foreign 
state. However, states in any jurisdictions participate through other persons to 
perform public functions. Consequently, questions of whether an entity that 
performs a public function is a public body, or whether persons who perform 
public functions are entitled to state immunity, lingers and needs to be answered 
on a case-by-case basis. In these cases the two common law tests are still relevant. 
Some of these issues are revisited in chapter 15.  
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
 
There are different theoretical explanations of the formation of the state. In the 
UK the Crown is used instead of the state. The Crown has a long history dating to 
the medieval era. Over decades, the Crown developed two legal personalities. 
First, the corporation sole was used to transpose to the king a permanent 
metaphysical entity that would provide for the devolution of the king‟s public 
estate to the king‟s successor in office. It becomes problematic when former 
colonies of Britain become independent and maintain the Crown as head of state 
and when the role of Crown is extended and delegated in a welfare society.  
Second, a corporation aggregate was adopted to bring within the ambit of the 
Crown those bodies that perform delegated responsibilities; however the concept 
has its problems. Notwithstanding, the different tests developed to identify public 
bodies, and with different pronunciations in legislation and case laws, have left 
the question unanswered. 
 
The role of the state becomes an issue when it extends its functions into the 
private sector domain with the use of SOEs that have the status of a separate legal 
personality. Several questions can be posed about SOEs. Are they public bodies? 
Can the act of directors, managers and responsible ministers bind the state? Can 
the officers and responsible ministers be subjected to public scrutiny? Can officers 
including the minister responsible for SOEs enjoy state immunity? These issues 
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have not conclusively been dealt with. Chapter 15 discusses whether SOEs are 
public bodies for purposes of public scrutiny in PNG. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
 
CORPORATISATION AND STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
History is rich with instances of the state using its power to enter into the private 
sector domain. The state‟s participation in the economy is not a new phenomenon1 
and can be traced, firstly, back to the Renaissance
2
. State participation in the 
economy can even be seen during the biblical era where Joseph (the Prime 
Minister) erected a big government warehouse in the first seven good years in 
Egypt in anticipation of the next seven years of drought.
3
 Furthermore, state 
participation in the economy can be seen after the disastrous recession of 1929 
and during World War One and Two where governments took control of the 
economy.
4
 Particularly, after World War Two there was wide spread growth of 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) in industrialized countries.
5
 The increase in SOEs 
was made possible by nationalization. Tonnielli explains that: 
 
The policies [of nationalization] aimed, on one hand, at „the removal of sectoral 
imbalance and catching-up with full employment‟ and, on the other, at „the enlargement 
of the public sector in order to down-size monopolistic and rent positions as well as to 
build infrastructures and strengthen the interest and welfare of the community‟.6  
 
In recent years, due to increasing globalization, immense pressure is placed on the 
public sector to be economically efficient. Consequently, the public sectors have 
moved away from nationalization to commercialization by adopting private sector 
management techniques and structure. Commercialization involves 
corporatisation and privatization.
7
 Corporatisation is a hybrid of nationalization  
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and privatization; hence, it is seen as a precursor to privatization.
8
 Studies have 
shown that SOEs have not performed as well as private corporations in terms of 
economic efficiency and profitability;
9
 it is this, which has justified privatization - 
privatization is seen as a solution. Professor Wiltshire described corporatisation as 
a “holding paddock for enterprise destined for privatization”10. Others see 
corporatisation not as a means to an end (privatization) and that corporatised 
entities such as SOEs are part of the corporate landscape and they have an 
important role to play in society.
11
  
 
This chapter discusses definition and rationality of corporatisation, and looks at 
corporatisation experiences in Australia and New Zealand (NZ). The chapter is 
important as it puts in perspective the rationale for the state‟s continuous 
participation in the economy and also provides a prelude to chapter 7. 
 
6.2 DEFINITIONS OF CORPORATISATION 
 
Corporatisation is defined as a process whereby change is made to the 
organization rather than transfer of ownership,
12
 particularly conversion of 
“government business enterprise into a firm which is similar in its objectives to a 
private firm while retaining government ownership of the enterprise”13. In other 
words corporatisation enables “trading activities”14 under government 
                                                          
8
  Political interference is inherent in corporatised entities, consequently making the call for 
privatization persuasive. See Farrar, J. and McCabe, B., “Corporatisation, Corporate 
Governance and the Deregulation of the Public Sector economy,” (March 1995) 6(1), Public 
Law Review, 24. 
9
  Boardman, A.E. and Vining, A. R., “Ownership and Performance in Competitive 
Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed and State Owned 
Enterprises,” (April 1989) 32(1), Journal of Law and Economics, 1. Studies have also shown 
that reform through commercialization and privatization has adjusted the characteristics of 
boards of SOEs and increased their effectiveness. See Bozec, R., Zeghal, D. and Boujenoui, 
A., “The Effect of the Reform of Canadian State-Owned Enterprises on Major Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms,” (2004) 63(2), Australian Journal of Public Administration, 79. 
10
  Wiltshire, K., “Privatisation and Corporatisation,” in Stewart, R. G., (ed.) Government and 
Business Relations in Australia, (1994) 202 at 217. 
11
  Skeel, D. A. Jr., “Virtual Privatization: Governance Reform for Government Owned Firms,” 
in Whincop, M. J., (ed.) From Bureaucracy to Business Enterprise: Legal and Policy Issues 
in the Transformation of Government Services, (2003) 91 -92. 
12
  As opposed to privatization where public ownership is transferred to private ownership either 
through selling assets or selling shares. See Duncan, I. and New Zealand Institute of 
Economic Research, Public Enterprise Reform in New Zealand since 1984, (Working paper 
91/10, 1991) 16. 
13
  Allars, M., “Private Law But Public Power: Removing Administrative Law Review from 
Government Business Enterprises,” (March 1995) 6(1), Public Law Review, 44 at 45. 
14
  Trading activities refers to buying and selling of goods and services at a price. 
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departments to be transferred to corporatised entities.
15
 Section 13 of 
Queensland‟s Government Owned Corporation Act 1993 (GOC Act) defines 
corporatisation broadly as a structural reform process:  
 
a. where the conditions and structure of a designated government entity is changed so that it 
operates on a commercial basis in a competitive environment; 
b. which maintains public ownership; and  
c. which allows government, as an owner on behalf of the people to set financial and non-
financial targets and community service obligations.  
 
In a narrow legal sense corporatisation is a process whereby “the government 
transfers some aspects of its operation to an incorporated entity. The entity may be 
incorporated under special Act of parliament, as with statutory corporation or [as 
in the case of state company,] under Corporations Law”16. Hence, corporatisation 
does not necessarily involve incorporation under company legislation. These 
definitions highlight the fact that ownership remains with the government, 
however the conditions and structure of an entity are changed to enable certain 
government activities be performed separately from direct government control, to 
ensure they operate in a competitive market and/or are efficient. However, the 
government is required to monitor the board and management of SOEs on behalf 
of the people. 
 
In a democratic society, government is the representative of the people. It is the 
trustee shareholder in SOEs acting on behalf of the residual owners - the people. 
Management is accountable to the board and the board in turn is accountable to 
the government. Ultimately, the government is accountable to the people through 
parliament. In addition, an SOE may be subjected to scrutiny by public 
institutions such as an ombudsman commission, or auditor general. This would 
depend on the rules and legislative requirements of a jurisdiction. 
 
6.3 RATIONALITY OF CORPORATISATION  
 
There are different ideologies that influence corporatisation. Two of them play a 
prominent role in influencing the drive to corporatisation. First, in socialist 
                                                          
15
  Not only trading activities are corporatised, but other public sector organizations which are 
involved in performing social, welfare and regulatory functions. This shows that an 
organization need not be seeking profit to enjoy the benefits of corporatisation. Through 
corporatisation an organization can be efficient and accountable to achieve other outcomes.  
16
  Bottomley, S., “Corporatisation and Accountability: the Case of Commonwealth Government 
Companies,” (March 1997) 7(2), Australian Journal of Corporate Law, 156 at 156. 
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countries public ownership continues to dominate the national economy and 
remains influenced by Karl Marx‟s socialist and communist ideologies. Marx 
foresaw a time in history where the common good of the society would be best 
served when the capitalist system being replaced with socialist and communist 
systems in which public ownership is combined with heightened productivity.
17
 
Communism advocates a planned national economy and public ownership. China, 
North Korea and Cuba are conspicuous examples of countries that continue to 
largely embrace Marx‟s socialist ideology. The national economies of these 
countries are dominated by public ownership, and often, socialist objectives are 
pursued at economic cost. Although socialist objectives are noble and benefit 
society, the issue of economic efficiency, and quality of service, including the 
waste of public money through lack of managerial accountability and bureaucratic 
control of the public sector, pressured governments to reconsider public 
ownership. The solution to these problems is to introduce corporate autonomy and 
remove government control of public enterprise. Consequently, Russia and China 
(as early as the late 1970s and during the 1980s) have gradually moved towards 
adopting a capitalist philosophy of market economy.  
 
The problems in public ownership have, secondly, led to the recent movement of 
corporatisation and privatization influenced by the current economic literature 
about the agency theory of the firm. Agency theory is one of the factors that has 
influenced corporatisation and privatization in NZ and Australia.
18
 The theory is 
discussed in chapter 2; however suffice to surmise that separation of ownership 
and control creates an agency problem. Agency cost is incurred in using an agent 
in control of a corporation. Agency cost is severe in public enterprises due to a 
lack of well-defined property rights, absence of external markets, absence of clear 
internal hierarchical governance structure, and clear transparency and 
accountability mechanism. Through corporatisation an attempt is made to adopt 
some of the characteristics analogous to that of private sector enterprise but 
maintaining the ownership. 
 
                                                          
17
  Pipes, R., Property and Freedom, (1
st
 edn., 2000) 55. 
18
  New Zealand Business Roundtable, Jennings, S., Begg, S. and Cameron, R. L., State Owned 
Enterprises: Issues of Ownership and Regulation, (1988) 20 – 22. 
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It is the belief in the superiority of the marketplace and the efficiency in private 
sector corporations that drove the SOE reform process in NZ and Australia.
19
 
Particularly, in NZ corporatisation was meant to establish a corporate form that 
would improve efficiency of SOEs in both commercial and non-commercial 
activities and ensure accountability of management in an attempt to maximise the 
value of SOEs using limited resources.
20
  In doing so SOEs are intended to 
promote the interest of the public by way of benefits through efficient use of 
resources.
21
  
 
Deane
22
 identified six key principles of corporatisation as a basis for the reform of 
SOEs in NZ. Of the six, four of them include clarifying the objectives of 
management, providing management autonomy, improving the monitoring and 
assessment of managers and instituting effective rewards and sanctions for 
managers.
23
 First, the managers of an SOE are meant to have a single and clear 
objective, which would provide a clear and unambiguous direction, assists in 
monitoring, and improves accountability in management. Further this prevents 
inconsistent political pressure being exerted on the managers from time to time. 
This, in the end would ensure that the commercial and non–commercial objectives 
of SOEs‟ are achieved without any excuses from managers about political 
pressure or vague and multiple objectives. 
 
Second, the managers are meant to be given autonomy over the management of 
SOEs, which means to make decisions necessary to meet the objectives of the 
SOE with regard to major investment and strategic decisions, including 
recruitment, remuneration and dismissal and other day-to-day business and affairs 
of the SOE. The government‟s responsibility is to the overall performance of 
SOEs, leaving managers, who have intimate knowledge of the firm to focus on the 
day-to-day operation of the SOE. This is basically to insulate the managers from 
external interference. 
                                                          
19
  Taggart, M., “Corporatisation, Privatization and Public Law,” (June 1991) 2(2), Public Law 
Review, 77 at 79. 
20
  Above n 18 at 2. 
21
  Efficiency requires competition so that it maximizes the benefit to the consumers. See Wells, 
P. K., The New Zealand State Owned Enterprise Model: Issues of Competition and Social 
Obligation, (vol. 6, no. 2, November 1998) 67. 
22
  Deane, R. S., Corporatisation and Privatization: a Discussion of the Issues, (1989) 6 – 8. 
23
  Two other key elements of the reform of SOEs include increasing the competitive neutrality 
of input markets, and increasing competitive pressures on output markets. 
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Third, management should not be left without scrutiny. Their performance needs 
to be closely monitored against the stated objectives of the SOE and it is the role 
of the board of directors to ensure that the managers are performing their duties 
and fulfilling the objectives of the SOE. The minister monitors the overall 
performance of SOEs with Treasury providing assistance in the monitoring of 
financial matters. In addition, management must provide a statement of corporate 
intent and half yearly and annual reports to the minister. 
 
And fourthly, as incentives for managers, there should be rewards and sanctions. 
Salaries are linked to performance with bonuses for good performance and 
dismissal for bad performance as a way of sanction. The rewards and sanctions 
are meant to be a natural follow on from monitoring managers. Although SOEs in 
NZ have undergone reform based on the above model they were not highlighted 
in the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 (SOE Act). 
 
States in Australia adopted similar principles.
24
 For example, s 16 of 
Queensland‟s Government Owned Corporations Act 1993 specifically provides 
that the key principles of corporatisation for an SOE are to clarify its objectives; 
have an autonomous management and authority; be strictly accountable for its 
performance, and be operating in a competitive environment.
25
 Further, s 14 states 
that the overall aim of corporatisation is to enhance economic performance and 
improve the ability of the government to achieve social objectives through 
improving efficiency, effectiveness and accountability.  Corporatised legislation 
gives effect to these principles. 
 
6.4 CORPORATISATION EXPERIENCES 
 
In the last 20 years NZ and Australia subjected the public sector to 
commercialization following the example in the UK, as part of the micro-
economic reform. Commercialization involves promoting structural reform, a 
competitive market, and reforming industrial relations. A private sector model 
was examined to identify characteristics that would be adopted to address high 
                                                          
24
  Hilmer, F.G. and Independent Committee of Inquiry into Competition Policy in Australia, 
National Competition Policy, (1993) 300. 
25
  Government Owned Corporation 1993 (Qld) s, 19. 
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budget deficiencies,
26
 and ensure efficiency of service delivery.
27
 Privatization 
and corporatisation were adopted to address some of these problems. NZ, like the 
UK, favours privatization whereas the Australian states have been reluctant to 
privatize, instead generally finding favour with corporatisation. The prevalent 
view in Australia is that SOEs have an important role to perform and are not a 
mere means to privatization. Corporatisation can ensure “efficient use of 
resources, an appropriate return on public capital and more efficient 
management”.28  
 
The varying views of different jurisdictions are reflected in their SOE legislation. 
NZ‟s State Owned-Enterprises Act 1986 (SOE Act) is a short piece of legislation. 
It only provides for the government‟s control of SOEs and accountability. The 
Government Owned Corporations Act 1993 (Qld) and State Owned Corporations 
Act 1989 (NSW) have more detail than the SOE Act and they provide for the legal 
structure, governance and accountability of SOEs, and provide for both statutory 
corporation and state companies (see chapter 7). Corporatisation (or privatization) 
is motivated by different objectives that depend on prevailing socio-economic and 
political circumstances. NZ was the first country in the South Pacific to embark 
on corporatisation. The discussion below examines further the corporatisation 
experience in NZ. 
 
6.4.1 Corporatisation: New Zealand’s Experience 
 
The fourth Labour Government of 1984-1990 and National Government of 1990-
1999, influenced by British experience, predominantly drove corporatisation in 
 
 
                                                          
26
  Spicer, B., Emanuel, D. M. and Powell, M., Transforming Government Enterprises: 
Managing Radical Organisational Change in Deregulated Environments, (1996) 2; In 
Australia, the Hilmer Committee was tasked to come up with a report on National 
Competition Policy. It recommended elimination of government monopolies and introduction 
of competition in the public sector to improve efficiency; especially those that are involved in 
trading activities. See above n 24 at 124 – 137 and 295. 
27
  Spicer, Emanuel and Powell, above n 26 at 2. 
28
  Farrar, above n 7 at 462 – 463. 
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NZ.
29
 Previously governments traditionally operated through government 
departments and statutory authorities to provide goods and services. Statutory 
authorities were created in situations where provision of goods and service 
required independence from direct control by government, especially for goods 
and services that are provided on a market.
30
 Prior to reform in 1984, the NZ 
Government played a major role in providing administrative and social services 
and owned and operated trading activities until the early 1980s. Government 
participation in trading activities was motivated by a number of factors, which 
include the absence of a domestic private sector, the promotion of public works, 
and inadequate performance of the existing institutions or a combination of these 
factors.
31
  
 
Public sector reform was commenced in 1984. It was initiated by the Treasury‟s 
report “Economic Management”32 that recommended a change to the 
government‟s involvement in trading activities.  Generally, corporatisation was 
undertaken in NZ because of poor productivity and growth performance since the 
mid-1970s, and influence from the western world embracing economic 
liberalization.
33
 In making recommendations for change, Treasury gave its reasons 
for SOEs‟ unsatisfactory performance. First, the objectives of SOEs were vague 
and at times conflicting. They were required to achieve both social and 
commercial objectives without government subsidization of the former, causing 
management to cross–subsidize, incurring costs which resulted in disadvantage to 
SOEs as any gain in commercial activities was lost in cross subsidization. And 
there was an absence of proper guidance in circumstances where there was 
conflict. Second, the special privilege and constraint imposed on SOEs in their 
working environment distorted their performance and their appraisal. And thirdly, 
                                                          
29
  Farrar and McCabe, above n 8 at 27. The National Party stands for the principles, amongst 
others, of private enterprise and reward for individual effort, whereas Labour stand s for more 
government involvement in the economy.  It was a surprise to many when the Labour Party 
initiated and pursued corporatisation and privatization. See New Zealand Labour, “Policy – 
Labour Manifesto 2008,” (2008) in New Zealand Labour,  < 
http://labourparty.org.nz/policy/> at 5 October 2009; New Zealand National Party, “What 
National stands for,” in The National Party, < 
http://www.national.org.nz/About/standsfor.aspx > at 5 October 2009.  
30
  Quiggin, J., “Governance of Public Corporations: Profits and the Public Benefit,” in 
Whincop, M. J., (ed.) From Bureaucracy to Business Enterprise: Legal and Policy issues in 
the Transformation of Government Services, (2003) 28. 
31
  See others also discussed by Duncan, I. and Bollard, A., Corporatisation and Privatization: 
Lessons from New Zealand, (1992) 7. 
32
  New Zealand Treasury, Economic Management, (1984) 279 – 284. 
33
  See others discussed above n 31 at 5 – 6. 
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management was divorced of its mandate to make decisions and was consequently 
not held accountable for the operation of SOEs. These problematic issues require 
solution. 
 
In 1985, the Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas published five key principles as 
part of the program for corporatisation and commercial liberalization.
34
 These 
principles were meant to reorganize state trading activities and improve 
efficiency.
35
 One of the devices utilized in the reorganization and reducing 
problems in SOEs is the SOE Act. Its main objectives are to: “specify principles 
governing the operation of State enterprises; and authorise the formation of 
companies to carry on certain Government activities and control the ownership 
thereof; and establish requirements about the accountability of State enterprises, 
and the responsibility of Ministers”.36 Upon enactment the SOE Act: 
 
a. separates commercial activities from advisory and statutory activities; 
b. provides for a clear statement of objectives with respect to commercial activities; 
c. clarifies the role of the [state] Shareholding Ministers as residual claimant[s]; and 
d. provides explicit contracting between the government and SOEs for those activities 
or services deemed necessary for the government to achieve its social objectives.
37
 
 
Essentially, an SOE is meant to operate as a successful business.
38
 In doing so it 
must be profitable, be a good employer and demonstrate a sense of social 
responsibility. By separating commercial and non-commercial objectives, it is 
intended that SOEs would focus principally on commercial objectives.
39
 Section 7 
of the SOE Act, provides that if government advises the SOE to undertake non-
commercial activity, it must be compensated for doing so.
40
 This is intended to 
ensure that the SOE operates on an equal footing with other private sector 
enterprise and not to be given any preferential treatment because it is government 
owned.
41
 Also, this demonstrates the fact that the whole intention of the SOE Act 
                                                          
34
  See the five key principles in Spicer, Emanuel and Powell, above n 26; See also Wettenhall, 
R., “Corporation and Corporatization: Administrative History Perspective,” (March 1995) 
6(1), Public Law Review, 7 at 9. 
35
  These principles are provided under s 4 of the State-Owned Enterprise Act 1986 (NZ).  
36
  See the preamble of the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 (NZ). 
37
  Spicer, Emanuel and Powell, above n 26 at 183 -184. 
38
  State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 4.  
39
  Galvin, B. and Victoria University of Wellington, Institute of Policy Studies, Corporatisation 
and Privatisation: Completing the Revolution? (papers presented at a seminar held on 3 
September 1987 in the Michael Fowler Centre, 1987) 2 – 3. 
40
  State-Owned Enterprise Act 1986, 7. 
41
  Alam, M., Wells, P. K. and University of Waikato, Dept. of Accounting, Control Systems of 
Government-Owned Business Enterprises: a Critical analysis of the New Zealand Model, 
(Working paper series no. 62, 1999) 8; see also above n 18 at 7. 
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is to establish the SOE as a successful commercial enterprise. The implication is 
that the SOE is not obliged to provide social services, and its decision not to do so 
may not be subject to judicial review as it is a commercial decision.
42
 An SOE can 
then focus on the main commercial objectives which can easily be measured, and 
eradicate chances of any excuse of having too many objectives, or of objectives 
being affected by government directions.
43
 Theoretically s 7 can also allow 
government to intervene anytime using social objectives as a justifying factor.
44
  
 
Many have acknowledged that corporatisation has rolled back the role of the state 
in the production of goods and services, exposed SOEs to market forces, and 
allowed government to focus on its traditional role of governance.
45
 The 
concurrent effect of rolling back the role of the state improves the performance of 
corporatised entities; making them become competitive in the market. Despite the 
good intentions of corporatising, which are to enable management to emulate the 
competitive management strategies of private corporation so that the outcome of 
its performance would reflect productivity in the form of efficiency and/or 
profitability, corporatised entities can never fully emulate the characteristic of the 
private sector (see chapter 7). Despite this, corporatised entities have an important 
role to play in any society. The heavy emphasis on the use of private sector 
standard shrouds the real essence of importing efficiency into the public sector. 
As King noted “the use of private sector benchmarks to assess public firms 
obscures the real issue of efficiency: how can the public managers of government 
business enterprises [or government owned corporations] best be motivated to act 
in the broader interests of society?”46  
 
 
                                                          
42
  Northern Regional Health Authority v Human Rights Commission [1998] 2 NZLR 218; The 
Wellington Regional Council v Post office Bank Ltd, High Court, Wellington, 22 December 
1987, CP 720/87. 
43
  Above n 18 at 7. 
44
  Above n 41 at 10. 
45
  Richardson R., “Governance: Promoting Sound Development – Management Lessons from 
New Zealand,” in Asian Development Bank (ed.), Governance: Promoting Sound 
Development Management, (1997) 21 at 28. 
46
  King, S. P., “Corporatisation and the Behaviour of Government Owned Corporation,” in 
Whincop, M. J., (ed.) From Bureaucracy to Business Enterprise: Legal and Policy Issues in 
the Transformation of Government Services, (2003) 43 at 45. 
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NZ has immensely benefited, in terms of profitability immediately after the 
reform.
47
 The current Government‟s expectation of SOEs is profitability.48 
Profitability is an inherent consequence of the efficiency of the corporation. SOEs 
also have a community service obligation and they are required to be efficient in 
pursuing these obligations; however, previous situations experienced in 
government departments and statutory entities are still present in SOEs such as 
control by government. Hence, efficiency can be compromised. As a result, there 
was a recommendation for revamping of the public sector through privatization,
49
 
which NZ has been pursuing since the 1990s. The advantage in government 
involvement in SOEs is that it ensures community service obligations are pursued. 
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The general move towards commercialisation and particularly corporatisation of 
the public sector is influenced by a number of factors. The most important factors 
include the collapse of former planned economies and economic inefficiencies 
experienced in public sector enterprises. Corporatisation maintains public 
ownership and provides mechanisms whereby economic efficiency is improved. 
Further, the process adopts private sector management technique and structure 
into the public sector, to ensure efficiency and/or profitability. Governments that 
attempt to generate profit, concurrently ensuring public accountability appear to 
face predicaments. The inevitability of maintaining public ownership in 
corporatised entities is continuous government influence in SOEs either direct or 
indirect and that may hinder profit maximisation. 
 
In NZ, economic efficiency and profitability were the main objectives that drove 
the Labour Government to corporatise many of its public enterprises. Many 
problems in the public sector still sprout given the fact that there is still public 
ownership with multiple interests. The fact that public ownership is maintained 
means that an SOE may not fully realize the objectives of efficiency and 
profitability. Corporatisation experience in NZ has indicated that although 
improvement has been evident, the job is far from complete. Consequently, NZ 
                                                          
47
  Kelsey, J., Rolling Back the State: Privatization of Power in Aotearoa, (1993) 30 – 31. 
48
  Power, S., “Ministers seek better performance from SOEs,” (Port Moresby, 9th April 2009) in 
The National, < http://www.national.org.nz/Article.aspx?ArticleId=29712 > at 5 October 
2009. 
49
  Farrar and McCabe, above n 8 at 27. 
 94 
has proceeded ahead with privatisation of selected public enterprises. Not meeting 
the standards of private sector corporations must not make corporatised entities be 
seen as inferior. They have an important role to play in societies. 
 
 95 
CHAPTER 7: 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC SECTOR 
ENTERPRISES 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter discusses corporate governance in public sector corporations in New 
Zealand (NZ) and Australia, particularly focusing on the Crown Entities Act 2004 
(CE Act) and State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 (SOE Act) for NZ, the 
Government Owned Corporations Act 1993 (GOC Act), Queensland and the State 
Owned Corporations Act 1989 (SOC Act) for New South Wales (NSW).  The 
chapter is important as it discusses the roles and responsibilities of various 
stakeholders in the governance of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in NZ and two 
major Australian states, and identifies persons who are in control of SOEs. The 
discussion here will assist with comparing and contrasting corporate governance 
in the public sector in Papua New Guinea. This chapter discusses corporate 
governance of the public sector in NZ, followed by Queensland and NSW. Then a 
comparison of corporate governance in public and private sector corporations 
follows before the conclusion. For the purposes of this chapter SOE includes a 
government owned corporation (GOC) and state owned corporation (SOC). In 
discussing SOEs in Queensland and NSW, GOC and SOC is used respectively.  
 
7.2  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES - 
NEW ZEALAND 
 
The legal structure, governance and accountability of SOEs in NZ are provided 
under the SOE Act and the CE Act. SOEs that are listed in the SOE Act are 
publicly owned and independent commercial entities. The SOE Act introduces a 
business model for the trading function of the NZ Government, with the intention 
that these SOEs listed under the SOE Act would generate annual returns to the 
public accounts (see chapter 6).
1
 These SOEs have enabling legislation and are 
incorporated under the Companies Act 1993. On the other hand the CE Act 
applies to statutory corporations and state companies and generally provides for 
                                                          
1
  Joseph, P. A., Constitutional & Administrative Law in New Zealand, (3
rd
 edn., 2007) 593 – 
594. 
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non–commercial entities. The discussion begins with corporate governance in 
non-commercial SOEs followed by commercial SOEs.  
 
7.2.1 Corporate Governance in Non-Commercial State Owned Enterprises 
 
SOEs under the CE Act are called “Crown entities” and they are non-commercial 
public enterprises (although some can be involved in limited commercial 
activities). Before 2004, Crown entities comprised of ad hoc statutory bodies that 
were governed under constituent legislation. The only standard provision was 
under the Public Finance Act 1989 that provides for reporting by each Crown 
entity and other legislative provisions were under constituent Acts.
2
 Section 3 of 
the Public Finance Act defines Crown agency but did not provide for list of 
bodies that come within the definitional ambit. This resulted in the enactment of 
CE Act. The Act was intended to provide “...a consistent framework for the 
establishment, governance, and operation of Crown entities and to clarify 
accountability relationships between Crown entities, their board members, their 
responsible Ministers on behalf of the Crown, and the House of 
Representatives...”3 Crown entities were arranged under five categories.4 They 
are: 
 
a. Statutory entities 
b. Crown entity companies (CEC) 
c. Crown entity subsidiaries (CES) 
d. School boards of trustees 
e. Tertiary education institutions 
 
CEC and CES are incorporated under the Companies Act 1993 and they also have 
enabling legislation. Crown entity subsidiaries are controlled by other Crown 
entities, whether by CEC or statutory entities. Statutory entities are also classified 
into three categories.
5
 They are: 
 
a. Crown agents 
b. Autonomous Crown entities (ACE) 
                                                          
2
  Goddard, D.J. and New Zealand Law Society, Crown Entities Act 2004, (2005) 3. 
3
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 3. 
4
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 7. 
5
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 7 (1)(a). 
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c. Independent Crown entities (ICE) 
 
Crown agents must respond to the direction of the responsible ministers to give 
effect to government policy and they are under a statutory duty to comply.
6
 A 
responsible minister may direct an ACE to have regard to government policy; 
however the ACE is under no statutory obligation to comply,
7
 whereas ICEs are 
generally independent of government policy.
8
 Statutory entities and CEC are 
listed under Schedule 1 and 2 of the CE Act, respectively. Corporate governance 
in statutory entities and CEC are discussed below. 
 
7.2.1.1 The Government 
 
The CE Act specifically prescribes the role of responsible ministers. The role of 
responsible ministers for CEC and statutory companies is to oversee and manage 
the relationship between the state and Crown entities and perform their statutory 
responsibilities. Statutory responsibilities include:
9
 
 
a. appointment and removal of directors; 
b. giving of directions to the entity; 
c. review the operations and performance of the entity; 
d. request information from the entity; 
e. participate in the process of setting and monitoring the entity's strategic 
direction and targets; and 
f. other matters provided in the CE Act or another Act.  
 
In statutory entities, the responsible ministers can also determine the remuneration 
of some members.
10
 Some of these roles of the responsible ministers are further 
discussed below. Clearly, the role of government in Crown entities is a full “hands 
on” approach. This is understandable given the essential services that such entities 
are providing. 
 
 
                                                          
6
  Crown Entities Act 2004, ss 103 and 114. 
7
  Crown Entities Act 2004, ss 104, 113 and 114. 
8
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 105. 
9
  Crown Entities Act 2004, ss 27 and 88. 
10
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 27(1). 
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7.2.1.2 The Board 
 
Responsible ministers appoint members of the board of the Crown agent and 
autonomous Crowns entity whereas the Governor General, on the 
recommendation of the responsible minister, appoints board members of an ICE.
11
  
The candidate for the appointment must be a person who has the appropriate 
knowledge, skills and experience to achieve the objective of a statutory 
corporation. In addition, the appointment must aim at promoting diversity on the 
board.
12
 The responsible ministers may use their discretion to remove a board 
member of a Crown agent at anytime;
13
 however, they cannot simply remove 
board members of ACEs or ICEs. The minister must justify by reasons the 
removal, as a decision to remove may be subjected to judicial review.
14
 There is 
more constraint with the removal of a board member of an ICE.  The minister may 
only remove the board member upon just cause, which the legislation states 
includes misconduct, inability to perform the functions of office, or neglect or 
breach of duties.
15
  
 
The appointment of board members of CECs must meet any statutory 
requirements, including the company‟s constitution.16 The shareholding ministers 
must appoint persons with appropriate knowledge, skills and experience and also 
the appointment should promote diversity in board membership.
17
 It is not clear 
under the Act who appoints chief executive officers (CEOs). 
 
The duties of board members are clearly specified under the CE Act. Section 25 
provides that the board of a statutory entity is the governing body and must 
exercise powers and perform functions in accordance with the CE Act and the 
entity‟s Act. Board members have collective duties to ensure that: 
 
a. the entity must act consistently with the objectives, functions, statement of 
intent, and output agreement;
18
  
b. functions must be performed efficiently, effectively, and consistently with  
                                                          
11
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 28(1) (2). 
12
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 29. 
13
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 36. 
14
  Crown Entities Act 2004, ss 37 and 41. 
15
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 40. 
16
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 89(1). 
17
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 89(2). 
18
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 49. 
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spirit of service to the public;
19
 and  
c. the entity must operate in a financially responsible manner.20  
 
In addition, board members have an individual duty: 
 
a. to comply with the CE Act and the entity‟s Act;21  
b. to act with honesty and integrity;22  
c. to act in good faith and not at the expense of the entity's interests;23  
d. to act with reasonable care, diligence and skill;24 and  
e. not to disclose information.25  
 
Collective duties are owed to the responsible ministers. Failure to perform these 
duties would enable the responsible minister to take action,
26
 whereas individual 
duties are owed to both responsible ministers and the Crown entities. The minister 
can remove a board member whereas a Crown entity can only take court action 
against a board member for violation of individual duties. 
 
Further, CECs are managed by, and under the direction and supervision of, the 
board in accordance with s 128 of the Companies Act 1993.
27
 Board members 
have a collective duty to act consistently with objectives, functions, statement of 
intent, and output agreement,
28
 and they have individual duties to comply with the 
CE Act and the entity's Act.
29
 Further, individual members are subject to duties 
under Part 8 of the Companies Act 1993.
30
 Board members are accountable to the 
shareholding ministers.
31
 The collective duties of directors are owed to 
                                                          
19
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 50. 
20
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 51. 
21
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 53. 
22
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 54. 
23
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 55. 
24
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 56. 
25
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 57. 
26
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 58. 
27
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 86. 
28
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 92. 
29
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 95. 
30
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 87(3). 
31
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 87(2). 
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shareholding ministers,
32
 whereas individual responsibilities are owed to both 
shareholding ministers and the Crown entities.
33
  
 
7.2.1.3 Accountability 
 
There are several ways of ensuring accountability in Crown entities, apart from 
providing a standard for individual and collective duties of board members. First, 
the CE Act provides that every Crown entity has to have a statement of intent 
(SOI). Generally, a SOI promotes the public accountability of Crown entities.
34
 
Section 141 of the CE Act clearly specifies what is to be included in an SOI of 
each Crown entity. It is the responsibility of Crown entities to prepare SOI before 
the start of each financial year.
35
 The ministers participate in the draft of the SOI 
by specifying the particular form that an SOI should have, or propose any changes 
that should be made to an SOI.
36
 The changes suggested by the minister must be 
incorporated.
37
 Even if there are any changes made by the Crown entities after the 
ministers‟ endorsement, the ministers must be informed of the changes so that 
they can make any suggestions (if any).
38
   
 
Second, at the end of each financial year Crown entities are required to prepare 
and submit annual reports to the responsible ministers.
39
 Section 151 of the CE 
Act provides for the form and content of the annual report. Third, ministers have 
greater power to review the operation and performance of Crown entities and 
obtain information from them. The responsible ministers have the power to review 
the operations and performances of Crown entities anytime.
40
 The Crown entity 
must provide the minister with the information required. Further, the minister can 
at anytime request information about the operation and performance of the entity, 
which must be provided.
41
 
 
                                                          
32
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 94(1). 
33
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 95(2). 
34
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 138. 
35
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 139(1). 
36
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 145.  
37
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 147. 
38
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 148. 
39
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 150.  
40
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 132. 
41
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 133. 
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Fourth, all Crown entities are subject to whole of government direction from the 
Minister of State Services and the Minister of Finance jointly. The direction of the 
two ministers is given only to support the whole of government approach and to 
improve public services, and is not given to individual Crown entities.
42
 Even an 
ICE, which is an independent entity, is required to comply with the direction from 
the two ministers. 
 
Finally, Crown entities are audited by the Auditor-General
43
 and are subject to 
financial review by parliamentary Select Committees as part of the annual 
appropriation process. In addition they are subject to the Public Finance Act 
1989,
44
 the Ombudsmen Act 1975 and the Official Information Act 1982.
45
  
 
7.2.2 Corporate Governance in Commercial State Owned Enterprises 
 
As discussed in chapter 6, corporatisation is intended to ensure that SOEs perform 
in an efficient and accountable manner and to become successful businesses by 
meeting their community service and commercial obligations.
46
 Although the 
community service obligation is clearly provided under s 4 of the SOE Act, 
courts, when asked to provide interpretative guidance for the section have given 
prominence to commercial obligations.
47
 This section focuses on the governance 
and accountability under the SOE Act. 
 
7.2.2.1 The Government 
 
The Government owns shares in an SOE through two shareholding ministers,
48
 
namely the Minister of Finance and the responsible Minister.
49
 The shareholding 
ministers are given various powers and functions under the SOE Act apart from 
the ones provided under the Companies Act 1993 as shareholders (see chapter 4). 
                                                          
42
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 107. 
43
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 156. 
44
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 176. 
45
  Crown Entities Act 2004, s 131. 
46
  State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 4. 
47
  For example, see Auckland Electricity Power Board v Electricity Corporation of New 
Zealand [1994] 1 NZLR 551. 
48
  State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 10. 
49
  State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 2. 
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They are accountable to Parliament,
50
 in exercising their powers and performing 
their functions. 
 
Shareholding ministers appoint and remove directors of SOEs.  Appointment and 
removal processes are not provided under the SOE Act. All commercial SOEs are 
incorporated under the Companies Act 1993 therefore are subject to the Act. As 
shareholders the ministers appoint and remove directors on behalf of the 
Government on the recommendation of the SOE Advisory Unit, Treasury Office 
and the SOE Steering Committee and refer to the Cabinet for ratification.
51
 The 
directors are appointed based on their business experience, skills in certain 
disciplines such as finance or accounting, or ability to represent certain interest 
groups such as unions or farmers, and few others are appointed purely for political 
reason(s).
52
  
 
Shareholding ministers have a greater role in the formulation of the statement of 
corporate intent (SCI). The SCI sets out objectives that must be achieved within 
each financial year. The board of an SOE formulates and submits the draft SCI to 
shareholding ministers before the commencement of each financial year.
53
 The 
ministers examine the statement and comment on it where necessary and forward 
it to the board. The SOE Act does not set the limit in the discretion of the 
shareholding ministers to comment and modify SCI. The risk is that the ministers 
can make wholesale change. Consequently, it would be illusory to say that SCI is 
the responsibility of the board.  After considering the comments made by the 
shareholding ministers, the board submits the final statement back to them for 
endorsement.
54
 An SCI consists of corporate objectives, the scope of activities, 
accounting policies, performance targets, estimated returns, commercial valuation 
and other information.
55
 The SCI replaced the mixed, inconsistent, discretionary 
                                                          
50
  State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 6. 
51
  State-Owned Enterprises Advisory Unit and New Zealand Office of the Minister for State-
Owned Enterprises, The Minister for State-Owned Enterprises, (1990) 17 – 18; Duncan, I. 
and Bollard, A., Corporatization and Privatization: Lessons from New Zealand, (1992) 28; 
Spicer, B., Emanuel, D. M. and Powell, M., Transforming Government Enterprises: 
Managing Radical Organisational Change in Deregulated Environments, (1996) 20 – 21. 
52
  Duncan and Bollard, above n 51 at 28.  
53
  State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 14(1). 
54
  State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 14(4). 
55
  State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 14(2). 
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and sometimes, non-monitoring objectives with clear, consistent, commercial and 
measurable objectives, which set the operational scope of an SOE.
56
  
 
Further, the shareholding ministers have the power to request any information 
from the board to be supplied to them or supplied to a third party.
57
 The fact that 
the SOE has to meet social responsibility commitments requires greater 
information flow for the government to be informed of the progress. The 
shareholding ministers can, by written notice to the board of a “new SOE”58, 
determine the amount to be paid as dividend after consulting the board.
59
 The Act 
is silent on old SOEs under schedule one. In this case it seems that board makes 
declaration of dividends for SOEs under schedule 1 of the SOE Act, meeting the 
requirement under the Companies Act 1993.
60
 If this is the case then it is a proper 
approach as declaration of dividends is a commercial decision and must be left to 
the board and the management, rather than shareholders, unless the company 
constitution provides otherwise, and if so the board must recommend such 
payment for declaration to be made.  
 
7.2.2.2 The Board  
 
The specific roles of individual directors are not provided under the SOE Act. 
Since all SOEs enlisted under the SOE Act are incorporated under the Companies 
Act 1993 the directors are subject to powers and functions under the Companies 
Act. But in general terms s 5(2) of the SOE Act stipulates that all decisions 
relating to the operation of a state enterprise shall be made by or pursuant to the 
authority of the board of the state enterprise in accordance with its SCI. The 
provision endows the board with day-to-day decisions in implementation of the 
SOE‟s objectives but provides condition for that decision – only in accordance 
with the SCI. The board is then accountable to the shareholding ministers.
61
  
 
                                                          
56
  Duncan and Bollard, above n 51 at 24 – 25. 
57
  This excludes any information about individual employee or customer of SOE. See State-
Owned Enterprises Act, 1986, s 18(1) (2). 
58
  State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, sch. 2. 
59
  State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 13(1)(b)(2).  
60
  Companies Act 1993, s 52; see also Borrowdale, A., Duties and Responsibilities of Directors 
and Company Secretaries in New Zealand, (2
nd 
edn., 1995) 159 – 160. 
61
  State-Owned Enterprises Act, 1986, s 5(3). 
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The general function of making decision emulates the board in the private sector, 
but raises further question of the specific functions of the board. The specific role 
of the board is not expressly provided under the SOE Act. This means that their 
powers and functions are provided under the entity‟s Act, the Companies Act 
1993 or indirectly through complying with the requirement of submitting annual 
reports and meeting the obligations under the SCI. The Companies Act is not of 
much help as it also has broad provision on functions of the board.
62
 However, as 
persons in position of trust, any boards are subject to case law rules on the legal 
obligation of those persons who are fiduciaries.
63
 
 
The SOE Act does not provide for the appointment and the roles of chief 
executive officer (CEO) in an SOE. In practice, like a private corporation, the 
board appoints and terminates the CEO.
64
 The appointment responsibility renders 
to board disciplining power, which concomitantly ensures accountability.  
 
7.2.2.3 Accountability 
 
The submission of reports to shareholding ministers is an important requirement 
under the SOE Act. At the end of each financial year the board is required to 
submit an annual report on the operation of the SOE, financial statements and an 
auditor‟s report to the shareholding ministers.65 In the middle of the year the board 
must also submit a half-yearly report.
66
 The responsible minister presents all the 
reports and documents to Parliament, including the SCI, annual report and audited 
financial statements and auditors‟ reports on financial statements.67 Annual and 
half-yearly reports will be compared against SCIs,
68
 to see whether SOEs have 
achieved their aims for the period. 
 
Corporatisation has only eliminated some of the bureaucratic control of SOEs. 
They are still subject to the Official Information Act, the Ombudsman‟s Office 
                                                          
62
  Companies Act 1993, s 128. 
63
  Corcoran, S., “The Legal Liability of the Statutory Board – Public Corporations Act 1993 
(SA),” (1993) 10(1), Corporate and Business Law Journal, 95 at 98. 
64
  Spicer, Emanuel and Powell, above n 51 at 20 – 21. 
65
  State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 15(1). 
66
  State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 16(1).   
67
  State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 17(2). 
68
  State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, ss 15(2)(a) and 16(2). 
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and financial assessment and advice from the Department of Treasury.
69
 In 2009, 
the “Crown Ownership Monitoring Unit” (COMU)70 was established as a unit in 
the Department of Treasury to provide advice to shareholding ministers on the 
performance of SOEs and Crown companies, and recommends qualified persons 
to be appointed as directors, and generally monitors the performance of SOEs. 
COMU is administratively attached to the Department of Treasury and its 
function is different, however it complements the role of the Department of 
Treasury.
71
 Further, the Auditor-General audits all SOEs,
72
 however in certain 
cases the responsible minister appoints an additional auditor after consultation 
with the Auditor-General.
73
  
 
SOEs are subject to the Ombudsmen Act 1975 (OA) and the Official Information 
Act 1982 (OIA). They were subject to review in 1990.
74
 The review by the special 
Select Committee on SOEs recommended their continuous application in SOEs. 
In upholding their role the Committee stated that:
75
 
 
The OA and OIA provide a measure of accountability for the public, particularly on 
matters that affect individuals and which the other SOE accountability processes do not 
address, and to remove the jurisdiction of the two Acts would result in a significant loss 
in public confidence in the Government‟s oversight of the SOEs. 
 
The factors that ultimately decided their continuous application, despite their 
commercial objective, is their role in the community and the ownership of SOEs. 
In other words the people of NZ still owned them hence it is important for them to 
be subject to these public laws and state institutions. 
 
7.2.3 Summary 
 
Unlike SOEs, Crown entities are still subject to a parent department. The parent 
department makes an agreement with responsible ministers on how the Crown 
                                                          
69
  Duncan and Bollard, above n 51 at 27 – 28. 
70
  COMU is the amalgamation of ownership monitoring, appointments and governance 
functions of the Treasury and the former Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit 
(CCMAU) into an integrated unit of the Treasury on 23
rd
 November 2009. 
71
  Department of Treasury, “Crown Ownership Monitoring Unit,” in The Treasury, < 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/statesector/soes  > 18 May 2010. 
72
  Public Audit Act 2001, ss 5 and 14. 
73
  State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 19. 
74
  State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s 31. 
75
  Select Committee, New Zealand House of Representatives, Report of the State-Owned 
Enterprises (Ombudsmen and Official Information Acts) Committee (1990) [1.22A, para.  
4.2]. 
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entity is to be monitored. For example, the Broadcasting Commission of NZ is an 
ACE and comes under the responsibility of the Broadcasting Minister and is 
monitored by the Department of Culture and Heritage.
76
 Similarly, Television NZ 
Ltd is a CEC and has two responsible ministers, namely the Ministers of 
Broadcasting and Finance. It is monitored by the Department of Treasury, COMU 
and the Department of Culture and Heritage.
77
 On the other hand SOEs are 
commercial entities, incorporated under the Companies Act and have two 
shareholding ministers. COMU administers and monitors with the shareholders 
and not the parent department. For example, NZ Post Ltd is an SOE and has two 
shareholding ministers, namely the Ministers of Finance and Post Ltd. Unlike the 
SOE Act, the CE Act clearly provides for the roles and responsibilities of 
responsible ministers, the board and board members. Both the CE Act and the 
SOE Act have similar provisions on accountability. The CE Act is unclear on the 
appointment and role of the CEO. What appears from the two Acts is that the 
ministers under the CE Act have much more control than ministers under the SOE 
Act. Control varies with different form of Crown entities. 
 
7.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES - 
AUSTRALIA 
 
7.3.1 Corporate Governance in Government Owned Corporations - 
Queensland 
 
The reasons for corporatisation in Queensland are similar to NZ. The Labour 
Government in Queensland drove corporatisation out of the desire to place SOEs 
on a commercial basis in a competitive environment.
78
 Corporatisation is intended 
to improve efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of the GOC. 
Consequently, this is intended to improve the overall economic performance and 
ability of the Government to achieve social objectives;
79
 particularly to provide 
key services. The key principles of corporatisation are to provide clarity of 
objectives, management autonomy and authority, strict accountability for 
                                                          
76
  Broadcasting Act 1989 (NZ), part 4, sch. 1. 
77
  Television New Zealand Act 2003. 
78
  Queensland Treasury Department, A Green Paper on Government Owned Enterprises, 
(August 1990) 4. 
79
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 14. 
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performance and competitive neutrality.
80
 Section 17 of the GOC Act gives equal 
prominence to commercial and community service obligations.
81
 
 
GOC is defined as a government entity established by an Act or incorporated 
under the Corporations Act 2001 and declared by regulation to be a GOC.
82
 That 
means a GOC can be either a statutory GOC or a company GOC. After the major 
amendment in 2007 to the GOC Act, statutory GOCs were converted to company 
GOCs. The GOC Act largely provides for company GOCs. The following 
provides reasons for the amendment: “amendments to the GOC Act updated it for 
current company law requirements and made all GOCs subject to regulation and 
oversight by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. To effect this 
reform, all statutory GOCs have been converted to company GOCs”.83 As a result 
the GOC Act largely provides for company GOCs and transitional arrangements 
before becoming a company GOC. The corporate governance framework of 
company GOCs is discussed below. 
 
7.3.1.1 The Government 
 
The Government is the owner of GOCs. The portfolio minister and minister for 
GOCs are shareholders in company GOCs.
84
 They control company GOCs in 
compliance with the Corporations Act 2001. In addition, GOCs are subject to 
additional control under the GOC Act. First, the Governor-in-Council (Cabinet) 
appoints directors of GOCs.
85
 The question of who removes directors is uncertain. 
If the Corporations Act 2001 were to be complied with, this would mean 
shareholding ministers, and not the Governor-in-Council, remove directors.  
 
Second, apart from the Corporations Act 2001, GOCs are subject to additional 
controls under the GOC Act. Shareholding ministers can direct the board under 
certain circumstances. The Act ensures that directors have adequate freedom to 
operate GOCs; however shareholding ministers have the final say in the ultimate 
                                                          
80
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 16. 
81
  Compare this with s 4 of State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 (NZ). 
82
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 5. 
83
  Queensland Government, Office of Government Owned corporations, “Amendments to 
Government Owned Corporation 1993,” in Queensland Government, < 
http://www.ogoc.qld.gov.au/current-issues/amendgocact.shtml > at 4 July 2009. 
84
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 78.  
85
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 89. 
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and general direction of GOC. The Act empowers the shareholding minister with 
reserve power to direct the board to perform a community service obligation.
86
 In 
addition, shareholding ministers have reserve powers with regard to notifying the 
board of GOCs of public sector policies,
87
 and written direction to the board of 
matters in the public interest from time to time.
88
 The board must comply with the 
directions from the shareholding ministers.
89
 Further, shareholding ministers may 
give written direction to prevent GOC disposing off specified assets.
90
 The board 
has the obligation to inform shareholding ministers on whether following their 
direction would result in insolvency.
91
  
 
Third, the responsible ministers can issue guidelines about the form and content of 
the corporate plan.
92
 The board formulates the corporate plan and submits it to the 
shareholding ministers.
93
 The shareholding ministers can request the board to 
reconsider or consider it in the light of other matters,
94
 or can direct the board to 
modify the corporate plan where necessary.
95
 Shareholding ministers exercise 
similar power with regard to the SCI.
96
 Before giving direction for a corporate 
plan and an SCI, shareholding ministers must consult the board. The corporate 
plan sets policy objective that GOCs are to adopt over a medium term period. 
That is usually three to five years. The SCI provides short-term goals to be 
achieved annually. The guidelines in the corporate plan are similar to subordinate 
legislation.
97
 The legislative requirement makes it mandatory that the requirement 
of the corporate plan must be complied with.
98
 In the process of drafting the 
corporate plan and the SCI, negotiation occurs between the board of directors and 
the shareholding ministers. The final plan is an agreement between both parties. 
Section 7(2) of the GOC Act noted: “It is intended that the statement of corporate 
intent should represent an agreement between the GOC‟s board of directors and 
                                                          
86
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, ss 112 and 113. 
87
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 114. 
88
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 115. 
89
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, ss 114(2) and 115(2). 
90
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 138. 
91
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 116 
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  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 96(1). 
93
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 97. 
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  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 98. 
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  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 101. 
96
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, ss 107, 108 and 111. 
97
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 96(3). 
98
  The Queensland‟s Financial Administration and Audit Act 1977 also requires corporate plan 
to be provided by the public sector organizations. 
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its shareholder Ministers”.99 An SCI is analogous to a contract whereby the board 
makes an undertaking to fulfil the objectives provided in it.  
 
7.3.1.2 The Board  
 
The GOC Act did not provide for the duties of individual directors. That means 
that directors of corporations incorporated under the Corporations Act 2001 are 
subject to the Act and the common law, however in exercising their duty they 
must have regard to the application of the GOC Act.
100
 The board:
101
 
 
a. is responsible for the GOC's commercial policy and management;  
b. ensures that, as far as possible, the GOC achieves, and acts in accordance with, its 
statement of corporate intent and carries out its objectives outlined in its statement of 
corporate intent;  
c. accounts to the GOC's shareholders for its performance as required by this Act and 
other laws applying to the GOC;  
d. ensures that the GOC performs its functions in a proper, effective and efficient way. 
 
The board appoints a CEO of the GOC with prior written approval of 
shareholding ministers.
102
 The CEO is an officer under the Corporations Act 
hence subject to the Act.  
 
7.3.1.3 Accountability 
 
The GOC Act sets out a series of procedures which directors are required to 
comply with in informing responsible ministers and the Government regarding the 
operation of GOCs. The Act requires the board to submit annual reports to 
shareholding ministers along with additional reports at different intervals during 
the year. This includes quarterly reports.
103
  The annual report has a standard 
content.
104
 This does not exclude the board from providing other information 
under s 122 of the GOC Act to the ministers. The reports would enable 
responsible ministers to compare directors‟ reports and achievements of a GOC 
                                                          
99
  Galvin, B., Victoria University of Wellington and Institute of Policy Studies, Corporatization 
and Privatisation: Completing the Revolution? (Papers presented at a Seminar held on 3 
September 1987 in the Michael Fowler Centre, 1987) 5.  
100
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 123. 
101
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 88. 
102
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 92. 
103
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, ss 119. 
104
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 120.  
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against an SCI in order to be informed of the operation of GOC and how much 
that has been achieved.
105
  
 
GOCs are subject to Part 2, Division 7 of Queensland‟s Financial Administration 
and Audit Act 1977 on financial statements and annual reports.
106
 Further, the 
GOCs are required to provide the Auditor-General with financial statements 
prepared in compliance with the Corporations Act 2001,
107
 and must submit it to 
the shareholding ministers as part of the annual report.
108
 The report is then tabled 
in Parliament for examination.
109
 The Auditor-General audits the accounts of 
GOCs. The Auditor-General‟s role is not of control but one of accountability.110 
But, GOCs are not subject to the office of Ombudsman.
111
   
 
In addition to accountability requirements under the GOC Act, all GOCs are 
required to comply with various “GOC Policies and Guidelines”; one of which is 
“Corporate Governance Guidelines for Government Owned Corporations” (see 
Appendix T).
112
 Further, GOCs must provide in annual reports a section on 
corporate governance.
113
 
 
7.3.2 Corporate Governance in State Owned Corporations – New South 
Wales 
 
NSW was the first state in Australia that followed the example in NZ in 
undertaking the corporatisation process. NSW‟s State Owned Corporations Act 
1989 (SOC Act) came into effect three years after NZ‟s SOE Act. The Act defines 
a state owned corporation (SOC) as a company SOC or statutory SOC,
114
 and 
provides greater detail for both types of SOCs. The principle objectives of the two 
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  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 120 (1)( c). 
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  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 118. 
107
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, sch. 1(46F). 
108
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, sch. 1(46J). 
109
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, sch. 1(46K). 
110
  Coates, J., “Government-Owned Companies and Subsidiaries: Issues in Accounting, 
Auditing and Accountability,” (March 1990) 49(1), Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 7 at 11.  
111
  Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, s 157. 
112
  Queensland Government, Office of Government Owned Corporation., “GOC Polices and 
Guidelines,” in Queensland Government, < http://www.ogoc.qld.gov.au/goc-
policies/index.shtml > at 4 July 2009. 
113
  Queensland Government, Office of Government Owned Corporation., “Corporate 
Governance Guidelines for Government Owned Corporation,” (February 2009) [p4] in 
Queensland Government, < http://www.ogoc.qld.gov.au/goc-policies/index.shtml > at 17 
July 2010. 
114
  State Owned Corporations Act 1989, s 3. 
 111 
SOCs is to operate as successful businesses and in doing so must operate 
efficiently as comparable businesses, exhibit a sense of social responsibility and 
comply with ecologically sustainable development where their activities affect the 
environment.
115
  
 
7.3.2.1 The Government 
 
There are two shareholders of SOCs, called voting shareholders.
116
 They hold 
shares in trust for the State.
117
 The State Treasurer automatically becomes the 
shareholder but a minister is appointed by the Premier to be the second 
shareholder. In addition, the portfolio minister is responsible for the affairs of 
statutory SOCs and provided with certain responsibilities under the SOC Act (see 
below).  
 
Shareholding ministers have extensive responsibilities. First, they need to be 
consulted on the SCI after it has been drafted by the board and submitted. Any 
changes proposed by shareholders must be incorporated into the draft. In addition, 
the shareholding ministers can give written notice to include or remove certain 
matters from the SCI.
118
 Second, on request the board must supply to the voting 
shareholders of a company SOC,
119
 or the portfolio minister of a statutory SOC,
120
 
any information relating to the affairs of the SOC. The Act is not specific on the 
type of information, so that means any information. Third, a minister may direct 
the company SOC with regard to non-commercial activities with the approval of 
the Treasurer even if the SOC considers it to be not in its commercial interest. The 
SOC must comply with the direction.
121
 A minister refers to any minister. In a 
statutory SOC the portfolio minister may direct the corporation when it comes to 
dealing with non-commercial activities.
122
 Fourth, acquisition or disposal of assets 
or sale or disposal of the main undertakings in SOCs must be with the written 
approval of the voting shareholders.
123
 And fifth, in statutory SOCs, the portfolio 
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minister has the power to notify the board of any public sector policies,
124
 and 
give directions in the public interest.
125
  
 
Clearly, the shareholders can intervene and deal with some of the operational 
matters, even to the extent that voting shareholders have to make an agreement 
with the board on the amount of dividends and the time the dividend is to be 
paid.
126
 In addition, the Treasurer may request statutory SOCs to pay any amounts 
in dividends.
127
 The above shows that the government, including voting 
shareholders and any other ministers, can give direction to SOCs. 
 
7.3.2.2 The Board 
 
The voting shareholders appoint directors in company SOCs,
128
 whereas in 
statutory SOCs, the Governor appoints directors on the recommendation of voting 
shareholders.
129
 The staff director is a full time director and is appointed by a 
Select Committee which consist of two members nominated by voting 
shareholders and two members nominated by Unions NSW.
130
  The CEO may 
also be appointed as a director in a statutory SOC.
131
 Voting shareholders appoint 
and remove a director as a chairperson in a statutory corporation.
132
 The Governor 
appoints the CEO of a statutory SOC on the recommendation of the portfolio 
minister. But such an appointment cannot be effected without recommendation 
from the board.
133
 Further, the Governor may remove the CEO with the 
recommendation of the board.
134
  
 
The board and management of a company must comply with the Corporations Act 
2001. The board of a statutory SOC is responsible for operational decisions of the 
SOC whilst the CEO is responsible for the day-to-day management of the 
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operation.
135
 The board of a statutory SOC may require the CEO to enter into a 
performance agreement.
136
 The directors of a company are required to comply 
with duties under Corporations Act 2001,
137
 however in doing so they must have 
regard to the SOC Act.
138
 The duties of directors in a statutory SOC are provided 
under schedule 10, part I.  These duties generally cover the fiduciary duty and 
duty of care. 
 
7.3.2.3 Accountability 
 
The board of a statutory SOC is accountable to the voting shareholders in the 
manner set out in the SOC Act and the constitution of the corporation.
139
 On the 
other hand the board of a company SOC is accountable to voting shareholders in 
accordance with the Corporations Act 2001. All SOCs are required to submit a 
half-yearly report
140
 in which, amongst other things, they have to set out the 
extent to which objectives in SCIs are achieved.
141
    
 
The SOCs must submit annual reports. Sections 24 and 24A of the SOC Act 
provide for matters that are to be included in the annual reports of statutory SOCs 
and company SOCs respectively. Statutory SOCs must submit an annual report 
that complies with the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 and the Annual Report 
(Statutory bodies) Act 1984.  
 
The Auditor-General audits the accounts of all SOCs.  If the Auditor-General 
feels that any matters arise that require the attention of Parliament then the 
Auditor-General must submit a special report to Parliament.
142
 Parliament also 
receives other reports and documents from a minister. That means any minister 
and not necessarily the shareholding minister. These documents include the 
constitutions of a SOC, the SCI, a copy of the annual report, the audited financial 
report, and the Auditor-General‟s report on that financial report.143 The Public 
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Accounts Committee can also investigate the accounts of a SOC.
144
 This is 
irrespective of whether a SOC is a company SOC or a statutory SOC. 
 
7.3.3 Summary 
 
There are commonalities, discussed above, feature in the legislation in NZ, 
Queensland and NSW with regard to structure, governance and accountability. 
The laws in the three jurisdictions provide: 
 
a. for state companies; 
b. that shareholders hold shares in trust for the state; 
c. for commercial and non – commercial objectives; 
d. for SCIs and their content; 
e. that shareholders must be consulted in drafting SCI; 
f. for submission of annual and half-yearly reports and their contents; 
g. for submission of annual and half-yearly reports to the shareholders; 
h. that shareholders can direct SOEs in the payment of dividends; and 
i. for the role of the Auditor-General in SOEs; 
 
There are also differences observed in the three jurisdictions. These include the 
following: 
 
a. NSW provides for statutory corporations and state companies in the same 
legislation, whereas in NZ these come under two different Acts. In 
Queensland statutory corporations are seen as transitional entities after a 
2007 amendment whereas in NSW the legislation treated both types of 
SOCs as having important functions to perform and provide in detail for 
their governance and accountability. 
 
b. Two shareholding ministers in NZ and Queensland are the Minister of 
Finance and the minister responsible for SOEs, whereas in NSW 
shareholders are the State‟s Treasurer and a minister appointed by the 
Premier. In addition, statutory SOCs in NSW have a portfolio minister 
who is provided with specific responsibilities under the SOC Act.  
                                                          
144
  State Owned Corporations Act 1989, s 28. 
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c. NZ and NSW legislation provides clearly for reports and documents that 
need to be laid before the parliament. 
 
d. Queensland and NZ provide for the role of an Ombudsman Commission 
but not NSW. NSW legislation provides for the role of the Public 
Accounts Committee but not NZ and Queensland. They may have been 
discussed in other legislation and documents; however this observation is 
made looking particularly at the SOE legislation discussed above. 
 
The reporting requirements for SOEs in the three jurisdictions are more onerous 
than for private sector corporations. This is a clear expression of tension between 
the desire of government to maintain control and concurrently allowing SOEs to 
operate as independent enterprises.  
 
7.4  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PRIVATE SECTOR AND PUBLIC 
SECTOR CORPORATIONS 
 
SOEs are corporations. As discussed in chapter 6 the aims of corporatisation are 
to separate the activities of SOEs from the control of government, and to adopt the 
characteristics of efficiency and accountability to ensure the effectiveness of all 
SOEs and profitability for some (especially the state companies). Corporatisation 
ensures that SOEs are exposed to external market forces so that management 
adopts the competitive, strategic and efficient spirit of private sector corporations. 
The significant question is to what extent corporate governance structures in 
SOEs have replicated that of private sector corporations. This segment compares 
corporate governance in private and public sector corporations. 
 
7.4.1 Bonding Mechanism 
 
As discussed in chapter 3 the bonding arrangement is one of the ways to ensure 
that the interests of managers align with that of the owners. The common strategy 
under bonding is pay for performance. Pay strategy is never applied in NZ and 
Australia, although it was recognized in some of the reports as one of the devices 
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to be applied.
145
 There are difficulties in trying to apply a pay for performance 
strategy. 
 
The first difficulty lies in assessing the quality of managers‟ performance and 
providing incentives for them to improve. An SOE usually operates in a regulated 
environment and its market is relatively fixed. Managers have little control over 
the variables that determine the productivity of an SOE.
146
 The absence of 
tradable equity creates no incentive for the market to monitor an SOE. This 
creates an arm‟s length relationship with the shareholding ministers and the 
ultimate accountability to parliament.
147
 Thus, the introduction of bonding 
devices, such as an increase in salary, will not contribute in an effective way to 
increasing the value of an SOE. Further, unlike private corporations, a board 
member in an SOE will never have any chance of acquiring residual ownership 
interests.
148
 In other words they cannot purchase shares. Consequently, SOE 
boards and managers have weaker incentives than private corporations. 
 
Second, unlike a private sector corporation the management in an SOE is required 
to pursue broad objectives provided under SCI. This “weakens the link between 
the manager‟s diligence and firm‟s performance”149. The rationale for managerial 
incentive can be questioned in an SOE. For example, take again the increase in 
salary of a CEO. It is unclear whether through this device the CEO is required to 
increase the value of the SOE, given other social justice and equity objectives.
150
 
Government, as the shareholder, has different objectives such as community 
services for an SOE to pursue. As a result of multiple objectives pursued by an 
SOE, its real value cannot be properly assessed to reward managers for the SOE‟s 
performance. 
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And thirdly, unlike private sector corporations where there is no public statement 
of corporations‟ intentions, (rather a private corporation‟s business intentions are 
monitored and disciplined by the market) the detailed SCI setting out the business 
intentions of an SOE limits creativity and innovation.
151
 The managers‟ true worth 
cannot be assessed on “doing what they are being told to do”. Hence, there is no 
creativity and innovation. 
 
Where there is no incentive, the possibility of shirking, slacking or theft is high 
without scrutineers such as shareholding ministers and the Auditor-General. To 
that extent the shareholding ministers‟ participation would reduce residual costs if 
they are not themselves involved in diversion through collusion. However, if 
incentives are put in place, most SOEs lack true market value. This is in stark 
contrast to a listed public firm that has a share price which reflects its value. Most 
SOEs operate in monopolized markets or do not have shares on stock markets 
where a firm value can be established. Therefore, maximizing the value of SOEs 
would be a vain effort. In other words there is no true value whereby the increased 
value can be assessed.
152
 
 
7.4.2 External Markets 
 
In chapter 3 it is identified that external markets perform an important role in 
terms of accountability. However, in the public sector there are no external 
markets by which the performance of SOEs can be monitored. Most SOEs have a 
monopoly over their markets. The external monitors refer, amongst others, to 
managerial market, product market, share market and market for corporate 
control.  
 
First the managerial market is non–existent. The government, based on political 
affiliation, and taking into account communitarian interests, appoints directors and 
managers. Professional directors and managers who are appointed on merit from 
private corporations are not used to direct shareholder participation in the control 
of SOEs and this would cause tension between the government and the 
                                                          
151
  Above n 147 at 9. 
152
  Above n 150 at 45 – 46. 
 118 
management. This is one of the reasons that discourage managers from taking up 
office in SOEs. Private sector managers would be reluctant to take up offers to be 
managers in SOEs where they perceive the possibility that they may be subject to 
political persuasion. Their reluctance protects their reputation as professional 
managers with future prospects of being employed. 
 
Second, SOEs do not compete in a competitive market; hence there is no product 
market. This may be the result of  “statutory monopoly, or because of the market 
failure to provide the goods or services in question at an acceptable price, then the 
product market will not exert any discipline over the management of the 
entity”.153 Where SOEs are exposed to competitive markets they are subject to 
market forces. The organization would not survive if it fails to create wealth. This 
would then lead to insolvency and liquidation. However, the government usually 
does not allow liquidation to occur taking into account public interest 
considerations, such as ensuring employment of its citizens.
154
 
 
Third, most SOEs in NZ and Queensland have two shares under the trust of two 
shareholding ministers. The shares are not traded on the stock market, and 
therefore SOEs are not subject to share market scrutiny. Skeel Jr noted that: 
 
the shares of the government cannot be bought and sold, managers of SOE do not face the 
same capital market pressures. For instance, they do not receive the same market signals, 
as managers of private firm.
155
 
 
And fourthly, most SOEs operate in a monopolized environment and there is no 
market for corporate control. Takeover is unlikely or at best impossible given the 
fact that most SOEs have monopoly over their market. Also, SOEs have 
government as the only shareholder and it is a legislative requirement that the 
shareholding ministers must not transfer shares.
156
 The absence of a market for 
corporate control through takeover means that management cannot be disciplined. 
The absence of a market for corporate control is a serious disadvantage to low 
cost monitoring, which would have been imported into an SOE. Assuming that 
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there is a market for corporate control, most SOEs do not have a market value by 
which they can be assessed for takeover. 
 
A lack of low cost external monitors theoretically means a corporation will not 
reduce agency costs and therefore residual costs. However, the fact that 
shareholding ministers can request any information from SOEs any time ensures 
greater information flow to the shareholders.
157
 Without external markets, the 
flow of information in SOEs is important to ensure the shareholding ministers 
keep themselves properly abreast with SOE business, markets and any new 
technology adopted so that negotiation of an SCI is realistic, and appropriate 
expectation is set against which the performance of an SOE can be assessed.
158
 
Further, in an SOE a request for information by shareholding ministers and the 
availability of such information provide vital information to investigate and 
enforce a breach of fiduciary and statutory duties, and can enable new ministers to 
be informed about the affairs of the company. Furthermore, the information 
requested can be used to seek advice from a third party to hold the board 
accountable.
159
 Without information efforts to ensure accountability would be in 
vain.
160
 Hence, easy access of ministers to company information can enable them 
to monitor the performance of directors, and SOEs in achieving their objectives.  
 
7.4.3 Monitoring Mechanism 
 
Unlike, private sector corporations, management in an SOE is not directly 
accountable to owners (the public), and owners cannot exert direct influence on 
management in anyway. Without a bonding device and external markets, SOEs 
rely on government and the board for monitoring. The monitoring by these 
stakeholders has its disadvantages. The “shareholding ministers are … politicians 
and are part of the political process which is often driven by short-term fiscal and 
political imperatives”.161 A political system creates incentives that are different 
from the owners of SOEs and the objectives of SOE;
162
 hence SOEs can easily be 
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used for immediate political gain. Further, unlike private corporations, politicians 
do not have personal claim to the profits of SOEs or are interested in efficient 
organizational performance. In addition, with their busy schedules politicians 
cannot spend sufficient time scrutinizing the performance of SOEs.
163
 
 
Even if there is motivation to provide strict and close monitoring it would not be 
compelled by the quest for profit as in private corporations but by political 
imperatives. Political imperatives that compel government to intervene usually 
disregard agency costs. In the private sector the establishment of a monitoring 
mechanism is assessed on whether it would incur an agency cost and that the 
benefits of agency cost would outweigh residual costs. Professor John Farrar 
explained: 
 
A private owner will not insist on extra monitoring if the cost of implementing and 
administering arrangements outweigh the likely benefits. A government however has 
other priorities: in particular, it is concerned to minimize the risk of political scandal 
which might result in the event of any waste being uncovered, even waste that would not 
be pursued in the private sector because of the enforcement costs. Political considerations 
might compel the government to insist on higher standard of accountability in the entities 
that it controls notwithstanding the cost of doing so.
164
  
 
The board is an important organ in an SOE. The board ensures that management 
is accountable and the objectives of the corporations are pursued. The board 
becomes effective if it is provided with powers, such as the power to appoint a 
CEO to hold the management accountable. However, the board tends to be 
ineffective when the appointment of members is made based on political 
affiliation, to reward loyalty and support. Usually these directors lack knowledge 
and experience. 
 
After looking at the distinction between corporate governance in private and 
public sector, it is explicit that an SOE would not fully replicate the characteristics 
of the private sector in ensuring accountability. In an SOE, the government has an 
important accountability role in monitoring.  
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7.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The comparative discussion that has been provided makes it clear that there is 
considerable government control over SOEs. The shareholding ministers, under 
their respective pieces of legislation, have greater say in the formulation of SCIs 
and appointment of directors, they receive annual, quarterly and half-yearly 
reports, inform the board of government policies to be implemented from time to 
time, and request information from time to time. Boards perform a subservient 
role. Other political involvement is limited to monitoring. The role of departments 
and other government agencies has been reduced, but those that are still involved 
with SOEs have a restricted role in monitoring and audit. Applying the concept of 
control discussed in chapter 2, there is clearly little separation of ownership and 
control. SOE legislation was created to provide a degree of separation of the 
activities of SOEs from the state but state also has an incentive to control the 
SOEs. The legislation attempts to allocate control rights over SOEs between the 
relevant ministers, shareholders and the board, the accountability of control rights 
over SOEs and provides means whereby SOEs can become efficient and effective, 
and/or maximise profit.  
 
This chapter has shown that SOEs would not replicate the corporate governance 
model of the private sector as long as the government is the owner. Even 
developing effective proxy strategies in SOEs will not resemble strategies that are 
adopted in private sector corporations. SOEs do not have bonding devices or 
external market control mechanisms. Notwithstanding, government‟s active 
participation in the control of corporation and its duty of ensuring accountability 
can curtail any agency costs that may arise. This means that the advantage of 
active government participation can reduce agency cost of SOEs and therefore 
residual costs. The agency problem may inevitably arise when responsible 
ministers lack motivation in monitoring the management or begin colluding with 
the board or the management to divert an SOE‟s resources or finances for political 
support or self-interest. This problem is augmented through the appointment of 
government allies as members of boards and CEOs of SOEs. But the government 
would not commit malfeasance knowing that it is accountable to the people 
through parliament. But when parliament and state institutions are weak and 
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ineffective in monitoring, this can allow the relevant ministers and/or 
management to get involved in self – interested activities. 
 
Despite, not being able to fully replicate features of the private sector, SOEs in 
NZ have operated efficiently as reflected in profitability (chapter 6). This reveals 
the fact that when there is clear stipulation of the objectives of SOEs, roles and 
responsibilities of stakeholders in governance, and effective accountability, result 
in efficiency and profitability. 
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CHAPTER 8: 
 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE STATE OF PAPUA 
NEW GUINEA 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The indigenous people have lived in Papua New Guinea (PNG) for over 50, 000 
years.
1
 The assertion is that some migrated from South East Asia through the 
western part of Indonesia and settled in New Guinea while others migrated 
eastward through to the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu and New Caledonia.
2
 The 
groups of people settling in these countries are now called the Melanesians.
3
 The 
coastal villagers had occasional contact with Asian traders from the 16
th
 to the 15
th
 
century.
4
 The Chinese in particular had a long history with South East Asia for 
hundreds of years. They had contact with indigenous people in and around the 
area long before the European explorers.
5
 The recorded contact of indigenous 
Papua New Guineans with expatriates was as early as the 16
th
 century,
6
 
particularly with explorers and navigators from Europe between the 16
th
 and 18
th
 
centuries.
7
 The traders and explorers had no interest in settlement or colonization. 
Colonization then ensued in the 1900s by Great Britain and Germany and 
recently, under Australian colonial administration, PNG gained Independence. 
 
This chapter discusses the establishment of the State of PNG and its government 
and issues that are associated with governance. It focuses on the brief history of 
PNG and the political development before Independence (16 September 1975), 
the Government of PNG, the political parties, the political philosophy and the 
problems that affect the political status in PNG in the form of political instability, 
corruption and institutional incapacity, and finally it sets out the conclusion. 
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8. 2 COLONIZATION 
 
Since the middle of the 19
th
 century the island of New Guinea was divided into 
three parts. The west (West Papua) was Dutch territory and subsequently became 
part of Indonesia. The eastern part was further divided into two. The north was 
called New Guinea and was German territory, administered by German New 
Guinea Company. Germany annexed New Guinea in November 1884. Otto Von 
Bismarck celebrated Germany‟s sovereignty over New Britain (an island off the 
mainland of New Guinea) with 200 marines.
8
   
 
The southern part was called Papua and was a British Protectorate until 1905, 
three years after Australia federated.
9
 Papua was annexed in 1873 by Commodore 
J E Erskine.
10
 The actual proclamation of Papua as a British Protectorate was in 
1884, the same year German‟s sovereignty was declared over New Britain. 
Germany administered New Guinea until its defeat in the First World War. The 
administration of New Guinea was given to the League of Nations as a “Trust 
Territory”. In 1921 New Guinea came under Australian administration as a 
Mandate under the covenant of the League of Nations until PNG‟s Independence 
in 1975.
11
 Twenty-eight years after 1921 the Australian Federal Parliament 
enacted a new law, the Papua and New Guinea Act 1949 to administer the two 
territories.
12
   
 
When PNG gained Independence in 1975, it was not as Papua and New Guinea, 
but Papua New Guinea to recognize that the two territories had become a united 
and independent state. PNG, now on the world map, is located on the eastern part 
of the Island of New Guinea. On the Western part of the island is West Papua, 
occupied by the Indonesians. PNG borders four countries; on the north, the 
Federated State of Micronesia, to the south, Australia, to the east, the Solomon 
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Islands, and to the west, Indonesia. The map in figure 8.1 shows the geographical 
territory of PNG and its international borders. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1                 Map of Papua New Guinea 
 
PNG, off its mainland, has four large islands: Bougainville and Buka, New 
Britain, New Ireland and many smaller islands spreading across the coastline of 
the mainland. It has many mountains and valleys, fast flowing rivers, lakes and 
white sandy coastlines. The highest mountain, Mt Wilhelm is located in Simbu 
Province with a height of 4, 700 metres. It has the second longest mountain range 
(Owen Stanley Range) in the Pacific extending from West Irian, inside Indonesia 
to the tip of PNG. The largest rivers in PNG are the Sepik, Fly, Kikori, Purari and 
Ramu. The country is blessed with beautiful beaches, untouched jungles, 
vegetations and swamplands with many inorganic resources like gold, silver, 
copper and oil. 
 
8. 3 THE ROAD TO STATEHOOD 
 
The progress towards an independent State of PNG was swift. It was a little over 
10 years before Independence that a handful of Papua New Guineans were given 
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an opportunity to be members of the legislature. Many of them lacked knowledge 
of why they were in the House of Assembly (Parliament) and of the purpose of 
the House of Assembly. Many people doubted that there would be independence 
within a space of 10 years.
13
 Henry Okole described the process as “PNG evolved 
from a colony to an independent state in roughly the time a human being achieves 
adulthood”14. 
 
The Legislative Council (Parliament) was first established in 1951. It had six 
representatives from Papua and New Guinea. In 1964 the name changed to the 
House of Assembly and the elected representatives increased to 54. These were 
representatives from the special and open electorates. In 1968, the members of the 
House of Assembly increased to 84, and for the first time the regional seats were 
created. In 1972, the elected representative in the House of Assembly increased to 
100.
15
 The year 1972 was also important, as it was the year that brought in the 
leaders like Sir Michael Somare who would determine the destiny of the country.  
 
The formulation of the PNG Constitution took place between 1972 and 1974. In 
1972 a Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC)
16
 was appointed and approved 
by the House of Assembly and it was both the Committee of the government and 
the Committee of the House of Assembly.
17
 The CPC consisted of PNG citizens.
18
 
The purpose of the CPC was to develop and draft a Constitution so that there was 
a transfer of executive and legislative power from Canberra to PNG. The CPC 
traveled extensively around all parts of PNG collecting views from the people in 
its consultation process.
19
 The reason for such an exercise was for the 
development of a homegrown Constitution.
20
 The idea of having a homegrown 
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Constitution was conceived long before the formation of the CPC. The indigenous 
leaders aspired to a politically homegrown Constitution that is unique to PNG.
21
 
This is done with an intention that the Constitution would sever colonial ties while 
at the same time reflecting the wishes of the people of PNG. On 27 June 1974, the 
draft report of the CPC was presented to the House of Assembly and it was 
adopted after much discussion on the many matters it contained.
22
 
 
Within two years, the CPC had wide consultations with the people of PNG and 
the report tendered to the House of Assembly is a nationalistic document 
reflective of the views of the people.
23
  The homegrown nature of the Constitution 
is reflected in the preamble of the PNG Constitution where it proclaims that “we, 
the people of Papua New Guinea…establish this sovereign nation…declare 
ourselves to be the Independent State of Papua New Guinea”. These words make 
undoubtedly explicit that the text and the authority of the PNG Constitution 
purport to come from the people, making it the supreme law. Therefore there is no 
higher law than the Constitution. Using Hans Kelsen‟s24 words the Constitution is 
a grundnorm (or basic norm) given its autochthonous nature and form, and 
therefore the supreme law. This means that any other laws that are inconsistent 
with it are ineffective and invalid to the extent of inconsistency.
25
 On 16 
September 1975 the new state of PNG adopted the new Constitution. It provides 
for the Head of State, organs of the government and other constitutional offices. 
 
8.4 GOVERNMENT OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
 
The PNG political system is based on the Westminster model. It has a 
parliamentary system of government with a party system and a written 
Constitution. The Constitution establishes the structure and form of government, 
rule of law, National Goals and Directive Principles (NGDP) and recognizes the 
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Crown as the Head of State. The Government consists of a National Parliament, 
National Executive and National Judicial System.
26
 Elections are held after every 
five years to determine representatives from electorates and provinces and the 
party that would form the next government. After Independence, PNG had a 
centralized form of government until 1977 when the Constitution was amended 
and governmental powers were delegated to the provincial governments.
27
 Despite 
delegation the National Government is still the powerful entity. In 1995 the 
provincial government structure was removed by the Organic Law on Provincial 
Governments and Local-level Governments to improve governance and the 
delivery of goods and services direct to the people at the local level.
28
 This is done 
in response to “poor management of many provincial governments and suspension 
of so many of them for gross financial mismanagement and/or break down of 
administration”.29 The change in the structure of the provincial government 
completely centralized the power and gives unhindered control to national 
representatives from the national to the local level. All members of the National 
Parliament are also members of provincial assemblies
30
 and the regional member 
who is a member of the National Parliament becomes the governor and 
chairperson of the provincial assembly
31
. 
 
8.4.1 The Executive Government 
 
The executive government comprises the Head of State, the National Executive 
Council (NEC), and the government ministers who are supported by the 
administrative system. The Queen of the United Kingdom (or any of her 
successors) is the Head of State, represented by the Governor General who is 
endowed with the privileges, powers and functions of the Head of State.
32
 The 
Governor General only acts in accordance with the advice of the ministers and the 
Cabinet.  
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The executive government is a powerful entity in the country; however it is only 
accountable to the Parliament through the ministers. It is the constitutional right of 
the Parliament to be able to probe the Government through questions, motions and 
resolutions and petitions.
33
 Unfortunately, parliamentary sittings have often been 
postponed,
34
 and where there are sittings the reality is that a number of members 
sign in for purposes of receiving their sitting allowance and after few minutes the 
House is empty. Further, the number of debates and questions has decreased since 
Independence in 1975. The annual reports of various officers and bodies such as 
state owned enterprises are required to be tabled in Parliament so that the 
Parliament is kept up to date about the management and affairs of the 
institutions.
35
 Presentations of reports in Parliament have declined (see Part V). 
Issues in reports are only raised when questions are asked in Parliament. 
 
8.4.2 The Administrative System 
 
The administrative system is made up of responsible ministers who are political 
heads and government departments. Departments consist of civil servants, headed 
by departmental secretaries who are appointed by the Government. The minister is 
accountable to Parliament for any acts or omissions of the department and the 
civil servants. Administrative matters in relation to the public servants are 
managed by Public Service Commission. The Commission is established under s 
190 of the Constitution, and s 191 provides for its powers and functions. The 
powers of the Commission originally were: 
 
a. to ensure the efficient management and control of the National Public 
Service; 
b. responsibility for all personal matters connected with national public 
service; 
c. to keep the State services under continuous review; and 
d. to advise, on its own initiative or on request, the NEC and any other state 
service on organizational matters and the co-ordination of effort in relation 
                                                          
33
  Constitution of PNG, s 111. 
34
  Narokobi, B., “Parliamentary Reform for Good Governance,” in Sullivan, N., (ed.) 
Governance Challenges for PNG and the Pacific Islands, (2004) 108 at 112. 
35
  Kwa, E.L., Constitutional Law of Papua New Guinea, (2001) 62. 
 131 
to conditions of employment to avoid wastage and duplication of 
resources. 
 
These powers, especially those under a, b, and c, were however significantly 
reduced by Constitutional Amendment No. 8 of 1986. The power that remains is 
the right to be consulted by the executive government before appointments are 
made to senior public service positions. Government usually ignores this 
procedural requirement making appointments without required consultations. 
Many of these cases ended up in court.
36
 The reality is that the Government 
appoints associates who may not be appropriately qualified for such high 
positions of authority.
37
 Removing the powers of these important constitutional 
offices allows the Government to do things without being taken to account. 
Government departments are known for rampant abuse and corrupt practices. 
People are losing faith in the system of government that the country inherited with 
continuous corrupt practices and no solutions. In 2007, the Prime Minister with 
senior departmental heads and the Secretary of Defence transported the fugitive, 
Moti, an Australian citizen to the Solomon Islands, using a government plane 
belonging to the State. A Commission of Inquiry was established to investigate 
this. The Commission of Inquiry implicated the Prime Minister and senior 
officials of the Defence Force.
38
 In 2006 millions of Kina were stolen from the 
Department of Treasury. The Government appointed a commission of inquiry 
then suspended it three times.
39
 The final report has not been acted on. Those who 
were implicated have not yet been held to account. These scandals involving 
government officials including the prime minister undermine public confidence in 
the Government. Despite this, the Government continues to be involved in all 
aspects of the economic life of the country. 
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The state intervenes through public ownership and regulation of public enterprise. 
Given the weak economy base, Government basically controls the economy 
through public ownership and not so much by regulation. Much of the regulation 
in the private sector is on the mining companies. This is because the biggest 
income of the country is generated through mining. State owned enterprise is one 
of the forms which the State uses to participate in the economy; however one of 
the biggest problems in SOEs is the problem of accountability. Since 
Independence in 1975, there is still confusion and there are questions over 
whether public accountability mechanisms apply on SOEs. This is not to say that 
PNG‟s Constitution has not provided for public accountability mechanisms. 
 
There are 21 constitutional offices established under the PNG Constitution, 
including the three arms of the Government, which are required, in principle, to 
keep checks and balances on each other. The PNG Constitution also sets out other 
constitutional offices such as the Ombudsman Commission, Auditor General 
(AG), and Parliamentary Committees to ensure accountability in government 
departments and SOEs. That is not to mention others
40
 that perform important 
roles in extending state services and ensuring transparency and accountability in 
state organs and agencies. Many of these state institutions lack resources and 
cannot perform their responsibilities. For example, the function of the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC) is to investigate the public accounts of PNG.
41
 
However, owing to a lack of funding the PAC has been redundant. Since the 
Prime Minister, Sir Michael Somare, took office in 2002 he activated PAC 
through financial assistance to perform its constitutional duties. The Auditor 
General lacks resources and sufficient funding, hence outsources auditing 
responsibilities to private firms. The Ombudsman Commission also lacks funding 
and many cases that are brought to its notice are often not investigated. The lack 
of resources and funding are largely due to the policies and priorities of the ruling 
parties and the government of the day. 
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There are few political parties such as the National Alliance, forming 
governments that have concrete policy objectives of how they would like the 
country to be governed. They strive to ensure their policy objectives are 
formulated into the national plan by the Department of Planning and copies sent 
to all departments and governmental bodies for implementation. The national plan 
is formulated taking into account policy directives of the ruling parties and the 
Government, and it must be in harmony with the NGDP.
42
   
 
8.4.3 Act of the State 
 
As noted in chapter 5, the State is not simply the government or the Head of State 
(Crown) but ultimately the representative of the people of PNG. Consequently, 
the State refers to the people of PNG. The act of the executive government, 
bureaucrats or any public body is an act of the State or the people. However, there 
are other public bodies that come within the control of ministers and government 
departments that perform governmental activities. These activities are delegated 
through franchise, contract or legislation. It becomes problematic when trying to 
attribute an act of State to these entities. For example, SOEs that are established 
by statutes or incorporated under the Companies Act 1997 are independent and 
possess a separate legal personality but the Government owns them on behalf of 
the people. What would be the extent of Government control to make these 
entities a public body? Should the actions of directors and managers be attributed 
to that of the State, or should they enjoy the privileges and immunities reserved 
for the State? These issues have not been clarified in PNG. They are further 
discussed in chapter 15. 
 
 
 
                                                          
42
  For example, one of the policies of the National Alliance Party (a majority party currently in 
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8.5 POLITICAL PARTIES  
 
PNG used to have a fluid political party system. Many of them do not have a 
strong support base, and tangible and attainable goals.
43
 The national members 
used to have no party loyalty. Some commentators refer to them as “yoyos and 
political prostitutes”.44 Change of membership is frequent, especially approaching 
the 18-month period when a vote of no confidence in the government is permitted. 
Consequently, one of the causes of the lack of development is political instability. 
Some commentators have blamed political instability for the lack of investment in 
PNG.
45
 Businesses do not want to operate in an unpredictable environment where 
the Government is changed through changes in membership of political parties. 
Changes in Government also changes policies and that can affect businesses.  
 
The instability of political parties appears to be a perennial problem, partly 
contributed to by the absence of a nationalist movement.
46
 This is not to dismiss 
the few political parties formed before and immediately after Independence that 
still actively contribute to the democratic process and the welfare of the 
parliamentary system in PNG. For example, the PANGU party was formed before 
the Self-Government in 1973 and on Independence produced the first Prime 
Minister and continues to be active after 35 years of Independence. 
 
The main root causes leading to political instability are jockeying for political 
positions. The Prime Minister is constantly under threat to please members within 
the coalition in order to maintain his/her position, thus focus is diverted from 
important issues of policy formulation and implementation to maintaining power 
and prestige. An attempt was made by the legislature to stabilize political parties, 
and to ensure that parties become ideologically oriented, and concentrated on the 
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realization of their policy objectives. This led to the enactment of the Organic 
Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC) in 2001.  
 
OLIPPAC sets out explicit guidelines for the formation of the Government, 
addresses major issues of corrupt practices like funding of members and 
candidates,
47
and compels members to maintain political party membership. The 
law restricts and regulates the movement of members of Parliament from one 
political party to another. A member who is sponsored by a political party is to 
maintain membership with the political party until three months before the writ is 
issued for the next general election.
48
 An independent member, who is elected into 
Parliament, joins a party to remain with it until three months before the issue of 
the writ.
49
  
 
OLIPPAC was first tested in 2002. It was enforced during the general elections 
and the formation of the government after general elections. An attempt was made 
unsuccessfully to overthrow the Government in 2003, 2009 and 2010 through 
votes of no confidence. This shows that there are still loopholes in the law that 
requires reconsideration and amendment to prevent a situation that might lead to 
political instability. OLIPPAC, on one hand brings a certain measure of stability 
but at the same time undermines good governance and integrity because its 
enforcement has seen a “gradual rise in „executive dominance‟ both in decision 
making and in parliamentary debate and politics”50. This increases the power of 
the political party. Further, the effect of OLIPPAC is that any lack of trust in a 
minister who is a member of a party shows a lack of confidence in the whole 
party. Should the Prime Minister decide that issues need addressing with a 
particular minister, he/she must also consult with the minister‟s party. Thus, a 
minister of the department or a minister responsible for SOE can continue with 
corrupt practices if other accountability mechanisms do not hold him or her to 
account. 
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8.6 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
The attitudes and behaviors of people towards politics are reflected in political 
institutions and public policies. These are affected by a number of influences. One 
of the significant influences is the custom of the people. PNG has many different 
customary practices and clan affiliation, and over 800 different languages in a 
population of over six million people. To date people still have very strong ties to 
their customs and this basically governs their daily lives. Bernard Narokobi calls 
the prevailing custom the “Melanesian Way”.51 Despite coming from different 
customary backgrounds people have an open mind about the fact that other people 
have different customs from theirs, and try to accommodate them. At the same 
time they strive to find commonalities that are shared between their customs and 
those of others so that these commonalities become a “pulling factor” and a 
common denominator in their relationship.  
 
Before Independence, the people had the common objective of breaking away 
from the colonizers to become an independent society. This provided them with a 
common objective to pursue, which in the process united them as one people 
despite differences in their customs.
52
 After Independence in 1975, the common 
goal was achieved. The people required new and common objectives, and 
direction that would enable them to work together as one people. Out of the 
CPC‟s wisdom common aspirations of the people were engaged and enshrined in 
PNG‟s Constitution as the NGDP. The PNG Constitution recognizes the custom 
that governs the affairs of the people from time immemorial as part of the laws 
under s 9 of PNG‟s Constitution, and various laws called for customary practices 
to be recognized.
53
 As a result, having been colonized for nearly a century, people 
are continually struggling with the systems and ideologies left by the colonizers 
and new ideas being introduced on the one hand and custom on the other.  
 
Currently, the society is doing a balancing act of picking and choosing from the 
introduced system and customary laws in order to establish a system that is 
workable and appropriate for PNG society as a whole. This process results in  
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conflicts
54
 that prevent the country from progressing. The “Melanesian Way” has 
become a “sacred cow” that prevents society from moving toward modernity by 
clashing with new ideas, creating conflicts, hence dilemmas of development (see 
chapter 9) continue to be experienced.
55
 However, the Melanesian Way has served 
PNG well from time immemorial in maintaining relationships and peace and order 
in society. 
 
Many lessons can be learnt from the custom and cultures of the people. The 
people of PNG have always lived a subsistence way of life and more than 80 per 
cent of them still do today. Much of the communal ideology is seen in practice in 
the villages. Every family that has a garden shares the produce from the garden 
with everyone in the village. Those that go hunting or fishing and come home 
with a catch share with everyone in the village. Loyalty and respect for one 
another is a norm. Elders are people with authority and they are respected and 
looked up to for advice and direction. These people have lived long enough to 
have studied the climate and the movement of animals and fish, and are in a 
position to advise on when to make a garden and go hunting or fishing. The elders 
are well acquainted with custom. The village people go to them for advice and 
they also mediate over disputes. These are “big men” in Melanesian custom. 
Consequently, when the concept of state was introduced in 1975 people had no 
problem in grasping the idea.  
 
PNG communities were always organized as states but on a smaller scale. They 
are now looking up to the State as a benefactor, parent or guardian. This creates a 
paternalistic attitude. The national politician depicts the “big man” in Melanesian 
custom and, according to the people, has responsibility directly to them. 
Inevitably, these politicians have the mentality and morality of providing for their 
followers – the members of the clan and voters. As a result instead of involvement 
in public services, the domain of their activities is in a spectacular version of 
                                                          
54
  For example, a big man under custom provides for the whole clan or tribe. When a person 
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“pork-barrelling”.56 Many of these politicians lack formal education and that 
ostensibly leads to a lack of understanding of their roles and responsibilities.
57
  
 
During colonial rule PNG experienced two wars. The second war had a great 
impact on the lives of the people. Their involvement in the war was not because of 
any conviction but through loyalty to their colonizers.
58
 This, amongst other 
things, facilitated co-operation from Australia in granting Independence when the 
drive for Independence was initiated in PNG.  Independence of the country 
occurred after 25 years when the world was geared towards welfarism. Thus, 
when PNG adopted its Constitution it focused on the welfare of the people. This is 
reflected generally in PNG‟s Constitution, and particularly under the NGDP. 
 
The State of PNG inherited much of the social and economic undertakings from 
Australia immediately after Independence. The whole focus of the State is on 
health, education, communications, agriculture and infrastructural development, 
and housing for public servants in an attempt to meet the NGDP. Given the wide 
range of developmental and welfare needs of the society the State is not only 
using departmental enterprises but statutory corporations and state companies in 
the production and delivery of goods and services to the people. The welfare state 
affects the stability of the political regime in a sense that the public may confuse 
their political self-interest (based on ideology) and welfare linkages. This easily 
lends a certain degree of volatility to political preference and fragmentation of 
political choice. For example, since Independence, politics has been personified as 
a form of economic enrichment in PNG. Paula Brown stated that “people have 
come to regard government as the major…source of opportunity and finance. 
Having a friend in national government is seen as necessary for economic 
success.”59 This shows that the focus of Government and political parties on 
welfare issues has confounded public conception of political self-interest and 
public welfare linkages against economic self-interest. 
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The political parties in PNG have no foundation in ideologies other than promises 
of providing goods and delivering services.
60
 Their formation is with the primary 
aim and practical consideration of gaining access to the resources of the country.
61
 
For example, a political party having members who hold a ministerial portfolio 
enables loyal supporters to be rewarded through various appointments to state 
institutions and departments. Some political parties do not develop distinctive 
policies.
62
 This explains the inconsistencies and lack of direction in their policies. 
As a result many are formed before elections and fade as fast as they appear 
immediately after elections.
63
 After seven elections there is a culture of the “hand 
out” mentality. During campaigns political parties host functions, buy votes to 
lure support, and make outrageous promises of the benefits that they would bring 
if they were given power.
64
 The popular custom of the “wantok system” is 
manipulated where “gift and exchange system is adapted to election campaign 
food, beer and money distribution” to lure votes.65 General elections are occasions 
that people looking forward to receiving benefits in one form or another. When 
parties win an election they spend half of the five-year term trying to recoup the 
expenses incurred during campaigns. Consequently, they become involved in 
corrupt practices to recoup their election expenses while people would be 
awaiting action on the promises that they make during campaigns. Unfortunately, 
the policies of political parties will only consist of “promises” as long as the 
culture of “hand out mentality” subsists. People are demanding from their political 
leaders, money for travel, funeral, wedding ceremonies, etc. and the demand on 
leadership has reached epidemic proportion.
66
 As long as party and government 
policies are based on promises of infrastructure development etc., people will 
continue to have “hand out” mentality.  
 
Pressure groups can influence the direction of the Government in terms of 
directing policies; however they are less influential in PNG than their counterparts 
in New Zealand and Australian where they participate in political process to 
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influence policymaking by political parties or government. The interest groups 
such as unions, non-governmental organizations, PNG Transparency International 
and women‟s groups do influence government policies; however their impact is 
somewhat limited. Generally, the lack of effective participation by interest groups 
is contributed to by a lack of information and the growing complexity and 
technical knowledge involved in modern decision-making in governmental 
processes. In order to make policy decisions the Government receives advice from 
government institutions such as the Department of Planning and Finance or the 
Department of Treasury or other private institutions that can provide technical 
advice. Further, in PNG, there are rival community groups. They do not influence 
Government and party policies but compete against one another over resources.
67
  
 
Interest groups are an important avenue through which the public participates in 
governmental processes apart from the general elections. Active participation by 
interest groups may have some impact on the policy directions of political parties 
and the government in PNG to divert from having policies based on promises to 
ideologies. To be effective they must realize their relevance. 
 
8.7  POLITICAL INSTABILITY, CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL 
INCAPACITY 
 
PNG cannot go forward if it cannot address some of the factors that affect its 
political status, which is affected by political instability, corruption within 
Government and weak state institutions. The three are related and must be 
addressed in order to pave the way for the good governance and for the efficient 
delivery of goods and services to the people to improve their lives.  
 
First, political instability began when PNG gained Independence. From 
Independence in 1975 until 2010 PNG has had 11 different governments in its 35 
year history. In every parliamentary term since Independence and up to the 2007 
election, politicians were able to capitalize on votes of no confidence under s 145 
of PNG‟s Constitution to vote out the legitimately and popularly elected 
Government by the people, and replace it with a Government that the 
parliamentarians themselves formed through political jockeying by political 
                                                          
67
  Above n 61 at 16 – 17. 
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parties and individual politicians.
68
 No government formed through a vote of no 
confidence was ever returned to government after a general election. Political 
instability has often been pointed out to be the main cause of the lack of delivery 
of goods and services to the people. It is also argued to be the reason for the lack 
of foreign investments in PNG,
69
 the lack of good governance, and the cause of 
corruption.
70
  
 
The first vote of no confidence was by Sir Julius Chan against Sir Michael 
Somare‟s Government in 1983 and the last was by Sir Mekere Morauta against Sir 
Bill Skate in 1999. Since 2000, the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political 
Parties and Candidates has provided assistance in regulating the conduct of 
political parties and individual politicians, to avoid political jockeying. Despite 
the law, attempts are still made to replace Governments through votes of no 
confidence. The latest unsuccessful attempt was on 20
th
 July 2010. This was an 
attempt to replace Sir Michael Somare‟s Government.71 Somare‟s Government 
benefited from the integrity law thereby allowing it to complete, in full, its second 
term of office. 
 
Second, corruption has become a perennial problem in the society. It has gone 
from endemic to pandemic and is yet to reach rampant stage. It is localized at the 
political leadership level, permeates to the senior bureaucratic level and has 
become pandemic at all layers of the bureaucracy.
72
 Corruption, amongst other 
things, includes nepotism, political appointments not based on merit, interference 
by politicians in the administration, receiving of commissions or kickbacks, the 
abuse of power or misuse of funds.
73
 Since Independence, corruption has 
consumed millions of Kina that are allocated for developmental purposes. Despite 
major investigations, corruption continues to have a detrimental impact on 
                                                          
68
  Siaguru, A., In-House in Papua New Guinea: The Great Game, (2001) 28 – 34. 
69
  Above n 45. 
70
  Duncan, R., “Papua New Guinea Economic Survey: A Scoreboard for the Morauta 
Administration,” (2001) 16(2), Pacific Economic Bulletin, 1 at 6. 
71
  World News – Australia, “High Drama as Somare survives PNG Vote,” in SBS < 
http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1306852/Somare-no-confidence-vote-sparks-PNG-chaos 
> at 20 August 2010 
72
  Above n 68 at 144 -145. 
73
  Hevie, J. C., “Forms of Corruption,” in Ayius, A. A. and May, R. J., (eds.) Corruption in 
Papua New Guinea: Towards an Understanding of Issues, (No. 47, 2007) 17 at 19 – 20. 
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investment and development.
74
   Further, corruption increases poverty, threatens 
national sovereignty and is closely linked to crime.
75
 Not surprisingly, in 2003 
PNG was listed as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, ranking at 118
th
 
out of 133 countries and in 2004 it ranked 102
nd
 out of 143.
76
 In 2006, PNG 
remained a corrupt country ranking 130
th
 out of 163.
77
 By 2009, the corruption 
ranking had not improved. It remains a corrupt country ranking at 154 out 188 
countries.
78
 The Ombudsman Commission has been effective in holding to 
account those involved in corrupt practices, but it lacks funding and resources to 
investigate many other cases.  
 
The report on corruption does not look good for PNG in the eyes of the 
international community, especially the international aid donors. The sad reality is 
that corruption is eating away at the fabric of society. Different international 
organizations pressured government to adopt policies addressing corruption. As 
one of the conditions for loans the World Bank requested that the Government 
reviews contracts which it undertakes with logging companies that are involved in 
corrupt dealings, and reviews the terms of moratorium on new logging 
agreements. Due to the lack of governmental consent on the terms, the loan 
agreement was suspended in 2004.
79
 Developed states such as Australia and New 
Zealand were concerned that the possibility of corruption would propel PNG to a 
“failed state”, attempt to help the country. In addition to the financial aid that 
Australia provides to PNG, it initiated the Enhanced Co-operation Programme 
(ECP) to assist state services, especially police and customs services, to improve 
their efficiency.
80
 The ECP did not last long. It was declared null and void on 
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  Ayius, A. A., “An Overview of Corruption,” in Ayius, A. A. and May, R. J., (eds.) 
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(2001) 16(2), Pacific Economic Bulletin, 127. 
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  Transparency International, Global Corruption Report in 2004, (2004). 
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(Discussion paper No. 1, 2007) 4. 
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  Transparency International – The Global Coalition against Corruption, “Corruption 
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11 March 2009. 
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  Above n 77 at 7 – 8. 
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  Many have questioned ECP as being based on concerned for Australia‟s security rather than 
concern for corruption or failed state. This especially occurred after 9/11 when Australia 
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constitutional grounds.
81
 In PNG, there is a realization that measures were needed 
to combat corruption. Several recommendations were put forward that include: 
 
a. strengthening the electoral system; 
b. regulating political parties and candidates; and 
c. strengthening constitutional institutions. 
 
The Government enacted a new electoral law and a new organic law with an 
objective of strengthening the political parties and the candidates, giving effect to 
the first and second recommendations.
82
 With regard to the third recommendation, 
a proposal was submitted for a body to be solely responsible for combating 
corruption. It was first mooted in 1998 as the only solution, which would cure 
corruption in PNG.
83
 With the assistance of the World Bank the proposal for an 
Organic Law (with a copy of the law) for an Independent Commission against 
Corruption was submitted to the National Parliament. The proposed Organic Law 
addresses issues such as bribery of members of parliament, disclosure of official 
secrets, corruption and abuse of office, secret commissions and even conspiracy to 
commit any of these offences.
84
 There was no serious effort made to have the law 
passed. Passing the law would affect the personal interest of politicians. The 
current Government under Sir Michael Somare is silent on these 
recommendations although it was elected to office on promises to fight 
corruption. Clearly their personal interest takes priority over the well being of the 
nation.  These recommendations, with the draft laws, are collecting dust on 
parliamentary shelves. 
 
Thirdly, in PNG there is a general perception that the State has weak institutions 
that are incapable of performing their functions, contributing to a consensus that 
PNG is a weak State.  These institutions are unable to control and eliminate 
corruption, deliver goods and services to the people and withstand political 
turmoil that follows after the change of government. The people often blame 
                                                          
81
  Above n 77 at 9. 
82
  These are the Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections and the 
Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates. 
83
  Boeha, B., “Corruption, National Security and Outsourcing,” in Boeha, B. and Robins (eds.), 
Trends in National Development: Searchlight on Papua New Guinea, (No. 28, 2000) 70 at 
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  Donigi, P., “Appropriate Information for Combating Corruption,” in Ayius, A. A. and May, 
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Government and the state institutions for the lack of tangible development in the 
country. Problems that contributed to institutional incapacity are identified to be: 
 
a. a lack of properly qualified and trained human power; 
b. insufficient funds; 
c. political interference; 
d. a lack of institutional infrastructure;  
e. a lack of co-ordination; and 
f. unrealistic political promises. 
  
Others blame weak state institutions on the adoption of state institutions that were 
designed from a foreign perspective without taking into account the local 
circumstances in PNG.
85
 Political interference is serious and on the increase in 
PNG, including interference in SOEs that are meant to be independent of political 
interference. Other state institutions such as the Public Accounts Committee that 
are supposed to hold responsible ministers accountable are weak and incapable of 
performing their responsibilities. 
 
Weak state institutions are a great concern for the government and aid donors.
86
 
The Government and aid donors depend largely on state institutions to deliver 
goods and services to the people. Hence, Australia through AusAid is delivering 
aid services direct to the people in partnership with non-governmental 
organizations instead of government agencies. This has caused tension between 
the Australian and PNG governments. In the late 1990s, the PNG Government, 
with the support of the aid donors introduced the Public Sector Reform Program. 
The objectives of the program are to: 
 
a. improve the critical process of decision-making and management; 
b. redefine and refocus the efforts and resources of the Government in its 
core functions; 
c. strengthen the capacity of the state agencies in managing the operations of 
government; and 
d. improve the delivery of basic goods and services. 
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A review of the program was undertaken in 2000. Commenting on the status of 
the program, the former Chief Secretary, Robert Igara
87
 warned that the success of 
the program would depend on: 
 
a. political stability; 
b. stability of leadership within state institutions; 
c. sufficient time (about 3 years) to be allowed for the program to mature; 
and  
d. the building up of relevant expertise and experience within agencies. 
 
The Government took Igara‟s comments seriously. The second factor was given 
effect in 2004 with the enactment of the Regulatory Statutory Authorities 
(Appointment to Certain Offices) Act 2004 to ensure that heads of government 
institutions are competent to hold office, in order to avoid the corrupt practice of 
appointing political cronies to these important state institutions. In other words the 
Act ensures merit-based appointments. The legislation provides for the 
appointment and removal processes for the heads of government and statutory 
bodies and criteria where they can be appointed or removed. As discussed in Part 
V the procedures are often not followed. 
 
Although critical comments like the above can be made or criticisms directed at 
weak state institutions, corruption or political instability, the people and the 
Government of PNG are resilient and are continually striving to find ways of 
addressing these problems to ensure that the two precious commodities of 
democracy and rule of law are maintained, and the lives of the people are 
improved.
88
 In other words democratic processes remain despite predictions that 
the country would go into a state of anarchy. The Judiciary is impartial and 
effective, the Ombudsmen Commission is still effective despite a lack of funding, 
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and other state institutions and agents are still performing their fundamental 
obligations amidst a cloud of mismanagement and corrupt practices. 
 
PNG has been called a failed state in the past by commentators who have 
themselves failed to appreciate the fact that like any developing country, PNG is 
facing dilemmas of development. However, it still has a vibrant government, state 
services and law enforcement agencies that continue to perform in the society.
89
  
Facing dilemmas of development as a developing nation does not make a state a 
failed state (chapter 9). Despite this, the State and the people of PNG have 
accepted the tag of failed state and are continually working on addressing major 
national issues such as weak state institutions, corruption and political instability 
that affect the fabric of the society. 
 
8.8 CONCLUSION 
 
PNG encountered traders and explorers from different countries and was 
colonized by three different countries. The Westminster model of government was 
adopted from Britain. The political structure adopted since Independence 1975 
has yet to effectively produce the results envisaged by CPC. Changes have been 
made through laws on the structure of government to enable effective delivery of 
goods and services; however individuals and groups have exploited loopholes in 
the system for their own gain. State institutions and agencies are vital in a 
transitional economy like PNG. But the state‟s active participation in the economy 
does not result in the effective delivery of goods and services. Having a good 
system is one thing, and having good people working in the system is another.  
 
SOEs are an important medium through which a government delivers goods and 
services to the people. In order for SOEs to effectively and efficiently achieve 
their objectives they have to be independent and have an effective government 
that probes and scrutinize their performance. They also need effective public 
institutions that ensure that they are accountable for their performance. Hence, this 
chapter examines the State of PNG and its government structures, their powers 
and functions. Further, it highlights the fact that the State of PNG is to be equated 
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Governance Challenges for PNG and the Pacific Islands, (2004) 98 – 107.  
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with the people and not the government. Furthermore, it provides the context in 
understanding the role of SOEs in a developing economy, and the extent to which 
the government of PNG controls SOEs discussed in chapters 10, 12, 13 and 14. 
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CHAPTER 9: 
 
DILEMMAS OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Papua New Guinea (PNG), like any third world country, is faced with many 
challenges of development. It has to confront globalisation, economic crises, 
political crises, poverty and environmental degradation.  Faced with these 
dilemmas and challenges it has been formulating strategies and identifying 
effective means of delivering goods and services to the people. Every year the 
Government works on a constrained budget. Essential services such as education 
and health are sometimes overlooked because there are not enough funds for the 
provision of these services, or where they are provided, there is misuse through 
corrupt practices. Successive governments have come up with economic policies 
to bring sustainable improvement to the lives of the people. Often these policies 
do not come to fruition.  
 
This chapter discusses the various developmental issues faced by PNG. The focus 
is on population, education, health, environment and economic development in 
PNG. This chapter is necessary, as it will provide background information on the 
developmental issues faced by PNG, and concurrently show that given the state of 
development in the country it is vital for government participation in the delivery 
of goods and services. Thus, state owned enterprises (SOEs) have an important 
role to perform in PNG‟s developing economy. Many of these SOEs are involved 
in the production and delivery of goods and services to the people. They are vital 
in a developing economy where a country still faces many dilemmas of 
development. 
 
9.2 POPULATION 
In year 2005 the population of PNG was estimated to be at 5.9 million.
1
 This was 
to be predicted by the increase over the last 25 years. The population was 3 
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million in 1980; in 1990 3.7 million and by 2000 it was 5.1 million.
2
 The 
population is increasing at the rate of 3.5 per cent every year.
3
 It is estimated that 
if the current mortality and fertility rate is maintained, by 2020 the population of 
PNG will reach the 10.2 million mark.
4
 This is an alarming rate of growth and if 
the Government does not plan for the increase it will have detrimental social and 
economic implications. The bulk of the population, about 85 per cent, is living in 
the rural areas using subsistence means
5
 of living and about 45 per cent of the 
population are children under the age ranges of 0 – 4 years. If the Government is 
not serious in controlling the population increase, it will have much bigger 
problems to deal with in the future. Population and social issues cannot be 
separated from each other. They are intertwined, hence must be considered 
together under the national development plan.
6
  
 
Some of the problems PNG faces are caused by population increase. Lack of 
planning in considering increases in population of the rural communities causes 
rural–urban migration where people are migrating into towns and cities in search 
of better social services such as health, and a better quality of life.
7
 Often they do 
not find a better life as they lack trade skills and knowledge to do professional 
jobs. In some areas of PNG the increase in population is exhausting limited 
resources. Land shortage, depletion of resources such as fish, and trees for houses 
is putting a strain on relationships, and frequently results in tribal fights.
8
 
 
The increase in population is caused by a number of factors. One of the reasons is 
to do with property ownership, particularly land. Nearly 97 per cent of land in 
PNG is customarily owned
9
 and needs to be transferred to future generations. A 
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clan or tribe sees it as important to have as many children as possible so that they 
can occupy the unused land. Having more children will ensure security over 
private property and land, and provide security from attacks from other tribes and 
clans.
10
 Further, better health is also considered one of the reasons for the 
population increase.
11
 
 
The Government planning, decisions on infrastructural development and delivery 
of goods and services must take population into account. Population must be 
considered in determining policies. Recently the Government became aware of the 
importance of population and its overall social and economic implications. It has 
taken measures to address this by adopting a 14-year policy on population.
12
 The 
policies address issues like integration, which calls on the Government and its 
agencies and other stakeholders
13
 to integrate population in their developmental 
planning.
14
 Whether this has been effected has not been seen however, what is 
conspicuous is that law and order problems with unemployment have increased 
with the increase in population.
15
 
 
The Government‟s population policy aims to reduce the annual population growth 
from 3.5 per cent to 2 per cent by year 2020.
16
 The Government should not only 
seek to decrease the population size but address the social and economic needs of 
the population. Policies must be in place to create more employment to absorb 
graduates from the universities and colleges into the work force, divert more 
funds into the development of infrastructure in rural areas to prevent rural-urban 
migration, and revitalize the redundant minimum wages board so that it performs 
its duty of considering minimum wages for employees. Dealing with these issues 
will lead to addressing law and order problems that are evident in PNG. 
Population increase must be addressed along with these other causes of societal 
concerns. 
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9.3 EDUCATION 
 
The literacy rate in PNG is low compared to other developing countries in the 
South Pacific.
17
 The literacy rate in 2004 was at 57.3 per cent.
18
  The importance 
of literacy and education has compelled the Government to undertake a major 
overhaul of the education system. The result, within the 10-year period from 1992 
to 2002 shows that “schools have increased by 175 per cent, enrolments have 
doubled, and the number of teachers has increased by 70 per cent”.19  
 
By 2000 PNG had six universities and other smaller colleges around the country. 
The total number of students attending universities and colleges was 13, 637.
20
 
That was two per cent of the population. The number of students attending 
universities was 8, 121. That is 0.1 per cent of the total population. Not many 
students who attend elementary and primary schools enter universities and 
colleges. The Government envisaged increasing the intake into universities. In 
1997, the University of Divine Word, University of Vudal, University of Goroka 
and the Pacific Adventist University were converted to universities by various 
Acts of parliament.
21
 This was done to give effect to the Government‟s basic 
policy on education provided in the 1996 White paper on Higher Education, 
Research, Science and Technology.
22
 
 
Since 1997, the number of secondary schools has increased to 30 and they are 
graduating every year at around 19, 000 students. Unfortunately, the higher 
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learning institutes can only take in 2500 students, and many among the 19, 000 
students become “drop outs”.23 By increasing the number of universities and 
colleges would cater for more students who are leaving grades 10 and 12. The 
idea is noble; however unequal consideration is given to various levels of 
education. The policy direction of increasing the number of students at the 
secondary high school level did not equate with the facilities at the universities to 
accommodate the increasing number of students. There is increasing demand 
placed on lecturers to impart high quality education; however there is no 
reciprocal commitment on the part of the Government in terms of extra funding so 
that more classrooms can be erected, equipment purchased, and support services 
provided. Although, the state universities are autonomous bodies under the 
respective Acts of parliament, Government is obliged to fund them to meet their 
overall objectives in education. 
 
The universities have their own internal problems. Student and staff unrest has 
been the major issues. There have been stand-offs between university 
administrations and the students, or the members of staff and university 
administrations. This leads to disruption of classes. In 2010, students went on 
strike at the University of Goroka and the classes were suspended for six weeks.
24
 
The Government was unable to intervene, as it is not permitted to under the Acts 
of Parliament.
25
 The 2007 unrest between the PNG University of Technology and 
its staff members has prompted the minister responsible to submit a proposal to 
the National Executive Council to amend the law to allow the minister to 
intervene where there is unrest at a university.
26
 Government intervention may 
compromise academic freedom. Universities must not be politicized and their 
freedom of academic criticism, research and free impartation of knowledge must 
be maintained. However, other measures taken by the Government to address 
literacy problems are commendable. 
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The important step taken by the Government is the realization that there is a need 
for better and quality education for its people and it has taken some positive 
measures towards improving education and general literacy. Secondary and higher 
education were not the only areas the Government is looking at. It has also 
focused its attention on the elementary and primary education and vocational 
schools around the country.
27
 The Medium Term Development Strategy (MTDS) 
2003 – 2007 is reassuring, with a plan that Government would increase the budget 
for basic education from K101.8 million in 2003 to K103.2 million in 2006. The 
Government is explicit that it would cater for such things as, elementary teacher 
training, improve primary school infrastructure; improve rural education facilities, 
teacher training, literacy and awareness and technical and vocational training.
28
 
Further, “A National Plan for Education 2005 – 2014” sets out a road map for 
education in PNG, with a strong recognition of custom and quality education.
29
 
Many of the grand ideas encapsulated in the MTDS have not been realized.  
 
There are other critical issues in education that still need to be looked into. The 
World Bank report under “Papua New Guinea Public Expenditure and Service 
Delivery”30 identified some important and perennial problems in PNG. Physical 
facilities of schools are on the decline, and this increases with the remoteness of 
the school. Many schools do not have electricity, or water or basic textbooks or a 
library for students. School funding is another area that cripples many schools. 
Most school funding is sourced from school and project fees. Governments, 
occasionally distribute grants, unfortunately many schools especially those in 
remote areas do not receive these grants. The free education policy of the 
Government has positive results, which increases the enrolment of the students; 
however, the policy itself is questionable. Is the Government genuine about the 
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policy and is it sustainable, or is it a seasonal political benevolence? These and 
many more issues such as disparity between male and female education,
31
 
teachers not attending classes, delay in the payment of salary and under-payment 
of teachers are some of the interrelated problems that needs to be looked into and 
addressed.
32
  
 
There is a lot more that Government needs to do at the basic educational level to 
fulfil the much-needed improvement that is clearly outlined in the MTDS. Some 
of the tangible benefits are seen through the establishment of elementary schools 
and the setting up of more secondary high schools. Concurrently an equal effort, 
resources and concentration should be diverted to higher education to see the 
establishment of facilities so that lecturers can effectively discharge their primary 
duty of teaching and research.
33
 The way forward is to address financial, 
infrastructural and technical problems at the basic educational, high school and 
tertiary education levels, and ensure that they complement one another. 
 
9.4 HEALTH  
 
Health issues are of major concern for PNG. The majority of the population is 
living in the remotest part of the country, and is in desperate need of primary 
health care. There are many reasons for inadequate provision of health services, 
including insufficient funds, lack of transport or the misappropriation of funds 
allocated to the Health Department. Two of the major obstacles are centralization 
of decision-making and lack of transparency. The basic health service is of utmost 
importance to the country and yet the policy and legislative framework put in 
place are not effectively implemented. Consequently, the country is rated amongst 
the worse in the South Pacific island countries in terms of the overall health of its 
people.
34
 
                                                          
31
  World Bank, “Gender Analysis in Papua New Guinea,” (1998) The World Bank, < 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAPUANEWGUINEA/Resources/chapter+2+Key+T
hematic+Issues.pdf > at 9
th
 April 2007. 
32
  World Bank, “Papua New Guinea Public Expenditure and Service Delivery,” < 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPAPUANEWGUINEA/Resources/Ex-Summary-
PESD-Report.pdf   > at 9 April 2007. 
33
  Guy, R., “How Many Marks for the Education Budget?” (July – December 2000) 2(30) in 
Boeha, B. and Robins, J., (eds.) Issues and Trend in National Development: Searchlight on 
Papua New Guinea, (2001) 49 at 51 - 52. 
34
  Papua New Guinea Government, Health Vision 2010: National Health Profile, (vol. III, Part 
I, 2000) 2. 
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In 1997, the National Health Administration Act was passed as a step towards 
ensuring the effective delivery of health services.
35
 The Act is the culmination of 
previous policies, which have never been effectively implemented. Through the 
legislation, it is intended, that parties involved in the decision-making and 
delivery process will be compelled to act. Importantly the Act establishes the 
National and Provincial Health Board to oversee the implementation of national 
policies and to co-ordinate the delivery of health services to the people. This 
establishment is long overdue but a step in the right direction that will ensure the 
fulfilment of the health needs of the people.  
 
Subsequent to the National Health Administration Act different governments have 
adopted health policies. In 2001, the Government adopted a ten year National 
Health Policy, which points to areas where Government is lacking in effective 
delivery and where it could intervene to ensure 80 per cent people living in rural 
areas receive basic health service. In 2002, the new Government sets out MTDS 
2002 -2007 and health was the main priority. 
 
There are other serious issues in health that the country must continuously deal 
with. Undoubtedly the HIV/AIDS pandemic is a major concern to the 
Government and the people. In 1997, National Aids Council Act was enacted to 
give a formal, legislative status to an autonomous
36
 body set up to administer 
HIV/AIDS matters. The Aids Council is tasked with the aim of preventing, 
controlling and eliminating the transmission of HIV, and to have in place 
procedures to minimize the personal, social and economic impact of the HIV 
infection and the disease of AIDS.
37
 By 2003, the population of HIV/AIDS 
infected people was increasing at an alarming rate. The victims of the virus were 
shunned and ignored, even ostracized by their own family members. In 2003 the 
HIV/AIDS Management and Prevention Act was enacted. It protects victims of 
HIV/AIDS from discriminatory practices by other people. Despite the 
Government‟s attempt to prevent HIV/AIDS, it is increasing annually among the 
                                                          
35
  See s 3 of National Health Administration Act 1997 for the basis of the enactment. 
36
  Section 3 of the National Aids Council Act 1997 established the National Aids Council and 
gives it a status of legal personality.  
37
  National Aids Council Act 1997, s 4. 
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population. The current Government has put in place the “National Strategic Plan 
on HIV/AIDS 2006 – 2010”38 to deal with the issue. 
 
The emphasis on HIV/AIDS should not reduce the significance of preventing 
other diseases such as cancer, tuberculosis (TB) and malaria. Malaria has caused 
more deaths in PNG than all other diseases combined and continues to do so. 
Tuberculosis is another chronic disease which affects a large majority of the 
population. In 2007, the Health Department adopted a “Stop TB Strategy” to 
successfully detect and treat the disease.
39
 Most of these strategies have yet to be 
implemented. 
 
9.5 POVERTY 
 
Poverty has never been considered to be an issue in PNG. Like any new concepts 
people have to be educated to understand poverty and its relevance. Earlier it was 
conceived that poverty was a lack of food, water and shelter and the Government 
had the impression that poverty did not apply to PNG. The vast majority of the 
people lived in rural areas, cultivating land, and there was a supply of food, water 
and shelter. This is a narrow and restrictive view of poverty. Poverty has many 
faces and it can include a lack of food, water, adequate shelter, deteriorating 
physical structure, poor health services, inaccessibility to health services, and a 
rise in the rates of mortality and high unemployment. For the last 20 years the 
Government has realized that poverty is an acute problem in PNG and it is an 
issue that needs addressing. The Millennium Development Plan highlighted 
poverty as one of the issues that the Government needs to address.
40
 In MTDS 
2005–2010 the Government prioritizes the alleviation of poverty as one of its key 
policy goals.
41
 The international donors also require that poverty alleviation 
should be included in the developmental plan as a condition of eligibility for a 
loan.
42
 PNG must show evidence that steps have been taken to alleviate poverty in 
order to be eligible for a loan.  
                                                          
38
  National Aids Council, National Strategic Plan on HIV?AIDS  2006-2010,  (January  2006) . 
39
  The National, “TB Strategy the only Cure,” in The National, (Port Moresby, 13th April 2007) 
< http://www.thenational.com.pg/041307/nation26.htm > at 13 April 2007. 
40
  United Nations Development Programme, Millennium Development Goals – Progress Report 
for Papua New Guinea 2004, (2004) 10 – 13. 
41
  Government of PNG, The Government Medium Term Development Strategy 2005 – 2010, 
above n 28 at 25 – 26. 
42
  World Bank, A sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies, (vol. 1, 2002) 3. 
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Low-income earners live in rural areas, and others live at the periphery of towns 
and cities and are involved in small-scale commercial activities like trade stores, 
petty services like painting and maintenance and other trading activities. Much of 
the Government‟s budgetary allocation has been diverted towards manufacturing 
and commercial activities.
43
 The budgetary allocation for rural areas in health, 
education and infrastructural development is either exhausted at the national level 
or, if it trickles down to the rural level, it becomes inadequate to complete the 
intended project.  
 
Another important concern is the impact of poverty on women and children, 
particularly women who play an active role for survival in and out of the home. 
Poverty has immense effect on women, who have to struggle every day either 
through subsistence farming or low paid jobs and/or long hours, to have food on 
the table for their family. Unfortunately, government policies on poverty do not 
give special recognition to the poverty status of women in PNG, or provide means 
where women can improve their welfare. To a limited extent, the Department of 
Education is encouraging more girls to attend schools and national leaders have 
supported reserving seats in the national Parliament specifically for women,
44
 
however this is not enough, and only a start to improve the current poverty level 
of women. 
 
Successive governments formulated policies on poverty without identifying 
groups of people in acute poverty level and their economic characteristics. 
Implementation of policy is another important concern. It is one thing to have a 
well written policy but it is another to implement it. The Government has an 
ambitious goal of reducing poverty by half from 43.7 per cent.
45
 There are 
obstacles that it has to deal with in the implementation of poverty alleviation 
policy. First, there needs to be a working criterion to assess poverty. At the 
moment there is no national standard. Second, there is no clear estimation or 
documented evidence of the numbers of people who are at an acute poverty level, 
                                                          
43
  Most monies put into commercial sectors are to revamp SOE which go through bad debts.  
44
  Nanol, F., “PNG Leaders‟ Summit Support Seats for Women,” in ABC – Radio Australia, 
(19
th
 August 2009) < http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/pacbeat/stories/200908/s2660909.htm  
> at 30 March 2010. 
45
  This is the 1998 rate taken from, Papua New Guinea Government, Papua New Guinea 
National Assessment: Response to Rio and Agenda 21,  above n 3 at 7. 
 158 
and the provinces in the country that have high poverty rates. Further, there is no 
clear understanding of the causes and effect of poverty. Given the lack of proper 
assessment and documentation of these issues, it will not be possible to have 
appropriate initiatives to address them. Consequently, eradication of poverty will 
be a vain effort. 
 
9.6 LAW AND ORDER 
 
Crime is a serious violation of law and is of grave concern to the peace and 
stability of the society. Crime in PNG refers to many forms of criminal activities, 
ranging from theft, robbery, arson, fraud, rape, murder and extortion, to white 
collar crime committed by leaders through the embezzlement of thousands and 
millions of Kina from the Government coffers. Crime in PNG has hampered 
development.
46
  
 
The lawless situation also affects business prosperity, deters foreign investment, increases 
cost structure of the economy, and directly inhibits economic growth.
47
 
 
In the last 30 years crime has grown out of proportion because the Government is 
not seeing it as a developmental issue but as a problem for the police. Many 
government resources are diverted to the police through recruitment and training 
to curb crime. For example in the 2000 and 2001 budgets alone, the law 
enforcement agencies received a substantial increase in their annual budgetary 
allocation,
48
 and they receive an occasional increase in their salary when they 
demand it.
49
  
 
Law and order can be seen in many forms. It can be seen through the high rate of 
break-and-enter crimes that occur on a daily basis. This is obvious in Port 
Moresby and other towns and cities with big high-rise spike fences built around 
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  Sikani, R., “Crime and Development in Papua New Guinea,” (July – December 2000) 2(30),  
in Boeha, B. and James Robins, J., (eds.) Issues and Trend In National development, 
Searchlight on Papua New Guinea, (2001) 53. 
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  Ibid at 64. 
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  Safihao, J., “Cops cash in,” in Post Courier, (Port Moresby, 15th October 2009) < 
http://www.postcourier.com.pg/20091015/news01.htm  >  at 27 October 2009; See also Post 
Courier, “PNG Police to Get Pay Rise,” in Pacific Business Online, (Port Moresby, 15th 
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residential houses. Too many break-and-enter crimes occur on a daily basis that 
police find it difficult to deal with them, and victims are reluctant to report these 
matters knowing that police may not be able to address them. Vandalism of public 
property is obvious from the debris lying around in towns and cities. Frustration 
over government policies or decisions is expressed through the destruction of 
public properties like hospital and school buildings, or by burning down public 
buildings. Rape is on the increase in PNG. Politicians are involved in committing 
these crimes and try to use money to silence victims and their relatives from 
reporting the matters to the police. Media through reporting can control such 
crimes; unfortunately they do not reveal the names of the politicians involved.
50
 
On a daily basis national newspapers report murder and stealing.  
 
Many causes are attributed to criminal problems and societal disorder. In the 
main, people find it hard to cope with the rapid modernization combined with 
interaction with the rest of the world in a land with diverse customs, cultures and 
languages.
51
 Participation in social, economic and political development has 
allowed people to detach themselves from Melanesian values and ways of doing 
things.
52
  Changes brought about by developments affect social fabric of the 
communities. The Melanesian custom of respect for elders, women and children is 
eroding. Elders who used to maintain law and order in the villages have become 
things of the past. Youths are roaming streets and freely committing endless 
crimes. Police use of brutal force, unfortunately escalates further violation of rules 
and social norms, and not even correctional justice enforced by correctional 
service institutions is of any assistance in preventing crimes.  
 
The correctional justice system does not make a distinction between first time 
offenders and serial offenders, petty crime and serious crime, and reformative and  
punitive justice. Cells in PNG are crowded, unhygienic and unfit for human  
 
                                                          
50
  For example, in Post – Courier, “$40M in MP‟s Account,” in Post Courier, (Port Moresby, 
2
nd
 July 2008) 1 and 3. 
51
  PNG has more than 800 languages spoken by clans and tribes within the population of six 
million people. 
52
  Sikani, R., “The Law and Order 2001 Budget,” above n 47 at 63. 
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habitation.
53
 Instead of having a prison system where inmates become better 
citizens to be released back into society, they become worse than their earlier 
person upon entering the cell.
54
 No appropriate systems of rehabilitation have 
been developed and a lack of funds mean that probation and parole officers are 
unable to assist and supervise offenders when they are allowed to live in the 
community. 
 
Crime must be regarded as a social problem and the Government must have a 
strategic plan in place to prevent it.
55
 The social and economic plan must take this 
into account and address the hopes, aspirations and expectations of the younger 
generation, because it is this generation that is the cause of much of the disorder in 
the society and the prison is full of them.
56
 Government policy must make them 
become participants in the economic development so that they are not made to 
feel as spectators. Penalties for “white collar crimes” are too lenient and 
inadequate as deterrence; as a result leaders continue committing crimes and are 
allowed to run for public office after their convictions.
57
 This questions the 
credibility of public office and people are gradually losing trust in the leadership. 
The laws have to change so that a person must not occupy public office after 
conviction of a criminal offence.  
 
9.7 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
PNG is the richest country in the South Pacific in natural resource and yet its 
economic performance has been mixed since the late 1980s and 1990s. Internal 
and external factors contribute to economic woes. Generally, globalization 
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introduces its share of problems but a particularly negative development in 
commodity prices and unfavorable trade conditions and others have contributed to 
economic stagnation. Internally, a series of natural disasters, inappropriate policy 
regimes, fiscal failures and civil war in Bougainville from 1989 to 1999 have all 
contributed to negative economic growth and macroeconomic instability.
58
 
 
In 1972, in the period of Self-Government
59
 under Somare, Eight Aims were set 
out as development goals.
60
 These aims were established to achieve equitable and 
sustainable growth, protection of environment and use of natural resources for the 
benefit of all. These goals are reflected in the current National Goals and 
Directive Principles in PNG‟s Constitution. In tune with these goals, PNG‟s 
economic policies “were characterized by fiscal discipline, stable prices and 
responsible governance”.61 Within the first four years after Independence 
Government pursued a hard currency strategy where there was tight control over 
expenditure that resulted in real per capita public sector outlays.
62
 In 1994, the 
hard budget currency was abandoned and the Kina was floated to achieve external 
balance but flotation did not achieve the intended goal.  
 
In trade, PNG had an open–economic policy before Independence. After 
Independence this policy was adopted and pursued with liberal stance on the use 
of exchange controls, foreign investment, imports, and employment of foreign 
labour. Due to pressure from business groups the protectionist policies were 
adopted in the early 1980s to protect domestic business interests.
63
 In the 1990s 
the country reverted back to trade liberalization. Although the open–economic 
policy is directly contrary to the National Goals and Directive Principles, the 
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Government still pursues this policy today.
64
 So there has not been one stable and 
steady course of action. The changes in trade and economic policies are the result 
of changes in successive governments. The current Government still pursues the 
open–economic policies. 
 
PNG is blessed with natural resources. These include, gold, copper, oil, gas, 
timber, fisheries, coffee, cocoa, oil palm, copra and others. The mining and 
petroleum sectors bring in large revenue for the country; however the money is 
not used for sustainable projects in fisheries or agriculture, or invested in a 
consolidated account for use in the future after non-renewable resources are 
exhausted. Agriculture is the least developed sector since Independence, although 
indigenous people are excellent farmers, having a long history of farming in the 
Pacific dating back over 10, 000 years.
65
 Previous governments have given less 
consideration to agriculture. Recently, the current Government is vocal in 
developing the agriculture sector and has taken some of the necessary steps in 
policy formulation.
66
 Apart from agriculture the country has the second largest 
tropical rainforest in the world and is characterized by extra ordinary biodiversity. 
Further, it has an exclusive economic zone of 3.1 kilometers that harbours 
abundant tuna resources. These areas have lacked proper policy guidelines and a 
sufficient budgetary allocation to make appropriate and sustainable use of them.  
 
Despite its abundance of resources half the population is still living in poverty - 
partly caused by lack of employment and low wages. The country has a 
centralized wage – setting mechanism. The Minimum Wages Board (MWB) and 
the Unions play an important role in setting minimum wages. The MWB was last 
convened in 1992 and remain redundant until 1999.
67
 Many employees are still on 
low wages. The wages are inadequate to meet the increasing cost of living and 
rising inflation. With unemployment considerably high and increasing, it is hard 
for these employees to vacate their low paid jobs, and people who are unemployed 
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resort to illegal activities such as theft to survive, hence contributing to law and 
order problems. The current minimum wages must be reviewed and employment 
opportunities must be created for people. The onus is on the Government. 
 
PNG can fully realize its economic potential but it must address law and order 
problems, maintain its infrastructures (particularly roads), encourage investment 
in mining and petroleum, and develop and implement good policies in agriculture, 
forestry and fisheries.
68
 If there is prudent economic planning and implementation 
from Independence people would not be asking the question: “where has all the 
wealth gone”?69  
 
9.8 CONCLUSION 
 
PNG cannot move forward if it cannot address its social and economic woes. 
These are serious problems that need to be immediately addressed. Government 
has come up with fashionable policies, good on paper and yet failed to implement 
them. The literacy rate is low, the poverty rate is high, and the law and order 
problem is out of hand. Economic problems equate with high unemployment. 
These signs indicate that the Government is slowly losing its grip on the society. 
Development cannot be left in private hands, and goods and services cannot 
expect to be delivered, with more than 80 per cent of the population still living in 
rural areas (although it can decide from time to time to leave certain activities in 
private hands). This makes the role of SOEs important in PNG‟s developing 
economy. Using SOEs would separate the Government from its activities, and 
simultaneously allow Government to only have a say in community services 
obligations of SOEs.  
 
Government has responsibility to the society, especially the rural community - in 
providing goods and services. This responsibility calls for the Government to 
meet its third national goal of equality and participation where it declares that all 
citizens have an equal opportunity to participate in, and benefit from, the 
development of the country. Given the current social and economic dilemmas, the 
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Government needs to take control of the situation by either implementing its 
policies or coming up with policies to address some of these dilemmas. 
Government has a responsibility to people to use all means such as SOEs to 
achieve its aims and address the dilemmas of development. 
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CHAPTER 10: 
 
CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Companies have been operating in Papua New Guinea (PNG) long before 
Independence, 1975. The first big company was incorporated in Germany and carried 
on business in PNG during a significant part of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, 
followed by two other big Australian companies. Nue Guinea Kompagnie (NGK) was 
the German company that was mainly involved in cash crops and operated in Rabaul 
with its business activities along the coast of New Guinea. The two Australian 
companies were involved mainly in mining based in Morobe Province. PNG was 
under colonial administration of Germany, Great Britain and Australia. Germany and 
Great Britain occupied New Guinea and Papua from 1884 until the early part of the 
20
th
 century. After Australia became a federated state it took over the administration 
of Papua from Britain and eventually New Guinea after World War One. Many of the 
laws adopted, including company law, were a reflection of its colonial links. 
Australian law had a significant influence on PNG law before Independence; hence 
many of the laws were adopted from Australia. This is also true for the company law. 
The laws of PNG and Australia have some characteristics similar to English law as 
both countries were colonized by Britain. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a 
brief history of companies and highlight background information on rules of 
corporate governance in PNG generally and particularly governance in state owned 
enterprise (SOE). 
 
The first part of the chapter examines company law and corporate governance before 
and after Independence, 16 September 1975. The discussion acknowledges the role of 
major companies in the early development of the country, and the position of 
corporate governance rules in PNG legal system. The final part ensues with a 
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discussion on corporate governance in SOEs and why government continues to 
effectively participate in the economy with the use of SOEs.  
 
10.2 COMPANY LAW AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
PNG is a developing country. The society is divided into urban and rural sectors. 
More than 85 per cent of people in the society live a subsistence way of life in rural 
communities on land that is 97 per cent customarily owned. Customary law that has 
been practiced from time immemorial still governs the life of people living in the 
rural areas, and there is very little commercial activity in these places. In remote areas 
like Karamui in Simbu Province and Telefomin in Sandaun Province people still 
practice a barter system. There are no commercial activities or small-scale 
commercial activities (if any). The concept of the company is still foreign to many 
rural-based people.   
 
Despite the fact that the concept of the corporation is not well known in the country, 
corporations have a long existence in PNG, contributing to the social and economic 
development of the society. The history of corporations began in England. The 
modern company law that is applied in Commonwealth countries began taking shape 
after the Bubble Act 1720. The Act hindered growth of any joint stock companies.
1
 
With lawyers‟ ingenuity and the assistance by the Court of Chancery a new medium, 
the “deed of settlement” was developed based on the concept of trust.2 After over 100 
years later Joint Stock Companies Registration and Regulation Act 1844 was enacted 
having all the features of modern company law except that members did not have 
limited liability. The Limited Liability Act 1855 was enacted, limiting personal 
liability of members.
3
 The House of Lords affirmed the limited liability and separate 
                                                          
1
  Austin, R. P. and Ramsay, I. M., Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law, (14th edn., 2010) 39 - 
41, paras. 2.110 and 2.120. 
2
  The deed enabled the funds of subscribers to be controlled by trustees and contained mutual 
agreements between investors, the committee of directors and trustees and used as a separate 
juristic entity that could carry out commercial activities. Even though its usage was contrary to 
the requirements of the Bubble Act it was meeting the economic needs of the country, hence 
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3
   Cassidy, J., Corporations Law: Text and Essential Cases, (2
nd
 edn., 2008) 3 - 4, para 1.30. 
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legal personality of companies in Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd
4
, giving recognition 
to de facto private companies. Subsequently, the 1855 Act was repealed then 
incorporated into the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856.
5
  Nearly 20 years later, after 
1844, English company law was consolidated in the Companies Act 1862,
6
 which 
became the company legislation model for British colonies. 
 
Each Australian states enacted legislation based on the UK Companies Act 1862 
before and after federation 1901, until pressure in the 1960s for a uniform company 
legislation to be adopted.
7
 Before 1960s, there was no uniformity in the legislation 
and the administration of company law, and this proved difficult for those 
corporations operating out of the jurisdiction in which they were incorporated.
8
  The 
Commonwealth Government drafted a bill, which was to be passed as Companies 
Acts by each state except for Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory and 
Territory of Papua and New Guinea.
9
 The three territories were directly controlled by 
the Commonwealth administration in Canberra. Subsequently, the Commonwealth 
Government made ordinances for the three territories. The Companies Ordinance 
1963 came into effect on first July 1964 in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea.
10
 
The Companies Ordinance 1963 was applied in Papua and New Guinea until 
Independence, 1975. As a result of the historical link there are a lot of similarities 
between company laws of Great Britain, Australia and PNG. The same is true for 
New Zealand (NZ).
11
 
  
10.2.1  The Papua New Guinea Company and Corporate Governance Regime – 
Pre Independence 
 
PNG was colonized by three different countries; namely Great Britain, Germany and 
Australia. Britain and Australia colonized Papua, the southern part of PNG mainly for 
                                                          
4
  Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. 
5
  Gower, L. C. B., Davies, P. L. and Prentice, D. D., Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, 
(6
th
 edn., 1997) 44 – 46. 
6
  Above n 1 at 42 - 43, paras.  2.140 and 2.150. 
7
  Ibid at 43 – 44, para. 2.170. 
8
  Ciro, T. and Symes, C., Corporations Law: in Principle, (8
th
 edn., 2009) 3 – 4, para. 1.30. 
9
  Ford, H. A. J., Ramsay, I.  M.  and Austin, R. P., Ford's Principles of Corporations Law, (9
th
 
edn., 1999) 43, para. 2.180.  
10
  Ibid at 43, para. 2.180. 
11
  Grantham, R. and Rickett, C. E. F., Company and Securities Law: Commentary and Materials, 
(2002) 33, par. 1.4; McDermott, J. R., Understanding Company Law, (2005) 3, para. 1.2, 1.3. 
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security reasons
12
 and German colonized the northern part, New Guinea for economic 
reasons. Annexation effectively means that the territory is colonized; hence becomes 
part of the territory of the colonizer and its laws then apply. 
 
10.2.1.1 The Territory of Papua 
 
Papua was annexed by Britain in 1884.
13
 The annexation was an act of state. It made 
it possible for British laws to apply. These laws include Acts of parliament and 
common law and equity. This made it possible for companies that were incorporated 
in Britain to operate in the territory. The administration of Papua was transferred to 
Australia in 1906 after five years of confederation in 1901. The Australian colonial 
administration made a serious attempt to provide for the corporate form, 
incorporation and operation of company and corporate governance framework. In 
1912, the Lieutenant–Governor of Papua adopted the Companies Ordinance 1912 
(No.29 of 1912) which was based on the Companies Act 1863 of Queensland. 
Company law from 1912 to 1926 was fragmented and there was need for 
consolidation. In 1926, Papua adopted a consolidated Companies Ordinance 1912–
1926.
14
 
 
Some years later under Australian colonial administration gold was discovered in 
Eddie Creek near Wau, Morobe Province. This attracted two of the largest 
companies, Bulolo Gold Mining and Dredging Ltd and New Guinea Goldfields Ltd to 
operate there. These companies were incorporated in Australia.
15
 The New Guinea 
Goldfields Ltd was the biggest company operating in Wau and a major employer in 
the country. The hive of activity around the discovery of gold attracted many 
expatriates and locals who moved into the area and were employed. There were other 
smaller companies attracted by the gold mine that moved into Wau and Morobe 
Province, including Burns Philp & Company Ltd, which set up a trading store in 
                                                          
12
  See Nelson, H., Fighting for her Gates and Waterways: Changing Perceptions of New Guinea in 
Australian Defence, (Discussion paper No. 3, 2005) 1. See the rest of the discussion in the paper. 
13
  Moore, C., “Queensland‟s Labour Trade and the Annexation of New Guinea in 1883,” in 
Latukefu, S., (ed.) Papua New Guinea : a Century of Colonial Impact, 1884-1984, (1989) 1. 
14
  Deklin, A., “Company Law in Papua New Guinea,” in Tomasic, R., (ed.) Company Law in East 
Asia, (1999) 565 at 568 – 570. 
15
  Waiko, J. D., A Short History of Papua New Guinea, (1993) 87. 
 169 
Wau.
16
 This illustrates that companies were operating in PNG long before 
Independence and that they contributed to the development of the territory and 
prepared it for Independence. 
 
10.2.1.2 Territory of New Guinea 
 
New Guinea was under Germany‟s control. Its presence in the territory was 
predominantly for economic reasons; hence it did not leave any lasting legal legacy. 
The Germans first settled in New Guinea in 1883 and declared it a German territory 
in 1884.
17
 The administration of New Guinea was handed to a conglomerate of 
German trading companies that consolidated as NGC and it was the first company 
operating in New Guinea from 1885 – 1899.18 Although the company‟s operation was 
the biggest undertaken in New Guinea, many factors contributed to its downfall. 
Immediately after the downfall the German Imperial Government took over the failed 
enterprise.
19
  
 
As stated, NGK was involved in commercial activities in New Guinea and at the 
same time it was the administrator and controlled German New Guinea on behalf of 
the Government of Germany. Being the administrator it determined, amongst other 
things, who went into the territory and activities that were to be undertaken in it. For 
example if missionaries were to come to New Guinea they had to be German 
speakers and from the German Missionary Society. In addition to their responsibility 
of spreading gospel they were to assist NGK to achieve its objectives through training 
of indigenous population in manual and other skills.
20
   
 
NGC was the largest plantation firm in the Pacific. It grew crops like rubber, cacao, 
coffee, cotton, kapok, lemon grass, maize, taro, copra, palms and sisal. Of the 138, 
000 hectares that it had, 8288 was used for coconut, palms, rubber, cacao and sisal. 
                                                          
16
  Sinclair, J., Golden Gateway: Lae & the Province of Morobe, (1997) ch 13, 105. 
17
  Clay, B.J., Unstable Images: Colonial Discourse on New Ireland, Papua New Guinea, 1875-
1935, (2005) 69.  
18
  Ibid. 
19
  Moore, C. and Kooyman, M., (eds.), Australian Journal of Politics and History - A Papua New 
Guinea Political Chronicle 1967-1991, (1998) Introduction XVI. 
20
  Firth, S., New Guinea under the Germans, (1983) 136. 
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Eighty per cent of the whole of its plantings in New Guinea, including Madang and 
Finschhaben, was coconut. No wonder that by September 1914 copra export was 
increased to 6 million marks, making German New Guinea the leading copra 
producing country in the Pacific.
21
 
 
NGC was not all that successful. Eventually it collapsed. Many reasons were given. 
One reason was the fall in the commodity price
22
 whilst for others it was 
mismanagement.
23
 And yet others look at the factors within the territory. Wrong 
crops were planted and they did not bring the needed revenue, thousands of labourers 
were not properly looked after or there was loss of control over the villagers.
24
 These 
were reasons provided to justify the collapse of what otherwise appeared to be the 
biggest and successful company in the country. The collapse of NGK marked the end 
of the monopoly of one of the biggest companies in New Guinea. 
 
10.2.1.3 Papua and New Guinea 
 
Germany was defeated in World War One and it surrendered administration of New 
Guinea. It became a mandate territory under the League of Nations. Australia was 
given trusteeship of New Guinea in 1919. It set up its head quarters in Rabaul and 
adopted laws from Papua to be applied in New Guinea including the Companies 
Ordinance 1912 – 1926.25 The company ordinances of both territories have the same 
content. In 1963, Papua and New Guinea adopted the Companies Ordinance 1963 
made by the Australian administration, which was applied in the two territories until 
Self-Government
26
 in 1973.
27
 Under Self-Government the two ordinances were 
merged into one, retitled Companies Act 1973 and adopted under the PNG 
Constitution on 16 September 1975. The Companies Act 1973 was applied until it 
                                                          
21
  Ibid at 91. 
22
  Firth, S., “The German Firms in the Pacific Islands, 1857 – 1914,” in Moses, J. and Kennedy, 
P.M., (eds.) Germany in the Pacific and Far East, 1870 – 1914, (1977). 
23
  Above n 17 at 70. 
24
  Above n 19, Introduction XVI at 66. 
25
  Above n 14 at 569. 
26
  See chapter nine, particularly footnote 59, which explains Self-Government. 
27
  Ford, Ramsay and Austin, above n 9 at 43, para. 2.180. 
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was consolidated in 1982. 
28
 Finally, the Companies Act 1997 was adopted from NZ 
law with some modifications, and is effective currently. 
 
10.2.2 Company and Corporate Governance Regime – Post Independence 
 
As noted in chapter three, corporate governance consists of rules, which are 
established to govern the affairs of a corporation. In terms of their binding order, 
Professor John Farrar classified corporate governance into three categories.
29
 They 
are hard law, hybrid law and soft law. Hard law consists of legislation, and common 
law and equity. Hybrid law includes rules of Stock Exchange Listing Rules, and 
accounting and auditing standards, whilst soft law consists of codes of ethics, codes 
of good corporate governance and business ethics. 
 
In order to understand the position of corporate governance rules in PNG it is 
important first to understand laws applicable in PNG. On 16 September 1975, PNG 
declared Independence and adopted a constitution. The Constitution is a supreme law 
in the country. Any other laws that are inconsistent with it are ineffective and invalid 
to the extent of that inconsistency.
30
 Section 9 of the Constitution enlists all laws 
applicable in the country. It provides that the laws of PNG consist of: 
 
a. the PNG Constitution;  
b. the Organic Laws;  
c. the Acts of the Parliament;  
d. Emergency Regulations;  
e. the provincial laws;  
f. laws made under or adopted by or under PNG Constitution or any of those laws, including 
subordinate legislative enactments made under PNG Constitution or any of those laws; 
and 
g. the Underlying Law. 
 
The Underlying Law consists of customary laws of PNG and the common law and 
equity of England.
31
 In cases of inconsistency between common law and custom, the 
latter takes precedence.
32
 The Underlying Law is firstly a “reserve law” in a sense 
that where there is absence or deficiencies in other laws it would be invoked to fill the 
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  Above n 14 at 570. 
29
  Farrar, J. H., Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles and Practice, (3
rd
 edn., 2008) 3 – 4. 
30
  Constitution of PNG, ss 10 and 11. 
31
  Constitution of PNG, sch. 1.2. 
32
  Constitution of PNG, sch. 2.2 (1).  
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deficiencies and in the process develop underlying law based on custom. The 
common law and equity adopted are those that are applied in the country immediately 
before Independence in 1975. Further, the Acts of parliament apply before 
Independence also became part of the laws of the country. This means any corporate 
governance principles adopted under common law and equity before Independence 
became part of the laws of the country. This includes also corporate governance 
principles adopted under any Act of parliament such as the Companies Act 1912 -
1926. 
 
In PNG, corporate governance rules are provided in statutory laws, common law and 
equity, accounting and auditing standards and the constitution of a specific company. 
The significant statute is the Companies Act 1997, amongst other corporate 
governance legislations such as Securities Act 1997. It is not mandatory under the 
Companies Act 1997 to have a company constitution, however if a company has a 
constitution it must register and file a copy with the Registrar of Companies at the 
Investment Promotion Authority. The rules that predominantly govern the internal 
affairs of a company include the Company Act 1997 and the constitution of the 
company. 
 
Case law or precedents are recognized as a source of laws in PNG. Two higher 
courts, namely the National and the Supreme Court, develop case law and they 
become binding on themselves and the lower courts. In developing case law the 
courts must take into account factors such as the National Goals and Directive 
Principles (NGDP) under Schedule 2.3 of the Constitution. Corporate governance 
rules developed by courts become binding on every person in the country.  
 
10.2.2.1 Companies Act 1997 
 
Corporations are either incorporated under Companies Act or created by a special Act  
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of Parliament.
33
 The Companies Act 1997, along with company regulation, remains 
the more prominent legislation in the commercial field including related legislation 
such as Securities Act 1997 and other commercial Acts of Parliament.
34
 As indicated, 
the PNG Companies Act 1997 was adopted from NZ and has the similar provisions to 
NZ‟s Companies Act 1993.  
 
The important reasons for the adoption and establishment of Companies Act 1997 
were to facilitate economic development with company legislation that is easy to 
understand and a registration process that is not long and cumbersome.
35
 Thus, unlike 
the Companies Act adopted in 1975, the 1997 Act does not make it mandatory to 
lodge the company‟s constitution and memorandum of association, and has removed 
the requirement of having a company secretary. The Act provides protection for 
shareholders and remedies when rights are violated and gives a prominent role to 
courts to effect remedies. Further, the Act defines the rights and duties of 
shareholders and directors.   
 
The term “director” is given a broad definition. A director includes not only a person 
who is appointed to a position of a director,
36
 but those persons who are: acting as 
directors, persons whose advice or instruction either a director or board is accustomed 
to act; persons who are required by the constitution to have powers that are normally 
exercised by the directors or board, or person who is acting under delegated power 
from the board.
37
 A person who is acting in his or her professional capacity is not a 
director.
38
 Hence, a receiver is not a director.
39
 Shareholders, at the general meeting,  
                                                          
33
  Special Act of parliament includes the following: Business Group Incorporation Act 1974, 
Business Names Act 1963, Bodies Corporate (Joint Tenancy) Act 1951, Associations 
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  Companies Act 1997, s 107(1) (a). 
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38
  Companies Act 1997, s 107(5). 
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appoint directors by ordinary resolution.
40
 In certain cases the court appoints them.
41
 
Likewise, a director is removed by ordinary resolution at the general meeting; 
however appointment and termination is subject to the constitution of the company.
42
 
 
The board of directors is empowered to manage, direct or supervise the business and 
affairs of the company.
43
 The Companies Act specifically uses the terms “managed”, 
“direction” or “supervision” implying that the board can either be a managing board 
or advisory board or both, depending on the size of the company and the stipulation 
under company‟s constitution. Board members appoint one among them to be the 
chairperson of the board.
44
 The board is responsible for the appointment of chief 
executive officer (CEO) and senior executives. The CEO and the management team 
are responsible for the day-to-day operation of the company. The power to manage is 
subject to review from time to time. The review mechanisms include preparation and 
submission of annual reports to shareholders prior to general meetings,
45
 so that at the 
general meeting shareholders can question, discuss and comment on the management 
based on the report.  
 
Duties of directors are explicitly provided under Companies Act 1997. The Act does 
not exclude the application of common law and equity. Therefore these laws on 
directors‟ duties, and any other duties developed by courts by virtue of schedule 2.3 
of the PNG Constitution, are still applicable. The Companies Act incorporates many 
director‟s duties. These include the duty to: 
 
a. act in good faith and in what the director believes to be the best interest of the 
company;
46
 
b. exercise care, diligence and skill;47 
c. refrain from unauthorized use of company information;48 
                                                          
40
  Companies Act 1997, s 131(2). 
41
  Companies Act 1997, s 132. 
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  Companies Act 1997, s 134(1). 
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  Companies Act 1997, s 109(1). 
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  Companies Act 1997, sch 4.1 (1). 
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  Companies Act 1997, ss 209 and 210. 
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  Companies Act 1997, s 112. 
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  Companies Act 1997, s 115. 
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d. disclose interests in contract with the company;49 and 
e. comply with the Companies Act and the Constitution.50  
 
There are specific duties under the Act that directors owe directly to shareholders. 
These include, amongst others, the duty to supervise the share register, to disclose 
interests and disclose share dealings.
51
 A shareholder can bring a personal action if 
there is a breach of these duties.
52
 
 
The Companies Act 1997, in greater detail, provides for powers and functions of 
shareholders. Certain powers are automatically available to shareholders when they 
invest in a company. These powers include giving their approval for transaction that 
require unanimous agreement from them,
53
 alteration of shareholders‟ rights,54 and 
when company enters into major transactions.
55
 Also, shareholders have right to 
apply to a higher court
56
 for remedies. The application can be made on the basis that 
the affairs of the company are conducted in a manner that is oppressive, unfairly 
discriminatory or unfairly prejudicial to the person in his or her capacity as a 
shareholder or in any other capacity,
57
 or apply to court for a derivative action.
58
 
Further, shareholders can apply to court for an order restraining a company or a 
director from engaging in conduct that would contravene the constitution or 
Companies Act.
59
 Also, a shareholder has a right to inspect minutes and other formal 
documents.
60
 Shareholders can make a formal written request for the information,
61
 
however if this fails they can obtain inspection by court order.
62
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Most people in PNG do not understand the concept of the corporation and those who 
form companies do not fully grasp the concept of separate legal personality to 
differentiate between the assets of the company and personal assets. This leads to the 
abuse of company finances and properties.  Consequently, many companies are 
usually declared insolvent and liquidated before they are fully established. The PNG 
Government under Self - Government
63
 in 1973 realized that there were problems 
preventing 90 per cent of rural population undertaking commercial activities. 
Immediately prior to Independence, it enacted two pieces of legislation to give legal 
recognition to customary entities and enable them to be involved in business 
activities. It is important to give some consideration to these entities. 
 
10.2.2.2 Customary Corporations 
 
Customary law is part of the laws of PNG.
64
 Custom recognizes corporate entities 
such as clans and tribes. These customary entities own land. The members only have 
the right of use for different activities such as hunting and gardening. The 
Government came up with an innovative idea of enabling these traditional corporate 
entities to be involved in business activities by enacting the Business Groups 
Incorporation Act 1974 (BGI Act) and the Land Groups Incorporation Act 1974 (LGI 
Act) in giving effect to the Eight Point Plan (Eight Aims) of the Self-Government in 
1974 to enable greater number of people to participate in the national economy. 
 
The two Acts aimed at encouraging the people, especially 90 per cent of rural people 
living a subsistence way of life, to be involved in business activities using customary 
entities that they were already familiar with. The LGI Act was enacted to encourage 
local people to participate in the national economy by use of their land through 
incorporating land groups,
65
 whereas the BGI Act enables customary groups to 
participate in general business activities not necessarily with the use of land. The BGI 
Act provides: 
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  Above n 26.   
64
  Custom is part of the Underlying Law adopted under s 9 of PNG‟s Constitution. 
65
  Land Groups Incorporation Act 1974, s 1. Government owns around 3 per cent of land in PNG 
and the customary landowners own the rest. The Act is meant to enable people to use their land 
as an asset to participate in economic activities. 
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a. greater participation by local people in the national economy by the establishment by 
them of group business and other economic enterprises;  
b. for the use of sound principles in the management of business;  
c. some formal structure of business groups for the basic protection of the members of 
business groups and persons dealing with those groups;  
d. for the use of simple rules for the regulation and control of business groups; and 
e. for the better and more effective settlement of certain disputes.66 
 
Upon incorporation through the processes under the LGI Act and the BGI Act the 
incorporated land group and business group become corporations. This means that 
they have perpetual succession, can own and dispose of property, and can sue and be 
sued under their own names.
67
 Customary corporations are only subject to customary 
laws, their own constitutions and the enabling Acts (i.e. LGI Act and BGI Act). 
Where there is dispute these laws are applied to resolve them by dispute settlement 
authorities.
68
 The formal courts do not have jurisdiction over customary corporations 
unless it is stated otherwise.
69
 An important point to note is that the LGI Act and the 
BGI Act provide means whereby groups that are already in existence in villages such 
as clans and tribes are given formal recognition through incorporation processes 
under the two pieces of legislation,
70
 to use land in doing business or do other 
businesses not necessarily with use of land, hence custom is applied to resolve any 
disputes that arises between members in these corporations. 
 
There is no clear corporate governance framework under the constitution or the 
enabling Acts. Custom is used in the appointment of the executives and the 
management of corporation. It is usually the leaders or elders of the incorporated clan 
or tribe that lead the customary corporations in accordance with custom.
71
 Given the 
fluid nature of custom leaders manage a group‟s business and affairs in such a 
manner for self-interest using custom as justification. Lack of proper corporate 
governance rules and framework leaves customary corporations riddled with 
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mismanagement and misuse. As a result, there are high numbers of complaints.
72
 The 
notion of establishing a customary corporation is noble; however the lack of clarity 
and certainty in the powers and functions of management was, and is, the cause of 
problems in these corporations, and will continue to be if these problems are not 
addressed. 
10.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE – A NEW CONCEPT 
 
The term corporate governance is a new concept in PNG. It has never been discussed 
in literature or seen as an issue. Although, often there is public discussion of 
directors‟ misuse of company finances, insider dealings by company directors or 
collusion between government and SOE for the sale of the company assets, are all 
corporate governance issues; however these are never discussed from the perspective 
of corporate governance. Hence, there is little or no serious discussion on the matter 
to enable development of private and public sector corporate governance regimes. A 
number of reasons can be given for the lack of discussion, mainly the following: 
 
a. more than 85 per cent of the population lives a subsistence way of life in rural 
areas and the concept of company is still foreign to them; 
b. government controls much of the economy and the private economic sector is 
still at an infant stage; and 
c. PNG‟s financial market is still at a developing stage. 
 
These reasons have made corporate governance take backstage, and it has not been 
considered seriously in PNG. In a transition economy like PNG it is important to 
understand corporate governance to improve laws to ensure good corporate 
governance practice in organizations, and this will contribute to attracting investment 
for PNG‟s private sector economy. PNG has a transition economy and government 
still controls the economy, making it difficult for private sector to expand in any 
major way.
73
 Government participation in the PNG economy is justified in that it is to 
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  See generally Kalinoe, L.K., “Incorporated Land Groups in Papua New Guinea,” above n 70. 
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  For example, a private telecommunication company Digicel had to go through a court battle with 
Telikom, a public owned company to be given a license to operate in PNG. See Apec Digicel 
Opportunity Center, “Court clears air on Digicel License,” < http://www.apecdoc.org/node/6832> 
at 25 September 2008. 
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fulfil the aspiration of the society enshrined in the NGDP. Its participation with the 
use of SOE creates serious corporate governance problems.  
 
10.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE 
 
SOEs played a significant role in the social and economic development of PNG prior 
to Independence. Twenty years immediately before Independence the Australian 
colonial administration created state owned enterprises and used them as vehicles by 
which to provide goods and services to the people in the country. The Government, 
after Independence, retained many of them. Also, many private enterprises owned by 
foreigners operating in 1960s and 1970s came under the ownership of Government 
immediately before Independence when they left the country, as there was, at that 
time, an absence of a national capitalist class or national bourgeoisie to purchase, and 
privately own and control these enterprises.
74
 Further, one of the significant reasons 
for Government control of public and private corporations after Independence was 
giving effect to one of its Eight Aims of 1974 of involving in the economy, which 
would bring desired development to the people. 
 
After Independence in 1975, PNG economy continued to have weak markets. It had a 
formal cash sector and an informal subsistence sector, which created wide spread 
externalities. This inevitably led to SOE having broad objectives.
75
 The broad 
objective is to make profits and provide fundamental social and economic needs of 
the society. In a developing economy SOE assumes the role of protecting and 
enhancing the infant economy and stimulating private sector economy and growth.
76
 
In light of this, public enterprise performs an important role in the socio-economic 
development of PNG. The role of SOE fundamentally depends on the complex inter-
relationship between economic, social, political and ideological factors in a 
developing economy. In PNG, it is the combination of these interrelation and 
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National Goals and Directive Principles (NGDP) that provide the basis for 
government‟s continuous use of SOE.  
 
The NGDP are provided for in the preamble of PNG Constitution, reflecting the 
aspiration of the society. They were formulated after a wide consultation with public 
leading to Independence on 16
th
 September 1975. The NGDP were first adopted 
under Self-Government by then - Mr. Michael Somare as Eight Aims in the 
Government‟s 1974 Policy Document. The Eight Aims were adopted to help prepare 
the country for independence and also conceived as a socio-economic guideline for 
PNG‟s future.77 The document generally provides for national self-reliance, equality 
of opportunity and equal distribution of benefits. The three of the Eight Aims for the 
purposes of this discussion are: 
 
a. A rapid increase in the proportion of the economy under the control of Papua New 
Guinean individuals and groups, and  in the proportion of personal and property income  
that goes to Papua New Guineans; 
 
b. More equal distribution of economic benefits, including movement toward equalization 
of incomes among people and toward equalization of services among different areas of 
the country; and 
 
c. Government control and involvement in those sectors of the economy where control is 
necessary to achieve the desired kind of development.
78
 
 
The Eight Aims were then adopted under the national Constitution of PNG as the 
NGDPs. The following are the five NGDPs. 
 
a. Integral human development - We declare our first goal to be for every person to be 
dynamically involved in the process of freeing himself or herself from every form of 
domination or oppression so that each man or woman will have the opportunity to 
develop as a whole person in relationship with others; 
 
b. Equality and participation - We declare our second goal to be for all citizens to have an 
equal opportunity to participate in, and benefit from, the development of our country; 
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c. National sovereignty and self-reliance - We declare our third goal to be for Papua New 
Guinea to be politically and economically independent, and our economy basically self-
reliant; 
 
d. Natural resources and environment - We declare our fourth goal to be for Papua New 
Guinea‟s natural resources and environment to be conserved and used for the collective 
benefit of us all, and be replenished for the benefit of future generations; and 
 
e. Papua New Guinean ways - We declare our fifth goal to be to achieve development 
primarily through the use of Papua New Guinean forms of social, political and economic 
organization.
79
 
 
The NGPDs are the national aims of the country that the Government and its 
agencies, and all persons, should use as guide in pursuing their various objectives. 
Although, the NGDPs are non–justiciable it is the duty of all governmental bodies to 
apply and give effect to them as far as lies within their powers.
80
 These objectives 
have been adopted through many of the government policies, and through various 
enabling pieces of legislation that establishes SOE. The enabling legislation must 
clearly declare which NGDPs that the Act is giving effect to in establishing SOEs. 
For example, s 1 of Electricity Commission (Privatization) Act 2002 provides that the 
Act is made taking the NGDPs into account. 
 
Some SOEs were inherited from the colonial administration and are now owned and 
controlled by the Government. After Independence some activities of departments 
were corporatised, changing their organizational status: from department to statutory 
corporation; from part of a department to a government owned company; and from 
statutory corporation to government owned company, and the state maintains 
majority shareholding. The SOEs account for a large chunk of the machinery of 
Government and still maintain cultures, forms and spirits analogous to the public 
sector.  
 
Corporatisation in PNG is seen generally as a process undertaken to ensure SOEs 
become efficient in the delivery of goods and services, and generate profit in the case 
of state companies. Enterprise autonomy is not a priority. The profit made is diverted 
to sustaining the activities of SOEs. During 1990s, the World Bank pressured the 
                                                          
79
  The National Goals and Directive Principles are found in the preamble of the Constitution of 
PNG. 
80
  See s 25 of PNG Constitution. The term non-justiciable is defined under sch. 1.7 of PNG 
Constitution as a matter that cannot be heard or determined by any courts or tribunals. 
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government to privatise some of the SOEs as one of the conditions for loans. PNG 
Banking Corporation was privatised and bought by the Bank of South Pacific. Others 
such as Telikom PNG Ltd, PNG Power Ltd and Eda Ranu were incorporated under 
the Companies Act with state having a 100 per cent shareholding through the 
“Independent Public Business Corporation of Papua New Guinea” (IPBC)81. SOEs 
are corporatised entities and they are either created by special legislation (statutory 
corporations) and/or incorporated under the Companies Act 1997 or its predecessor 
(state companies). State companies are accountable to the IPBC and statutory 
corporations are accountable to responsible ministers. Ultimately, they are all 
accountable to parliament. 
 
Other state institutions also ensure accountability in SOEs. Activities of SOEs are 
reviewed by the “Auditor General”82 and “Public Accounts Committee”83. For 
purposes of Public Finances (Management) Act 1995 (PFM Act) SOE is a public 
body.
84
 PFM Act applies to those SOEs that have enabling Act that provides for the 
application of the Act except where provisions of PFM Act explicitly state that the 
Act applies to all public bodies such as SOE.
85
 Government monitors the 
performance of SOE through a five-year corporate plan that they submit to it. SOE 
must submit a proposed work program,
86
 and a performance and management plan 
from time to time setting out estimates of receipts and expenditure for the next 
financial year.
87
 In addition, SOEs incorporated under the Companies Act 1997 are 
required to comply with transparency and accountability requirements under that Act.  
 
                                                          
81
  IPBC was established to manage and increase value of SOE so that they can be sold through 
privatisation. It also acts as a shareholder in trust for the state. IPBC replaced the Privatisation 
Commission that was established in 1997 to assist privatization of SOEs. See Independent Public 
Business Corporation of Papua New Guinea Act 2002. 
82
  Section 8 of the Audit Act 1989 provides that the auditor General shall inspect and audit the 
accounts of public bodies. SOEs are regarded as public bodies under section one of the Audit Act 
1989. The issue of public body is further discussed in chapter 14. 
83
  Public Accounts Committee is the constitutional office created under s 215 of PNG Constitution 
and its functions are provided under s 216. It has responsibility of examining public accounts, and 
control and transactions of moneys and property of the country and report to the parliament. 
84
  Public Finances (Management) Act 1995, s 2. 
85
  Public Finances (Management) Act 1995, s 48 (1) (4). 
86
  Public Finances (Management) Act 1995, s 50. 
87
  Public Finances (Management) Act 1995, s 49. 
 183 
The Minister for Treasury performs an active role in SOEs. An SOE must submit a 
performance and management report, and financial statement of the previous year‟s 
report ending 31
st
 December to the Minister for Treasury before 30 June every year.
88
 
The Minister must approve any contract involving payment or receipt of an amount or 
property of a value exceeding 100, 000 Kina.
89
 Further, the Minister may direct the 
head of the Department of Treasury to carry out an investigation if he or she believes 
that SOE fails to implement the proposed work programme.
90
 But Part V shows that 
Minister for Treasury does not deal with SOEs although PFM Act explicitly provide 
for the Minister‟s role in SOEs. 
 
The roles and responsibilities of the board, management and Government in statutory 
corporations are provided under special Acts of Parliament, whereas in state 
companies they are provided under enabling Acts and/or Companies Act 1997. The 
roles and responsibilities of ministers/government are not clearly enunciated under 
some of the legislation. Even in other legislations that spell it out, the Government 
does not comply with statutory requirements. It is the similar state of affairs with 
directors, board and the management of SOE. Having different pieces of legislation 
dealing with the powers and functions of stakeholders in governance of SOEs, and 
being directed by  government to execute other activities, is confusing and creates 
difficulties for management. The problem is exacerbated by appointing members of 
the board and management team who are political cronies, having no managerial 
knowledge or experience. These issues call for governance and accountability of 
SOEs to be improved. 
 
10.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Companies have been operating in PNG since annexation by Great Britain and 
Germany in the 19
th
 century, and have assisted in developing PNG, preparing it for 
Independence. Under Australian colonial administration SOEs were created, 
independent of government and they provided essential goods and services. After 
                                                          
88
  Public Finances (Management) Act 1995, s 63. 
89
  Public Finances (Management) Act 1995, s 61. 
90
  Public Finances (Management) Act 1995, s 64. 
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Independence the Government continued to utilize SOEs in accordance with the Eight 
Aims and the NGDP. Corporate forms adopted under company legislation are foreign 
to most people in PNG. To enable more people, especially the rural populace to 
participate in the national economy Government enacted two pieces of legislation, 
namely the LAGI Act and the BGI Act. However, without any specification of 
powers and functions of the executives and members, this has led to considerable 
corruption.  
 
PNG has a developing economy and the Government controls much of it either 
through government departments, statutory corporations or state owned companies. 
The Constitution made it vital for government participation to ensure that the 
aspirations of people in NGDP are realized. However, ensuring productivity is 
equally important, as is accountability and transparency on the part of the 
Government, especially in SOEs, making discussion on corporate governance vital. 
Discussion of corporate governance is long overdue. These discussions are important 
for transitional economy like PNG‟s to assist with understanding problems and for 
the identification of issues that need development, to not only ensure accountability, 
transparency, efficiency and profitability but also to encourage foreign investment. 
 
 185 
 
 
 
 
 
PART V: 
 
CASE STUDIES 
 
 
 
 186 
CHAPTER 11: 
METHODOLOGY IN DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Human beings are continually struggling to comprehend the nature of phenomena 
presented by their environment. The means through which understanding of these 
phenomena is achieved is either through experience, reasoning, research or 
through a combination of one or more of them.
1
  Research is a means often used 
in understanding these phenomena in the academic arena. Research is defined 
broadly as “generating knowledge about what you believe the world is”.2 In The 
Management Research Handbook, Roger Bennett defines research as:  
 
a systematic process of discovery, acquiring, and using knowledge. Put more formally, 
research is: a systematic, careful inquiry or examination to discover new information or 
relationships to expand/verify existing knowledge for some specified purpose.
3
  
 
Research is a form of inquiry based on logic, reason and systematic investigation 
of evidence to answer questions or negate or affirm a proposition. There are four 
different approaches to research.  In their book Business Research Methods – A 
Managerial Approach Veal and Ticehurst divide research approach into four 
paradigms:
4
  
 
a. Positivist – Critical/Interpretative; 
b. Qualitative – Quantitative; 
c. Inductive – Deductive; and 
d. Experimental – Non-experimental 
 
First, the positivist paradigm approaches the subject of research objectively, 
detached from the researcher. The main aim of the inquiry is to provide 
description and explanation based on facts and observation. The interpretative 
paradigm views the world subjectively and the researcher is part of the research 
                                                          
1
  Mouly, G.J., Educational Research: The Art and Science of Investigation, (1978) 6. 
2
  Lee, N. and Lings, I., Doing Business Research: a Guide to Theory and Practice, (2008) 6. 
3
  Bennett, R., “What is Management Research?” in Smith, N. C. and Dainty, P., (eds.) The 
Management Research Handbook, (1991) 67 at 68; see also Collis, J. and Hussey, R., 
Business Research: A Practical Guide for Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students, (2
nd
 
edn., 2003) 1. 
4
  Veal, A. J. and Ticehurst, G. W., Business Research Methods: a Managerial Approach, (2
nd
 
edn., 2005) 24. 
 187 
process. Second, quantitative research involves gathering and analysing numerical 
data to draw conclusion or test hypotheses. Often the research involves large 
numbers of cases and seeks to generalise to the whole population. On the other 
hand qualitative research does not involve numerical data, but involves a small 
number of cases and the findings are not generalised. Third, the deductive 
paradigm involves collection and analysis of data to confirm or negate a 
proposition or theory. Hence, the research starts with a theory and gathers 
information to confirm it. In inductive research the researcher interrogates data to 
find an explanation or come up with a hypothesis.  Finally, experimental research 
occurs in an environment where researcher has control over variables, whereas 
non-experimental research occurs in the environment where the researcher has no 
control over the variables.
5
  
 
This study is undertaken with a view to recording corporate governance practice 
in state owned enterprises (SOEs) in Papua New Guinea (PNG); therefore the 
empirical data are the responses of directors, chief executive officers, senior 
managers and consumers of SOEs, to discover the current corporate governance 
practice in SOEs. The appropriate approach in this circumstance is to adopt and 
apply research methods that provide flexibility and diversity in an area where the 
research has never been done before in PNG.  Therefore the research paradigm 
undertaken is interpretive, qualitative, inductive and non-experimental so that this 
will enable the investigation of the real world in SOEs where more information is 
extracted to provide the position of corporate governance in SOEs in PNG.  Given 
the fact that individual organizations (that is individual SOEs) are the focus of the 
research, the case study approach is considered suitable in the circumstances. 
 
Empirical data forms an important component of this study, hence this chapter on 
methodology, which discusses the methods undertaken in collecting data and the 
underlying reason for their adoption. Further, it elucidates the rationale for the 
process involved in data analysis. The chapter therefore discusses the 
interpretative paradigm, which involves qualitative method, case study method 
and the inductive process of data collection and the processes involved in data 
collection and analysis.   Then ethical processes and the validity and reliability 
issues in the research are discussed. Finally, the conclusion ensues. 
                                                          
5
  Ibid at 29. 
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11.2 INTERPRETIVE RESEARCH  
 
As stated above, the main objective of the research is to identify and document the 
corporate governance practice in selected SOEs in PNG. In doing so, an attempt is 
made to identify factors that affect good corporate governance practice in SOEs. 
In the light of the research objectives and the questions (see chapter 1) the 
research engaged current and the former directors and chief executive officers 
(CEOs), and current senior managers who are and have engaged with SOEs to 
gauge their knowledge, views and experiences on corporate governance. Further, 
the views of consumers of SOEs were obtained. This is because performance in 
corporate governance is reflected in the overall performance of SOEs and 
consumers are in better position to assess the quality and efficiency of services. 
The proper approach in such an inquiry is to apply interpretive research paradigm 
so that views of these different persons can be obtained. Further, this would 
enable subjects to be investigated in their natural settings. 
 
Interpretive research is considered appropriate in this study as it allows the 
researcher to “study meaningful social action, not just external or observable 
behaviour of the people”.6 By definition interpretive approach is “the systematic 
analysis of socially meaningful action through the direct detailed observation of 
people in natural settings in order to arrive at understandings and interpretations 
of how people create and maintain their social networks”.7 Viewing interpretive 
research from an epistemological perspective, the inquiry takes a subjective 
approach to engage views and insights, which are created from human intuition 
and experiences, making the researcher a part of the research and yet maintaining 
objectivity so as to be “unaffected by and external to the interpretative process”.8 
In this research the participants mentioned above are made subjects of the study to 
obtain their views and experiences and to understand issues in corporate 
governance in SOEs from their perspective.  In this sense, in interpretive research, 
                                                          
6
  Neuman, W. L., Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, (3
rd
 
edn., 1997) 69. 
7
  Neuman, W. L., Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, (6
th
 
edn., 2006) 88. 
8
  Schwandt, T. A., “Three Epistemological Stances for Qualitative Inquiry – Interpretivism, 
Hermeneutics, and Social Constructionism,” in Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S., (eds.) The 
Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues, (2
nd
 edn., 2003) 292 at 299 – 300. 
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unlike positivism, the researcher becomes part of the research process because of 
the researcher‟s role in understanding the circumstances and behaviour, and 
concurrently interpreting the information.
9
 Interpretive research involves 
qualitative method, case study method and inductive process. 
11.2.1 Qualitative Research 
 
The qualitative research comes under the interpretative research paradigm.
10
 
Denzin and Lincoln define qualitative research as: “qualitative research involves 
an interpretative, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative 
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or 
interpret phenomena in terms of meaning people bring to them”.11 Qualitative 
research begins from the premise that social reality is inherently associated with 
human beings and their social context.
12
 The nature of the research enables a 
researcher to collect open–ended information from open - ended questions.13 Bill 
Gillham outlines the rationale for qualitative method of research as follows:
14
 
 
a. To carry out an investigation where other methods – such as experiments – are either 
not practicable or not ethically justifiable. 
b. To investigate a situation where little is known about what is there or what is going 
on. More formal research may come later. 
c. To explore the complexities that are beyond the scope of more „controlled‟ 
approaches. 
d. To „get under the skin‟ of a group or organization to find out what really happens – 
the informal reality which can only be perceived from the inside. 
e. To view the case from the inside out: to see from the perspective of those involved. 
f. To carry out research into the processes leading to results (for example how reading 
standards were improved in a school) rather than into the „significance‟ of the results 
themselves.   
 
Points b, c, d, and e apply in this research. Qualitative research is suited for 
studies where “little is known” and there is a need to acquire information in order 
to learn more through document analysis or exploration of participants.
15
 In the 
                                                          
9
   Above n 4 at 24 – 25. 
10
  Creswell, J.W., Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches, 
(2
nd
 edn., 2007)  39;  Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S., “Preface,” in Denzin, N.K. and 
Lincoln, Y.S., (eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research, (3
rd
 edn., 2005) ix at xiv. 
11
  Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S., “The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research,” in 
Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S., (eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research, (3
rd
 
edn., 2005) 1 at 3. 
12
   Ibid. 
13
  Creswell, J.W. and Plano C.V.L., Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research, 
(2007) 6. 
14
  Gillham, B., Case Study Research Methods, (2000) 11. 
15
  Creswell, J.W., Educational Research: Planning, Conducting, and Evaluating Quantitative 
and Qualitative Research, (2
nd
 edn., 2005) 45. 
 190 
context of this study I intend to examine and identify the corporate governance 
features and practices of five different SOEs through gauging the views of the 
directors, CEOs, senior managers and customers of SOEs. By adopting qualitative 
research I intend to gain a holistic worldview of the phenomena (that is corporate 
governance practice in these SOEs).
16
 By holistic I mean that I study “a situation 
or thing in its entirety rather than identification of specific variables” and am not 
interested in hypothesis.
17
  
 
In any qualitative research the researchers are part of, rather than separate from, 
the research problem that they investigate. Hence their work has a reciprocal 
impact on both them and the participants.
18
  Therefore, as a researcher, I am part 
of the research collecting and interpreting of data from the perspective of the 
participants.
19
 My involvement in the research is to collect and interpret data from 
the perspective of officers involved in corporate governance. The knowledge, 
experiences and views of participants is collected, analysed and interpreted from 
their social milieu.     
 
11.2.2 Case Study  
 
The case study is part of qualitative research and interpretative inquiry purposely 
used to unveil social phenomena.
20
 The interpretative research paradigm adopts 
many different approaches in qualitative research for data collection. The 
qualitative data collection methods include narrative research, phenomenology, 
grounded theory, ethnography and case studies.
21
 This research applies a case 
study method. Case study, as the name suggests, focuses solely on one case and 
that may include an individual, a group or an organization.
22
  This may also 
include several cases. Case study is used in circumstances where the researcher 
                                                          
16
  Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches, above 
n 10 at 39. 
17
  Lichtman, M., Qualitative Research in Education: a User's Guide, (2006) 11. 
18
  Morrison, M., “What do we mean by educational research?” in Coleman, M. and Briggs, 
A.R.J., (eds.) Research Methods in Educational Leadership and Management, (2002) 1 at 18. 
19
  Above n 17 at 12–13. 
20
  Neuman, W. L., Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, (3
rd
 
edn., 1997) 331 – 332; see also Punch, K., Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and 
Qualitative Approaches, (2
nd
 edn., 2005) 142 – 148. 
21
  Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches, above 
n 10 at ch 4; Baker, M.J., Business and Management Research: How to Complete your 
Research Project Successfully, (2003) ch 7. 
22
  Above n 2 at 200 – 201. 
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“has little control over events, and when the focus is a contemporary phenomenon 
within some real-life context”.23 In the context of this study corporate governance 
is a new area in PNG; particularly in SOEs. This makes it significant to engage 
the views of current and former directors and CEOs, senior managers and the 
customers of SOEs to understand corporate governance practice and the factors 
that affect good corporate governance in statutory corporations and state 
companies in PNG.  
 
Case study is a research method rather than procedure for collecting data. That 
means that it is a comprehensive research strategy or methodology that covers 
design, data collection techniques and specific approaches to data analysis.
24
 Case 
study mainly uses three strategies in data collection, namely, interviewing, 
observing and document analysis.
25
 Clearly, the advantage in using the case study 
approach is the multiple strategies that can be used in order to examine a 
previously developed theory or to develop theories or propositions about 
phenomena after studying a social setting. The research involves interviews and 
document analysis to complement each other. Although case studies have often 
been categorised as qualitative, they can also use quantitative research tactics, 
particularly the employment of a mix of data collection methods.
26
  In the context 
of this study I gauge the views and experiences of the participants, and include 
secondary quantitative data in the form of SOEs‟ performance records in terms of 
profitability, from annual reports and the ratings of SOEs‟ performance by 
customers in terms of efficiency of service delivery. 
 
Case study enhances the research in that it focuses on first hand information to 
gain in-depth and rich information from a case. Gummesson succinctly states that 
a case study allows an in-depth and holistic understanding of multiple aspects of a 
phenomena, and interrelationship between different aspects.
27
 This then provides 
the researcher with necessary and sufficient information to answer research 
                                                          
23
  Yin, R.K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (3
rd
 edn., 2003) 1. 
24
  Denzin and Lincoln, “The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research,” above n 11 at 25; 
Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches, above 
n 10 at 73; Stake does not see case study as method but choice of what to be studied. See 
Stake, R.E., “Qualitative Case Studies,” in Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S., (eds.) The SAGE 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, (3
rd
 edn., 2005) 443 at 443. 
25
  Denzin and Lincoln, “The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research,” above n 11 at 25. 
26
  Above n 2 at 200–201; see also Yin, R.K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (3rd 
edn., 2003) 14. 
27
  Gummesson, E., Qualitative Methods in Management Research, (2
nd
 edn., 2000) 86 -87.  
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questions or develop propositions. The conclusion therefore cannot be generalised 
and applied to other settings. In the context of this study case study examines the 
norms and practices in corporate governance and factors that affect good 
corporate governance particularly in each of the SOEs and generally in statutory 
corporations and state companies.  
 
There are three types of case studies. Yin identified them as exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory.
28
 The types that are of relevance to this research are 
exploratory and explanatory case studies. The exploratory case study explores a 
case to gain in-depth knowledge and rich information. An explanatory case study 
examines and analyses how representative a case is by looking at similar cases, 
situations and contexts, rather than an individual case.
29
 This can be done through 
“triangulation”30 both within cases and between cases.31 The exploratory case 
study answers the “what” question and explanatory case study answers the “why” 
and “how” questions.32 In this research I intend to study five SOEs under the 
categories of statutory corporation and state company to gain in-depth knowledge 
of corporate governance in each SOEs. From this I wish to identify the similarities 
and differences in corporate governance practice in SOEs under statutory 
corporations and state companies and between statutory corporations and state 
companies.
33
 In doing so I seek to discover the status of corporate governance in 
each SOEs to enable me to identify the factors that affect good corporate 
governance so that propositions can be made for improvement or further inquiry.   
 
The literature review is a vital component of case study providing theoretical 
concepts relevant to conducting case studies. The discussion of theories and 
concepts through a literature review “is to place the case study in [or within the 
context of] an appropriate research literature [framework], so that lessons from the 
case study will more likely advance knowledge and understanding of a given 
                                                          
28
  Yin, R.K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (1984) 17–19; See also above n 27 at 
85; Cohen, L., Manion, L. and Morrison, K., Research Methods in Education, (6
th
 edn., 2007) 
254–255. 
29
  Stakes refers to this as collective case study. See Stake, R.E., The Art of Case Study 
Research, (1995) 3–4. 
30
  Triangulation in research refers to the process in analysis of data to bring together data 
collected from different sources. 
31
  Stake, R.E., Multiple Case Study Analysis, (2006) 33–38 and 77. 
32
  Yin, R.K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (3
rd
 edn., 2003) 5–7. 
33
  This is using the comparative analysis method. See Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L., The 
Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative research, (1999) 21; Yin, R.K., 
Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (2
nd
 edn., 1994) 14.         
 193 
topic,” and “to help define the unit of analysis…to identify the criteria for 
selecting and screening potential candidates for the cases to be studied, and to 
suggest the relevant variables of interest and therefore data to be collected as part 
of the case study”.34 These choices will be hampered or limited without proper 
guidance from preliminary theoretical concepts. Hence, chapters 1 to 10 provide 
literature reviews and discussions of theoretical concepts. Theoretical concepts 
assist with defining research questions and guide any propositions for 
improvement (as discussed in chapters 14 and 15). 
 
11.2.3 Inductive Process 
 
Inductive research is typically associated with qualitative research.
35
 It involves 
exploration of a subject to find more information as less is known about it.
36
 This 
initially requires the collection of data, followed by analysis and theorisation or 
answering a question raised in the research.  However, as stated above, in 
qualitative research literature reviews are important to demonstrate familiarisation 
of the subject and they assist with articulating the research issues.
37
 This approach 
is frequent in case studies. In a case study “the researcher brings prior knowledge 
and understanding to their observations and so combines induction and deduction 
in selecting and interpreting information”38 and prior knowledge is gained through 
literature review. This study applies a similar approach. A literature review was 
done, guided by agency theory to assist with familiarisation of the subject, that is 
corporate governance and this helps to refine the research questions. 
 
11.3 DATA COLLECTION - METHODS 
 
After selecting a research design, a data collection method has to be determined. 
In qualitative research, data collection involves ethnography/participant 
observation, qualitative interviewing, focus groups, language – based approaches 
to the collection of qualitative data (such as discourse and conversation analysis) 
                                                          
34
  Yin, R.K., Applications of Case Study Research, (2
nd
 edn., 2003) 3. 
35
  Alvesson, M. and Deetz, S., Doing Critical Management Research, (2000) 1. 
36
  Creswell, J.W., Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 
(2
nd
 edn., 2003)  30; See also above n 17 at 11 and 49. 
37
  Baker, above n 21 at 168. 
38
  Ibid. 
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and the collection and quantitative analysis of texts and documents.
39
 Similarly, 
Lee and Lings discuss data collection in qualitative research as involving, 
amongst others, interviews, focus groups and documentary data.
40
 For purposes of 
this research, the qualitative data collection method selected was interview and 
public document analysis. 
 
11.3.1 Interviews 
 
An interview is a “way of accessing people‟s perceptions, meanings, definitions 
of situations and construction of realities”,41 so that it provides “an authentic 
insight into people‟s experiences”42. The interview is a formal and guided 
conversation involving the process of asking question and listening.
43
 The 
interview enables the researcher to have face-to-face contact with the subjects and 
this would enable him or her to gain an insight into the personal views and 
experiences of the interviewees to obtain rich information on issues in corporate 
governance practice in SOEs. The rationale for the use of interviewing method is 
to gain access to people who can describe and analyse phenomena or a situation in 
their own words so that this “may provide access to the meanings that people 
attribute to their experiences and social world”.44 The subjects, namely, the former 
and current directors and CEOs, senior managers and consumers of SOEs have 
special knowledge and experiences of issues being asked about and they are in a 
better position to answer questions.  
 
There are different types of interviews method applied in qualitative research. 
They are categorised mainly as structured, semi - structured and unstructured 
interviews.
45
 First, in structured interview, the respondent is asked pre-established 
                                                          
39
  Bryman, A. and Bell, E., Business Research Methods, (2003) 281–282. 
40
  Above n 2 at 217 - 227; Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing among 
Five Approaches, above n 10 at 129. 
41
  Punch, above n 20 at168. 
42
  Silverman, D., Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and 
Interaction, (2001) 87. 
43
  Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S., “Methods of Collecting and Analysing Empirical 
Materials,”  in Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S., (eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, (3
rd
 edn., 2005) 641 at 643. 
44
  Miller, J. and Glassner, B., “The „Inside‟ and the „Outside‟ – Finding Realities in 
Interviews,” in Silverman, D., (ed.) Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice, (2nd 
edn., 2004) 125 at 126. 
45
  Fontana, A. and Frey, J.H., “The Interview – From Neutral Stance to Political Involvement,” 
in Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S., (eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research, (3
rd
 
edn., 2005) 695 at 698. 
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questions which the respondent has already had time to review prior to the 
interview.
46
 This interview provides limited flexibility and the researcher follows 
the set of questions in a sequential order. The role of the researcher is neutral, 
recording the answers delivered in a sequential order. Second, on the opposite end 
is the unstructured interview. This interview is non-standardised, open-ended and 
it enables the researcher to explore an issue in debt.
47
 This type of interview 
usually occurs informally and the respondents are encouraged to “speak by using 
open questions and by asking them to clarify their statements.”48 The respondent 
is comfortable and at ease when responding to questions. This interview enables 
the researcher the flexibility to probe in detail and extract rich information from 
the interviewee. The third type is the semi structured interview. This is the 
interview type applied in this research. 
 
In semi-structured interview, the researcher uses the standard set of questions as 
an interview guide but also has an opportunity and flexibility of asking further 
related questions.
49
 There are three reasons for using semi-structured interviews in 
this research. First, it allows the researcher to generally follow pre-established 
questions, and simultaneously provides clarity to the respondents as to the issues 
to be raised during interviews. Second, it provides opportunity and flexibility for 
the researcher to probe any issue that is relevant and important to the research. As 
Creswell explained that “probes are sub questions under each questions that the 
researcher asks to elicit more information. These probes vary from exploring the 
content in more depth (elaborating) to asking the interviewee to explain her or his 
answer in more detail (clarifying)”.50 By probing, the researcher is able to conduct 
an exploratory discussion to get more information on an issue from the 
interviewee. This is where second question is asked to seek further description 
and clarification on issues raised with relation to first question.
51
 And thirdly, 
semi–structured interview allows the respondents, who are people with vast 
knowledge and experience in the area of corporate governance to speak openly 
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  Ibid at 701–703. 
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  McMurray, A., Pace, R.W. and Scot, D., Research: A commonsense Approach, (2004) 200. 
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Qualitative Research, above n 15 at 596. 
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without restriction on issues raised with them. There are factors that may 
prejudice an ideal interview. Joseph Hair noted that: 
 
When we conduct interviews there is always a risk the interview process itself will 
influence respondents. Perhaps the respondent comments are not entirely accurate. The 
inaccuracy maybe because of incomplete recall, a suppression of information because of 
social concerns or unwillingness to provide an accurate response to the question. There 
are some things people will simply not tell an interviewer.
52
 
 
To avoid these risks, I ensured that prior to the interview the interviewees were 
given interview questions in order to refresh their memories and they were 
informed again of the nature of the study and privacy and confidentiality matters 
before the interviews. If there were signs of incomplete recall their memories were 
jogged by asking related questions. Where interviewees were unwilling to provide 
accurate information, it was noted and the same questions were posed to other 
respondents to answer. Answers given were then compared. The government 
appoints most directors and CEOs and they have tendency not to disclose 
information that would question the position of the government. Therefore, the 
former directors, CEOs and senior managers were included in the research, so that 
information that current directors and CEOs provide could be verified. The 
respondents were encouraged to provide written answers to the interview 
questions so that any answers they would not provide face-to-face could be 
obtained from written answers. This also enabled the participants to provide 
answers at their own convenience without being put under pressure, as is usually 
the case in interviews.  
 
11.3.2 Documents 
 
In a case study the researcher can keep a journal diary and analyse public 
documents.
53
 In the context of this research I kept a journal diary and collected, 
examined and analysed documents from individual SOEs. There are some 
documents that are categorised “confidential” that I had access to with the 
permission of chairpersons and CEOs. For example, I had access to the minutes of 
the board meetings, which were read at the office without being photocopied or 
taken out. I made copies of some public documents with the permission of the 
                                                          
52
  Hair, J.F., Babin, B., Money, A.H. and Samouel, P., Essentials of Business Research 
Methods, (2003) 59. 
53
  Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches, above 
n 10 at 132-133. 
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chairpersons and the CEOs. The main documents that I copied were company 
constitutions, annual reports, annual returns and corporate plans. 
 
11.4 DATA COLLECTION - PROCESSES 
 
11.4.1 Sampling 
 
Sampling is an important process in data collection. Sampling involves a selection 
process where subjects are chosen from which information can be collected.
54
 It is 
important to consider the nature of the research before sampling, which is assisted 
by literature review. First, five SOEs were chosen for this research. Two of them 
are examples of statutory corporations and three are examples of state companies. 
This is a representative selection of cases.
55
 The SOEs were chosen because they 
are the biggest SOEs in their category in PNG. More than one case was chosen 
because data from each can be compared and contrasted with others under their 
category and with others in another category. Second, choices have to be made 
about who to study in SOEs. This is called the selection of “cases within the 
cases” or mini-cases.56 Given the fact that this is qualitative research involving 
case study methodology the researcher applied three types of non-probability 
sampling, which involved convenience sampling, snowball sampling and quota 
sampling.
57
  
 
Convenience sampling is where selection is made due to accessibility of subjects 
to the researcher. In this case all current directors, CEOs and senior managers of 
selected SOEs are located in their head offices in Port Moresby and their 
accessibility and limited number made it convenient for me to conduct interviews 
with majority of them. Snowball sampling was also applied. This sampling tactic 
involves making contact with a small group of subjects for data collection and 
they in turn make contact with others. This is not random selection because the 
number in this case is imprecise. This sampling method was applied on former 
directors and CEOs. The addresses and locations of these subjects were not 
known after they left their jobs. Some are living in Port Moresby and others reside 
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  Ghauri, P.N., Research Methods in Business Studies: A Practical Guide, (2
nd
 edn., 2002) 112. 
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  Stake, “Qualitative Case Studies,” above n 24 at 450. 
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  Ibid at 451. 
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in their respective provinces. The researcher went through the former and current 
directors and CEOs to locate others so as to involve them in the research. Quota 
sampling involves selection where sample is collected from “different categories, 
such as gender, ethnicity, age groups, socio-economic groups, and region of 
residence, and combination of these categories”.58 This sampling method was 
applied to consumers of SOEs. Three major suburbs in Port Moresby were 
selected from which 30 residents from each suburb who were and/or are 
consumers of SOEs were randomly selected for interviews.  
 
It is important to note that the study is about corporate governance in SOEs and 
selection of the participants in the research is to help with understanding of issues 
in corporate governance in SOEs, and also that any information they provide 
could also be verified against one another. Hence, different authorities in 
management hierarchy are selected including former directors and CEOs. The 
managers are important participants in this case study but consumers were also 
engaged so that their views on performance of SOEs can be obtained. This is 
because good corporate governance must ultimately be reflected in efficiency and 
quality of services experienced by consumers. 
 
The total number of participants interviewed in each SOE differs. This depends on 
the number of current directors and senior managers of each SOEs and their 
accessibility and availability for interview. Their numbers are provided in chapter 
12 and 13. Former directors and CEOs are difficult to locate. After locating them I 
had to assess their availability for interview. There were 90 customers of each 
SOE from three different suburbs and altogether 450 customers were interviewed. 
Thirty residents from each suburb in Port Moresby were selected. Although their 
views are not necessarily reflective of the views of the people in PNG, they 
provide some evidence of the performance of SOEs in terms of service delivery.
59
 
Their views are considered sufficient to assist in identifying whether corporate 
governance practice has an effect on the performance of SOEs.  
 
                                                          
58
  Ibid at 107. 
59
  I am aware of the fact that if services are rated poor in Port Moresby then that may generally 
be the same with other towns in PNG but worse in rural areas. But if services rated as good in 
Port Moresby, it may be bad or worse in rural areas. 
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Customer interviews were conducted with the assistance of three law students 
from the University of PNG. The students were paid allowances with funding 
from the Centre for Human Resources Development, University of PNG. I am 
grateful for their financial assistance. 
 
11.4.2 Issuing Questions for Interview 
 
Many participants are government appointees and they may be reluctant to discuss 
or divulge information face-to-face that may appear to be critical of the 
government. Interview questions were issued with a covering letter instructing 
participants to provide written answers when they came for their interview (see 
Appendices H, I and M). The interview guide questions allowed them to answer 
questions on their own at a time and place where they were motivated to do so. 
However, there are risks involved where the researcher is not sure whether the 
respondents have completed the questions on their own or whether they have 
asked for opinions from others.
60
 I did not rely heavily on the written answers, but 
the answers provided in the interviews were compared against the written answers 
given by participants. The written answers were collected merely for comparative 
purposes. 
 
11.4.3 Conducting Interviews 
 
The interview in qualitative research is not a survey interview for discovery 
purposes but an active interview where “what”, “why”, and “how” questions are 
asked to obtain in-depth and rich information on a subject.
61
 This research applied 
face-to-face and telephone interviews. Telephone interviews were conducted for 
those respondents who were unable to meet me in person or who lived out of Port 
Moresby where the research was conducted. With telephone interviews, I took 
notes and tried to remember everything stated in the conversation.
62
 The 
disadvantage in telephone interview is the inaccessibility of interviewee to the 
information made available to the researcher for confirmation purposes.
63
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All the interviews took place at the offices of the directors and CEOs. The 
interviews with former directors and CEOs were conducted at their current place 
of work or a place convenient to them. I rang secretaries of boards to make 
appointments with individual directors, and in the case of CEOs, I rang their 
secretaries. Others who did not want to meet arranged for a telephone interview. 
The arrangement for interview was made directly with formers directors and 
CEOs, and customers of SOEs. Those former directors and CEOs who live out of 
Port Moresby were interviewed by phone. All the interviews were conducted in 
English based on the questions issued with the consent form submitted earlier (see 
Appendices K and L). Before the interview, I ensured that the consent form was 
signed and that the interviewee was aware of the nature of the study. Further, I 
requested and was granted verbal consent again from the interviewee before 
recording our conversation on audiotape. During the interview some participants 
were reluctant to answer detailed questions. In such circumstances I refrained 
from asking further questions. The interviews that were recorded on tape and on 
paper are kept in a secure place. 
 
11.5 ETHICS 
 
Ethical considerations are paramount in any research that involves human beings 
as subjects. As a student from the University of Waikato, I complied with ethical 
procedures under University‟s Ethical Conduct in Human Research and Related 
Activities Regulations
64
 in conducting this research. First, I submitted an ethics 
application with the proposal to University of Waikato, School of Law and it was 
approved before I left for PNG on the field trip (see Appendix A). Second, along 
with the support letter from the supervisor (see Appendix B) a letter with the 
proposal and ethics approval was sent to the Centre for Human Resource 
Development, University of PNG for their support (see Appendix C). They 
assisted with funding and provided a letter of support (see Appendix D). Third, a 
letter (see Appendix E) was sent to the chairperson of the Independent Public 
Business Corporation (IPBC) for the consent of IPBC to conduct research in state 
companies (i.e. Telikom PNG Ltd, PNG Power Ltd and NCD Water & Sewerage 
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  University of Waikato, Ethical Conduct in Human Research and Related Activities 
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June 2009. 
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Ltd). The chairman of IPBC sent an internal memo to all board members and 
senior managers of state companies informing them of the nature of my study and 
asking for their co-operation and support in this research, and informed me to 
proceed with the research (see Appendix F). Similarly, the chairpersons of two 
statutory corporations (i.e. National Housing Corporation and National 
Broadcasting Corporation) sent an internal memo to all board members and senior 
managers after receiving my letters (see Appendix G).  
 
I sent a letter and questions with the consent form to all directors and CEOs 
through the secretaries of the board (see Appendices H, K and M). I contacted the 
SOEs to ensure that the letters with their attachments had been received. Former 
directors and CEOs were contacted directly through letters and appointments were 
made for interview (see Appendix I). The consumers of SOEs were approached 
directly and the nature of the research was explained through a letter submitted to 
them (see Appendix J) and the letter was given for them to confirm the purpose of 
our studies. After they were given the opportunity to voluntarily sign the consent 
form we asked them several questions (see Appendix N). The data collection was 
done between April and September 2008. 
 
11.5.1 Written Consent and Access to Participants 
 
A letter was sent to the chairman of IPBC for state companies and chairpersons of 
each statutory corporation regarding the conduct of research in each SOE (see 
Appendices E and G). Then a letter was sent to individual respondents about their 
participation in the research and their written consent was received prior to the 
interviews (see Appendices K and L). Before the interviews, I explained the 
benefits and potential adverse effects of the information that would be provided 
and further advised that they could withdraw before or at any time during the 
interview. I was aware of the fact that I was dealing with many busy individuals 
and I made myself available at a time and place of their convenience.  
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11.5.2 Privacy of Participants 
 
The researcher regards the right to privacy as important in this research. The right 
to privacy is a constitutional right provided under PNG Constitution.
65
 If people‟s 
affairs are made public through the information that they provide they can be 
offended and/or suffer stress. Therefore privacy and confidentiality is 
paramount.
66
  I made it absolutely clear in my letter to the participants that their 
permission would be sought where the disclosure was necessary. I was aware of 
the fact that most directors and CEOs are politically appointed and therefore 
would not want anything said against the government to be recorded. I was also 
aware that several participants were fearful that if some SOE issues were exposed 
to the public it would create a negative reaction, so they were unwilling to 
disclose the information.
67
 
 
11.5.3 Confidentiality 
 
The interviewee must have some trust in the researcher. Therefore on the first 
meeting for the interview I made it absolutely clear again reiterating, face-to-face 
the issue of privacy and confidentiality that I mentioned in the letter sent to them. 
This was done to enable the interviewee to feel at ease and comfortable, and able 
to disclose information that was asked of him or her. Further, I made it clear to the 
participants that any information provided by them would be kept confidential and 
not disclosed to anyone. As a qualitative researcher I was gauging people‟s views 
and experiences on a situation and “those whose lives and expressions are 
portrayed risk exposure and embarrassment, as well as loss of standing, 
employment, and self-esteem”.68 Their names are, and will only be, known to me, 
and any information they provided would be discussed using code names (see 
Appendix Q) to protect their identity.  
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  See Constitution of PNG, s 55. 
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  Stake, above n 24 at 459. 
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11.5.4 Confirmation of Information Collected 
 
It is important that information noted in interviews are from the interviewees and 
they must authenticate the information. After the interviews the notes and tape 
recordings were transcribed and sent to the interviewees for confirmation. I rang 
them individually for confirmation. Not many alterations were made to most of 
the transcripts.  For customers, confirmations were made immediately after the 
interviews. Before all interviewees confirmed the information in the transcripts I 
made it absolutely clear that they should inform me clearly of anything 
contradictory to what they meant and how it should be said so that their words and 
intention could be noted. 
 
11.5.5 Papua New Guinea Cultural Views on Ethics 
 
PNG is culturally diverse, and the people have different traditions and ways of 
doing things. Similarly, organizations such as the SOEs have their own practices 
and norms that have to be observed. All participants in the research are from 
PNG; however few senior managers and the CEO of PNG Power are expatriates. 
Papua New Guineans live in a close-knit society and news spreads easily. Again 
the issue of confidentiality is very important in this research. Hence, I ensured that 
information disclosed was not revealed to anyone, not even my own close family 
members or research assistants.  
 
In PNG, respect for one another and those above in the social hierarchy, such as 
elders and leaders, is an important custom. Even in SOEs there are hierarchical 
structures that have to be observed and respected. Nearly all senior managers and 
directors are Papua New Guineans and the customary practice of respect is also a 
norm in public organizations and institutions such as SOEs. Part of PNG culture is 
that one cannot enter a village or a clan without letting the elders and village 
leaders know about his/her presence. Before the issuance of letters and interview 
questions to the participants I formally informed the chairman of IPBC (which 
manages state companies) and chairpersons of statutory corporations that I would 
be interviewing their employees so that they would be expecting my presence. 
Those above the hierarchy were aware of my dealings with the directors and 
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senior managers. The culture of the society and the organization was observed in 
conducting this research. 
 
11.6 RESPONSIBILITY OF A RESEARCHER  
 
From the commencement of data collection to the end of the interview, I ensured 
that ethical values were upheld at every stage. After the completion of every 
interview I assessed myself on how I would improve in approaching and talking 
to the participants, to make them feel comfortable and open in providing 
information. Douglas pointed out that: 
 
Creative interviewing, as we see through out, involves the use of many strategies and 
tactics of interaction, largely based on an understanding of friendly feelings and intimacy, 
to optimize co operative, mutual disclosure and a creative search for mutual 
understanding.
69
  
 
Before the interviews I introduced myself to the participants, told them about the 
purpose of interview and the nature of the study and asked them if they had any 
questions about the interview and the study.
70
 I assessed the participants to ensure 
that friendly feelings were created and any tension was removed. Further, before 
the interview I explained the privacy and confidentiality matters and with their 
permission put on the audiotape recording before asking questions. During the 
interviews I smiled, and I maintained composure and curiosity. I listened 
attentively and took notes of important points raised but made eye contact at all 
times, apart from periodically looking at the tape recorder to ensure it was still 
running and recording. 
 
11.7 METHODS IN DATA ANALYSIS  
 
The next process after collection of data is data analysis, which encompasses the 
“process of bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of collected data”.71 
John Creswell describes the process as “preparing and organizing the data…for 
analysis, then reducing the data into themes through a process of coding and 
condensing the codes, and finally representing the data in figures, tables, or 
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  Douglas was quoted in Holstein, J.A. and Gubrium, J.F., The Active Interview, (1995) 13. 
70
  Above n 51 at 55. 
71
  Quoting Marshall and Rossman in Ghauri, P.N. and Grronhaug, K., Research Methods in 
Business Studies: a Practical Guide, (3
rd
 edn., 2005) 206. 
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discussion”72 or to understand and gain insight from collected data.73 Data 
analysis depends on whether research is quantitative or qualitative.
74
 The data 
analysed is collected from semi–structured interviews and documents of the 
corporations.  
 
11.7.1 Transcribing Data 
 
In qualitative research the empirical data has to be transcribed. Transcription can 
be a tedious job and takes considerable time,
75
 especially in situation where 
participants are communicating in languages other than English. Transcription is 
the “process of converting audiotape recording or field notes into text data”.76 The 
information and intentions of participants can easily be distorted in the 
transcription process through words, writing and reinterpretation.
77
 These 
problems were avoided as the means of communication during data collection was 
in English and were also recorded in English; hence there was no need for any 
translation. In this research all transcription was done while on the field trip in 
PNG to capture information while it was still fresh in the mind, and to be able to 
immediately refer the transcript to participants for confirmation. It also avoided 
amassing huge amounts of data. The data was analysed after it was transcribed. 
 
11.7.2 Data Analysis 
 
Data can be analysed in many different ways. In qualitative research it is through 
description, themes and layering and interrelating themes.
78
 When the data is 
transcribed and organised into a format that is easy to analyse then the process of 
analysis takes place. The data analysis method used in this research is colour 
coding and thematic analysis. The data was organized into scripts and hand coded 
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into different colours using a thematic coding analysis, in which common themes 
were coloured with the same colour (see Appendix O).  
 
11.7.3 Thematic Coding Analysis 
 
In thematic coding the researcher uses themes to analyse the qualitative data.
79
 
Information in the documents was analysed to identify common themes, and 
different coloured codes and notes were used for each emerging theme. First, the 
themes that appear in the script were highlighted with a highlighter and notes 
were put in the margins to re-emphasize the points raised in the script to assist 
with thematic categorisation. In the second phase, instead of examining the whole 
script the focus was on the coded themes to identify common themes. Then the 
final stage was looking through the data and previous coded themes and making 
contrasts and comparisons.
80
 In this process different files and folders were 
created for the related codes, categories and themes for convenience and 
interpretative purposes.  
 
11.8 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
 
Validity and reliability are means used in an empirical research to provide 
assurance of the research design, process, analysis and the conclusion reached.  
They can be referred to as measures used in providing quality assurance. Gay and 
Diehl define validity as “the degree to which a test measures what it is supposed 
to measure”81 and “a research finding which accurately represents what is 
happening in the situation”82. In a qualitative research the researcher must validate 
findings.  That means that the researcher applies different strategies to ensure 
accuracy and credibility of findings. There are different kinds of validity, amongst 
them, internal validity and external validity.
83
 In internal validity I have used 
triangulation and “participants checking”.84  
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Triangulation is a means of ensuring validity.
85
 In triangulation I firstly 
corroborated interview answers from current directors and CEOs with former 
directors and CEOs, and senior managers. Their answers are corroborated with the 
answers provided by consumers of SOEs on the performance of SOEs. Second, I 
corroborated evidence from observable field notes and interviews. And thirdly, 
evidence from two different method of data collection – that is from interviews 
and documentary sources were corroborated. In drawing information from these 
multiple sources, it is not only intended that the report presented is an accurate 
and credible account, but that it properly answers the research questions. Second 
in internal validity, applying the “participants checking” I showed the interview 
transcripts to each interviewee to be checked for accuracy, except those 
participants who lived out of Port Moresby, and who were interviewed by 
telephone.   
 
Finally, external validity looks at the question of whether research findings can be 
generalised.
86
 Given the nature of the research, that is case study, only five SOEs 
were the focus of the study and the findings cannot necessarily be generalised. 
However, other SOEs with similar features to the SOEs in the five case studies, 
and who have the Government or the IPBC as shareholder, and are covered by the 
same laws such as the IPBC Act and the Companies Act 1997, would find some 
aspects of this research relevant.   
 
Reliability connotes consistency, dependability or trustworthiness. In the context 
of research reliability “is the degree to which a test consistently measures what it 
measures” winning confidence and trust that similar results would obtain using 
similar methodology. 
87
 It suffices to state that methods of data collection and 
analysis were clearly outlined in this chapter and this has been the process that I 
have been following from data collection to reporting the findings. In this process, 
I have identified my own biases, experiences, views and knowledge in corporate 
governance so that they are separated from the new lenses that I put on, looking at 
corporate governance solely from the perspective of the interview participants. I 
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have used audiotapes to capture highly detailed information of participants so that 
the report presented is reliable.
88
 
 
11.9 CONCLUSION  
 
One of the important components of the study is empirical data collection and 
analysis; hence this chapter discusses the theoretical framework and research 
methodology followed in extracting and analysing the data. The interpretive 
research paradigm was adopted in this research that includes, qualitative and case 
study methods and inductive process. The option of interpretative paradigm was 
adopted and used to study the participants in their natural settings in SOEs and to 
construe corporate governance from their perspective. From an ontological 
perspective corporate governance practice cannot be fully understood without 
understanding the rationale for certain processes, conduct and actions by posing 
“what”, “how” and “why” questions to gauge the views, experience and 
knowledge of the managers. This approach is relevant as this study is the first of 
its kind on corporate governance in PNG and particularly in SOEs. In addition, 
this approach would enable exploration and explanation of corporate governance 
to answer the research questions. The sources of data extractions were semi-
structured interviews and documentary evidence. Ethical process, validity and 
reliability of the methodology are considered important, and discussed in this 
chapter to illustrate attempts taken in addressing them. Five SOEs are the subject 
of case studies and the findings in them are reported in chapters 12 and 13.   
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CHAPTER 12: 
 
INCIDENCES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICE 
IN STATUTORY CORPORATIONS 
 
 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The National Housing Corporation (NHC) and the National Broadcasting 
Corporation (NBC) are the two largest statutory corporations in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG). As defined in chapter one, statutory corporations are state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and established by Acts of parliament. Statutory corporations 
come under the responsibility of the Government and they can be funded through 
the Government‟s annual budgetary allocations. Unlike NBC, Government does 
not provide annual funding for NHC.  
 
The NHC and the NBC have a controversial past. Both NHC and NBC have been 
the focus of considerable public attention since their inception for many reasons, 
including ministers‟ interference in governance, corrupt practices, and sacking of 
chief executive officers (CEOs) and directors. These incidents have become a 
norm. Interestingly, on my field trip between April and August 2008, the CEO of 
NHC was terminated and an acting appointment was made while awaiting court 
action which questioned the validity of the Government‟s action in terminating 
the CEO. Consequently, the acting CEO refused to answer questions or talk to me. 
The highlight of the field trip was while I was in the office of the former senior 
legal officer. Armed policemen forcefully entered the office, ordered the legal 
officer out and changed the locks to the office doors after removing all his 
personal belongings. Later I was informed that current management was 
dismissing the associates of the former CEO. Given these situations, it is 
important to understand corporate governance practice in statutory corporations. 
Furthermore, given their different legal framework, studying both NHC and NBC 
assisted in comparing and contrasting corporate governance frameworks and 
practice between them and with state companies in chapter 13. 
 
The methodology of data collection is discussed in chapter 11. Questions that 
were asked relate to five themes. They were the definition of corporate 
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governance, ownership role of government, board and management, 
accountability and the objectives of SOEs. With regard to the last theme the 
annual reports were examined and the customers of the SOEs were interviewed to 
identify their views and experiences of the quality and efficiency of services 
provided by NHC and NBC. I now proceed to present the data provided by the 
participants. 
 
12.2 PRESENTATION OF DATA 
 
All information in this field survey was collected in Port Moresby. Arrangements 
were made for telephone interviews with senior managers, current and former 
directors and CEOs who live outside of Port Moresby or who did not want to meet 
me in person. I shall now proceed to present the data beginning with NHC. 
 
12.3  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN NATIONAL 
HOUSING CORPORATION 
 
NHC is established under the National Housing Corporation Act 1990 (NHC 
Act).
1
 It was established, amongst other things, to improve housing conditions and 
provide adequate and suitable housing for letting to eligible persons,
2
 especially 
public servants. The head office is located in Port Moresby with branches located 
in each of the 19 provinces around the country. The majority of current directors 
and CEOs also reside in Port Moresby. Table 12.1 provides the number of current 
and former directors and CEOs who were issued with interview questions and 
were interviewed, including the senior managers. 
 
Table 12.1            Number of Interview Participants in NHC 
 
Participants 
Interview 
questions issued 
Numbers that 
completed 
interview 
questions in 
writing 
Numbers  
Interviewed 
Current Directors 8 6 5 
                                                          
1
  National Housing Corporation Act 1990, s 5. 
2
  See others under s 25 of National Housing Corporation Act 1990. 
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Former Directors 5 4 4 
Current CEO 1 0 0 
Former CEOs 3 2 3 
Senior Managers 4 2 4 
Total 21 14 16 
 
There is a total of eight current directors and all except two reside in Port 
Moresby. The director representing the churches lives in Tabubil, Western 
Province and the women‟s representative lives in Alotau, Milne Bay Province. 
There was difficulty in locating former directors and CEOs; however I was able to 
find eight of them in Port Moresby through other directors. Five of them are 
former directors and three are former CEOs. All participants were interviewed 
face-to-face, except the director who lives in Alotau who was interviewed by 
telephone. The Acting CEO refused to answer interview questions or be 
interviewed. 
 
12.3.1 Views on the Definition of Corporate Governance 
 
Questions were asked about the definition of corporate governance to obtain the 
views and perceptions of the participants. The understanding of the concept of 
corporate governance is important because only through understanding of it can 
the directors and managers identify issues and problems that may appear in SOEs. 
From the data collected it is clear that directors and managers do not understand 
the definition of corporate governance. Their limited understanding depends on 
their prior acquaintance either through training or dealing with issues in corporate 
governance. The following answers were given when asked “what is corporate 
governance?”  
 
I have heard it before. I think it is in my economic class at UPNG [University of PNG]. It 
is something to do with how a corporation is run (NHC - SM3). 
 
It is something to do with directors in a company…oh yeah…as the name 
indicates…directors are responsible for governing the corporation (NHC - SM4) 
 
It is a subject matter concerning the management of the company (NHC - SM1). 
 
Most of these participants that explained corporate governance are senior 
managers. The definitions provided did not clearly explain the meaning of 
 212 
corporate governance. Most directors stated having heard about it but did not 
know what it means. A few of the directors indicated not hearing about it. Those 
that explained corporate governance were expressing their own views. Most 
interviewees agreed that there is need for them to be educated on corporate 
governance and their duties and responsibilities.  
 
12.3.2 The Role of the Government 
 
The Minister for the NHC is directly responsible for that entity. The board and 
CEO report directly to the Minister. Appointment of directors is made in 
compliance with the Regulatory Statutory Authorities (Appointment to Certain 
Offices) Act 2004 (RSA Act). The Minister for the NHC, in consultation with the 
Government submits a list of potential directors to the Public Service Commission 
(PSC). After recommendations from the PSC the responsible Minister appoints 
directors, except the ex officio members who become directors by virtue of their 
office. There are three ex officio members; namely the CEO, and the Heads of 
Department responsible for Treasury and for Lands and Physical Planning. If a 
director is to represent an interest group then the responsible Minister must also 
consult the group. Other directors appointed represent various interest groups in 
the society. For example, one of the directors represents private real estate 
interests and another represents the interests of women.  
 
Nearly all participants who were interviewed stated that the responsible Minister 
does not comply with the procedures in making appointments. The following 
responses were received from the participants: “the Minister appoints directors 
without consulting anyone” (NHC – SM3); “I was directly appointed by the 
Minister and after being in the system, I realized that the Minister never follows 
the processes” (NHC – FD4). Procedures are put in place for the appointment of 
directors but they are never complied with.  
 
Directors who were appointed have some form of association with the 
Government. Some current directors were reluctant to state their personal 
relationship with the Government, while others frankly described their 
relationship. For example, one of the directors was the advisor to the current party 
in Government during its election campaign. Another contested under the ruling 
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party in Government and being unsuccessful was subsequently appointed as a 
director after 2007 general elections. Some of the senior managers that were 
interviewed expressed the view that directorships were given to those persons as a 
reward for supporting the Government. One of the senior managers stated in the 
interview that “positions for a director and CEO are jobs for the boys” (NHC – 
SM2). The current chairman of the board is the CEO of PNG Agriculture Bank 
and a close ally of the current Government. 
 
The Government also appoints the CEO of NHC. The Acting CEO refused to 
answer questions and have an interview with me but when I interviewed the 
directors, former CEOs and senior managers of NHC, they informed me about the 
appointment process for the CEO. This appointment process complies with the 
RSA Act. The board submits a list of names of potential CEOs after consultation 
with the PSC
3
, to the responsible Minister to be submitted to the Government for 
appointment. Two directors who were interviewed stated that they try to submit a 
list of people that can find favour with the Government and persons who can work 
in harmony with the Government. One of them stated that “we try to submit list 
that Government can accept. We do not want our list of nominee to be rejected by 
government” (NHC – FD2). There is a system put in place to select the CEO but 
the Government bypasses this process. When further asked how the Government 
bypasses the process, two instances were given. First, when the Government 
appoints a CEO outside of the list given contrary to the procedural requirement. 
And second, before deliberation over the names for CEO before the board, the 
Government submits the name of a person that it prefers for the job. The 
difference between the appointment of directors and of a CEO is that responsible 
Minister submits the names of potential directors to PSC and the board submits 
the names of potential CEOs to PSC. Ultimately, it is the responsible Minister and 
the Government that makes the appointment. 
 
The Minister has the right of access to all information of the NHC. He can request 
any information from the board or the management. The Minister communicates 
directly with the CEO and can direct the CEO and the management to implement 
Government policies, unless a matter requires approval of the board. When asked 
why the Minister communicates directly with the management instead of the 
                                                          
3
  Public Service Commission is established under s 190 of the Constitution of PNG. 
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board the majority of the interviewees indicated that members of the board are 
part-time and are not intimately connected with the issues in NHC, hence the 
Minister needs to deal directly with the CEO and the management. When asked 
whether the roles of the Minister are clear and understood by directors and 
managers, the majority indicated that they did not know the specific 
responsibilities. As one senior manager stated “the Minister‟s relationship with us 
is not clear [or]… put in a document for us to see, that is why everyone here [in 
NHC] is required to follow his [the Minister‟s] directions” (NHC – SM1). 
 
12.3.3 The Board 
 
The board of NHC does not have board committees and only consists of non–
executive directors. All directors are in full time employment with outside 
organizations. The directors, chairperson and CEO were not informed of their 
roles and responsibilities at the time of the appointment; however they generally 
understood that they were to give effect to the objectives of NHC and 
Government policies. As one former director stated “we were not told what we are 
required to do in the organization but we are expected to do our job as directors” 
(NHC – FD1). The board does not have a code of conduct.  
 
Generally, a board‟s principal role is to approve major transactions and it can 
sometimes order and direct management through board resolution on specific 
matters. Further, the board ensures that policy directives of the Government are 
implemented. The directors who were interviewed stated that their role on the 
board was to approve major transactions and ensure that management pursues the 
objectives and give effect to Government‟s policies. Almost all directors did not 
have a knowledge, or if any, limited knowledge of affairs and business of the 
corporation. A former director stated that: “I do not know what the finance 
division does or legal division does. Since my time in office I have never spoken 
to persons in these divisions of NHC” (NHC – FD2) 
 
The board does not review its own performance and its performance is not 
reported in the annual report.  The CEO is the head of the management. The 
Government, rather than the board, reviews the role of the CEO and has the power 
to discipline the CEO through termination.   
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12.3.4 Accountability 
 
Since 1992, NHC has not had a corporate plan. However, it gives effect to 
objectives under NHC Act and implements Government policies. The revenues 
generated from rentals are diverted to sustaining its activities. NHC does not 
submit reports to the Department of Treasury. The reason given was that it does 
not get funding from the office of the Treasury or Government. One of the senior 
managers stated that: “Government does not fund us [NHC]. We were left out a 
long time ago and we try to survive with little money that we make. Why should 
we be reporting to them when we are not getting any money from them [the 
Government]?” (NHC – SM2). Further, the answer was “no” when senior 
managers and directors were asked about whether they deal with the Minister for 
Treasury. 
 
The CEO deals directly with the responsible Minister. It is the CEO that submits 
the annual report to the responsible Minister with financial statement and 
auditor‟s report. The annual reports are supposed to be presented in Parliament; 
however, the reports of NHC are never presented on the floor of the Parliament. 
One of the former directors stated that “the reports are presented but you hardly 
hear them presented on the floor of Parliament. They may be looked at by NEC or 
discussed in some ways in Parliament but that is not for me to say” (NHC – FD1). 
None of the information from the annual report, or any other information of the 
NHC is disclosed to the public. The annual report contains accounts report. Before 
it is submitted to Government the Auditor General must audit the accounts. The 
Auditor General is legally required to audit NHC‟s account; however over the 
years private audit firms have been auditing accounts of the NHC. The Auditor 
General has the power to outsource auditing functions to private audit firms. 
 
There is uncertainty over the question of whether the NHC is subject to the Public 
Finances (Management) Act 1995 (PFM Act). Further, there was uncertainty over 
whether responsible Ministers, directors and CEOs can be investigated by the 
Ombudsman Commission. Some say only the Minister, while others stated that 
both the Minister and the directors can be investigated. Others did not have any 
idea. Similarly there was uncertainty and confusion over whether NHC can be 
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investigated by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). Some stated that they can 
whilst others stated that they cannot.  
 
In conclusion, it is clear from discussing issues of accountability that all 
participants generally agreed that NHC does not report to the Department of 
Treasury because of the Government‟s lack of funding, and does not have 
corporate plan. Further, there was uncertainty about the role of the PAC and the 
Ombudsmen Commission in relation to the NHC.  
 
12.3.5 Objectives 
 
There was clearly a general agreement among the interviewees that the main 
objective of the NHC is community service; however where profits are made they 
are diverted to sustaining activities of the NHC. Ninety-eight per cent of 90 
people that live in three main suburbs of Port Moresby and who are users or 
former users of NHC services, pointed out in interviews that the quality and 
efficiency of services provided by the NHC were poor, whilst two per cent were 
satisfied with the services. The NHC‟s annual reports for 2005, 2006 and 2007 
show that the corporation did not make profits and in the three years and has not 
received funding from the Government. 
 
12.4  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN NATIONAL 
BROADCASTING CORPORATION 
 
The NBC is established under the Broadcasting Corporation Act 1973.
4
 Its role is 
to provide balanced, objective and impartial broadcasting services within and 
outside the country.
5
  The NBC has, amongst other things, power to erect, 
maintain and operate transmitting and receiving stations and install and operate 
wired radio distribution services.
6
 The NBC‟s head office is in Port Moresby. All 
data in this case study was collected in Port Moresby. Table 12.2 provides number 
of people that participated in the data collection. 
 
 
                                                          
4
  Broadcasting Corporation Act 1973, s 3. 
5
  Broadcasting Corporation Act 1973, s 6. 
6
  Broadcasting Corporation Act 1973, s 6. 
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Table 12.2              Number of Interview Participants in NBC 
 
Directors/ 
Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) 
Interview 
questions 
issued 
Number of 
interview 
questions 
answered 
Numbers 
interviewed 
Current Directors 0 0 0 
Former Directors 9 6 5 
Current CEO 1 1 1 
Former CEOs 4 4 4 
Senior Managers 5 2 4 
Total 19 13 14 
 
The terms for the directors expired in January 2008 and were not renewed when I 
was in Port Moresby for data collection from April to September 2008. The legal 
officer of the NBC, who is also the board secretary, contacted the five former 
directors. They were issued with the interview questions, and the answered 
interview questions were collected before the interviews. The other four former 
directors whom I approached directly also live in Port Moresby. Two former 
directors and a senior manager were interviewed by telephone, whilst others were 
interviewed face-to-face. 
 
12.4.1 Views on the Definition of Corporate Governance 
 
The participants were asked to express their views on corporate governance. 
There were different views. Some senior managers expressed the view that they 
have come across corporate governance but did not know what it means. Others 
attempted to explain it. Most directors, especially those representing interest 
groups stated that they did not know the definition of corporate governance. An 
interesting answer was given by a former director, a lawyer by profession whose 
law firm does undertake corporate work. He stated that “corporate governance 
regards how the management administers NBC and how they are accountable for 
their conduct” (NBC – FD4). Some participants had come across the concept and 
understood what it meant whilst others had heard about it and could not define it. 
Further, others such as NBC – FD4 who dealt with issues relating to corporate 
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governance understood what it meant. A large majority of participants did not 
understand corporate governance although they had heard about it. 
 
12.4.2 The Role of the Government 
 
The Minister for Communication is responsible for NBC on behalf of the 
Government. The Government appoints and terminates the chairperson and the 
directors.  Before the appointment, the Minister for Communications submits the 
names of potential directors to Cabinet to be endorsed and thereafter to the Head 
of State for the appointments. The directors are usually associated with the 
Government. The former chairman of the board was a candidate for parliament, 
and he did not get elected in 2002 general election under the ruling party in the 
current Government. As a private lawyer he also represented many Government 
members and ministers in court with their election petitions. It is the prerogative 
of the Government to appoint any person that it wishes to serve on the board, 
except the CEO and a nominee from the Department of Finance and Treasury who 
are ex officio members. In addition, the Government appoints and terminates the 
CEO. 
 
When I was in Port Moresby on the field trip between April and September 2008, 
there was no operational board or legally appointed board. The vacancies existed 
for over eight months after the directors‟ contracts expired in January 2008. 
Senior managers stated that directors were not really needed. The responsible 
Minister communicates and deals directly with the CEO and therefore there is no 
need for them. One of the senior managers stated cynically that “directors come to 
board meetings to only receive their allowances” (NHC – SM2). It was agreed by 
all interviewees that the Minister for Communication deals with all operational 
and policy matters and may direct the management from time to time. Further, the 
Government through the responsible Minister has right of access to all 
information of the corporation. 
 
12.4.3 The Board 
 
The board consists of non-executive directors without board committees. All 
directors are part–time, fully engaged in employment with outside organizations. 
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The board can order and direct management through the board‟s resolutions, 
however much of what is done at meetings is approval of major transactions. The 
directors, chairperson and the CEO were not notified of their roles and 
responsibilities at the time of their appointment. They understood that they were 
to give effect to the objectives of NBC and policies of Government but did not 
understand their specific responsibilities in NBC. This was the exchange between 
a former director (NBC – FD3) and the researcher. 
 
Researcher: What are your roles and responsibilities as a director? 
Participant: Generally to attend board meetings and approve transactions. 
Researcher: At the time of your appointment were you being told about your duties? 
Participant: No, that has not happened. 
Researcher: Were you aware of company documents that were provided for your duties? 
Participant: Not that I am aware of…I have not come across any documents. I don‟t think 
having responsibilities written would make any difference…as you 
know…we are supposed to implement Government policies and objectives. 
 
Further, directors, including the chairman do not have a code of conduct. The 
board does not review its own performance nor its performance reported in annual 
reports. The CEO is the executive head of NBC and a member of the board. The 
CEO deals directly with the board and the responsible Minister. The responsible 
Minister disciplines the board members and CEO through termination or other 
means such as suspension. The directors were also asked whether they know of 
the business of various divisions, and many indicated they did not have an 
intimate knowledge of, or had made an attempt to find out, what they do. 
 
12.4.4 Accountability 
 
The responsible Minister deals directly with the board and the CEO. The CEO 
submits annual report to the responsible Minister and the Department of Treasury 
after approval by board. NBC does not have corporate plan. It only implements 
policies of the Government and the NBC. The CEO reports directly to the 
responsible Minister. The Auditor General is legally required to audit the accounts 
of NBC. However, all the participants in this case study indicated that it 
outsources the auditing responsibility to private audit firms. 
 
There was uncertainty and confusions among the participants in the case study 
over whether the PAC and the Ombudsmen Commission can investigate the NBC. 
Further, there was uncertainty over whether directors, CEO and responsible 
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Ministers can be investigated by the Ombudsman Commission. Some participants 
expressed the view that responsible Minister, directors and the CEO can be 
investigated by the Ombudsman Commission, while others were not sure and few 
indicated that that the Ombudsman Commission cannot investigate them. 
Certainly there is uncertainty amongst the interviewees about the role of the PAC 
and the Ombudsman Commission in the NBC. But it is generally agreed that 
Department of Treasury deals with the NBC with regard to financial matters. 
Further, participants agreed that issues with regard to the NBC are rarely 
discussed in Parliament. 
 
12.4.5 Objectives 
 
The main objective of the NBC is to provide broadcasting services to the 
community. It receives an annual budgetary allocation from the Government to 
perform its duties. Out of the 90 people that were interviewed about the efficiency 
and the quality of service provided by the NBC, 30 per cent were satisfied and 70 
per cent rated the services as poor. Issues raised were of poor reception of 
programmes aired, boring programmes and the closing of NBC stations in more 
than half of the provinces so that people are unable to receive up-to-date 
provincial news. 
 
12.5 CONCLUSION  
 
The recurring themes that can be observed from these case studies can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
1. Generally, the members of the board do not understand the concept of 
corporate governance. The interviewees that attempted to explain it have 
heard about it or dealt with issues in corporate governance. 
 
2. The Minister of NHC and the Minister of NBC are responsible for the 
NHC and the NBC, respectively.  The roles and responsibilities of these 
Ministers are provided under enabling legislation. The Ministers can be 
involved in both policy and operational matters of the SOEs. Further, 
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Government through the responsible Ministers can direct management to 
implement Government policies from time to time. 
 
3. The Government has unfettered discretion and absolute power to appoint 
and terminate directors and CEOs.  
 
4. The directors and CEOs were not informed of their roles and 
responsibilities at the time of appointment; however they agreed that they 
are appointed to implement Government policies and objectives of the 
corporations. Many of them are still uncertain about their specific 
responsibilities. 
 
5. With regard to accountability it is clear from interviewing participants that 
Auditor General audits the accounts of the NHC and the NBC and can 
outsource to private audit firms.  
 
6. Only the NBC submits annual reports to the Department of Treasury; the 
NHC does not.  
 
7. There was uncertainty over whether the Ombudsmen Commission and 
PAC can investigate the NHC and the NBC.   
 
8. The main objective of these SOEs is community service; however the 
quality and efficiency of services are poor. 
 
Clearly, from above discussion it can be seen that Government has control over 
the two SOEs. People who have government connections are appointed as 
directors and CEOs, placing in important positions those who do not have 
supervisory or managerial knowledge and skills to manage the corporations. As 
stated by one of the senior managers, they are “job for the boys”. Hence there is 
no motivation to establish proper corporate governance mechanism or to improve 
on them. Like a government department the board and the management are at the 
whim of the Government. Lack of public scrutiny by PAC, the Ombudsman 
Commission or Treasury allows stakeholders in governance to pursue self-
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interested activities. Lack of good governance and accountability in SOE is partly 
reflected in the quality and the efficiency of the service.  
 
This chapter generally discusses corporate governance practice. Chapter 14, in 
addition, synthesizes and provides analysis of the different themes discussed in 
this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 13: 
 
INCIDENCES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICE 
IN STATE COMPANIES 
 
 
13.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 12 discusses corporate governance practice in statutory corporations in 
Papua New Guinea (PNG). Similarly, this chapter discusses corporate governance 
practice in state owned enterprise (SOE), however with particular focus on state 
companies or public companies incorporated under the PNG Companies Act 1997 
or its predecessor. All state companies have one shareholder, namely the 
“Independent Public Business Corporation of Papua New Guinea” (IPBC)1. Sir 
Michael Somare‟s Government established IPBC in 2002 to replace the 
Privatization Commission
2
 established in 1999. The IPBC is established as a 
corporation to monitor the trust and the performance of the assets of the State and 
to dispose or sell these assets within the timetable and policy guidelines set out by 
the Government.
3
 The Minister for SOEs oversees and supervises the performance 
of the IPBC and deals with state companies through the IPBC. 
 
Three state companies selected to be studied were PNG Power Ltd (PNG Power), 
Telikom PNG Ltd (Telikom) and NCD Water & Sewerage Ltd (Eda Ranu). The 
same methodology discussed in chapter 11 was applied to these three case studies 
for the purposes of data collection and analysis. I shall now proceed to present the 
data. 
 
13.2 PRESENTATION OF DATA 
 
The three state companies are involved in service-orientated activities. PNG 
Power and Telikom are two largest SOEs in PNG. Generally, they have monopoly 
over telecommunication service, and production and supply of electricity, 
respectively. On the other hand Eda Ranu‟s realm of business activities is 
                                                          
1
  IPBC was established under Independent Public Business Corporation of Papua New Guinea 
Act 2002. 
2
  Privatization Act 1999. 
3
  Independent Public Business Corporation of Papua New Guinea Act 2002, s 8. 
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restricted to Port Moresby and surrounding villages where it has a monopoly over 
the supply of water and sewerage services. I now proceed to present data under 
each of the SOEs starting with PNG Power, Telikom then followed by Eda Ranu.  
 
13.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN PNG POWER LTD 
 
The business undertakings of PNG Power used to be under the PNG Electricity 
Commission (PNGEC). PNGEC was established under the Electricity 
Commission Act 1961 to build power stations and supply electricity around PNG. 
Under the Electricity Commission (Privatization) Act 2002 the powers and 
functions were transferred from PNGEC to a successor company to be 
incorporated by Privatization Commission
4
 under the Companies Act 1997, which 
would take ownership and control of assets and liabilities of PNGEC.  PNG 
Power was incorporated under the Companies Act in 2003 taking full 
responsibility of powers and functions of PNGEC. PNG Power is the subject of 
this case study. Table 13.1 provides the number of current and former directors 
and CEOs, and senior managers of PNG Power who have participated in this case 
study. 
 
Table 13.1            Number of Interview Participants in PNG Power Ltd 
 
Participants 
Interview 
questions issued 
Numbers that 
completed 
interview 
questions in 
writing 
Numbers 
interviewed 
Current Directors 4 2 3 
Former Directors 6 2 4 
Current CEO 1 1 1 
Former CEOs 3 2 2 
Senior Managers 4 3 4 
Total 18 10 14 
 
                                                          
4
  The Commission is established under the Privatization Commission Act 1999. 
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Board secretary of PNG Power assisted in distributing the interview questions to 
current directors and CEO. Written answers to questions were collected before the 
interview. It was difficult to find former directors and CEOs. I was able to find six 
former directors and three CEOs in Port Moresby. I had a telephone interview 
with one current director and two senior managers who were unable to meet me 
because of their busy schedules. Others were interviewed face-to-face. 
 
13.3.1 Views on the Definition of Corporate Governance 
 
The majority of the participants attempted to define corporate governance. Nearly 
half of the directors including former directors stated that they had heard the 
definition but could not explain it. All senior managers including two expatriates 
fully explained the definition of corporate governance. One of them stated that 
corporate governance is “essentially to do with powers and functions of directors 
and managers in a company and how they are then accountable to higher 
authorities. In our [PNG Power‟s] case it is IPBC and the Minister” (PNGP – 
SM2). Some who fully explained the definition of corporate governance have 
come across it in their work or through university study.   
 
13.3.2 The Role of the Government 
 
IPBC is the only shareholder of PNG Power in trust for the State. The Minister for 
SOEs is responsible for PNG Power on behalf of the State and is supposed to deal 
with PNG Power through IPBC, but that is not the case in practice. Nearly all of 
the participants in this case study indicated that they do not understand the roles 
and responsibilities of the Minister for SOEs and IPBC but they only follow 
directions from them. The Minister is involved in all policy matters and some 
operational matters of PNG Power. 
 
The Minister for SOEs appoints and terminates the members of the board who are 
supposed to be appointed on the basis of their expertise in various fields such as 
architecture or engineering. Many who are appointed directors are Government 
associates. One of the directors is a son of the Prime Minister. Former directors 
and senior managers told me that his appointment invited public criticism of 
conflict of interest and nepotism. The public saw that appointments made to these 
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key positions by the Government are to protect its interest and provide jobs for 
families and associates. The board tried to quell the public outcry by pointing out 
that the son was appointed on merit. The Minister also appoints and terminates the 
chairperson. The current chairman is a close associate of the Government. He 
explained openly about having provided financial support to the current 
Government leading up to its formation.  
 
There were some disagreements over the method for appointing the CEO. These 
are some of the views that were expressed. 
 
The CEO is appointed by the IPBC but the IPBC must consult the Government. Many 
people say it is the board that appoints but let me tell you the truth that IPBC appoints the 
CEO… Many people think that board appoints the CEO but it is not true (PNGP – FD1). 
 
The Minister and IPBC appoint the CEO and the board makes the declaration of the 
appointment (PNGP – SM3). 
 
IPBC is the shareholder and as a shareholder it appoints the CEO. The board is only a 
rubber stamp. Even if the board is given the power to appoint CEO the Minister and IPBC 
will still influence the appointment. This is why I am saying that IPBC and the Minister 
effectively appoint the CEO (PNGP – CD2). 
 
From the different views expressed it is clear that the board appoints and 
terminates the CEO in consultation with the IPBC and the Minister. Any 
resolution by IPBC and the Minister of the person to CEO is final and the board 
must approve the decision by making declaration that that person is the CEO. 
 
Further, the Minister and the IPBC are consulted on the objectives to be achieved 
under the corporate plan. The process involves the board of PNG Power, 
formulating the corporate plan and submitting to the IPBC, which endorses and 
can suggest changes to the plan in consultation with the Minister for SOEs. This is 
where the Minister can have a role in influencing the content of corporate plan to 
be in line with Government policies. The recommendation of the IPBC must be 
given effect under the plan. Furthermore, the IPBC and the Minister for SOEs can 
have access to all information of the company and deal directly with the CEO. 
 
13.3.3 The Board  
 
The board consists of non-executive directors and a part time chairperson. Where 
necessary the board can appoint board committees to assist with its other extended 
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responsibilities. Directors were asked about whether they take time to find out 
about other divisions in the company. Two directors indicated making an attempt 
to find out about powers, functions and business of these various divisions. 
 
The board has no code of conduct, does not review its own performance and does 
not report its performance in the annual report. The directors are not given written 
explanation of their responsibilities after their appointment; however they are 
advised to attend courses offered on corporate governance. Nearly all directors do 
not understand their general duties under the Companies Act 1997. They indicated 
that they are required to attend board meetings and deliberate on issues 
highlighted in the agenda that they receive before the meetings. Similarly, the 
chairperson indicated not having access to any document prescribing the roles of 
the chairperson but he understood clearly his responsibilities as a chairperson. 
 
The CEO is the executive head of the company and is a member of the board. 
During the interview the current CEO stated that he generally understands his 
roles and responsibilities and his main role is to implement the objectives of PNG 
Power and the policies of the Government.  
 
13.3.4 Accountability 
 
The CEO reports directly to the board, which reports to the IPBC, which reports 
to the Government through the Minister for SOEs. Often the Minister for SOEs 
bypasses the board and the IPBC, and deals directly with the CEO and the 
management. One example given was when Government comes up with new 
policies, the Minister communicates directly with the management. 
 
The board of PNG Power submits annual reports to the IPBC, and it tenders 
copies of the report to the Government when requested by the responsible 
Minister. All interviewees stated that according to their knowledge Parliament 
never discussed issues about PNG Power. Further, the board submits a copy of the 
report to the Registrar of Companies. But the Department of Treasury does not 
receive a copy of the report. The company does not disclose the report directly to 
the public, although the information is available for public inspection at the 
company‟s office in Port Moresby. There is no requirements for the contents of 
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the report, however it is generally required that board reports on the yearly 
operation of PNG Power.  
 
The Auditor General audits the accounts of PNG Power; however it often 
outsources this to private audit firms. The reason for outsourcing is that the Office 
of the Auditor General does not have enough funds and auditors to audit PNG 
Power. All the participants were uncertain on whether PNG Power is subject to 
inspection by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC)
5
. Also, they were uncertain 
on whether Ombudsman Commission can investigate the Minister for SOEs, 
directors and CEO. This was a conversation between the researcher and a senior 
manager (PNGP – SM1) who has been working in the legal division of the 
company for over ten years. 
 
Researcher: So you are saying that PAC and Ombudsman Commission cannot investigate 
PNG Power? 
Interviewee: No…that is not what I am saying. What I am simply saying is that we are 
not sure after PNG Power was incorporated under the Companies Act. We 
[PNG Power] have become a private company. The Parliament must make it 
clear whether PAC and Ombudsman Commission can investigate PNG 
Power. 
 
Some of the participants stated that only the chairperson and the Minister for 
SOEs are subject to investigation by Ombudsman Commission, others indicated 
that it is only the Minister, whilst others were uncertain about the matter. What is 
generally clear from the interviews is that the role of the Ombudsman 
Commission and the PAC in PNG Power is uncertain; hence this matter requires 
clarification by the legislature. 
 
13.3.5 Objectives 
 
The main objective of PNG Power is to be commercially viable and to make a 
profit. The Government subsidizes when it requires the company to embark on 
community service obligation. PNG Power is the only producer and supplier of 
electricity in PNG. Since corporatisation PNG Power has been making profit for 
the State. However, profitability is not reflected in the quality and efficiency of 
the service. Ninety-one per cent of 90 consumers interviewed stated that 
                                                          
5
  It is established under s 215 of the PNG Constitution to inspect public accounts of PNG and 
report to parliament on any control of or transaction concerning public‟s monies or property. 
Also, see discussions in chapter seven. 
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efficiency and quality of services are poor while nine per cent were satisfied with 
the services. 
 
13.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN TELIKOM PNG LTD 
  
Telikom was established under the Telikom PNG Limited Act 1996 and 
incorporated as a company under the Companies Act in 1997. In 1982 the business 
of telecommunication merged with postal services and they were governed under 
the Post and Telecommunication Corporation Act 1982.
6
 The powers and 
functions were separated in 1996 under the Post and Telecommunication 
Corporation (Corporatisation) Act 1996. The regulatory powers and functions of 
the corporation with relation to telecommunications and radiocommunication 
were transferred to PANGTEL
7
; the powers and functions and business 
undertaking relating to postal services was transferred to Post PNG Ltd and 
powers and functions and business undertaking of the corporation with regard to 
telecommunication were transferred to Telikom. This case study focuses only on 
corporate governance practice in Telikom. Table 13.2 summarizes the number of 
current and former directors and CEOs, and senior managers of Telikom who 
were issued with questionnaires and were interviewed during my field trip to PNG 
between April and September 2008. 
 
Table 13.2         Number of Interview Participants in Telikom PNG Ltd 
 
Participants 
Interview 
questions Issued 
Numbers that 
completed 
interview 
questions in 
writing 
Numbers 
interviewed 
Current Directors 6 2 4 
Former Directors 4 3 4 
Current CEO 1 1 1 
Former CEOs 2 1 1 
                                                          
6
  Post PNG Ltd, “Corporate profile,” in Post PNG Ltd, < 
http://www.postpng.com.pg/about_us.htm > at 12 April 2010. 
7
  PANGTEL stands for Papua New Guinea Radio-communications and Telecommunications 
Technical Authority. See Part IV of Telecommunication Act 1996. 
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Senior Managers 4 1 4 
Total 17 8 14 
 
There are six current directors of Telikom and four were interviewed. Like PNG 
Power, I found it difficult to locate former directors and CEOs in Port Moresby. 
Most of them have retired and are living in towns outside Port Moresby or in 
villages. I was able to locate four in Port Moresby and interviewed them. I 
interviewed one former CEO and two senior managers by telephone. Others were 
interviewed face-to-face. 
 
13.4.1 Views on the Definition of Corporate Governance 
 
Like PNG Power, views about the definition of corporate governance vary 
depending on prior knowledge. All senior managers interviewed attempted to 
explain the term. Generally, directors and CEOs had either heard about corporate 
governance and did not understand the concept, or had not heard about it and did 
not know what it is. Many of the interviewees did not understand the definition of 
corporate governance and did not provide an explanation.  
 
13.4.2 The Role of the Government 
 
IPBC is the only shareholder of Telikom in trust for the State. The Minister for 
SOEs and Minister for Communications are responsible for the company on 
behalf of the State. Telikom is indirectly subject to both as it is an SOE and also a 
communication company. The Ministers deal with the IPBC on matters regarding 
Telikom and the IPBC deals with the board. But the participants stated that the 
Ministers can deal directly with the board and management. For example, the 
Ministers can direct the board to implement Government policies without going 
through the IPBC. Directors that were interviewed were confused over the areas 
of responsibilities of the two Ministers. One of the former directors stated that “as 
a board we were required to implement any directions from the Ministers. We did 
not question whether direction they give is within their power” (T – FD4). 
Sometimes Telikom receives conflicting directions from the Ministers. Conflict 
arises when one directs the implementation of a policy without consulting the 
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other. Further, the directors and CEOs expressed disappointment over lack of 
clarity over the roles and responsibilities of IPBC. 
 
All the participants agreed that the Government performs an influential role in 
Telikom. The responsible Ministers appoint and terminate directors, except a 
representative of IPBC who is an ex officio member of the board. The current 
representative on board of Telikom is the CEO of the IPBC who is also the CEO 
of the “Sana Arthur Berta (SBA) Ltd”; a company owned by family members of 
the current Prime Minister. The responsible Ministers also appoint and terminate 
the chairperson. The board is supposed to appoint CEO but Ministers and IPBC 
greatly influence the appointment.  This is an exchange between former director 
(T – FD2) and the researcher. 
 
Researcher:  So…how is the appointment CEO done? 
Interviewee: the Minister submits the name of who he likes to be a CEO…and the board 
just appoints the person that the Minister wants. 
Researcher:   How would you describe your role in the appointment? 
Interviewee:  We are like rubber stamps. It is really the Government, through the Minister 
that appoints the CEO. 
 
The current management was careful in stating that the board appoints and 
terminates the CEO but in doing so it consults the Ministers and IPBC. Like PNG 
Power, it can be concluded that the board appoints the CEO in consultation with 
the Ministers. The responsible Ministers do influence the appointment. 
 
Further, the Ministers have a role in the formulation of the corporate plan. After 
the board submits the plan to IPBC, IPBC endorses and recommends the plan in 
consultation with the responsible Ministers. This is where the Ministers can 
influence the content of the plan. The recommendations of IPBC have to be 
incorporated. All interviewees expressed the view that Government only involves 
in policy matters but in certain instances it can intervene in operational matters. 
Furthermore, the responsible Ministers and the IPBC have direct access to all 
information of Telikom. 
 
13.4.3 The Board  
 
The board consists of non-executive directors, apart from the full time 
chairperson; and comprises of board committees. Most of these directors have full 
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time employment outside the company and spend less time getting to know the 
business and affairs of the company. The answer “no” was given when 
interviewees were asked whether directors spent time with senior managers to get 
to know what they are doing. Although directors ask questions about the company 
in meetings, this is insufficient to educate themselves about the business and 
affairs of the company. 
 
Interview data shows that the participants are not aware of any documents that 
specifically provide for the roles and responsibilities of the directors or the board. 
There was confusion and the answer “no” was given when directors were asked 
whether they understood their general responsibilities under the Companies Act 
1997. The board does not review its own performance, neither is its performance 
reported in the annual report. Further, the board has no code of conduct. The 
company secretary stated that he is working on a code of conduct that will be sent 
to the board for approval. A current and former chairperson stated that they are 
not aware of any documents prescribing their role but generally they preside over 
board meetings and ensure that the management implements the board‟s 
resolutions, including the objectives of Telikom and government policies. 
 
The CEO is not a member of the board. The CEO receives direction from the 
board and not the responsible Ministers or IPBC, however in certain cases for 
political expediency the responsible Ministers or the IPBC can direct the CEO to 
bypass the board and implement Government policies. The current CEO stated 
that the responsible Ministers deal with him directly to ensure that issues that are 
politically important are implemented, bypassing the IPBC. On occasions the 
board has reviewed the function of the CEO but at present there is no review 
mechanism. The CEO stated that his responsibility is to implement policies and 
the goals of the company and follow general duties under company constitution; 
however he is not aware of any documents that provide general guidelines on his 
responsibilities as a CEO. 
 
13.4.4 Accountability 
 
The CEO acts on behalf of the management and reports directly to the board, 
which deals with the IPBC, which then deals with the Government. The CEO, on 
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behalf of the management, submits an annual report to the board. The board 
submits a copy to the IPBC and another copy to the Registrar of Companies. The 
IPBC only submits the report to the Government upon request by responsible 
Ministers. Interviewees stated that they do not know whether these reports are 
tabled in Parliament, while others stated that they are not tabled in Parliament. 
Telikom does not submit its reports to the Department of Treasury.  
 
Telikom does not disclose any company‟s information to the public, although the 
public can gain access to the reports through the Registrar of Companies. The 
Auditor General audits the accounts of PNG Power. In most cases the Auditor 
General outsources to private audit firms and performs a supervisory role. 
 
There were uncertainties when participants were asked about whether the 
Ombudsman Commission can investigate responsible Ministers, directors and 
CEO. Some participants indicated that all directors apart from the CEO are 
subject to investigation by the Ombudsman Commission. Yet others indicated that 
it is only the chairperson and the CEO who are subject to investigations. 
Similarly, mixed reaction was given when participants were asked whether the 
Ministers can be investigated by the Ombudsman Commission in their dealings 
with Telikom. There were mixed responses also given to the question of whether 
PAC can investigate the accounts of Telikom. Some interviewees stated that PAC 
can investigate accounts of Telikom, some indicated that it cannot, whilst others 
were uncertain. Generally, there was uncertainty over the role of the Ombudsman 
Commission and PAC in Telikom. 
 
13.4.5 Objectives 
 
The main objective of Telikom is making profit in the process of providing 
telecommunication services. It does not receive funding from the Government 
hence Telikom has to make a profit to sustain its activities. If the Government 
would like Telikom to provide community services, it must subsidize costs. 
Within the last three years Telikom recorded profits. Seventy-six per cent of the 
90 customers of Telikom that were interviewed regarded the quality and 
efficiency of the service as poor while 24 per cent were satisfied with the services. 
Towards the end of 2007, competition against Telikom was permitted. An English 
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company, Digicel was allowed to compete against Telikom in the mobile service 
industry. Services improved in this area of industry. 
 
13.5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN EDA RANU 
 
The increase in population in the National Capital District (NCD) has stretched 
the water supply network beyond its limits. By 1990 the situation was 
deteriorating fast and getting worse. In 1993, a report of the Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) stated that water supply network established by 
Australian Department of Housing and Construction between 1971 and 1973 was 
outdated and outsized. Many suburbs in Port Moresby were experiencing less 
water pressure or were experiencing a day or two without water.  Following the 
report of JICA the Government corporatised the water and sewerage services in 
Port Moresby through enactment of NCD Water Supply and Sewerage Act 1996 
(NCD Act). 
8
 In compliance with NCD Act, NCD Water and Sewerage Pty Ltd 
was incorporated under the Companies Act 1997. Eda Ranu
9
 is a trading name for 
NCD Water and Sewerage Pty Ltd. Since 1997 Eda Ranu has been supplying 
water and providing sewerage services to the residents of Port Moresby and 
surrounding villages. Table 13.3 provides the summary of the number of current 
and former directors and CEOs, and senior managers of Eda Ranu who answered 
the interview questions, and were interviewed during the field trip between April 
and September 2008. 
 
Table 13.3               Number of Interview Participants in Eda Ranu 
 
Participants 
Interview 
questions 
Issued 
Numbers that 
completed 
interview 
questions in 
writing 
Numbers 
interviewed 
Current Directors 6 3 5 
Former Directors 5 3 3 
Current CEOs 1 1 1 
                                                          
8
  Eda Ranu, “Our History,” in Eda Ranu, < 
http://www.edaranu.com.pg/index_files/ourcomp.htm > at 9 April 2010. 
9
  Eda Ranu in „Motu‟ dialect means „our water‟. 
 235 
Former CEOs 3 3 2 
Senior Managers 4 2 3 
Total 19 12 14 
 
Secretary of the board assisted with distributing interview questions to current 
directors and CEOs, and senior managers. A director, who is a landowner 
representative living in Kerekadi village in Sogeri Plateau outside Port Moresby, 
did not respond, and the other lived in Mendi and was difficult to reach. A former 
CEO who lives outside Port Moresby was interviewed by telephone, whilst the 
rest were interviewed face-to-face. Two former directors refused to have an 
interview. 
 
13.5.1 Views on the Definition of Corporate Governance 
 
Generally all the participants had heard about corporate governance. Many of 
them did not understand what it means. Those that attempted to explain it are 
senior managers. Many of these senior managers have been working with the 
company for more than three years. The following are some of the views on the 
definition of corporate governance. 
 
I heard about it [corporate governance] but to tell you what it is, I might be lying to you 
(ED – FD3). 
 
People talk about corporate governance. I heard it…but I cannot explain it (ED – CD1). 
 
Corporate governance is to do with the conduct of the managers in governing the 
corporation (ED – SM3). 
 
The participants such as the senior managers who heard about corporate 
governance and deal with corporate issues explained it in their own words. Many 
of the directors have heard about it and cannot explain it. Clearly, explanation by 
participants depends on whether they have heard about corporate governance and 
dealt with issues surrounding it. 
 
13.5.2 The Role of the Government 
 
IPBC is the major and sole shareholder of Eda Ranu. Minister for SOEs is 
responsible for Eda Ranu but is not a shareholder. The Minister was supposed to 
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deal with IPBC on matters regarding Eda Ranu. However, in practice the Minister 
bypasses the IPBC and communicates and deals directly with the chairperson and 
the CEO. The Minister appoints and terminates the chairperson and members of 
the board. On the other hand the CEO is appointed and terminated by the board. 
The board appoints the CEO but upon consultation with the Minister and IPBC. 
Many of the participants stated that the board complies with the direction of the 
Government in appointing the CEO. 
 
Further, the Minister must be consulted by IPBC when the corporate plan is 
submitted for its endorsement by the board of Eda Ranu. Furthermore, the 
Minister can also have access to all information of the company, and can deal 
with both the policy matters and operation matters of the company. Most 
interviewees, including the senior managers stated that access to information was 
made possible by the close association the chairperson and the CEO have with the 
Government. One of the former directors stated bluntly that “the chairman and the 
CEO are the friends of the Government. Any information of Eda Ranu that 
Government asks, they provide” (ED – FD2). Usually the board of Eda Ranu 
submits reports to IPBC, which then submits reports to the Government. Many of 
these reports are not tabled in Parliament. 
 
13.5.3 The Board  
 
The board consists only of non – executive directors but only the chairperson is a 
full time member of the board. Also, the board comprises of board committees. A 
representative of IPBC and the Department of Treasury serve as ex officio 
members on the board. The question was asked, why Eda Ranu has a director 
representing the Department of Treasury on the board. This was one of the many 
similar responses received from the participants: “our company [Eda Ranu] is 
occasionally funded by the Government and NCDC [National Capital District 
Commission] and that is why the Office of the Treasury is interested in how we 
spend the public monies” (ED – CD3).   
 
The directors who were interviewed stated that they were not aware of their 
written roles and responsibility or understand their powers and functions under the 
Companies Act and the company constitution. When they were interviewed some 
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of the board members stated that they have not seen the Companies Act or the 
company constitution to understand their responsibilities. They understand their 
roles are to approve major transactions and ensure that management implements 
their resolutions and the objectives of Eda Ranu. The board and directors do not 
have a code of conduct. The board does not review its own performance or report 
its performance in the annual report. When the directors were first appointed they 
were not told of their roles and responsibilities nor were they trained after the 
appointment. Many of these directors lack intimate knowledge about the affairs 
and business of the company. 
 
The CEO is the executive head of the organization and is not a member of the 
board. The board appoints the CEO in consultation with IPBC and the Minister. 
The CEO receives direction from the board, implements board‟s resolutions and 
reports to the board. The current CEO stated that he deals directly with the 
Minister for SOEs and his role is to give effect to the objectives of Eda Ranu.  
 
13.5.4 Accountability  
 
The CEO reports directly to the board of Eda Ranu. Eda Ranu submits the annual 
report through the board to IPBC and the Registrar of Companies. However, Eda 
Ranu does not disclose directly to the public, although information about the 
company is available at the office of Registrar of Companies. Private audit firm, 
appointed by the Auditor General, audits the accounts of Eda Ranu. Eda Ranu 
does not report to the Department of Treasury or Minister for Treasury. Given the 
mixed responses from the participants it was clear that there was confusion over 
whether Minister for SOEs, directors and CEO are subject to investigation by the 
Ombudsman Commission. Further, there was uncertainty over whether Eda Ranu 
is subject to investigation by PAC.  
 
13.5.5 Objectives 
 
The main objective of Eda Ranu after incorporation is making a profit through 
supply of water and disposal of sewerage in National Capital District. 
Corporatisation was intended to ensure that Eda Ranu provides an efficient and 
quality service. Since incorporation Eda Ranu has occasionally received 
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Government funding. Eighty-eight per cent of 90 residents of Port Moresby 
interviewed stated that the quality and the efficiency of services are poor and 12 
per cent were satisfied with the services. Over the last three years Eda Ranu has 
recorded profits. 
 
13.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The similarities that each of the state companies share that featured consistently 
and predominantly in this chapter can be summarized as follows: 
 
a. Few participants had not heard about corporate governance. Many that 
knew about it could not explain it. Some, mainly the senior managers 
attempted to explain corporate governance but their explanations were too 
vague and incomplete. 
 
b. IPBC is the main and sole shareholder of each of the state companies in 
trust for the State. 
 
c. The Minister for SOEs appoints and terminates the chairpersons and the 
directors.  
 
d. The CEO is appointed by board in consultation with the relevant Ministers 
and IPBC. 
 
e. The directors and CEOs understand generally that they are required to 
implement the objectives of the state companies but do not understand 
their specific roles and responsibilities under the Companies Act or the 
company constitutions.  
 
f. State companies do not have code of conduct for the board, directors and 
CEOs, and they are not notified of their responsibilities upon appointment 
or educated on their specific roles and responsibilities. 
 
g. Directors lack detail knowledge and understanding of the business and 
affairs of individual SOEs. 
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h. The Auditor General is legally required to audit the accounts of the state 
companies; however the Auditor General outsources auditing of state 
companies to the private audit firms. 
 
i. There is confusion over whether the state companies are subject to 
inspection and investigation by PAC and whether relevant Ministers, 
directors and CEOs are subject to investigation by the Ombudsman 
Commission. 
 
j. State companies do not report to Department of Treasury and the Minister 
for Treasury. 
 
k. The main objective of the state companies is making profit, however 
where Government requires community services then it must subsidize 
costs. These companies have recorded profits since corporatisation, but the 
quality and efficiency of services are poor.  
 
On the other hand the differences that featured consistently and predominantly 
among the three state companies are summarized as follows: 
 
a. The number of government ministers responsible for each SOE differs. 
Telikom has two responsible Ministers while PNG Power and Eda Ranu 
have one. 
 
b. Eda Ranu and Telikom have full-time chairpersons and PNG Power has a 
part-time one. Eda Ranu has representatives of IPBC and Department of 
Treasury on the board, Telikom PNG Ltd has only the representative of 
IPBC while PNG Power Ltd has no representative from the two 
institutions. 
 
c. Eda Ranu and Telikom have CEOs who are not the members of the board. 
In PNG Power CEO is a member of the board. 
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IPBC was established to manage the state companies and prepare them for 
privatization. In addition, IPBC was also given ownership responsibility; however 
there was no clear distinction between its role and the role of the relevant 
Ministers. This allows the relevant Ministers to deal directly with the board and 
management of state companies. Further, the data establish that there is a 
subjective approach in appointing and terminating directors without procedural 
compliance. Consequently, Government associates are appointed to the board. 
The Government‟s direct influence of state companies is also made possible by 
having Government associates on the board and management and having directors 
and CEOs who lack understanding and appreciation of their powers and functions. 
Furthermore, other major issues in state companies‟ are continuous ministerial 
interference and lack of accountability. The general public perception is that there 
is poor provision of services.  
 
Like chapter 12, this chapter generally discusses corporate governance practice in 
state companies. Chapter 14, in addition, synthesizes different themes discussed in 
this chapter and provides analysis. 
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PART VI: 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
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CHAPTER 14: 
 
THE CONDITIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN STATE 
OWNED ENTERPRISES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA – A 
DEFECTIVE PARADIGM 
 
 
14.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter discusses the findings of the interview data collected in chapters 12 and 
13. Whilst these data are important per se, it is equally important that the legal 
position (that is the law) of corporate governance in each SOE is ascertained and 
addressed, and compared against the practice in individual SOEs. Then this is 
compared and contrasted against corporate governance systems in public sectors in 
New Zealand (NZ) and Australia as discussed in chapter 7.  This chapter firstly 
examines the legal core of corporate governance in SOEs that are the subject of case 
studies. Second, the law and practice on corporate governance in SOEs is analyzed to 
establish the position of corporate governance in Papua New Guinea (PNG). Third, 
corporate governance in PNG is compared and contrasted against corporate 
governance in NZ and Australia. Fourthly, deficiencies in corporate governance in 
PNG are identified and discussed followed by relevant observations proffered by way 
of conclusion.  
 
14.2  LEGAL CORE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN STATE OWNED 
ENTERPRISES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA  
 
PNG does not have generic corporatisation legislation that covers all SOEs. They are 
either established under statutes or created under statutes and incorporated under the 
Companies Act 1997. These different statutes provide for accountability and 
governance of SOEs. This part examines the legal core of corporate governance 
framework in SOEs that are the subject of case studies in Part V. Under the 
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Companies Act 1997, the company‟s constitution is binding;1 hence it is considered 
along with other legislation governing state companies. 
 
14.2.1 Statutory Corporation - National Housing Corporation  
 
The main legislation that governs the activities of the National Housing Corporation 
(NHC) is the National Housing Corporation Act 1990 (NHC Act). It sets out the 
general powers and functions of NHC.
2
 Under the Act, the Minister for NHC is 
responsible for the corporation and is greatly involved in its business and affairs. 
NHC must give effect to policies of the Government, directed by the Minister from 
time to time.
3
 Most of these policies are geared towards building and maintaining 
houses for public servants. In this sense, the NHC acts as an agent of the Government 
to develop houses for its employees.
4
 Interestingly, the Minister is involved in the 
affairs of the corporation to an extent that he/she determines payment for loss or 
damages to an affected person,
5
 and gives the consent before funds for research with 
regard to housing are appropriated.
6
 Furthermore, the Minister determines which 
bank the NHC should have an account with.
7
 These are operational matters that 
should have been dealt with by the board of NHC.  
 
The Government appoints the chairperson and sets their terms and conditions.
8
 The 
directors are appointed in compliance with the Regulatory Statutory Authorities 
(Appointment to Certain Office) Act 2004 (RSA Act). The Minister for NHC prepares 
and submits a list of candidates for directors‟ positions to the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) to be considered against the standard of “fit and proper person”. 
The Minister makes the appointment after receiving the recommendation from PSC. 
                                                          
1
  Companies Act 1997, s 32. Matters provided only in the Constitution and not the Companies Act 
are binding between the company and the shareholders, and between the shareholders. However, 
they are not binding on directors. Therefore the “constitution should not be used to confer rights 
on directors”. See Beck, A. and Borrowdale, A., Papua New Guinea Companies and Securities 
Law Guide, (1999) 33.  
2
  National Housing Corporation Act 1990, Part III. 
3
   National Housing Corporation Act 1990, s 27. 
4
  National Housing Corporation Act 1990, s 29. 
5
  National Housing Corporation Act 1990, s 73. A person who is wronged by the corporation is an 
affected person for the purpose of s 73. 
6
  National Housing Corporation Act 1990, s 63. 
7
  National Housing Corporation Act 1990, s 23. 
8
  National Housing Corporation Act 1990, ss 8 and 9. 
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For those directors who are required to represent an interest group, the Minister must 
consult the interest group before submitting the names to PSC.
9
 Further, the chief 
executive officer (CEO) is appointed in accordance with the RSA Act.
10
 The board 
submits names of three candidates to the responsible Minister for appointment.
11
 
Clearly, the Minister‟s powers are limited under the legislation. Also, the Minister on 
recommendation from the board may remove the CEO.
12
 These procedures are in 
place in the legislation, but from the case studies, it appears that the Minister directly 
appoints and terminates directors and CEO without consulting the board, PSC or the 
interest groups. 
 
The NHC Act does not provide for the powers and functions of the board, 
chairperson, directors and CEO. However, it does provide for the powers and 
functions of NHC. It can be concluded that performance of these officers can only be 
assessed against whether they have collectively exercised powers and performed 
functions of the NHC. 
 
NHC is subject to Part III of the Public Finance (Management) Act 1995 (PFM Act). 
That means the Auditor General can audit the accounts of NHC, and it must submit 
the management plan and annual report to the Department of Treasury. In practice, 
from Part V, this is not the case. The NHC does not submit the management plan or 
the annual report to the Department of Treasury, despite having custody over valuable 
assets of the State and coming under the control of the State‟s Minister. Also, the 
laws are not clear on whether the Ombudsman Commission can investigate 
responsible Ministers, directors, chairperson and the CEO or whether they are subject 
to the Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership (Leadership 
Code). Similarly, the laws are silent on whether the Public Accounts Committee 
(PAC) can investigate NHC.
13
 
 
                                                          
9
  Regulatory Statutory Authorities (Appointment to Certain Offices) Act 2004, s 10. 
10
  National Housing Corporation Act 1990, s 17; Regulatory Statutory Authorities (Appointment to 
Certain Offices) Act 2004, s 4. 
11
  Regulatory Statutory Authorities (Appointment to Certain Offices) Act 2004, s 6. 
12
  Regulatory Statutory Authorities (Appointment to Certain Offices) Act 2004, ss 7 and 8.  
13
  The powers and functions of Public Accounts Committee are provided under the Constitution of 
PNG, ss 215 and 216. 
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14.2.2 Statutory Corporation – National Broadcasting Corporation  
 
The Minister for Communications is responsible for the National Broadcasting 
Corporation (NBC). The only official and legal document that provides for a 
corporate governance framework is the Broadcasting Corporation Act 1973 (NBC 
Act), which also sets out the general powers of NBC.
14
 Under the Act the responsible 
Minister advises NBC, on behalf of the Government on policies and priorities that it 
should pursue from time to time.
15
 The Minister may direct NBC on what to 
broadcast and it has to report back to Parliament on whether the policies and 
directions given have been implemented. Further, the Minister may specify where to 
broadcast.
16
 These are operational matters yet the responsible Minister deals with 
them. 
 
The Government appoints and terminates the chairperson
17
 and the CEO.
18
 The 
directors are also appointed and removed by the Government, while the ex officio 
directors are nominated from their organization to be on the board of NBC.
19
 It is 
interesting to note that, although NBC is a statutory corporation it is not subject to the 
RSA Act for the appointment of CEO and the directors. Unlike NHC, the 
Government makes direct appointments in NBC. The reason given by senior 
managers and directors in interviews is that the Government wants substantial control 
over what is to be disseminated to the public by having the capacity to control those 
in the management. The roles and responsibilities of the CEO
20
 and chairperson
21
 are 
specifically provided in the Act; however the roles of the board and the directors are 
not specified. 
 
Section 27 of the NBC Act specifically provides that NBC is subject to Part III of the 
PFM Act. By virtue of Part III NBC must be audited by the Auditor General
22
, submit 
                                                          
14
  Broadcasting Corporations Act 1973, s 11. 
15
  Broadcasting Corporations Act 1973, s 7 (1). 
16
  Broadcasting Corporations Act 1973, s 7 (2). 
17
  Broadcasting Corporations Act 1973, ss 16 and 17. 
18
  Broadcasting Corporations Act 1973, s 21B. 
19
  Broadcasting Corporations Act 1973, ss 12 and 13. 
20
  Broadcasting Corporations Act 1973, s 21B.  
21
  Broadcasting Corporations Act 1973, s 20. 
22
  Constitution of PNG, ss 213 and 214; Audit Act 1989. 
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its management plan and annual report to the Department of Treasury. The NBC Act 
is silent on whether responsible Ministers, directors, the chairperson and CEO are 
subject to the Leadership Code and hence can be investigated by the Ombudsman 
Commission. Similarly, it is not clear whether PAC can investigate NBC. 
 
14.2.3 State Company – NCD Water & Sewerage Ltd 
 
NCD Water & Sewerage Ltd (its trading name Eda Ranu is used hereafter) is 
incorporated under the Companies Act 1997, and obviously subject to that Act. It is 
also subject to the NCD (Transfer of Assets, Etc.,) Act 1995, the PFM Act, the 
Independent Public Business Corporation of PNG Act 2002 (IPBC Act) and of course 
the company constitution. The Independent Public Business Corporation of PNG 
(IPBC)
23
 is the main and sole shareholder of Eda Ranu. 
 
The responsible Minister appoints and terminates directors of Eda Ranu.
24
 The 
Minister is defined under s 1 of the constitution as the Minister for Finance from time 
to time or such other Minister of State having the responsibility of the transfer act and 
the business of the company. This definition covers the Minister for SOEs; hence he 
or she can appoint and terminate directors. On the contrary, the IPBC Act provides 
for IPBC to appoint directors.
25
 The question of who appoints the CEO is not clear 
under the constitution, however under the IPBC Act, IPBC appoints CEOs. Similarly, 
powers and functions of the chairperson and the board, but not the CEO, are provided 
under the constitution. The board is given a wider power to make decisions in the best 
interest of the company.
26
 The board may delegate its powers to a committee in 
fulfillment of the purpose for which it was established.
27
 Interestingly, Eda Ranu‟s 
operational jurisdiction is within National Capital District (NCD) and yet the 
municipal council, NCD Commission, has nothing to do with it. 
 
                                                          
23
  The IPBC was established under the IPBC Act to act as a trustee shareholder and to manage state 
companies, increase their value and sell when they are ready for privatization. 
24
  Constitution of Eda Ranu, s 110.  
25
  Independent Public Business Corporation of PNG Act 2002, s 11 (2004 amendment). 
26
  Constitution of Eda Ranu, s 134. 
27
  Constitution of Eda Ranu, ss 126 and 127. 
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The company is required to appoint a private audit firm to audit the accounts of Eda 
Ranu in compliance with the Companies Act.
28
 The constitution is silent on whether 
the Ombudsman Commission and PAC can inspect and investigate Eda Ranu and its 
management. On the other hand, the PFM Act only applies to borrowing of money 
from an outside source.
29
  
 
14.2.4 State Company – Telikom PNG Ltd  
 
In 1996, telecommunication assets and activities of the State were transferred to 
Telikom PNG Ltd (Telikom) under the PNG Power Limited Act 1996. Telikom was 
incorporated under the Companies Act 1997 with IPBC as a sole shareholder in trust 
for the State. The Act provides that the Telikom must fulfil its community service 
obligations, its general governmental obligations and its commercial obligation.
30
 
Telikom must perform its function consistent with general policies of Government 
notified to PANGTEL
31
 by the Minister under s 6 of the Telecommunication Act 
1996, and any direction given directly to Telikom.
32
 The board of Telikom must 
prepare and submit to the Minister a corporate plan for three years.
33
 In addition, it 
must perform its functions in a manner consistent with sound commercial practice.
34
   
 
Shareholders appoint and terminate the appointment of chairperson and director(s).
35
 
Shareholders, in this case, refer to IPBC. The directors appoint CEO.
36
 Under the 
IPBC Act, IPBC appoints directors and CEOs therefore appointment of CEO by 
directors under the constitution is inconsistent with the IPBC Act. Further, under Part 
IV the responsible Minister appoints directors, contrary to the IPBC Act. The 
constitution does not specifically provide for the powers and functions of board, 
                                                          
28
  Constitution of Eda Ranu, s 171. 
29
  Constitution of Eda Ranu, s 75. 
30
  Telikom PNG Limited Act 1996, s 4. 
31
  PANGTEL means “Papua New Guinea Radio-communications and Telecommunications 
Technical Authority.” PANGTEL is a statutory corporation established under Telecommunication 
Act 1996, and it only deals with technical matters (see Telecommunication Act 1996, s 32). 
32
  Telikom PNG Limited Act 1996, s 6. 
33
  Telikom PNG Limited Act 1996, s 10. 
34
  Telikom PNG Limited Act 1996, s 7. 
35
  Constitution of Telikom PNG Ltd, s 14.01. 
36
  Constitution of Telikom PNG Ltd, s 18.01. 
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chairperson and CEOs but only powers of directors
37
. This means that the board only 
acts in situations where the constitution provides for the company to act. Also, 
Telikom is incorporated under the Companies Act, hence, the board and directors are 
subject to the powers and functions provided in the Act.  
 
Section 30.02 of the constitution requires auditors to be appointed and removed in 
accordance with the Companies Act. Under the Act it is the company that appoints 
and removes auditors. This is in direct conflict with s 3 of the Audit Act 1989. There 
is no provision anywhere that states that Telikom and/or its management is to be 
subjected to the Leadership Code or PFM Act. There is also no provision that states 
that the Ombudsman Commission or PAC can inspect and investigate Telikom or that 
Auditor General should audit the accounts of Telikom.  
 
14.2.5 State Company - PNG Power Ltd  
 
PNG Power Ltd (PNG Power) is incorporated under the Companies Act 1997. IPBC 
is the only shareholder in trust for the State. PNG Power is subject to the Companies 
Act, the IPBC Act and the constitution of PNG Power. 
 
The IPBC Act provides that IPBC appoints directors and CEOs. Under the 
constitution, company appoints and terminates directors at the annual general meeting 
after receiving the nominations of persons from shareholders.
38
 In this case it is the 
shareholders that make the appointment. The only shareholder is IPBC. However, the 
Minister for SOEs appoints directors. Under the constitution board appoints the 
chairperson
39
 and the CEO
40
. This is contrary to the practice under Part V where the 
Minister for SOEs appoints the chairperson and IPBC appoints the CEO. The 
appointment of CEO by IPBC is in compliance with the IPBC Act but contradicts the 
constitution of PNG Power. The powers and functions of the board
41
 and the CEO
42
  
are specifically provided under the constitution. 
                                                          
37
  Constitution of Telikom PNG Ltd, ss 17.01- 17.04. 
38
  Constitution of PNG Power Ltd, s 16.10.   
39
  Constitution of PNG Power Ltd, s 21.7.  
40
  Constitution of PNG Power Ltd, s 19.2.  
41
  Constitution of PNG Power Ltd, s 20. 
42
  Constitution of PNG Power Ltd, s 19.4. 
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PNG Power is required to comply with reporting requirement under ss 179 and 215 of 
the Companies Act;
43
 however its constitution is not clear on the appointment of a 
company auditor. In this case the company complies with the requirement of the 
Companies Act. That means the board appoints the auditor. The company‟s 
constitution and other related Act did not provide whether PNG Power is subject to 
the Leadership Code or the PFM Act. Further, there is no legislation that specifically 
provides whether the Ombudsman Commission and/or PAC can inspect and 
investigate PNG Power. 
 
14.2.6 Independent Public Business Corporation of Papua New Guinea  
 
It is important to also note that IPBC was established as a corporation to manage state 
companies and where necessary privatize them in accordance with policy guidelines 
and in consultation with the Responsible Minister.
44
 The IPBC Act does not specify 
the role of the Government and Minister for SOEs, and state companies constitutions 
do not specifically provide for the role of IPBC. This creates confusion as to which 
authority the state companies should be dealing with and even more confusing is 
having a state company such as Telikom dealing with IPBC and two ministers - the 
Minister for SOEs and Minister for Communications. This indicates that the process 
of corporatisation was undertaken with alacrity. During the draft of the legislation no 
thought was given to other rules and gaps that needed to be filled.  
 
In an amendment in 2003 to the IPBC Act Parliament vested in IPBC the power to 
appoint directors and CEOs. In explaining the rationale for the amendment in 
Parliament, the Prime Minister stated that “the Government amended the IPBC Act 
last year to give NEC full authority over decisions in sales and the appointment of 
directors, CEOs and consultants to IPBC and its vested entities. This is aimed at 
enhancing accountability and ensuring that the Government is in full control of the 
                                                          
43
  Constitution of PNG Power Ltd, s 23.2. 
44
  Independent Public Business Corporation of Papua New Guinea Act 2002, s 8. 
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policy approach and outcomes.”45 The effect of the amendment is that the 
Government appoints directors and CEO of IPBC and makes policies and where 
necessary implements them. That means that it can involve itself directly with state 
companies in the implementation of the policies. Further, the effect of the amendment 
caused confusion and inconsistencies between the IPBC Act, the Companies Act, and 
the company constitutions, which have not been updated to meet the recent changes. 
 
14.3  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES IN 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA  
 
The discussion in section 13.2 above, establishes the position of law in individual 
SOEs that are the subject of the case studies in Part V. The discussion in this part 
looks at the general position of corporate governance in statutory corporations and 
state companies by comparing corporate governance practice presented in Part V and 
law on corporate governance presented under section 13.4 in this chapter. From the 
data analysis five major themes emerged with their sub-themes. This part firstly 
discusses the understanding of the concept of corporate governance by directors and 
senior managers. Second, the explanation provided on the role of the Government. 
Third, role and composition of the board is discussed. Fourth, accountability in 
statutory corporation and state companies is discussed, and then followed by 
discussion of the objectives. Each of these themes is discussed under statutory 
corporations and state companies (except the theme on understanding of corporate 
governance), together with finding from literature reviews.  
 
14.3.1 Views on Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate governance is a new concept in PNG. The interview data shows that the 
interviewees have diverse views and understanding of corporate governance whilst 
others have no idea at all about what it is. The views and understanding depended on 
whether the participants were earlier introduced and exposed to the concept through 
                                                          
45
  Somare, M., “Statement to Parliament on Privatization Policy,” (2003) in Prime Minister of 
Papua New Guinea, < 
http://www.pm.gov.pg/pmsoffice/pmsoffice.nsf/pages/BFB46DA34BF5B5E64A256D6500169E
94?OpenDocument > at 14 October 2008. 
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training, during the course of their work or read or had heard about it. The diverse 
views are the result of different exposure to the concept. 
 
Familiarity with corporate governance.  Many of the interviewees who attempted 
to explain corporate governance were familiar with the concept. These persons were 
either senior managers who have been working in SOEs over many years, or educated 
at the university level or senior expatriate managers. Many of the explanations that 
were given did not fully explain corporate governance. For example, one director 
stated that corporate governance “is something to do with how a corporation is run” 
(NHC - SM3). The definition is too vague. Who and how corporations are governed 
is not explained and accountability to whom and for what is not clearly explained. 
Another interviewee stated that corporate governance is something to do with 
directors and managers (T – SM1). This does not explain corporate governance. 
Clearly, there is need for education on corporate governance. Only through education 
will directors and managers understand governance and accountability structure and 
processes.  
 
Unfamiliarity with corporate governance. More than half of the interviewees had 
not heard of corporate governance. This group of people comprised the directors of 
statutory corporations. Many of them were directors representing interest groups and 
they lived in rural areas or had not been dealing with corporate governance issues. 
They also included few of the directors in state companies. Half of the interviewees 
had heard about corporate governance but could not explain it. One of the reasons for 
lack of understanding is that SOEs do not conduct training for directors and managers 
or conduct induction workshops. Many participants expressed disappointment over 
lack of these programmes. 
 
Need for education. Nearly all participants agreed that there is need for education on 
corporate governance. They agreed that many problems that they have encountered 
relate to a lack of appreciation and understanding of what corporate governance is. A 
minority of the interviewees see no need as it is waste of time and money and they 
think that they essentially do what is required of them as directors and managers. 
There is greater need for education in corporate governance, particularly the general 
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fiduciary obligations of directors and managers and their specific responsibilities in 
individual SOEs. 
 
14.3.2 Statutory Corporations 
 
14.3.2.1 The Role of the Government 
 
Responsible Ministers, on behalf of the Government are hierarchically above the 
board and management of statutory corporations, and deal directly with the board and 
management. The following sub- themes emerged from the interview data. 
 
The role of responsible Minister. The specific roles and responsibilities of 
responsible Ministers are provided under the NBC Act and the NHC Act. These do 
not restrict the Ministers to perform any other responsibilities that are deemed 
necessary or otherwise. The interviewee data indicated that Ministers intervene in all 
aspect of the activities of statutory corporations. The responsible Ministers can direct 
the management to open an account with a bank of his/her choice or direct the 
management on how to spend money. The data indicated that responsible Ministers 
see no limit to their responsibilities towards the corporations. The roles of these 
ministers are analogous to a responsible Minister of a government department. The 
impression given during the interview was that Ministers have no appreciation of 
corporations as having the status of “separate legal entity”. 
 
Involvement in policy and operational matters. As stated above responsible 
Ministers deal directly with statutory corporations. The level of intervention in policy 
and operational matters of corporations involves directing and advising management 
on the type of policies to be implemented, and where and how to implement these 
policies. This is done to an extent that undermines managerial exercise of discretion. 
The case studies show that Ministers deal with operational matters without regard to 
the managers who are required to deal with these issues. As one letter to the editor 
puts it, “Minister seems to be running a one man show at NHC and innocent tenants 
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are being evicted without the consensus of the NHC officials”.46 Eviction of tenants is 
not the responsibility of the Minister. Interview data also shows that responsible 
Ministers have no sense of distinction between policy matters and operational matters 
of corporations. Both the NBC Act and the NHC Act have allowed Ministers to 
involve in certain operational matters. This clouds the distinction between policy and 
operational matters. These license the Ministers to involve themselves in all activities 
of the corporations. 
 
Appointment and removal of directors and CEOs. It is seen in chapter 12 that 
responsible Ministers appoint and remove CEOs directly without consulting bodies 
that they ought to consult required under the legislations. This enables responsible 
Ministers to appoint associates that Government prefers so as to advance their 
political agendas in the corporations. The Ministers, unfortunately, are not held to 
account for their actions. Directors and CEOs are terminated often, without any 
proper justification and compliance with procedures. This is clearly stated in Paul 
Asakusa v Andrew Kumbakor
47
 where Justice Injia stated that “the Minister and the 
NEC had not followed the procedure prescribed by ss 8 & 9 of the Regulatory 
Statutory Authorities (Appointment to Certain Offices) Act 2004 [the RSA Act] in that 
the decision to suspend and appoint an acting CEO were not based on any 
recommendation of the board of NHC”. The case of Paul Asakusa is just one of the 
many instances where Government appoints a director or a CEO without complying 
with procedures. This explains directors and CEOs moving in and out without settling 
in their jobs. The consequence is that a CEO who is terminated after one year of a 
four-year term would be paid contractual entitlements for three years without meeting 
the full term. Taxpayers are made to pay exorbitant amounts for incompetence and 
ineffectiveness. 
 
Corporate Plans. Statutory corporations do not have corporate plans but only give 
effect to government policies that are adopted as a management plan. Even though 
                                                          
46
  Simboy, East Boroko, “NHC needs Overhaul,” (Port Moresby, 27th May 2009) in Post Courier, < 
http://www.postcourier.com.pg/20090527/wehome.htm > at 27 May 2009. 
47
  For example Paul Asakusa v Andrew Kumbakor, Minister for Housing & Others [2009] PGNC 
39; N3303 (10
th
 April 2008) < http://www3.paclii.org/pg/cases/PGNC/2008/39.html > at 18 
March 2009. 
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the enabling legislations (i.e. the NBC Act and the NHC Act) provide for their 
objectives, the management generally adopts government policies as their 
management plans. In addition responsible Minister can give directions to the 
management from time to time on policy matters. This allows the Minister to 
intervene in the affairs and business of corporations from time to time and not 
necessarily with regard to policy matters only. 
 
Access to information of corporation. The Government through responsible 
Ministers has total access to all information of statutory corporations. They may 
request any information from time to time, including confidential information. The 
managements see it important for them to provide information to the Ministers and 
the Government so that they are updated about the progress of the corporations. Many 
of them feel that their primary obligation is to the Government. These views and the 
culture within statutory corporations have generally allowed Ministers to have total 
control of the corporations. 
 
14.3.2.2 The Board 
 
The boards that are supposed to ensure accountability in statutory corporations are 
indecisive and ineffective. Their only job is approving certain transactions undertaken 
by the management. This job is easily done by having CEOs walking into the 
Minister‟s office to have the transactions approved. The example that shows the 
insignificance of the board is when the terms of members of the board of NBC 
expired in early January 2008 and the Minister did not appoint new board members 
for over eight months. At the time of writing the new board was still not put in place. 
One senior manager summarized the view that they have of board members that; 
“directors come to board meetings to only receive their allowances” (NHC – SM2). 
The board is merely used as a “rubber stamp”. If the board is to be effective then it 
has to be given other important responsibilities and these responsibilities must clearly 
be provided under corporations‟ charters or documents. 
 
Roles and responsibilities of directors. The roles of stakeholders in governance of 
statutory corporations are not clear. The roles and responsibilities of the board, 
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chairperson, directors and CEO are not provided under the NHC Act, whereas in the 
NBC the roles of chairperson and CEO are provided. It is difficult for those officers 
whose roles are not provided to know how to conduct themselves. Consequently, 
corruption is rampant in statutory corporations. For example, in a case where police 
forcefully and unlawfully evicted a family from its home of 13 years, Justice Mark 
Sevua made the following observation; “allegations of serious corruption within the 
NHC is not a new issue, but is condoned and allowed to flourish with impunity by 
NHC management”.48 This is serious, especially coming from a senior judge of over 
20 years. The problem is exacerbated in appointing associates of the executive 
government with no experience and knowledge in governance, without following 
procedures enshrined in the enabling legislations or the RSA Act.  
 
Appointing and Monitoring CEOs. Unlike state companies a board does not 
appoint CEOs in statutory corporations. The responsible Minister directly appoints 
the CEO in the NBC. This is in compliance with the NBC Act. The appointment of 
the CEO must comply with procedures under the RSA Act before the Government 
makes the appointment. From the interview data, these processes are never complied 
with. The Government either influences or directly appoints and removes CEOs. As a 
result, many of these matters appear before court for procedural irregularities. Lack of 
uniformity in the appointment and removal of CEOs in both NBC and NHC is clearly 
noticeable. Both are statutory corporations and require consistency and uniformity in 
the appointment and removal processes. Further, the Government must be made to 
comply with procedures for appointment and termination. 
 
Composition of the board. Boards of statutory corporations consist entirely of non-
executive directors including the chairperson, and there are no board committees. The 
fact that a board does virtually nothing means that there is really no need for board 
committees. 
 
Knowledge of the affairs and business of corporation. Board members lack a 
detailed knowledge of the business and affairs of the corporations. All board 
                                                          
48
  Arlo, J., “NHC, Police blasted for Unlawful Actions,” (Port Moresby, 28th May 2009) in Post 
Courier, < http://www.postcourier.com.pg/20090528/thhome.htm > at 28 May 2009. 
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members are in full time employment with other organizations and they do not have 
time to acquaint themselves with the information of the corporation. Many directors 
are appointed and removed at the whim of the Government and they do not have time 
to fully acquaint themselves with the information of the corporation. Also the only 
job that directors perform is the approval of strategic plans to be implemented by the 
management, therefore there is less need for them to know detailed information of the 
company. Directors are an important part of the corporation and they need to be 
informed about the affairs and business of the corporation. 
 
14.3.2.3 Accountability 
 
Accountability is totally weak in statutory corporations. The board that was supposed 
hold management accountability is weak and ineffective. The Minister is in fact 
performing the duties of the board. Lack of accountability can enable the Minister to 
divert the resources of the corporation to advance political interests or involve in self-
interested activities. 
 
The role of Parliament. Matters with regard to the NHC and the NBC are not 
discussed or given much attention at the national Parliament. The Parliament is not 
performing its democratic responsibilities. It is an important institution that acts on 
behalf of the people to hold responsible Ministers accountable. When Parliament is 
not performing its democratic obligations responsible Ministers are not accountable 
to any persons. Parliament must be activated to perform its parliamentary 
responsibilities. 
 
Confusion over the role of state institutions. The interviews show confusion over 
the role of state institutions. It is clear the Auditor General audits the accounts of 
statutory corporations. The Department of Treasury receives annual reports from the 
NBC but not the NHC. The laws governing the NBC and the NHC are silent on 
whether the Ombudsman Commission and PAC can investigate the conduct of the 
NHC, the NBC, directors, chairpersons and CEOs. The interview data indicated that 
there was no past experience of their intervention. Half of the interview participants 
indicated that they do not know about whether these institutions can investigate the 
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corporations, while others stated that although they are not certain, investigation is 
essential. The roles of these state institutions must be clarified in relation to statutory 
corporations. 
 
Corporate plans and reports. Both statutory corporations do not have a corporate 
plan. They implement government policies, and for the NHC resolutions of the 
management (endorsed by the board). Both the NHC and the NBC are subject to Part 
III of the PFM Act and are required to submit a management plan and annual reports 
to the Department of Treasury; however they do not submit their plan and reports. 
For the NHC, the reason given during the interview is that the Government does not 
fund the NHC. This reasoning is flawed because firstly the NHC uses State‟s assets to 
generate revenue and secondly, the NHC Act adopted Part III of the PMF Act and it 
is mandatory under ss 50 and 64 to submit a management plan and annual reports to 
the Department of Treasury, respectively. For the NBC, the reason given was that it 
only implements government policies. Justification for lack of management plan must 
not undermine the mandatory nature of ss 50 and 64. That means every statutory 
corporation must have a management plan, which must be submitted to the Treasury. 
Further, the NBC submits annual reports to the Government and the office of the 
Treasury, whereas the NHC submits only to the Government. Both corporations do 
not have standard content for annual reports. There is a need for consistency and 
clarity in who the report must be submitted to and about what is to be reported. 
 
14.3.2.4 Objectives 
 
Both the NHC and the NBC are required to implement government policies. NHC is 
not supported through budgetary allocations and as a result it undertakes some 
commercial activities to sustain itself. Although statutory corporations are required 
under Part III of the PFM Act to have a management plan, this requirement is not 
enforced by the Department of Treasury. Even if they do have plans they are unlikely 
to be implemented with constant involvement and directions by Ministers. From the 
case studies the public rates the services of the NHC and the NBC poor. That means 
that services provided by statutory corporations to the public are inefficient and of 
low quality. 
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14.3.3 State Companies 
 
14.3.3.1 The Role of the Government 
 
The shareholders are owners of the company and they are provided with reserve 
powers under company legislation (chapters 4 and 10). There is an odd situation in 
state companies in PNG. IPBC is the main and only shareholder after enactment of 
the IPBC Act in 2002 and yet state companies deal directly with both IPBC and the 
relevant ministers. The following sub – themes emerged from the interviews. 
 
Uncertainty about the role of relevant ministers. IPBC is the only shareholder in 
state companies. From the interview data it is clear that the Minister for SOEs was 
supposed to deal directly with IPBC and not state companies, but that is not the case. 
The Minister bypasses IPBC and deals directly with the board and the management. 
The main role of IPBC is managing state companies in such a way as to increase their 
value so that they can be sold in accordance with Government‟s policies on 
privatization. The roles of the responsible Ministers are not provided in the 
Companies Act 1997, the IPBC Act or other relevant statutes and yet they continue to 
involve in affairs and business of the companies. Other state companies deal only 
with the Minister for SOEs but Telikom in addition deals with the Minister for 
Communications whose role is also unclear. From the data it appears that ministers 
can intervene in all aspects of SOE activities. Directors in SOEs and the IPBC cannot 
challenge the intervention or directions as most of them are politically appointed. 
With lack of clarity about their role it is difficult to hold the relevant ministers to 
account. 
 
Involvement in policy and operational matters. The Minister for SOEs is not a 
shareholder and yet is involved directly in the policy and operation matters of state 
companies. The Minister for SOEs is consulted in the drafting of the corporate plan 
and can intervene from time in giving policy directions. Further, the Minister is 
involved in operational matters. One of the examples provided in the data was the 
decision of PNG Power to renovate and extend the Power Station in Wewak, East 
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Sepik Province; but instead the Minister for SOEs gave direction for money to be 
utilized in building houses for government employees in Wewak (PNGP – SM3). It 
appears from the data that if it is politically convenient the relevant ministers can 
intervene in the operational matters of state companies. As stated above that the 
directors and CEOs are political appointees and cannot raise objections or challenge 
direction from the Minister. 
 
Appointment and removal of directors and CEOs. From the case studies, the 
Minister for SOEs appoints and removes directors, and the chairperson.
49
 During the 
case studies it was discovered that nearly all of the directors and CEOs have political 
affiliations. This establishes the fact that appointments are made to put persons with 
government affiliation in positions to assist in achieving political agendas or to 
pursue self-interests. For example appointments are made of persons who have 
associations with ruling parties so that whilst in the job they can accumulate enough 
financial resources to compete in the next elections.
50
  
 
There are inconsistencies between different rules and regulations and the practice on 
the appointment and removal of directors and CEOs. IPBC is the only shareholder of 
state companies. By virtue of the Companies Act 1997, the IPBC is required to 
appoint and remove directors. This is not the case in practice. The IPBC Act also 
requires IPBC to appoint and remove directors and CEOs. PNG Power‟s constitution 
requires shareholders to appoint and remove directors except casual vacancies.
51
 
Shareholder in this case is IPBC and not the Minister for SOEs. Eda Ranu‟s 
constitution specifically provides that the Minister appoints the directors. The 
Minister complies with the constitution; however it is contrary to the IPBC Act and 
the Companies Act 1997. Telikom‟s constitution provides for shareholders to appoint 
the directors and the board to appoint the CEO. In practice, the Minister appoints the 
                                                          
49
  For example, the Minister for SOE sacked all members of the board followed by public uproar 
and the Prime Minister ordered their reinstatement. See Radio New Zealand International, “PNG 
PM orders Reinstatement of Telikom Board,” (13th December 2004) in Radio New Zealand 
International, < 
http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=getresults&offset=440&keywords=somare > at18 
March 2009. 
50
  See The National, “Bonga Payout a Subject of Dispute,” (Port Moresby, 4th May 2007) in The 
National, < http://www.thenational.com.pg/050407/nation4.htm  > at 18 March 2009. 
51
  Constitution of PNG Power Ltd, ss 16.3 and 16.4. 
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directors and the CEO is appointed by the board on the recommendation of IPBC and 
the Minister for SOEs. The appointment by the Minister is contrary to the 
requirements of the IPBC Act and the Companies Act. Further, the constitution of 
Telikom does not say that the appointment of the CEO must be made on 
recommendation by IPBC and the Minister. Clearly, there are inconsistencies 
between practice, statutory requirements, and the constitution of the companies. They 
need to be streamlined so that there is consistency. 
 
Corporate plans. The board of state companies consults IPBC and the Minister for 
SOEs in the formulation of corporate plan. The recommendation of the Minister and 
IPBC must be incorporated into a corporate plan. The Minister and IPBC have 
different objectives that they would like state companies to pursue. IPBC‟s incentive 
is to see companies maximize profit as a means to privatization. On the other hand 
the Minister‟s interests are to ensure that companies are involved in community 
service obligations. This can allow for two conflicting directions. However, given the 
fact that directors and CEOs in IPBC are political appointees they can be submissive 
to the demands of the Government. Therefore, the corporate plan would reflect the 
wishes of the Government. In addition, the fact from interview data shows that the 
responsible Minister can intervene and direct management of companies from time to 
time, allows room for Government to impose political agendas on companies or to 
connive with management to pursue self-interests. That means requirements under the 
corporate plan cannot necessarily be followed. 
 
Access to information of a corporation. From the case studies responsible Ministers 
have right of access to all information of state companies on request. This is 
irrespective of whether it is information relating to policy or to operational matters. 
This is odd as the Minister is not a shareholder and there is no expressed provision in 
the role of the Minister with regard to accessing information and the type of 
information that the Minister should have access to.  
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14.3.3.2 The Board 
 
State companies in PNG have one-tier board structure. The board represents the 
interests of shareholders and it must be accountable to them from time to time. 
Boards of state companies have divided accountability to both IPBC and relevant 
ministers. Powers that are traditionally given to boards of private companies, such as 
the power to appoint CEOs, are removed from them. Hence the board is generally 
weak and indecisive. The board is never used to consider anything substantive. Apart 
from appointing CEOs the board is only used as a rubber stamp.  
 
Roles and responsibilities of directors. The general responsibilities of directors are 
provided under the Companies Act, which does not provide expressly for the powers 
and functions of the chairperson and CEO. Nearly all directors of state companies 
who were interviewed did not know their duties under the Companies Act. Some 
company constitutions did help in specifying their responsibilities whilst others did 
not. It is clear from the case studies that directors do not understand their roles and 
responsibilities, either because they do not have access to the documents or they are 
not specifically prescribed under the company constitutions. All corporations (that 
were the subject of case studies) did not have codes of conduct for the directors. At 
the time of the interview, the company secretary of Telikom was working on a code 
which will be sent to the board for endorsement. Generally directors and managers 
endeavour to achieve the objectives of the corporation without complying with 
standards of fiduciary duty and duty of care. Without clear knowledge of these 
responsibilities, it is difficult to assess whether their conduct, or following 
governmental directions, may be in breach of these duties.  
 
Appointing and monitoring CEOs. Appointments of CEOs in state companies are 
usually made by the board. In doing so the board is provided with disciplining power 
to hold managers accountable to them. In state companies, the limited power that they 
have of making appointments is further reduced. The board only appoints CEOs on 
recommendation by IPBC and the relevant ministers. The power of appointment and 
termination is usurped by the Government and IPBC. Consequently, former directors 
expressed the view that they were reluctant to challenge any decisions of CEOs and 
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management. Also the board does not have the power to discipline the management. 
When a CEO is on good terms with the Government, the board would not challenge 
any of his or her decisions. Doing so would only be putting their positions in 
jeopardy. Further, both directors and CEOs are government associates and hence 
challenge and constructive criticism is limited or absent. Also many of the directors 
lack independence - have political affiliation. Therefore they cannot effectively 
monitor CEOs as they are also appointed by Government.  
 
Composition of the board. Boards of state companies consist entirely of non–
executive directors, except Telikom and Eda Ranu which have full time chairpersons. 
These chairpersons ensure that board agendas are prepared and that strategies 
approved by the board are implemented. The CEOs of Telikom and PNG Power (but 
not Eda Ranu) are members of the board. These state companies do not have 
executive directors. They are all state companies and yet composition of the board 
differs. There is need for consistency in board composition. Further, the boards of 
state companies have board committees. Two main committees are common in these 
SOEs. These main committees are the Audit and Risk Management Committees and 
Human Resource Committees. The interview data indicated that none of these 
committees look into issues regarding corporate governance. It was indicated in the 
case studies that all major issues are considered by the board and committees are not 
often used. Other matters which require more time are delegated to committees for 
their considerations. The impression given from the data is that board committees are 
ineffective and not often used.  
 
Knowledge of the affairs and business of corporation. Nearly all directors of state 
companies work on a part-time basis. They are also on full time appointment with 
other organizations and are members of boards of other companies and SOEs. Given 
their divided commitments and time they would not be able to give much time and 
commitment to SOEs activities. The only time they have access to company 
information is at board meetings. Many of these directors generally lack intimate 
knowledge of the affairs and business of their companies and particularly lack 
technical knowledge of company businesses. In order to make decisions directors 
need to know all information about the companies.  
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14.3.3.3 Accountability 
 
As stated above, boards that should monitor management are ineffective. It is only 
used as a rubber stamp to approve major transactions. The national Parliament that is 
supposed to ensure accountability is not interested in the affairs of SOEs. 
Furthermore, there is confusion over the role of state institutions that ought to 
monitor SOEs. This leaves SOEs as the backyard for Government and relevant 
ministers to manage as their private properties. 
 
The role of Parliament. Boards of state companies submit annual reports to IPBC, 
which passes them onto the Government upon request. From the case studies the 
Government never discusses any issues with regard to state companies in Parliament. 
The views expressed by directors and managers are that they submit reports and what 
happens in Parliament is not their problem. When the issues of SOEs are not debated 
in Parliament the Minister is not held to account for his conduct in SOEs and for the 
activities of SOEs. 
 
Confusion over the role of state institutions. The Auditor General audits the 
accounts of state companies. In all cases with regard to auditing the Auditor General 
outsources the auditing responsibilities to private audit firms. The board has no 
control over who should audit the company. Compliance with the Companies Act 
would mean that, a company, through its board, would appoint the auditor.
52
 
However, it is clear from the data that this is not the case. The requirement under 
PNG‟s Constitution and the Audit Act 1989 is that the Auditor General must audit 
public bodies. Hence accounts of state companies are submitted to the Auditor 
General for auditing.  
 
Further, from interview data there was a mixed response by interviewees and 
confusion over the roles of certain state institutions in relation to state companies. 
Many participants interviewed stated that they are not certain whether state 
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companies and their directors and CEOs are subject to investigation by the 
Ombudsman Commission. The confusion becomes obvious after the incorporation of 
these entities under the Companies Act. Few participants expressed views that the 
Ombudsman Commission can investigate SOEs but it has not been doing its job. 
Company documents and relevant legislation do not assist with expressed provision 
on whether companies are subject to the Office of the Ombudsman. With regard to 
PAC the answer “no” was given to the question of whether they are subject to 
investigation by PAC. Like the Ombudsman Commission‟s involvement, statutes and 
company documents are not clear in stating whether companies are subject to 
investigation by PAC. The company secretaries for Telikom and PNG Power clearly 
indicated in the interviews that these matters need parliamentary clarification. If the 
Auditor General audits public bodies, PAC and the Ombudsman Commission were 
established to investigate public bodies. The logical conclusion would be that the 
Ombudsman Commission and PAC should investigate state companies. These issues 
will be discussed in chapter 15.  
 
Corporate plans and reports. All state companies have a corporate plan that sets out 
their objectives and it is reviewed every three years. It is difficult to assess whether 
the companies are achieving their goals. The management does not have a clear 
strategy to achieve goals within six months or one year. With Government 
interference being a regular occurrence many of these objectives may not be achieved 
after three years. Further, state companies submit their annual reports to IPBC and the 
Registrar of Companies. Apart from the content requirement under the Companies 
Act there are no set standards for content reporting. 
  
14.3.3.4 Objectives  
 
The emphasis placed on state companies is to maximize profit. Unlike the two state 
companies that are the subject of these case studies, only the enabling Act of Telikom 
provides for a community service obligation. This means that for others they would 
only provide service for profit, unless relevant ministers compel them to provide 
community services. Government participation in SOEs is important to ensure these 
community service obligations are fulfilled. This makes it confusing for state 
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companies, because they have to deal directly with IPBC and responsible Ministers 
who have different objectives that they would like SOEs to pursue. State companies 
have made substantial profits in the last three years; however this is not reflected in 
the quality and efficiency of their services. This also poses the question of how much 
of the profits are being pushed back into the companies for community services. 
From the case studies the efficiency and quality of services are rated poor in all 
SOEs. 
 
14.3.4 Summary 
 
The main issues that consistently and prominently figure in corporate governance in 
statutory corporations and state companies are reviewed in sections 13.4 and 13.5, 
and are summarized as follows. 
 
a. There are inconsistencies between the laws and practice in SOEs. 
b. There is uncertainty over whether SOEs are subject to inspection and 
investigation by the Ombudsman Commission or PAC. 
c. There is a lack of parliamentary debate on matters regarding SOEs. 
d. Procedures are often not followed in appointing and removing directors and 
CEOs. 
 
The issues that are highlighted specific to statutory corporations (i.e. NHC and NBC) 
are as follows. 
 
a. Both NHC and NBC do not have corporate plans. Generally, they implement 
government policies. 
b. NBC, but not NHC, submits an annual report to the Department of Treasury. 
c. The responsible Ministers are involved in the operational and policy matters 
of NHC and NBC and can direct the corporations from time-to-time with 
regard to policy and operation matters. 
 
Some of the recurring themes that arise in state companies (i.e. PNG Power, Telikom 
and Eda Ranu) are as follows. 
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a. There are inconsistencies between different rules and regulations that govern 
SOEs on corporate governance including company constitutions. Similarly, 
there are inconsistencies between the rules and the practice – this causes 
confusion. 
b. IPBC is the main and only shareholder of state companies but the responsible 
Minister for SOEs deals directly with SOEs in appointing directors and 
chairpersons, and directing state companies from time to time. Some of these 
actions are ultra vires. 
c. Telikom has two responsible Ministers, including the Minister for SOEs and 
the Minister for Communications whereas other state companies have only the 
Minister for SOEs. 
d. State companies submit their annual reports to IBPC rather than to the 
Department of Treasury or directly through Parliament.  
e. The roles of the responsible Ministers are not specified in any company 
documents. 
f. The Minister for SOEs and other responsible Ministers direct the 
board/management from time to time despite the fact that they are not 
shareholders. 
 
Also, it is important to mention that the Government involves actively in all policy 
and operational matters in statutory corporation. It only involves in operational 
matters in state companies when it is politically convenient. All these identified 
issues relate to governance and accountability in SOEs. To identify the strength and 
weaknesses in any system it must be compared and contrasted against other systems. 
Hence, the discussion below identifies features of corporate governance in PNG that 
are different from NZ, Queensland and NSW as discussed in chapter seven. 
 
14.4  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NEW ZEALAND, QUEENSLAND 
AND NEW SOUTH WALES COMPARED WITH CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA  
 
Corporate governance in NZ and Australian public sectors is discussed in chapter 
seven. It is clear from that discussion that relevant legislation has not distanced the 
Governments from SOEs. Further, it was concluded that SOEs would never replicate 
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the features of the private sector as long as the Government is a sole shareholder. It is 
useful to compare the PNG model with the NZ, Queensland and NSW models. 
PNG‟s model of corporate governance in public enterprise is similar in form to the 
models of NZ, Queensland and NSW but different in its substance. Their legislation 
provides simplicity, consistency and clarity with regard to the role of responsible 
Ministers, directors and CEOs, and also on the issue of accountability. The legislation 
also provide that SOEs should pursue both commercial and non-commercial 
obligations. There are major differences in governance and accountability between 
SOEs in PNG and those in NZ, Queensland and NSW. 
 
NZ‟s State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 applies to all commercial SOEs in addition 
to specific Acts, the Companies Act 1993 and company constitutions. Non-
commercial SOEs are subject to the Crown Entities Act (CE Act) as are some of the 
non-commercial SOEs that are incorporated under the Companies Act 1993. SOEs in 
Queensland and NSW are subject to the Government Owned Corporations Act 1993 
(GOC Act), the State Owned Corporations Act 1989 (SOC Act) and the entity‟s own 
Acts, respectively. SOEs that are incorporated under the Corporations Act 2001 are 
also subject to the GOC Act and the SOC Act. Unlike NZ, the GOC and SOC Acts 
cover both statutory corporations and state companies, and provide for the legal 
structure, governance and accountability of all SOEs. The enactment of respective NZ 
and Australian legislation is not an attempt to make “one size fit all” but to ensure 
that common elements shared in governance and accountabilities are fused and 
stressed to ensure clarity and consistency.  
 
As highlighted above PNG lacks the generic legislation that governs SOEs. Statutory 
corporations are subject to their respective constituent laws and the PFM Act for 
accountability. State companies have specific Acts, Companies Act 1997, company 
constitutions and the IPBC Act. These different laws with different provisions on 
specific issues create inconsistencies and uncertainties; hence they contribute, to a 
certain extent, to the lack of accountability. PNG needs generic legislation similar to 
NZ, Queensland and NSW that must provide for statutory corporations and state 
companies and their governance and accountability. 
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14.4.1 The Government 
 
There are many similarities and differences with regard to the role of government in 
public enterprises in the NZ, Australia and PNG public sectors. First, the relevant 
ministers in SOEs in NZ and Australia deal only with policy matters. They have a 
great influence with policy matters and strategic direction of SOEs. It is seen in 
chapter 7 that legislation provides for negotiations between the Ministers and the 
board in formulating agendas under the Statement of Corporate Intent (SCI), but it is 
clear that in the end shareholding ministers retain the prevailing right of objection and 
the power to impose their views on the final outcome. Similarly, shareholding 
ministers and responsible Ministers have the power to inform the board from time to 
time of government policy. This indicates that shareholders have ultimate power to 
determine the objectives that an SOE should pursue. Shareholders‟ direct intervention 
defeats the whole intention of having an autonomous board, separating politicians 
from management, making the intentions of corporatisation still an ideal.
53
 
Consequently, ministers deal only with policy matters. 
 
Generally, in PNG the Government involves in both the policy and operational 
matters of SOEs. Laws governing statutory corporations provide for the responsible 
Ministers to be involved in policy and operational matters of the SOEs. For example, 
the Minister for Communications can direct NBC to open an account with a bank of 
his or her choice. Further, the data shows that relevant ministers can intervene any 
time on policy and operational matters of statutory corporations. In PNG statutory 
corporations are like a government department where a minister as political head can 
be involved in both the policy and operational matters of a department. Although 
legislation and other company documents are not clear on the role of relevant 
ministers in state companies, interview data shows they can also intervene in the 
policy and operational matters of state companies. Government must be made to deal 
with policy matters only in SOEs. The direct intervention of government in 
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influencing policy implementation without related powers to do so creates the 
potential for corruption. 
 
Second, there are two shareholding ministers in SOEs in NZ and Australia. They are 
the responsible Minister and the Minister for Finance. Shareholders in NSW are the 
Treasurer and a minister appointed by the State Premier. In addition, SOEs in NSW 
have a portfolio Minister. The potential for collusion is reduced in having two 
shareholding ministers, who can hold each other accountable and work together on a 
concerted understanding in the public interest. There is a potential problem in having 
two shareholding ministers. They may have different interests, priorities and views 
about how an SOE should be governed, the type of objectives to be pursued and the 
objectives that should be given priority. That means having two shareholding 
ministers can create a divided accountability.
54
 Two ministers may have different 
views. For example, they may have different views about the goals that a SCI must 
have and how they should be pursued. Or conflict may arise given the fact that the 
Minister of Finance represents an electorate, the Government and Department of 
Finance - three institutions having different expectations from each other and their 
expectation for SOEs will also be different. Likewise, the responsible Minister 
represents different groups and his or her expectation of SOEs will be different from 
the first shareholding minister. In such circumstances the implementation of an 
SOE‟s objectives can be weakened due to the interplay of different interest of, not 
only shareholding ministers but also other governmental agencies.
55
 Conversely 
having one shareholding minister can also allow the Minister to push agendas through 
without resistance or challenge.  
 
PNG has a responsible Minister for individual statutory corporations and IPBC is the 
only shareholder of state companies. In addition, state companies have a sole 
responsible Minister, namely Minister for SOE, and in Telikom‟s case two 
responsible Ministers, including the Minister for Communications. The role of the 
Minister for SOEs is not outlined, however they are required to deal with IPBC on 
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matters with regard to SOEs but this is not the case in practice. The concern in PNG 
is not conflict of interest among numbers of relevant ministers but allowing sole 
ministers to be involved in the affairs of SOEs. Statutory corporations must have two 
responsible Ministers and state companies must have autonomy. Any differences 
between the two responsible Ministers can be resolved in Cabinet. Any issues in 
SOEs that require the relevant minister‟s involvement must be specified.   
 
Third, the governments in NZ and Australia appoint directors to SOEs. Governments 
may have political incentive in appointing directors to serve on the board. The power 
to appoint may ensure that appointed candidates are government associates so that 
government can influence them in order to use SOEs for political support or pursue 
other interests. The candidates can be appointed to the position of a director or CEO 
who share the same views as shareholding ministers or government. This means that 
the board and CEO will manage an SOE in such a manner that the shareholding 
ministers fulfil their wishes but do not directly mandate.
56
 Where an SOE is managed 
in such a manner contrary to the wishes of shareholding ministers, they can issue 
credible threats.
57
 There may be the threat of influencing appointment or termination, 
reduced-funding to an SOE or even regulation to reduce some of the powers of the 
management. Although criteria such as qualifications and experience are important 
factors for consideration in the appointment, they can be circumvented in SOEs. The 
ultimate discretion in the appointment and termination would see directors go in and 
out of power like a revolving door.
58
  
 
Like NZ and Australia, the Government in PNG appoints directors to SOEs. From the 
case studies many directors and CEOs in PNG‟s public sector have no knowledge or 
experience in managing corporations. Almost all directors and CEOs are government 
associates, not to mention the fact that the appointment of directors in state 
companies is illegal as it is contrary to the Companies Act 1997.  The Minister for 
SOEs is not a shareholder and yet continues to appoint directors. Many of the 
directors are political associates. The appointment of directors and CEOs to statutory 
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corporations (not including NBC) is provided under RSA Act, however often the 
procedures are not complied with. Government needs to comply with legislative 
procedures in appointing directors and CEOs to statutory corporations. It must not be 
involved in the appointment or removal of directors or CEOs in state companies. 
 
Fourth, the appointment of directors to SOEs in NZ and Australia is generally made 
on merit. But it must be admitted from the outset that appointments in SOEs are 
complex. Appointments in the private sector are based on managerial skills and 
experience. A director must have business and managerial skills and experience to 
ensure efficiency and profitability, to satisfy the requirement of successful business. 
However, in the public sector the board has to represent the ultimate residual 
claimants, the public. This requires directors to represent different interest groups 
such as employees and consumers. The group interest that a director represents 
obscures factors such as political affiliation. Interest groups would have a greater role 
in influencing the Government, and may easily pursue the Government to include 
their representative on the board, albeit having no specific investment interest or stake 
in the SOE. They bring different interests on board. Having a board that has different 
directors representing different interest has the potential to give rise to a conflict of 
interest.
59
The fact remains that as long as the Government makes appointments, they 
would be made to assuage special interest groups in return for political support or to 
repay political favours. Clearly, when other interests are pursued this easily leads to 
dissipation of the business aim of profit maximization.  
 
In PNG interest groups have less impact on national politics (chapter 8). The 
Government directly appoints directors and most of them are political associates. 
These appointments are made to reward loyalty and support by appointing to 
positions in order to assist in advancing political and/or self-interests. It is advisable 
to have professional directors on SOEs as they are less threatened by termination than 
others, with future prospects for employment, having their reputation intact,
60
 by 
ensuring the firm‟s performance standard are complied with. The down side is that 
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they may have outside business interest that may conflict with the SOE‟s interests.61  
Directors must be appointed on merit. This requires standard criteria to be set out that 
are based on merit.   
 
Fifth, in Queensland the boards of GOCs appoint CEOs with the approval of 
responsible Ministers. In contrast the NSW Government appoints CEOs of statutory 
SOCs with the recommendation of the board. In these cases the Government appoints 
or has an influence on the appointments. The important power of control through the 
appointment and removal of CEOs is shared with the Government. This can enable 
cohorts of government to be appointed to CEO positions. In a private corporation it is 
the board that appoints and terminates CEOs with minimal outside influence 
(although some shareholders influence the appointment of CEOs, especially in 
corporations where there is concentrated ownership in the form of institutional 
shareholders like in the UK and Australia). This is the approach taken by NZ where 
boards of SOEs appoint CEOs. In PNG, the Government appoints and terminates 
CEOs in statutory corporations. In state companies boards appoint CEOs on the 
recommendation from the Government and IPBC. The board‟s role is merely 
ceremonial. The important power to discipline management is taken away altogether 
from the board. Boards of SOEs must be given the exclusive power of appointing 
CEOs and senior managers. 
 
Sixth, the processes involved in the appointment and termination of directors in 
statutory corporations and state companies in NZ and Australia are consistent and 
uniform. In PNG there are inconsistencies. In NBC the responsible Minister directly 
appoints directors and CEOs. In NHC procedures under the RSA Act have to be 
complied with, however in practice the Minister directly appoints directors and CEOs 
without consultation. The Companies Act, IPBC Act and company constitutions 
stated different things about the appointment of directors and CEOs. The process of 
appointment and termination in SOEs must be made consistent and uniform.  
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Seventh, reporting to a parent department is no longer required in SOEs in NZ and 
Australia. The board is directly responsible to shareholders or responsible Ministers, 
but not the Department of Treasury when dealing with financial matters. This would 
ensure strict scrutiny by government; however not having an enabling system through 
a parent department may subject SOEs to direct political pressure. Originally parent 
departments would have acted as buffer zones to resist any political pressure.
62
 This 
is true of SOEs in PNG. Statutory corporations, apart from NBC, are only 
accountable to responsible Ministers and not the Department of Treasury. The board 
and management are at the discretion of the responsible Ministers. Although IPBC is 
required to deal with state companies as a shareholder the Minister takes on its role 
and deals with state companies. This enables the relevant minister to deal with both 
policy and operational matters of SOEs. The relevant ministers must only deal with 
policy issues. This must be clearly specified. 
 
Eighth, powers of shareholders in SOEs in NZ and Australia far outweigh the powers 
of shareholders in private corporations. Under Companies Act 1993 and the 
Corporations Act 2001 shareholders are only given the power to appoint and 
terminate directors, the right to receive annual reports and enforce their personal 
rights in court. Their roles are limited. However, shareholders in SOEs are given, 
amongst other things: power to influence the appointment of CEOs; power to 
formulate SCI; power to appoint and terminate directors; reserve power to intervene 
in directing management of government policies from time to time; and power to 
determine and declare dividends. These roles are prescribed in the legislation. 
Similarly, in PNG responsible Ministers of statutory corporations are provided with 
extensive powers but unlike Australia and NZ the powers and functions of Ministers 
are not clearly defined. There is lack of clarity and consistency of the roles and 
responsibilities of relevant ministers in practice and under various laws. Responsible 
Ministers are not shareholders in state companies but continue to deal with them. It is 
important that the powers and functions of relevant ministers dealing with SOEs are 
clearly specified. 
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And finally, it is highlighted in chapter 7 that the Government controls SOEs. Unlike 
the private sector, control of SOE does not necessarily mean responsible Ministers are 
directly accountable for all actions of SOEs. This is the biggest problem in PNG. The 
relevant ministers interfere in policy and operational matters and yet they are not held 
accountable for their actions by Parliament or by public scrutiny mechanisms such as 
the Ombudsman Commission. Even if they do, in the case of NZ and Australia, they 
may use “separate legal personality” argument so as not to answer questions in 
Parliament or they may regard any issues as commercially sensitive and not make 
public disclosure. Doctor Taylor summed up the possible behaviour of ministers as 
follows: “If it‟s bad news its commercially sensitive, and I‟ll refuse to answer, if it‟s 
good news or trivial, it‟s not sensitive, and I‟ll take credit; if I am not sure which it is 
I‟ll refer it to the corporation.”63 Unlike a departmental enterprise where the 
department errs the Minister also errs and has to account for the wrong and cannot 
hide behind any curtains of excuses. The data in Part V indicated that relevant 
ministers in SOEs are not held to account in their dealing with SOEs. PNG Ministers 
must be made to account in their involvement with SOEs. 
 
In conclusion it can be seen that Ministers‟ powers far exceed their political power to 
become involved.
64
 As McDonough noted that “the GOCs are little more than another 
manifestation of the state. They are very much agents and not independent entities 
with appropriate control over their own destiny”65. Consequently, there is little or no 
separation of ownership and control of SOEs in NZ, Queensland, NSW and PNG if 
the Berle and Means standards of control were to be applied (chapter 2). These 
standards of control, amongst others, include the appointment of management, 
formulation of a management plan and directing management from time to time. 
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14.4.2 The Board 
 
The roles and responsibilities of directors, and CEOs in NZ, and Australia are clearly 
provided under SOE and company legislation. Directors in state companies are 
required to comply with fiduciary duties under Companies Act 1993
66
 and the 
Corporations Act 2001
67
. Similarly, the directors of state companies in PNG are 
required to comply with fiduciary duties under the Companies Act 1997.
68
 Fiduciary 
duty and duty of care must be performed in the best interest of the company. The 
application of these duties becomes complex in SOEs. The following issues can be 
raised about these duties. 
 
a. First, fiduciary duty is complicated in its application, especially where 
directors representing different interests constitute the boards of SOEs. When 
a director is faced with a conflicting situation, whose interest should take 
priority? For example, in a situation where the employee representative is 
made to vote on a response to an industrial action: is it breach of fiduciary 
duty not to vote in the interests of the company?  What these issues raised is 
that fiduciary duty is difficult to enforce where there is no homogeneity of 
interest.
69
 In addition, it becomes difficult in situations where management 
keeps much of the SOE‟s information without disclosure to verify whether 
directors discharge their fiduciary duties.
70
 
 
b. Second, like fiduciary duty, application of duty of care raises difficulties in 
SOEs. Some directors at the managerial level do not have business and 
managerial experience and skills. Other directors are appointed on a part-time 
basis. Should the duty of care be strictly applied to them? The dilemma faced 
is whether the standard of care applied would be that of a reasonable director 
or that of a person with director‟s skill, experience and knowledge. If the latter 
were to be the standard then it would be very low standard given the fact that 
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  Companies Act 1993, ss 131 – 138. 
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  Corporations Act 2001, Chapter 2D, Part 2D.1. 
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  Companies Act 1997, ss 112 – 127. 
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  DeAngelo, H., “Competition and Unanimity,” (1981) 71, American Economic Review, 18. 
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  Dixit, above n 54 at 50. 
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most directors do not have business and managerial experience. The 
consequence would be that many directors would escape liability based on the 
argument that their performance meets the standard of a reasonable person 
with their experience, skill and knowledge.  
 
c. And thirdly, s 131 of the Companies Act 1993, s 181 of Corporations Act 
2001 and s 112 of the Companies Act 1997 provide that a director must act in 
good faith and in what he or she believes to be in the best in interest of the 
company, which creates tension with s 4 of the SOE Act, s 17 of the GOC Act 
and ss 8 and 20E of the SOC Act and generally for SOEs to involve in 
community service. The issue is whether it is in good faith and in the best 
interests of the company for SOEs to direct resources to meet community 
service obligations. There can be compromise by stating that good faith is 
subjective, therefore what matters is that the director believes in good faith 
that the act is in the best interest of the company. In other words “in the best 
interest of the company” means a director honestly believes that his or her 
actions promotes company‟s objectives, hence in the best interest of the 
company and it does not necessarily mean profit maximization.
71
 The issue 
needs clarification from the courts. 
 
Generally, SOEs have multiple interests and it is difficult to hold directors 
accountable for their fiduciary duties. To minimize these problems laws in NZ and 
Australia have clearly provided for the roles and responsibilities of directors and set 
out objectives under SCI. Whether directors acted in the best interest of the company 
would be assessed by looking at whether they have complied with their duties and 
pursued the objectives of the corporations. There is a lack of clarity and consistency 
about the roles and responsibilities of directors in practice and under various laws in 
PNG. The data indicated that the majority of directors do not understand their roles 
and responsibilities under the Companies Act, company constitutions or specific SOE 
legislations. Hence the breach of fiduciary duty is rampant. The roles of directors and 
CEOs must be clarified, made consistent and accessible to them. Further, goals to be 
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  Courts have never stated that “best interest” is profit maximisation. See McDermott, J., 
Understanding Company Law, (2005) 233 para. 8.2.5 (c). 
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achieved within six months or a year must be set out so that directors‟ performances 
are assessed against the achievement of those goals. 
 
14.4.3 Accountability 
 
There are vast differences in how the SOEs, directors and CEOs are accountable in 
NZ, and Australia to PNG. First, SOEs in NZ and Australia are required to submit 
quarterly, annual and half-yearly reports to the Government and Department of 
Finance. In addition, their legislation clearly provide for the content of these reports. 
However, the public is not given access to these reports. Where reports are available, 
they are expensive. It is important for the public to be given such information so that 
they are informed of the performance of Ministers to determine whether they can be 
re-elected with their party in the next election. The argument of disclosure to the 
public is compelling given the fact also that the public like shareholders in the private 
sector are direct beneficiaries, although unlike private corporations they do not have 
the choice of selling shares in SOEs. 
 
SOEs in PNG only submit annual reports; however there is no standard content which 
they have to report on. State companies submit reports to IPBC and not directly to 
Parliament. NBC submits annual reports to the responsible Minister and Department 
of Treasury, whereas NHC submits reports only to responsible Ministers. SOEs in 
PNG must also submit half-yearly reports, and legislation should clarify what must be 
reported and who the report should be submitted to. The public must also be informed 
about the activities of SOEs. 
 
Second, in NZ and Australia the relationship of SOEs to other state institutions such 
as the Department of Treasury, the Ombudsman‟s Office and the Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC) is clearly provided in legislations or government documents. This 
matter is uncertain for state companies in PNG under specific Acts or company 
constitutions, and is not clearly stated in any government documents. Directors and 
CEOs who were interviewed during the case studies in Part V were uncertain on these 
matters. This provides a compelling case for the relationship of the Ombudsman 
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Commission, PAC and other public institutions that ensure accountability be clearly 
provided, including matters that they should address in SOEs. 
 
Third, state companies in PNG have a corporate plan but not an SCI.  Corporate plans 
are reviewable every three years, however there is no requirement for their standard 
content. Statutory corporations have no corporate plan. They only implement specific 
government policies. All SOEs in PNG need to have an SCI with clear specification 
of their content. SCIs must be reported in the half-yearly and annual reports and be 
reviewed once every year. An SCI is an intelligent creation adopted in NZ and 
Australia because it contributes largely to ensuring transparency and accountability; 
however certain issues can be raised about SCIs generally.  
 
a. Although SCIs provide clarity and certainty to aims to be achieved,72 they are 
undermined when Ministers are allowed to intervene and inform management 
about public policies, including the political and social aims of the 
Government from time to time.
73
 This is a loophole the Government can 
exploit to direct management for political reasons.  
 
b. The creation of broad objectives under an SCI can exhaust the limited 
resources of SOEs in their implementation; consequently many objectives 
may not be implemented or only partially implemented. Further, too much 
government interference can discourage enforcement.  
 
c. Although an SCI has clear and identifiable objectives, it only solves part of 
the problem. The fact that the interest of the public is not homogenous; SCIs 
will have broad commercial and non-commercial objectives. Broad objectives 
combined with distributional flexibility can provide opportunity for rent-
seeking by interest groups, and political support by government.
74
 Further, 
inclusion of social aims can cause confusion in apt trade-off between 
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  Dixit, above n 54 at 49. 
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  For example see Government Owned Corporations Act 1993, ss 123 and 124. 
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  Whincop, J.M., “Another Side of Accountability: The Fiduciary Concept and Rent – Seeking in 
the Governance of Government Corporations,” (2002) 25(2), University of NSW Law Journal, 
379 at 383. 
 279 
commercial and social objectives and that can lead to complications in 
decision-making, and provide excuses for poor performance. Having these 
problems because of broad objectives, SOEs will never match the efficiency 
standards of private enterprise, which has only one objective. Jeanette 
Johnston et al in her report noted: 
 
The mixed objectives of public enterprise are in marked contrast with the traditional, 
single objective of private enterprise, that is, profit maximization, which provides [a] 
clear guide to decision-making, and a yard stick to measure results.
75
 
 
d. In drafting an SCI, to a certain extent, gives ownership of SCIs to the board, 
however as seen in chapter 7, legislation in NZ and Australia requires 
management of SOEs to operate in accordance with SCIs and directions from 
the shareholding ministers from time to time. This begs the question of 
whether the management of SOEs should be held to the highest standard 
under fiduciary duty. It is a misnomer to talk of SOE directors as fiduciaries 
when in fact they do not exercise discretion or utilize their business judgement 
acumen in managing SOE but are dictated to by the SCI and the shareholding 
ministers.  
 
e. An SCI is intended to be a contract; however it is contrary to the doctrine of 
contract to make it mandatory for the board to incorporate comments of the 
Minister and other modifications into the content of SCI. The parties to the 
agreement do not negotiate freely and on equal terms.
76
 
 
In conclusion, it can be stated that, unlike private sector corporations, responsible 
Ministers perform a significant role in setting out the objectives to be achieved, and 
they intervene from time to time through policy directives. The clear consequence of 
                                                          
75
  Johnston, J., Von Tunzelmann, A., New Zealand Planning Council and New Zealand State 
Services Commission, The State in Business: Public Enterprise in New Zealand (Planning paper 
No. 15, 1982) 10. 
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  For example, two SOEs in NSW, Australia Energy and Country Energy stated that an SCI is an 
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Corporate Intent - 2008/09,” (2008) in Energy Australia, < 
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this is that corporate plans and SCIs can be politicized. Also, being aware that 
ministers would scrutinize SCIs, boards would set out objectives that would favour 
the Government. The fact that ministers are allowed to modify SCIs
77
 and involve in 
the whole negotiation and drafting process defeats the whole purpose of 
corporatisation, which is to create an independent board and separate its role from the 
Government. Despite some weaknesses, the SCI is one of the important devices in 
accountability that must be adopted in PNG. 
 
14.4.4 The Objectives 
 
Crown entities in NZ are mainly non-commercial entities and they are required to 
pursue mainly social and some commercial objectives. SOEs under the SOE Act are 
commercial entities. Their main focus is to be commercially successful. Although 
they are required to undertake community service obligations, these are subservient to 
commercial pursuit. In Queensland and NSW equal prominence is given to the 
business and social objectives of SOEs. In PNG, NBC only implements government 
policies. NHC implements government policies and some commercial undertakings. 
The objective of state companies, whether social or commercial, is not stated in their 
legislation with the exception of Telikom PNG under ss 4 and 5 of the Telikom PNG 
Ltd Act 1996. Case studies have indicated that quality and efficiency of services by 
SOEs are poor. Objectives of SOEs in PNG, whether commercial or non–
commercial, must be clearly stated and equal importance must be placed on both.  
 
14.4.5 Summary 
 
Clearly, there is a vast difference in corporate governance arrangement in terms of 
substance, in NZ, Queensland and NSW on the one hand and PNG on the other. PNG 
needs to streamline the corporate governance framework in SOEs. This requires 
separating the Government from SOEs and clearly outlining the objectives of SOEs 
in legislation. Then there is a need to address fragmentation in SOEs, and improve the 
alignment of roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders in the governance of 
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  The shareholding ministers have an unfettered discretion under s 120 of Government Owned 
Corporations Act 1993 (Qld). 
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SOEs both in an SOE and between different SOEs of the same legal structure.  In 
addition, there is a need to improve clarity in the relationship of SOEs with the 
relevant ministers and other government departments and institutions. These aims 
have been achieved successfully under the CE Act, SOE Act, GOC Act and SOC Act, 
which PNG needs to examine and adopt. 
 
14.5  THE SPECIFIC ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE 
WAY FORWARD 
 
A wide range of problems has already been identified. The solutions to these 
problems can be brought about through complete or partial privatization, or reforming 
the enterprises. The reform can either be external or internal. External reform 
includes improving the business environment, promoting competition and imposing 
strict budget constraints, whereas internal enterprise reform would include 
restructuring of the enterprise and introduce corporate governance reform. This study 
has been focusing on corporate governance. Recommendation of any solution would 
depend on the laws, political and socio-economic circumstances of PNG and the type 
of problems that are experienced by SOEs. 
 
First, with respect to privatization, there is no dispute that it improves the efficiency 
of resource allocation and firm performance.
78
  There are occasional instances where 
privatization fails. For example, privatization in Russia and the Czech Republic was 
described as failures.
79
 Failures are mainly caused by a lack of blockholders
80
 and 
protection of minority shareholders, which consequently provides the opportunity for 
managers to expropriate the assets of the companies.
81
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Although privatization is an ideal solution that works effectively in many 
jurisdictions such as NZ and appears to be an ideal solution for corporate governance 
problems in PNG, the prevailing social and economic circumstances of the country 
and the business environment do not permit it. The political situation is unstable and 
the country still faces many dilemmas of development (see chapters 8 and 9). The 
Government controls half of the country‟s weak economy and SOEs have a 
monopoly in the markets. After nearly 35 years of independence, 80 per cent of the 
population still live a subsistence way of life, with little or no income. The vast 
majorities of them do not have electricity, water supply or telecommunication 
services. Many of them are uninformed about the outside world. Government workers 
in rural townships are living in villages and others working in metropolitan areas are 
living in settlements at the periphery of towns and cities. The current housing 
allowance for a lawyer in Public Prosecutor‟s office is seven kina (K7.00), which 
cannot match a current fortnightly rental of K300.00.  
 
If privatization were to be adopted, it would mean that private persons would have 
monopoly in the markets. And if profit maximization was to be the objective of 
private corporations they would avoid doing business in areas that would make them 
incur losses. This is usually the rural areas where more than 80 per cent of people live 
with little or no income. Monopolies have the tendency of increasing the price of 
goods and services without effective regulation. The consequence would be unequal 
distribution of goods and services contrary to the requirement of National Goals and 
Directive Principles of equal distribution of social and economic benefits to all 
people.
82
 Alternatively, competition can also be introduced that can improve 
corporate governance. When corporations compete in the same market to sell their 
product to the same customers they tend to improve their corporate governance and 
that is reflected in efficiency and profitability. These are ideal topical issues for 
further research. 
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Second, corporate governance can be improved through internal reform of 
enterprises, either through mixed ownership in SOEs or change of corporate 
governance framework. Mixed ownership is where companies are jointly owned by 
the state as well as private persons. Boardman and Vining concluded in their study 
that SOEs and companies with mixed ownership tend to perform worse than 
privatized companies.
83
 In terms of profitability mixed ownership is the same or at 
times worse than SOEs. Whether mixed ownership would improve corporate 
governance of SOEs in PNG is a matter that requires further research.   
 
This study is focused on corporate governance and identifies its strength and 
weaknesses in SOEs in PNG. For the purposes of this discussion it is useful to discuss 
corporate governance under the following headings to point out specific problems 
generally highlighted in this chapter:  
 
a. allocation of control rights over SOEs between the responsible Ministers and 
the board of directors; 
b. accountability of those with control rights over SOEs; and 
c. mechanisms put in place to make SOEs more efficient and effective. 
 
Firstly, the concept of control was discussed in chapter 2 and it is pointed out that to 
control means having the capacity to appoint and remove directors, to direct 
management from time to time and to determine the objectives of a corporation. From 
the above discussion on corporate governance in PNG and the discussion in Part V, 
responsible Ministers have these capacities. Consequently, responsible Ministers are 
in control of SOEs. 
 
Secondly, one needs to look at the issue of how those who control are accountable for 
their conduct. In other words what are the mechanisms in place to ensure responsible 
Ministers are accountable. From the discussions in Part V and this chapter it is 
identified that there is lack of parliamentary debate on issues regarding SOEs. The 
Ombudsman Commission and PAC do not investigate SOEs. State companies and 
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NHC are not subject to assessment by the Department of Treasury. This leaves the 
Auditor General as the only public institution that performs its statutory role of 
investigating the accounts of all SOEs. However, the Auditor General only audits the 
accounts of SOEs, leaving responsible Ministers completely immune to public 
scrutiny. They are like dictators, untouchable in their dealings with SOEs. This 
situation is unacceptable in a democracy. This is illustrated in state companies where 
the Minister for SOEs who is not a shareholder continues to illegally appoint 
directors. IPBC cannot do anything because directors and the CEO have government 
affiliation.
84
 Who can hold the Minister accountable? No-one. 
 
And thirdly, looking at the issue of efficiency and effectiveness, is largely 
considering whether management and SOEs have clear objectives. The roles and 
responsibilities of boards, chairpersons, directors and CEOs are not clear in some 
SOEs.  Where they are provided these stakeholders do not understand their 
responsibilities. This makes it difficult for them to know what they are supposed to 
do. Statutory corporations do not have corporate plans, and they only give effect to 
government policies. State companies have corporate plans, which are formulated in 
consultation with IPBC and the Minister for SOEs. These plans are reviewed every 
three years. There is no set content, which the plan should have. State companies are 
silent on whether they are pursuing social or commercial objectives or both. Not 
knowing the objectives they are pursuing makes it difficult to hold them to account. 
 
In conclusion discussion above shows that corporate governance problems in PNG‟s 
SOEs are the results of diverse and related causes. First, controlling shareholders and 
relevant ministers of SOEs have multiple interests, and their powers and functions are 
not clearly defined. They deal with the board and management that have no clear 
responsibilities or do not understand their responsibilities. Further, these shareholders 
and relevant ministers deal with SOEs that have no corporate plan (as in statutory 
corporations) or have corporate plans that have no standard format, and having the 
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plans reviewed every three years. Furthermore, there is lack of accountability of all 
stakeholders responsible for governance of SOEs. These issues have contributed to 
problems in corporate governance in SOEs highlighted in chapter one, and they 
inevitably lead to inefficient and ineffective performance of SOEs. The suggested 
ways to address these are set out in chapter 15. 
 
14.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter establishes the fact that the Government in PNG predominantly controls 
SOEs without concomitantly being held accountable for its conduct. Consequently, 
control without accountability can drive a government to be involved with 
management in self-interested activities or to pursue other political agendas which are 
not in accordance with the corporate plan or policy directions, and managers can 
pursue self-interested activities. The control of corporations leads sometimes to 
interference in the operation of SOEs. Ministers‟ greater and active role in an SOE is 
further facilitated by a lack of clear provision on their roles and responsibilities, 
inconsistencies in the laws; lack of clarity and understanding in roles and 
responsibilities of the board, chairperson, directors and CEOs; ineffective role of the 
board; and confusion over whether public accountability mechanisms apply to 
responsible Ministers, directors and CEOs of SOEs.  
 
Similarly, corporatisation in NZ and Australia has done little to separate the activities 
of SOEs from government but has provided greater transparency and accountability. 
Further, while the statutory framework for SOEs is not perfect as there is potential for 
political interference it does set out a clear framework to regulate the involvement of 
ministers through detailed legislation. This is not the case with PNG.  
 
In PNG the problem lies in legislative defects and failure of Parliament and state 
institutions to monitor SOEs. The only state institution in PNG that performs its 
constitutional obligations is the Auditor General, but this office focuses only on 
financial accountability. The Auditor General has been outsourcing auditing 
responsibilities due to a lack of funding. The Auditor General alone cannot ensure 
proper accountability. Lack of public and proper internal accountability can enable a 
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responsible Minister to act in an irresponsible manner, and by so doing and by taking 
total control over SOEs, this creates an avenue for corrupt practices. This has led to 
inefficient deliveries of goods and services to the people (as highlighted in Part V). 
Given the problems in corporate governance the established framework needs to be 
reconsidered. Relevant corporate governance principles need to be identified and 
given effect to under a generic corporatisation legislation. Further, addressing the 
legislative shortfall is going to be the effective way, and given PNG‟s propensity to 
legal actions one can be assured that legislative change clarifying issues of 
governance and accountabilities in SOEs and particularly concerning the role of the 
responsible Minister would lead to legal actions. These issues are further discussed in 
chapter 15. 
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CHAPTER 15: 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN STATE OWNED ENTERPISES 
IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA – DEVELOPING A NEW PARADIGM 
WHICH WORKS 
 
 
15.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are vital for Papua New Guinea‟s (PNG‟s) 
developing economy and its people. Hence, there must be a change in perception of 
corporatisation in the country. Corporatisation must not be perceived as a means to an 
end (privatization), but having an important role to play within the corporate setting 
and PNG society as a whole. Hence there must be clear articulation of what is 
required in an SOE and importantly its corporate governance framework. 
 
It is highlighted in chapter 3 that corporate governance principles adopted in a 
particular jurisdiction depends on ideologies that a particular state is pursuing or the 
political, legal, cultural and socio-economic circumstances of the country. Further, 
the principles adopted would also depend on whether an entity is in the public or the 
private sector. Thus, corporate governance enunciated by Cadbury Report (1992) in 
the UK is different from the King Report (2002) of South Africa and principles in the 
King Report are different from the Australian Stock Exchange, Corporate 
Governance Council‟s Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. 
After looking at political circumstance in chapter eight, the legal structure in chapter 
10, cultural and socio-economic circumstances in chapter nine, corporate governance 
practices in Part V and the legal framework of individual SOEs in chapter 14, the step 
forward is to adopt a corporate governance framework that brings independence, 
transparency, responsibility, accountability and social responsibility. 
 
First, in ensuring independence there must be a strong mechanism put in place to 
minimize and avoid potential conflict of interests between different stakeholders in 
governance so that each works within the confinement of their responsibilities and 
help contribute toward achieving the objectives of SOE. Second, in providing for 
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transparency an SOE must be able to make necessary information available to all 
officers so that an analysis is made for both financial and non-financial activities of 
the corporation.  Third, there needs to be a system that is responsible for ensuring that 
officers are penalized for wrongful conduct. Fourth, accountability ensures officers 
must be held to account for their actions in a sense of being answerable for their 
conduct. In order to be held responsible and accountable clear roles and 
responsibilities of stakeholders in governance must be provided and where there is 
violation wrongdoers must be penalized accordingly or be answerable, respectively. 
And finally, under social responsibility, every SOE must have community service 
obligations as a component of their objectives. A well-managed SOE would be able 
to fulfil both commercial and non-commercial obligations. The discussion below puts 
in perspective how these corporate governance principles can be realized in SOEs in 
PNG. 
 
This chapter moves a step further from the previous chapter and examines how a 
responsible Minister and management can be held accountable for their conduct. This 
is done by examining whether public accountability mechanisms can apply on 
management and responsible Ministers in their relationship with SOEs. Also, how 
responsible Ministers in state companies can be held to account under the Companies 
Act 1997. Hence, the aim is to highlight the external and internal accountability that 
would give effect to corporate governance principles, consequently give effect to the 
objectives and independence of SOEs. I shall begin by first discussing ministerial 
responsibility and the extent of its application followed by examination of the 
definition of public body. The discussion focuses on whether an SOE falls within the 
definitional ambit of a public body. This is followed thirdly by discussion of the 
external accountability mechanisms. In this segment external bodies established by 
the PNG Constitution and Acts of Parliament are looked at that can ensure 
accountability of ministers and managers. I also consider whether there is need for the 
establishment of any external accountability mechanisms. Fourth, I discuss how 
internal accountability mechanisms can be improved. Fifth, I discuss the possibility 
of having uniform legislation for SOEs in PNG and what that would entail. Finally, 
the conclusion provides general observations. I shall now begin the discussion with 
ministerial responsibility. 
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15.2 MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
In any democratic society responsibility to Parliament is important and necessary. 
The responsibility entails accountability, honesty and transparency. The ministerial 
responsibility is in essence the responsibility to Parliament. The Minister is 
responsible for all powers, functions and duties entrusted to him or her as a minister 
of the Government.
1
 The doctrine of ministerial responsibility has two features; 
namely individual responsibility and collective responsibility of ministers to 
Parliament. The former is relevant for purposes of this chapter. This is where an 
individual minister is accountable to Parliament and the society in executing his or 
her responsibility on behalf of the Government. This responsibility extends to actions 
or inactions of officers of government departments in their official capacity. This 
means complaints about wrongs committed by a civil servant must be directed to the 
responsible Minister.
2
 The doctrine is appropriately summarized as follows: “Each 
minister is responsible to Parliament for the conduct of his [or her] department. The 
act of every civil servant is by convention regarded as the act of his minister.”3 
Consequently, this creates reciprocity of duties whereby officers of department are 
responsible to the Minister in performance of their duties and the Minister is 
responsible for protecting and defending the officers. 
 
The doctrine of ministerial responsibility is still relevant today, however its 
effectiveness is of concern as the Government becomes larger and more complex. 
The activities of the Government have increased and are now under control of non-
departmental bodies. Notwithstanding, ministers are still responsible and accountable 
for their activities. Unlike a government department, the Minister is required to deal 
with non-governmental bodies only on matters with regard to policy. In some 
instances responsible Ministers may interfere in operational matters. The question of 
                                                          
1
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 edn., 2001) 209 – 211. 
3
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Process of Privatisation in New Zealand : Implications for Ministerial Responsibility and the 
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who is responsible and accountable for actions or omissions of the Minister or 
officers becomes uncertain. Herbert Morrison answered the question by stating that: 
“A minister is responsible to parliament for actions he [or she] may take with relation 
to a board, or action coming within his [or her] statutory powers which he [or she] 
has not taken.”4 This limits the ministerial responsibility to only the conduct of the 
Minister and it does not extend to officers of the company. This may create potential 
for evasion, confusion and manipulation between administrative matters that 
management should deal with, and policy matters that the ministers should deal with 
in non-departmental bodies. The Minister may easily evade responsibility by stating 
that it is the responsibility of the board or management. 
 
An SOE is an example of a non–departmental body. Unlike a government 
department, an SOE is a separate legal entity that is either created by statute or 
incorporated under Companies Act through the process of corporatisation. One of the 
aims of corporatisation is to separate the activities of an SOE from the Government; 
consequently narrowing ministerial responsibility and making the Minister only 
accountable for certain conduct of corporations.
5
 For example, the Minister would be 
responsible only for policy matters, but not for the daily operational affairs and 
business of the corporation. In this sense ministerial responsibility is narrowed. It is 
discovered in Part V and chapter 13 that there is no clear provision for responsibility 
and accountability of ministers and management in SOEs in PNG, hence the extent of 
the application of ministerial responsibility is unclear.  
 
It is important to distinguish between responsibility and accountability. They are 
inextricably connected and used interchangeably, however they have different 
meanings when used in the context of ministerial responsibility. Accountability 
connotes answerability whereas responsibility connotes blameworthiness. In 
distinguishing the two terms Sir Robin Butler argued that responsibility:  
 
…implies personal involvement in an action or decision, in a sense that implies personal 
credit or blame for that action or decision…a Minister is accountable for all the actions and 
activities of his department, but not responsible for all the actions in the sense of being 
                                                          
4
  Quoted in Woodhouse, D., “Ministerial Responsibility,” in Bogdanor, V., (ed.) The British 
Constitution in the Twentieth Century, (2003) 281 at 284. 
5
  Above n 3 at 6. 
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blameworthy…a civil servant is not accountable to Parliament for his actions but is 
responsible for certain actions.
6
  
 
The term accountability is used to refer to both responsibility and accountability 
throughout the thesis. The distinction is discussed here to highlight the fact that 
responsible Ministers are answerable not only for their conduct and the conduct of 
organization they are responsible for but can be penalized for their acts or omissions 
in appropriate circumstances. This is where the roles of the Ombudsman Commission 
and Public Accounts Committee (PAC) are important to ensure ministers and 
employees of SOEs are accountable and responsible for their conduct. The discussion 
below identifies mechanisms that ensure stakeholders in the governance of SOEs are 
held responsible and accountable. These include looking at external, public 
accountability mechanisms and internal accountability mechanisms, and how current 
establishments can be improved. Before looking at these issues it is important to 
identify whether an SOE is a public body. 
 
15.3 PUBLIC BODY 
 
Public functions began to increase when communities developed into welfare states. 
This resulted in governments delegating to entities outside of government 
departments the powers to perform public functions. Many private entities are now 
performing public functions and some of them operate under close ministerial or 
departmental control. There are different tests being used to determine whether an 
entity is a public body. First, Parliament may determine the definition of the term 
public body or may specifically stipulate in an Act of Parliament that an entity is an 
emanation of the State. For example, New Zealand‟s State Sector Act 1988 expressly 
excludes SOE in defining “state service” as “all instruments of the Crown in respect 
of the Government of New Zealand” including Crown entities.7 Similarly, the Public 
Finance Act 1989 defines the Crown as including all ministers and their Departments 
and excludes SOEs and Crown entities.
8
 In PNG, s 2 of the Public Finances 
(Management) Act 1995 (PFM Act) provides that public body means: 
                                                          
6
  Cited in above n 4 at 313. 
7
  State Sector Act 1988, s 2 (NZ). 
8
  Public Finance Act 1989, s 2 (NZ). 
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a. a body, authority or instrumentality (corporate or unincorporate) 
established by or under an Act or a Constitutional Law; and  
 
b. a body, authority or instrumentality incorporated under the Companies Act 
1997 where and to the extent that – the constitution of that body provides; 
or an Act [other than PFM Act]  provides, the Public Finance 
(Management) Act 1995 shall apply to that body, authority or 
instrumentality other than the Auditor General.  
 
Thus, any entity that is subject to the PFM Act or the Auditor General is a public 
body. The PFM Act is a public law and the Auditor General only audits the accounts 
of bodies that are funded by the State or that have control over the State‟s assets. The 
definition is inclusive, covering both statutory corporations and state companies. 
Further, schedule 1.2.2 of PNG‟s Constitution defines “governmental body” amongst 
other criteria as “a body set up by statute or administrative act for governmental or 
official purposes”. The definition is restrictive. It does not cover state companies, 
which of course are incorporated under the Companies Act and not set up by statute, 
and does not involve strictly in governmental or official purposes. Where there is 
unclear specification under legislation, two tests under common law are applied to 
determine whether an entity is a public body. They are namely the “control test” and 
the “public functions test” (see chapter 5). 
 
First, in the “control test” the nature and degree of control by government department 
and the responsible Minister is looked at to determine whether an entity is a “public 
body”.9 In order for an entity to be regarded as public body it must be largely 
controlled by the Minister or the government department.
10
 That means that an entity 
that retains some independent discretion with limited ministerial control is not a 
                                                          
9
  Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Medical Council of NZ [1997] 2 NZLR 297 at 327 – 328 
(CA).  
10
  See Tamlin v Hannaford [1950] 1 KB 18 (CA). 
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public body.
11
  Control in this sense refers to de jure or legal control and not de facto 
or control that is in fact exercised.
12
  
 
Applying the “control test” to PNG‟s SOEs results in different outcomes. The legal 
responsibility of the Minister for SOEs in state companies is limited and in some of 
them, not mentioned at all. If the “control test” were to be applied then obviously 
state companies are not public bodies, even though in Part V the Minister appoints 
directors and he or she has greater influence on the management directly. The role of 
the Minister for SOEs is not stated in any documents of state companies; the Minister 
is not a shareholder and yet the Minister has de facto control in appointing directors 
and dealing directly with the management. In this case, applying the idea that control 
means legal control and not control that is in fact being exercised, excludes state 
companies as public bodies. In statutory corporations the Ministers‟ responsibilities 
are clearly provided (see chapter 14). These responsibilities included intervening in 
the operational matters of SOEs. Sometimes, as discovered in Part V, Ministers 
exceed their responsibilities provided under the legislation. Hence, by applying the 
“control test” statutory corporations in PNG are considered public bodies. 
 
The second common law test is the “public functions test” which, in essence, looks at 
whether an entity is exercising the public function or doing public works. Given the 
reality of the scope of the activities of modern government in “almost all aspects of 
commercial, industrial and developmental endeavour,”13 and the use of private bodies 
in exercising governmental functions by virtue of statute, contract or franchise, the 
public function test must not be a conclusive test in itself.
14
 The public function test 
must be considered with other determinants. For example, in PNG the Auditor 
General outsources auditing of some government institutions to private auditing 
firms. Although, the firm exercises a public function, it is not a public body as it is by 
nature a private firm, a large part of its work revolves around doing private work, and 
                                                          
11
  See Metropolitan Meat Industry Board v Sheedy [1927] AC 899 (PC). 
12
  Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV v Administrator of Hungarian Property [1954] AC 584 at 
617 (HL). 
13
  Bropho v Western Australia (1990) 171 CLR 1 at 19 (HCA). 
14
  Some cases indicate that the test is broad and vague, therefore accepted as problematic. For 
example see Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Medical Council of NZ [1997] 2 NZLR 297 at 
326 – 327 (CA). 
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its management rather than the Government determines its strategic and operational 
direction. Therefore performing a public function does not necessarily prove that an 
entity is a public body. In circumstances where public function alone cannot 
determine whether an entity is a public body other factors have to be considered.  
Clearly, by applying the “public function test” all SOEs in PNG are public bodies. 
They implement government policies and relevant government ministers can direct 
them from time to time. 
 
The PFM Act and PNG‟s Constitution are the only statutory instruments in PNG that 
define “public body” and “governmental body,” respectively. The definition under 
the PFM Act is explicit that SOEs that are audited by the Auditor General or are 
subject to the PFM Act are “public bodies”. The Auditor General audits all SOEs in 
PNG therefore these SOEs come under the definition of “public body”. Further, the 
“control test” and “public purpose test” under common law are part of the Underlying 
Law of PNG and can be consulted and applied where there are deficiencies in the 
enacted laws.
15
 It is clear after applying all these tests that SOEs are “public bodies”. 
This then poses the question of whether SOEs, as public bodies, are subject to 
external, public accountability mechanisms.  
 
15.4 EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
 
External accountability mechanisms ensure SOEs and various stakeholders involved 
in governance are held accountable for their conduct. These accountability 
mechanisms are provided under the PNG Constitution or Acts of Parliament. The 
discussion below considers whether SOEs are subject to them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
  Constitution of PNG, ss 9 and 11. 
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15.4.1 The Constitution of Papua New Guinea 
 
15.4.1.1 Public Accounts Committee  
 
The PAC‟s role is to examine and report to the national Parliament on the public 
accounts, control of and transactions with or concerning public moneys and the 
property of the people of PNG.
16
 The inspection and examination applies to any 
accounts, finance and property that are subject to inspection and audit by the Auditor 
General.
17
 The Auditor General audits the accounts of all SOEs therefore PAC can 
investigate their accounts. Although, the Government does not fund state companies 
(i.e. PNG Power, Telikom and Eda Ranu) and the National Housing Corporation, 
they use state assets to generate revenues. These assets come under the “property” of 
the State and therefore PAC can investigate the accounts of all these SOEs. PAC‟s 
constitutional obligation with relation to SOEs is clear; however it is beyond 
comprehension to see the confusion over whether PAC can investigate SOEs in Part 
V. This means either PAC does not see its role extending to SOEs or feels reluctant to 
inspect their accounts given their corporate nature. The role of PAC in relation to 
SOEs must be specified clearly and made mandatory in a document that is accessible 
to members of the board and management, and other relevant authorities, including 
PAC. 
 
15.4.1.2 Auditor General  
 
Case studies in Part V point out the fact that the Auditor General audits all SOEs in 
PNG. The purpose of the discussion in this part is to point out the legal basis for its 
role. Section 214 (1) of PNG‟s Constitution authorises the Auditor General to inspect, 
audit and report to Parliament on public accounts, control and transactions of public 
money and property of all arms of departments, agencies and instrumentalities of the 
national Government and all bodies set up by an Act of Parliament.
18
 The Auditor 
General also audits and reports to Parliament any accounts, finances and property of 
                                                          
16
  Constitution of PNG, s 216 (1). 
17
  Constitution of PNG, s 216 (2). 
18
  Constitution of PNG, s 214 (1). 
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an institution, insofar as that institution derived from public money or property of the 
public.
19
 Section 8 (2) of the Audit Act 1989 echoes s 214 of PNG‟s Constitution but 
uses the term all “public bodies”. The Auditor General inspects, audits and reports to 
Parliament on accounts, records and financial transaction of all “public bodies”. The 
definition of “public body” under s 2 of the PFM Act includes statutory corporations 
and state companies. In addition, all SOEs possess and use the State‟s property and 
the Government funds statutory corporations, therefore the Auditor General, as a 
public institution has the right to audit them. Before annual reports of “public bodies” 
are submitted to Parliament they must be audited by the Auditor General,
20
 who can 
outsource auditing responsibilities to private audit firms.
21
 Under Part V it is 
discovered that the Auditor General outsources all auditing responsibilities to private 
audit firms and merely performs a supervisory role. The current practice of the 
Auditor General should remain the same. 
 
15.4.1.3 Ombudsman Commission   
 
The Ombudsman Commission is one of the important institutions established under 
PNG‟s Constitution to ensure that public bodies and public office holders are held 
accountable for their conduct. Section 218 of the PNG Constitution provides that the 
purpose of the Ombudsman Commission is to help improve the work of 
governmental bodies and ensure that they are responsive to the needs of the people. 
The Commission also supervises the enforcement of the Organic Law on the Duties 
and Responsibilities of Leadership (Leadership Code). The Leadership Code 
complements the Organic Law on the Ombudsman Commission and provides for 
general duties and responsibilities of public bodies and public office holders that are 
provided under s 26 of the Constitution. The Constitution
22
 and Leadership Code
23
 
give extensive power to the Ombudsman Commission to supervise the Leadership 
Code. Section 26 does not cover SOEs or directors and CEOs but only relevant 
ministers. Section 26(1)(a) of the Constitution explicitly provides that a minister is 
                                                          
19
  Constitution of PNG, s 214 (3). 
20
  Public Finance (Management) Act 1995, s 63(4). 
21
  Audit Act 1989, s 4(1). 
22
  Constitution of PNG, s 218. 
23
  Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership, s 17. 
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subject to the Leadership Code. If the relevant minister of SOEs, among other things, 
uses the office for personal benefit,
24
 deals with the matter that he or she has personal 
interest in it,
25
 asks, receives or obtains bribe
26
 or misappropriates the funds of the 
State
27
 in dealing with SOEs such a Minister would be subjected to investigation by 
the Ombudsman Commission. 
 
SOEs (as public bodies), directors and CEOs are subject to investigation by the 
Ombudsman Commission not by virtue of the Leadership Code but under PNG‟s 
Constitution. Section 219(1) of the Constitution provides that the Ombudsman 
Commission can, on its own initiative or on complaint by an affected person, 
investigate the conduct of a governmental body or its employees, or a body 
established under statute. In addition, the Ombudsman Commission can investigate 
entities, which are mainly supported from public money, or entities that have the 
majority of their controlling authority appointed by the National Executive Council or 
the Government. A governmental body, as referred to under schedule 1.2.2 of the 
Constitution of PNG, applies to bodies set up by statute. This refers to statutory 
corporation. But s 219 (1) refers to “governmental body” or “body establish under 
statute” in the same sentence. This is a reference to two different entities. As defined 
above, a governmental body refers to a body set up by statute. It is suggested that 
“body established under statute” does not refer to “governmental body” but to state 
companies which are established under the Companies Act.  
 
Further, the Government appoints directors and chief executive officers (CEO) in an 
SOE either directly or indirectly. The act of appointment qualifies under the statement 
“majority of controlling authority appointed by National Executive Council or 
government,” making them subject to investigation by the Ombudsman Commission. 
These requirements enable not only statutory corporations but state companies to be 
subject to investigation by the Ombudsman Commission. Furthermore, SOEs are 
publicly owned and they also involve in community service obligations, therefore 
their role in the community and ownership justifies the Ombudsman Commission as a 
                                                          
24
  Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership, s 5. 
25
  Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership, s 6. 
26
  Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership, s 11. 
27
  Organic Law on the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership, s 13. 
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public institution to investigation any matters of public concern. This includes 
investigation of relevant ministers under Leadership Code, and directors and CEOs of 
SOEs by virtue of the Constitution.  
 
After examining the PNG Constitution and the Leadership Code it is clear that the 
Ombudsman Commission can investigate relevant ministers, directors and CEOs. 
However, the lack of clear provision on the role of Ministers in SOEs makes it 
difficult for the Ombudsman Commission to perform its duty in holding them 
accountable. The problem is further exacerbated by the lack of clear demarcation 
between operational and policy matters and commercial and non-commercial matters 
in SOEs. The same problem applies with the investigation of directors and CEOs, 
where their roles and responsibilities are inconsistent and vague. Although, the 
Companies Act clearly provides for the duties of directors, the Ombudsman 
Commission would be reluctant to venture into the private sector arena. This calls for 
every SOE to have a corporate plan that provides for both commercial and non-
commercial objectives. The Ombudsman Commission would only intervene to 
investigate a lack of implementation of non-commercial objectives that directly affect 
people. 
 
People who lack government services or are recipients of inefficient and low quality 
service from government departments or institutions are “affected persons”. Section 
219 of the Constitution provides for “affected persons” to lodge a complaint with the 
Ombudsman Commission. The following are specific situations in SOEs that can 
enable an affected person to lodge a complaint with the Commission. 
 
a. National Housing Corporation (NHC) – one of the important responsibilities 
of NHC is to provide houses for public servants. Many public servants who 
are entitled to a house from NHC are living in settlements and going to work. 
Also, current residents are living in NHC houses that are in bad condition. 
The pipes are leaking, the wood in the houses has eroded and sanitation is 
poor. People who are in these conditions are affected persons under s 219. 
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b. National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) – nearly half of the radio stations 
in the country have closed. The Government has not done anything about 
them. Some of them have been closed for four or five years. Radio stations 
provide people with access to information and provide venues where they can 
express themselves. Freedom of information is one of the important qualified 
rights in PNG, and entails the right to express one‟s opinion and receive ideas 
and information.
28
 The people in the provinces who do not have radio stations 
are affected persons under s 219. 
 
c. Eda Ranu – water is an essential commodity, however there are problems 
experienced with its supply. Some of these problems include “water cuts” for 
half a day or even a whole day, which affects business and households and the 
company‟s response to plumbing maintenance, is very poor.29 It takes days or 
even a week to do maintenance. Recently the water rates have increased 
dramatically without prior notification and reason(s) justifying the sudden 
increase. Many people who could not afford the high prices of water are 
involved in illegal water connections.
30
 The persons who are affected by these 
situations come under s 219. 
 
d. Telikom – Telikom‟s charges are the most expensive in the world.31 Many 
people in rural townships, who are entitled to telecommunication services, 
have been waiting for 10 to 15 years, even though it is one of the stated 
objectives of Telikom to bring telecommunication service to the rural 
populace. And maintenance work takes weeks or even months to be done. 
People who are affected by these situations are affected persons under s 219. 
 
e. PNG Power – it has become a norm in towns and cities in PNG to 
continuously experience several power outages in a day. In Port Moresby 
                                                          
28
  Constitution of PNG, s 46.  
29
  For example, Victim of no water, “Eda Ranu Capability Questioned,” (Port Moresby, 22nd May 
2009) in The National, < http://www.thenational.com.pg/052209/letter6.php > at 22  May 2009. 
30
  Kenneth, G., “Eda Ranu clamps down on illegal connections,” (Port Moresby, 22nd July 2009) in 
Post Courier, < http://www.postcourier.com.pg/20090722/news03.htm > at 21 August 2010. 
31
  Kolma, F.S., “A Mobile Service that is not Mobile,” (Port Moresby, 17th April 2007) in The 
National, < http://www.thenational.com.pg/042307/column4.htm > at 29 March 2009.  
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whole suburbs can be without power for a day. This affects business 
operations and household electric appliances. Compensation can be sought for 
the loss or damages caused as a result of power outages under s 19 of the 
Electricity Supply (Government Power Stations) Act 1970; however the 
provision has never been invoked. In one of the private surveys conducted to 
find out the reasons for the lack of investment in PNG, power outage is one of 
them.
32
 Even a senior judge of the National and the Supreme Court, 
summoned the manager of PNG Power to explain continuous power 
outages.
33
 People who are affected by electricity supply are affected persons 
under s 219. 
 
As stated above s 218 of PNG‟s Constitution provides that the job of the Ombudsman 
Commission is to “help improve the work of governmental bodies and ensure that 
they are responsive to the needs of the people”. This justifies the Ombudsman 
Commission to intervene in the matters outlined above, not only to improve the work 
of SOEs but also to ensure that they are responsive to the needs of the people. State 
companies are subject to the Companies Act, but where there is financial 
mismanagement; the Ombudsman Commission must initiate investigation into them, 
especially in circumstances where moneys earmarked for a public project in rural 
areas are misused. The relevant minister and the board must be held accountable in 
such circumstances. In Part V the users of SOEs‟ services have rated the efficiency 
and quality of services poorly. Lack of efficiency and effectiveness affects people 
personally. 
 
In addition, persons who are affected by the activities of state companies can bring 
actions under entitled persons if the definition of entitled person is amended to 
include members of the public who are affected by their act or omissions (see 
discussions below). However, action through courts is expensive and it can take years 
for decisions. Hence, it is advisable to refer matters about SOEs to the Ombudsman 
Commission. Redress through the Commission is costless and after investigation, the 
                                                          
32
  Manning, M., Factors Contributing to the Lack of Investment in Papua New Guinea – A Private 
Sector Survey, (Discussion paper No. 74, 1999) 11 and 19. 
33
  Per, Z., “Judge Warns Power Boss over Blackout,” (Port Moresby, 17th June 2009) in The 
National, < http://www.thenational.com.pg/061709/nation3.php > at 17 June 2009. 
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Commission can then advise the SOE to implement appropriate policy, or where 
there is violation of the Leadership Code or other laws, the Commission can refer 
responsible Ministers, directors or CEOs to the Public Prosecutor‟s Office for 
prosecutions. 
 
15.4.1.4 Right to Freedom of Information 
Section 51 of PNG‟s Constitution provides for every citizen to have the right of 
access to “official documents”. Among the information that cannot be revealed, 
which is relevant for SOEs is commercial information. Particularly, s 51(1)(a) 
provides that citizens cannot have access to information on condition that the right to 
secrecy “is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society in respect of privileged or 
confidential commercial or financial information obtained from a person or body”. 
That means that commercial or financial information that is obtained by an SOE from 
another person but not information that belongs to SOE. The information that belongs 
to an SOE is official information and is required under s 51 to be disclosed to the 
public. Further, commercial confidentiality in SOEs is a non-issue in PNG given the 
monopoly of economic activities. The public must demand the disclosure of annual 
reports of SOEs through national newspapers. This right can be enforced under s 57 
of the PNG Constitution. State companies lodge their annual reports with the 
Registrar of Companies in Port Moresby, making some company information 
available for public accessibility; however over 90 per cent of people live out of Port 
Moresby and do not have access to the Company Office. The publication of reports in 
newspapers would enable these people to have access to the information. In doing so, 
the public is informed of the performance of the SOEs and can concurrently assess 
the performance of the responsible Minister and management and decide whether to 
re-elect the responsible Minister and his or her political party in the next general 
election.  
 
15.4.1.5 Parliament 
 
Parliament is the centre for accountability and it is through Parliament that SOEs are 
accountable to the people of PNG. As the guardian of public interest, Parliament 
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ensures, amongst other things, that policies of SOEs are consistent with government 
policies and that these objectives are implemented in an efficient and economic 
manner, and in accordance with the law.
34
 To ensure accountability Parliament 
performs an “enabling role” and an “evaluative role”. In the former Parliament 
establishes SOEs through legislation that also sets out their structures and domains of 
activities. Parliament also has an opportunity to review the functioning of SOEs 
through general debates, debates on motions and during “question time” in 
Parliament.
35
 Part V is clear that Parliament in PNG hardly performs its enabling role. 
Parliamentary sessions are unnecessarily adjourned,
36
 and debates are not taken 
seriously and the number of questions asked has decreased since Independence 
in1975 largely because the opposition is ineffective.
37
 The only time questions on 
SOEs are raised is during “question time” or in the media, both of which are 
insufficient opportunities to thoroughly assess an SOE and its performance. 
 
In its evaluative role, Parliament examines the annual reports submitted by SOEs to 
identify whether they have fulfilled the objectives set out for them to achieve.
38
 
Statutory corporations in PNG submit their reports to Parliament; however these are 
never presented in Parliament for discussion or debate. This defeats the whole 
purpose of submitting reports to Parliament. The boards of state companies submit 
reports to IPBC, which keeps all reports of state companies and submits them to 
Parliament when requested by the Minister for SOEs. IPBC is only a trustee 
shareholder. Its main role is to manage state companies, and prepare them for 
privatization through increasing their value. This role does not replace the role of 
Parliament, which is rightly the representative of the residual owners, the public. The 
public has the right to know how the SOEs are performing. 
 
It is suggested that the submission of annual reports of SOEs must be made 
mandatory. This can be done through stipulation under a statute or by establishing a 
                                                          
34
  Mascarenhas, R. C., Public Enterprise in New Zealand, (1982) 128. 
35
  Ibid at 128–135. 
36
  Supreme Court Reference No. 4 of 1990 [1994] PNGLR 141; Supreme Court Reference No. 3 of 
1999: re Calling of Parliament (unreported, 1999). 
37
  Narokobi, M., “Parliamentary Reform for Good Governance,” in Sullivan, N., (ed.) Governance 
Challenges for PNG and the Pacific Islands, (2004) 108 at 114. 
38
  Above n 34 at 35–37. 
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“Permanent Parliamentary Committee on SOEs” (PPCSOE) that would ensure that 
the reports are presented and assessed in Parliament. PPCSOE would not replicate the 
functions of PAC of examining accounts or examining matters raised by the Auditor 
General‟s reports, but would perform other accountability roles that include: ensuring 
that annual reports are tabled in Parliament; that corporate plans are submitted and 
scrutinize by the relevant ministers; and that the relevant ministers are performing 
their responsibilities.  
 
15.4.2 Acts of Parliament 
 
15.4.2.1 Department of Treasury 
 
Part III of the PFM Act provides for public bodies. It qualifies itself by stating firstly 
that it does not apply to public bodies, unless a law or constituent law provides 
specifically for its application with their exceptions and conditions. Second, if the 
provisions in Part III state that they apply to all public bodies notwithstanding 
contrary provision in any other laws then Part III applies.
39
 The example of the first 
condition is where s 23 of the National Housing Corporation Act 1990 provides that 
Part III applies to the corporation. This is where all provisions of Part III apply to the 
National Housing Corporation. The provisions that apply with regard to the second 
condition are examined below. 
 
First, the department Head of Treasury may, at any time require chief executives of 
all public bodies to submit a performance and management plan of that public body.
40
 
Section 50 of the PFM Act only makes it optional for department heads to do so. This 
means he or she may or may not request the performance or management plan. It is 
suggested that the provision must be mandatory for the submission of a management 
plan and not at the request of the department head. Section 50 must be amended so it 
is made mandatory. 
 
                                                          
39
  Public Finance (Management) Act 1995, s 48. 
40
  Public Finance (Management) Act 1995, s 50. 
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Second, under s 63 of the PMF Act, all public bodies must prepare and submit two 
reports to the Minister for Treasury. The first is the performance and management 
report of its operation for the year, and second the following reports on investment: 
quarterly report on investment decisions; detailed report on investment and returns for 
the year; and a five year investment plan.
41
 Failure to do so can result in the Minister 
penalising the public body by not releasing the annual grant appropriation and 
referring it to PAC for investigation.
42
 Further, the Minister is entitled to initiate 
investigation if there is reason to believe that the public body may have failed to 
implement the management plan.
43
 From the case studies in Part V none of the SOEs 
submit their performance and management report to the Department of Treasury. The 
explanation given during the interview is that, apart from the National Broadcasting 
Corporation, they do not receive their annual budgetary allocations from the 
Government. This is an inadequate and unconvincing explanation. SOEs have 
possession over the assets of the State and are generating revenue out of them. Surely, 
the people of PNG are interested in how they are being utilised. Therefore, the 
submission of a management report and an investment report must be made 
compulsory. 
 
State companies and statutory corporations as public bodies are accountable to the 
Minister for Treasury and his/her Department. On the contrary, it was discovered in 
Part V that state companies and statutory corporations do not submit their annual 
reports or management plans to the Minister for Treasury and his or her Department. 
Despite this, these SOEs are not disciplined through referral to PAC. This illustrates 
the fact that either the Minister for Treasury or his or her Department fail to perform 
their statutory and supervisory duties or do not understand their responsibilities under 
the PFM Act or ignore performing their duties. They have an important responsibility 
to ensure that public monies are spent properly. The difficulty with the National 
Housing Corporation and the National Broadcasting Corporation is that they only 
implement government policies and do not have corporate plans. The job of the 
Minister and the Department of Treasury is to compel SOEs to produce corporate 
                                                          
41
  Public Finance (Management) Act 1995, s 63(2). 
42
  Public Finance (Management) Act 1995, s 63 (8). 
43
  Public Finance (Management) Act 1995, s 64. 
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plans and ensure that public monies are spent according to the plans. The 
responsibilities of the Minister and Department of Treasury must be specified in a 
document that is accessible to SOEs and the Department of Treasury. 
 
In addition, the Department of Treasury must establish a unit like “the Crown 
Ownership Monitoring Unit”44 in New Zealand‟s Treasury where administratively the 
unit will be linked to the Treasury, but have a specific function of assessing the 
performance of SOEs. The unit would deal solely with SOEs by requesting 
management plans, examining annual and financial reports and other company 
documents, and reporting to the relevant minister or “Independent Public Business 
Corporation of Papua New Guinea” (IPBC) on the performance of the relevant SOE. 
 
15.4.2.2 Independent Public Business Corporation of Papua New Guinea  
 
The development of IPBC in the aftermath of the Privatization Commission has 
caused problems because its roles have not been articulated. It was intended to 
replace the Privatization Commission which was established under the Privatization 
Commission Act 1997. Then, the Privatization Commission had only one 
responsibility under the Act, which was to valuate SOEs to identify whether they 
were ready for privatization. By virtue of the Independent Public Business 
Corporation of PNG Act 2002, IPBC assumes the responsibility of the Privatization 
Commission and is additionally entrusted with ownership of state companies and the 
responsibility of managing them. IPBC is made to be directly responsible to the 
Minister for SOEs; however the roles of responsible Minister with regard to IPBC 
and state companies are not stated in any documents. Without clear specification of 
roles, the Minister has a lot of room to manoeuvre and often bypasses IPBC and deals 
directly with SOEs. At times some of the Minister‟s acts may be illegal. For example, 
the appointment of directors in state companies is contrary to IPBC Act and the 
Companies Act 1997. It is confusing for state companies to deal with both the 
Minister for SOEs and IPBC. Further, Telikom has to deal with two ministers 
                                                          
44
  See The Treasury – NZ, “Crown Ownership Monitoring Unit,” (December 2009) in The 
Treasury, < http://www.treasury.govt.nz/statesector/soes  > at 15
 
April 2010. 
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including the Minister for Communications. To resolve these impasses two 
approaches can be undertaken.  
 
a. Have the responsible Minister deal directly with state companies and have 
IPBC revert back to performing the role of the Privatization Commission. 
b. Revive the Privatization Commission and have it perform its previous role 
under the Privatization Commission Act, and have IPBC remain as a 
shareholder, performing all responsibilities of an owner. The Public Service 
Commission must make the appointment of directors and CEO of IPBC and 
the Government should be completely removed from dealing with state 
companies. The current situation is that the Minister for SOEs is not a 
shareholder or a director and yet continues to appoint directors in state 
companies thus violating the IPBC Act and the Companies Act 1997. 
 
The second option would be a better alternative, as it will prevent the Government 
from interfering directly with the state companies. IPBC will then focus solely on its 
ownership responsibilities in appointing directors and chairpersons and other 
responsibilities under the Companies Act 1997. The Government is doing too many 
things with IPBC: it is replacing relevant ministers with IPBC as owner to create 
independence; it uses IPBC to valuate SOEs for privatization and also empower IPBC 
to manage state companies. Some of these responsibilities have to be removed from 
IPBC so that there is effective performance with single responsibility as a 
shareholder, which essentially means that its focus will not be on privatization.  
 
15.4.2.3 Deemed Directors 
 
Case studies in Part V highlighted that the Minister for SOEs provides advice, and 
directs the board and management to implement government policies or pursue other 
political agendas. In this role the responsible Minister or IPBC can be regarded as de 
facto controllers under section 107(1) (b) of the Companies Act. The provision refers 
to such a person in this capacity as: 
 
a. a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions a person referred to in 
section 107(1) may be required to act; 
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b. a person in accordance with whose directions the board of the company may be 
required to act; and  
c. a person who exercises powers, which would fall to be exercised by the board.  
 
Therefore, both responsible Ministers and IPBC providing advice and directions as de 
facto controllers are deemed to be directors and can be held responsible for their 
actions. However, as shareholders they may decide not to pursue action against 
themselves. This is where an “entitled person” (see discussion below) can take action 
against the responsible Ministers or IPBC. People who are affected by an act or 
omission of the company under the direction of the responsible Minister or IPBC can 
pursue actions against them in their capacity as deemed directors. For example, if a 
responsible Minister is known for directing PNG Power and in compliance with the 
company‟s objective of rural electrification program, advises the company to install a 
generator in Wapenamanda in Enga Province and the company fails to do so, the 
people of Wapenamanda can sue the Minister as deemed director under s 148 or the 
company under s 150 of the Companies Act for failing to undertake actions that they 
are required to do. At the moment affected members of the public cannot sue. In order 
for them to take action, as suggested below, both provisions must provide for 
“entitled person”, whose definition is extended to include members of the public. 
Alternatively, they can report the inaction by PNG Power to the Ombudsman 
Commission. This is important as responsible Ministers are shareholders and it is 
unlikely for them to decide to take action against themselves. In state companies, 
IPBC is the shareholder. With government associates as CEO and directors on board, 
the management of IPBC would be reluctant to take action against the responsible 
Minister. 
 
15.4.3 Other External Accountability Mechanisms 
 
After looking at PNG‟s Constitution and Acts of Parliament it is clear that many 
issues about public accountability of SOEs are not certain or where there is certainty 
they are not given effect. The only public office that seems to be doing its job, as 
discovered from case studies is the Auditor General, who only ensures financial 
accountability, although accountability to the people of PNG is lacking. This provides 
an opportunity for stakeholders in governance to be involved in abuse, corrupt 
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practices and pursuance of self-interested activities. Apart from having uniform 
legislation (discussed below) the national Parliament needs to amend the definition of 
“entitled person” under s 2 of the Companies Act and establish a PPCSOE. 
 
15.4.3.1 Entitled Person  
 
SOEs that are established under the Companies Act are required to pursue objectives 
that are in the best interest of the company. Section 112 of PNG‟s Companies Act 
1997 provides that directors are to act in good faith and in the best interests of the 
company. State companies must not only pursue commercial interests but also have 
to meet their community service obligations. Therefore, the best interests of the 
company are to achieve both objectives under the corporate plan.  Members of the 
public who are affected by an SOE‟s activities in fulfilling community service 
obligations must be able to hold the company and the management to account.  
 
The public cannot pursue any actions against directors and the company under the 
Companies Act 1997. However this could be remedied by amending the definition of 
“entitled person”, and inserting the phrase “entitled person” into ss 148 and 150 of 
the Companies Act 1997. An “Entitled person in relation to a company, means a 
shareholder; and a person upon whom the constitution confers any of the rights and 
powers of a shareholder”.45 There is a need to extend this to a person aggrieved by 
breach of the Act as is the case under s 1324 of the Australian Corporations Act 
2001. The Companies Act provides that shareholders, former shareholders and 
“entitled persons” have the capacity to initiate legal actions under certain 
circumstances to hold a director or board to account if they engage in conduct which 
would contravene certain legislation or the constitution,
46
 if they do not undertake 
actions which they are required to do,
47
 or if the board is not acting in the best 
interests of the company,
48
 or in a manner which is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial 
or discriminatory to a particular shareholder.
49
 All of these provisions allow only a 
                                                          
45
  Companies Act 1997, s 2. 
46
  Companies Act 1997, s 142.  
47
  Companies Act 1997, ss 148 and 150.   
48
  Companies Act 1997, s 143.   
49
  Companies Act 1997, s 152.   
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shareholder to initiate an action, but s 142 (injunction) and s 152 (prejudicial actions) 
enable an “entitled person” including a shareholder to initiate an action.  
 
First, the extension of the definition of “entitled person” and its insertion under ss 
143, 148 and 150 of the Companies Act would enable the public to apply to court to 
compel a director or the board to take certain actions with regard to non-commercial 
obligations that affect them. This would also enable the public as an “entitled person” 
to initiate proceedings under ss 142 and 152 of the Companies Act. Secondly, in 
acknowledging the reciprocal relationship that exists between state companies and the 
public and given the fact that community service is one of the two objectives of SOEs 
it is appropriate to extend the definition of an “entitled person” to include persons in 
society who are affected by the actions of the company. This would clearly include a 
local community or members of that community. However, to be reasonable it would 
need to be shown that the acts or omissions of SOEs in implementing a public policy 
have a direct impact on the lives of the people. 
  
The amendment would ensure that state companies would be acting in the best 
interests of the public whose welfare and livelihood are affected by their actions. This 
recognizes the broad definition of corporate governance discussed in chapter three 
where managers are not only accountable to shareholders but to other stakeholders 
who are affected by the activities of SOEs. In chapter 14 it is pointed out that the 
Minister of SOEs breaches both the IPBC Act and the Companies Act in appointing 
directors. Unfortunately, board of IPBC and state companies cannot bring action as 
the members of the boards are cohorts of the Government and they would be reluctant 
to do so. This situation can enable an “entitled person” to bring a derivative action 
seeking the court‟s declaration on the legality of the Minister‟s actions under s 143 or 
an entitled person can bring an action seeking declaration through an “Originating 
Summons” in PNG‟s National Court.50  
 
                                                          
50
  Derivative action would allow the members of the public to bring an action on behalf of the 
company to get the company, directors and shareholders to do or not to do an act. This is 
important in SOEs where the directors and managers have close relationship and may be reluctant 
to initiate court actions against one another for acting contrary to the requirements of their duties. 
The amendment to the relevant provisions of the Companies Act can allow members of the public 
with vested interest to intervene in such circumstances. 
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An “entitled person” who brings an action against the company not only gives effect 
to implementing the objectives of the company but also ensures government policies 
are realized, which then indirectly gives effect to the National Goals and Directive 
Principles (NGDP) under PNG Constitution as all government policies generally 
reflect and amplify NGDP.
51
 Further, s 55(1) of the Constitution recognizes equality 
for all; however it allows Parliament to enact laws to advance special benefit or 
welfare of the less advanced groups or residents of less advanced areas.
52
 Policies of 
the Government usually reflect the principle of equality, consistent with s 55 and 
NGDP. It is submitted that amendment to “entitled person” is relevant and consistent 
with s 55 and NGDP to enable such people to advance their interests. This applies to 
those people in rural areas who have been waiting for the Government to provide 
them with electricity or telecommunication services for the last 35 years.  
 
15.4.3.2 Civil and Criminal Penalties 
   
In Australia, additional elements are inserted under civil penalty provisions to hold a 
person criminally responsible for contravention. Officers of companies who 
contravene ss 181, 182 and 183 of the Corporations Act 2001 would be criminally 
liable if they acted improperly using their positions or information of the company 
recklessly or with intentional dishonesty. Also, they would commit an offence under s 
184 of the Corporations Act 2001 if they exercise duty of good faith with 
recklessness or with intentional dishonesty. The additional elements of recklessness 
and intentional dishonesty are added to these various civil penalty provisions to create 
criminal offences.
53
 It is recommended that Companies Act 1997 or a new generic 
corporatisation legislation should adopt Australia‟s approach in criminalizing 
directors or officers of companies who intentionally compromise their duty of good 
faith. This would be seen not only as punitive but as a deterrent measure, to punish 
officers who violate their duty of good faith and would prevent future breaches. 
 
                                                          
51
  Constitution of PNG, s 25.  
52
  Constitution of PNG, s 55(2).  
53
  There are other civil penalty provisions that have criminal consequences where there is violation 
under Australia‟s Corporations Act 2001. For example, see ss 208, 209(3), 254L(3), 256D(4), 
259F(3), 260D(3), 344 and 588G(3) of the Act. The commonality among these provisions is the 
element of dishonesty in them that creates criminal offence. 
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15.4.3.3 Permanent Parliamentary Committee on SOEs 
 
The national Parliament has the power to establish permanent Parliamentary 
committees.
54
 These committees are established to cover all major fields of the 
national Government‟s activities. In compliance with s 118 of PNG‟s Constitution 
Parliament must establish a PPCSOE by an Act of Parliament. The Act would 
provide for membership, jurisdictions, functions, powers and procedures of PPCSOE. 
Backbenchers and members of the opposition must constitute the membership of 
PPCSOE. The powers and functions of PPCSOE must be generally to review the 
policies and administration of SOEs. Its specific roles and responsibilities must 
include the following: 
 
a. Ensure that all annual reports of SOEs are submitted to the Ombudsman 
Commission, PAC, IPBC and Department of Treasury, published in one of the 
national newspapers and submitted to Government and must tabled in the 
national Parliament. 
 
b. Ensure every SOE has a corporate plan, which is reviewed annually. 
 
c. Ensure the Ombudsman Commission, PAC, the Auditor General and the 
Department of Treasury are performing their obligations of making certain 
that all participants in governance of SOEs are responsible and accountable in 
performing their duties. 
 
d. Ensure that responsible Ministers are performing their obligations as provided 
in legislation and company documents. If they are not performing their duties, 
PPCSOE should refer them to the Ombudsman Commission or PAC for 
investigations.  
 
                                                          
54
  Constitution of PNG, s 118.  
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In addition, the PPCSOE must have the authority to call upon CEOs to answer for the 
efficiencies and the effectiveness of SOEs‟ operations. PPCSOE would be similar to 
PAC in a sense that like PAC it is a Parliamentary committee, but PAC has specific 
responsibilities to deal with financial matters including the power to investigate the 
accounts of all public bodies, inclusive of SOEs and governmental departments. 
PPCSOE would not deal with financial matters. Its area of responsibility would be 
confined to SOEs. The requirements of PPCSOE need to be clearly spelt out. 
 
15.5 INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
 
Internal and external accountability are equally important. Both have to operate 
together to ensure good corporate governance in an SOE. Sir Adrian Cadbury noted 
“…the actions which corporations take to improve their internal governance cannot 
make up for their deficiencies in their external framework, notably if an appropriate 
and enforceable legal system is lacking.”55  It is also true to say that the improvement 
in external framework cannot substitute for deficiencies in internal governance. In 
other words external accountability mechanisms, as discussed above, cannot be 
effective if the powers and functions of stakeholders in the governance of SOEs are 
not clearly specified. There has to be a clear standard whereby these stakeholders can 
be held to account. From Part V, there are many issues with the role of responsible 
Ministers, board, directors and CEOs that were identified and must be addressed to 
ensure good governance.  These issues are discussed below.  
 
15.5.1 Understanding Corporate Governance 
 
The conclusion reached from case studies is that participants were either not aware of 
the concept of corporate governance, or were unable to explain it. There is a greater 
need for SOEs to educate and provide training for their directors and managers on 
issues regarding corporate governance. Through this training they must be provided 
with general information about the public sector and the role of the Government; 
                                                          
55
  Cadbury, A., “Foreword,” in Claessens, S., Corporate Governance and Development, (March 
2003), [page 7] < 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/cgf.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Focus_1_CG_and_Development/$FILE/Fo
cus_1_Corp_Governance_and_Development.pdf > at 26 March 2009. 
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different legislation governing SOEs and the role of public institutions such as the 
Ombudsman Commission and PAC in relation to SOEs; information about their 
specific organization and its hierarchical structure; the powers, functions and 
procedures of the board and their own powers and functions, including fiduciary duty 
and duty of care, skill and diligence.  Training must be made compulsory in each 
SOE. 
 
15.5.2 The Role of the Government  
 
The legislation and SOEs‟ documents are silent on the powers and functions of 
responsible Ministers. This is the biggest hindrance to good corporate governance. 
Lack of clear expression of their roles and responsibilities has allowed the Ministers 
to interfere and control the management of SOEs who are confused about their own 
responsibilities and the responsibilities of the Ministers. Given their hierarchical 
status over management responsible Ministers can assume total control over the 
management without written explanation setting out the extent of their 
responsibilities. Having Ministers‟ roles specified would set the limit to how they 
should deal with SOEs and put management on notice as to the extent to which they 
can accept ministerial involvement. If there are two or more responsible Ministers, 
their powers and functions in relation to that SOE must be clearly specified. 
 
In statutory corporations, the Government makes direct appointment of directors and 
CEOs, except in NHC where the Government appoints after compliance with the 
process under the Regulatory Statutory Authorities (Appointment to Certain Offices) 
Act 2004 (RSA Act). Under the Act certain persons have to be consulted before 
appointment. In Part V, the Government does not comply with these requirements. 
On the other hand, although the Broadcasting Corporation Act 1973 does not provide 
clearly for the appointment and removal directors and CEOs, the Government 
continues to appoint and terminate them. It is suggested that appointment and 
termination of directors in NHC and NBC must comply with processes under the 
RSA Act. In state companies, IPBC is supposed to appoint directors and CEOs, 
however, the Minister of SOEs is still responsible for the appointment of directors 
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contrary to the IPBC Act and the Companies Act 1997. The Minister‟s actions are in 
serious breach of the Companies Act.  
 
Government appoints persons who have political affiliations with the parties in 
government. It is recommended that appointments should be made on merit. In 
circumstances where appointment is to be made on political affiliation candidates 
should demonstrate excellence in relevant skills and achievement and must 
demonstrate any significant political activity in the last five years. Where a statute 
requires a particular group or organization to appoint a delegate, the group should 
make the appointment according to merit-based criteria. The appointment and 
removal process must be set out in writing and must be open to public examination. 
In other words they must be transparent. The PPCSOE must scrutinize every 
appointment and removal made by the Government. It is suggested that for state 
companies IPBC should appoint directors and the board should appoint the CEO. In 
doing so, the Government is isolated from any direct dealings with state companies 
and only deals indirectly through IPBC.  
 
In PNG, responsible Ministers often interfere in operational matters inaptly or 
unofficially and abdicate responsibility by classifying all failures as operational – this 
situation occurs because there is a lack of express provisions on the powers and 
functions of ministers to hold them responsible and accountable.
56
 It is suggested that 
there must be a clear distinction between policy and operational matters. These must 
be clarified in the corporate plan. In conclusion the Government must be separated 
from SOEs. 
 
15.5.3 The Board  
 
All board members who were interviewed and who answered the questions in Part V 
do not fully understand their governing roles and responsibilities. The lack of 
                                                          
56
  For example, the responsible Minister for NHC, Andrew Kumbakor directed sales of the NHC 
building complex in Hohola, Port Moresby. He stated in Parliament, when questioned that it was 
a management decision and he had nothing to do with it. On interview during a case study, the 
former CEO at the time of the sales stated that the direction came from the Minister‟s office to 
sell NHC housing complex in Hohola and had nothing to do with his management at that time. 
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knowledge is the result of several causes including a lack of managerial knowledge 
and experience, lack of training or not having these responsibilities clearly provided 
in legislation, company constitutions or other documents of SOEs. To address these 
issues SOEs must have company charters that clearly set the powers and functions of 
the board. Having these duties provided in the document would provide a general 
guideline for the board to follow without making compliance compulsory so that the 
boards are still flexible and effective. One of the duties is for boards to appoint and 
terminate CEOs and senior managers. This duty must be made mandatory. This 
would ensure boards are effective and have the power to discipline management 
through appointment and termination. An important organ of the board is a board 
committee. These committees assist the board with workload. The committee must be 
provided with clear number, composition and procedure for reporting to the board. 
Apart from the committee, the board must have two executive directors. These 
directors must be in full time employment in SOEs. 
 
Chairpersons of SOEs in PNG experience the same dilemma of confusion and 
uncertainty over their responsibilities. They have important responsibilities of 
promoting cohesive effectiveness and functioning of the board and in doing so play a 
pivotal role in creating a good relationship between the Government ministers and the 
board. In this case the responsible Minister, in principle, is supposed to deal directly 
with the chairperson and the board. However, responsible Ministers deal with CEOs 
directly in most cases, making the role of the chairman ineffective as a result. 
Legislation or company documents should clearly set out the powers and function of 
the chairperson. This would ensure that the relationship between the chairperson and 
board, and the chairperson and responsible Ministers are monitored. Also, the job of 
chairperson must be a full-time position. 
 
CEOs of SOEs are basically the head of the management team and they perform 
administrative responsibilities. Their positions are hierarchically below the board and 
the responsible Ministers and for state companies, IPBC. However, in Part V, the 
roles and responsibilities of CEOs are not specified. The CEOs are generally required 
to provide leadership and strategic management in SOEs and in statutory corporations 
they are expected to provide policy advice to the responsible Ministers. 
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Unfortunately, these roles are not clearly identified; hence the leadership and strategic 
management roles of CEOs are poorly differentiated from those of the board. The 
CEO is at the top of the management team and his or her relationship with the board 
and the responsible Minister must be clearly articulated. For state companies, it is 
confusing for a CEO who has to deal with the board, IPBC and the Minister for 
SOEs. The responsibility of these stakeholders must be clearly articulated. 
 
15.5.4 Accountability 
 
Reporting is important in an SOE. All SOEs that are the subject of case studies in 
Part V indicated that they submit annual reports, however to whom the report is 
submitted and what is reported is important. It is suggested that the annual report 
should consist of corporate governance practices and the achievements of the 
organization. The corporate governance practice report, amongst other things, should 
consist of the structure and composition of the board, and the appointment and 
removal processes. Apart from submitting the report to Parliament and the company 
office for state companies, all SOEs must submit a copy of the report to the 
Department of Treasury and to one of the national newspapers in compliance with s 
51 of PNG‟s Constitution.  
 
Every SOE must have a corporate plan and submit their plan to responsible Ministers 
for approval before implementation and provide a copy to the Department of 
Treasury. State companies must submit their corporate plan to IPBC and the plan is to 
be approved by IPBC in consultation with Minister for SOEs. In addition to corporate 
plans, each SOE must have a “State of Corporate Intent” (SCI) like NZ and Australia, 
which sets out the objectives to be achieved half-yearly or annually. An SOE must be 
measured on the achievement of these objectives. Failure to achieve them must be 
reported and explained. It must be clearly stated that, apart from the end of each year 
when SCIs are reviewed, the Government must not intervene from time to time with 
policy directives of state companies. Hence, it must be mandatory for SCIs to be 
reviewed every year.  
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No SOE boards monitor and evaluate their own performance and that of individual 
board members in their official capacity. This is not a surprise given the fact that 
boards have no code of conduct. For state companies, directors are required to act in 
accordance with the Companies Act 1997, which requires them to comply with their 
fiduciary duties. That involves acting with integrity, care, skills and diligence and in 
the best interests of the company. However, most directors lack an understanding of 
these requirements. For statutory corporation there is no such requirement. It is 
suggested that all SOEs should have a code of conduct so that every board member 
has access to and can follow the code. 
 
15.6 UNIFORM LEGISLATION 
 
Given the importance of corporate governance in SOEs in PNG, it is proper that 
corporate governance principles highlighted above are provided in generic legislation 
following the examples of New Zealand, Queensland and New South Wales. This 
would ensure simplicity, clarity, consistency and uniformity in the corporate 
governance framework. The legislation must, in general, provide mechanisms for 
creating SOEs and provide for both statutory and state companies. First, the 
legislation must, in detail, include the governance of each type of SOE including:  
 
a. the powers and functions of the Government and relevant ministers; and  
b. the powers and functions of the board, chairperson, directors and CEOs. 
 
Secondly, and of equal importance is the provision for accountability of SOEs. Under 
accountability the legislation must state clearly: 
 
a. the role of the Ombudsman Commission, PAC and PPCSOE in SOEs; 
b. that SOEs must have a corporate plan and SCI and their content should be 
outlined in legislation. The relevant minister must have an input in the 
formulation of the corporate plan and SCI and the latter must be reviewed 
annually. In the annual report SOEs must state whether they have met their 
obligation under SCI. 
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c. that the SOEs must submit annual and half-yearly reports. One of the matters 
to be reported must be corporate governance practice. The legislation must 
also state that the Government, Department of Treasury or the Auditor 
General may request any information from time to time. 
d. that annual and half-yearly reports must be presented in Parliament.  
e. that SOEs must present their reports in one of the national newspapers for the 
people of PNG, so as to meet the requirement under s 51 of PNG‟s 
Constitution; and 
f. the objectives of SOEs and the legislation must give equal prominence to 
commercial and community service obligations.
57
 
 
It is recommended that the country should adopt generic corporatisation legislation 
similar to the Government Owned Corporations Act 1993 (Qld) and the State Owned 
Corporations Act 1989 (NSW) as discussed in chapter 7. The corporatisation 
legislation must adopt the above points and give effect to the corporate governance 
principles identified in the introduction of independence, transparency, responsibility, 
accountability and social responsibility. 
 
15.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has shown that SOEs in PNG are “public bodies” and are subject to the 
requirement under the PFM Act, subject to investigation by the Ombudsman 
Commission and PAC, and subject to audit by the Auditor General. Parliament also 
has an important responsibility to ensure accountability, although it lacks motivation 
in performing its duty in discussing and debating matters arising from the annual 
reports. Further, the requirement under the PFM Act is not met through submission of 
annual reports and corporate plans to the Department of Treasury. The Auditor 
General is left as the only effective external accountability mechanism. It only 
focuses on the accounts of SOEs to ensure accountability, however the Ombudsman 
Commission and PAC that were supposed to hold the responsible Ministers and 
management responsible for their actions or omissions are not performing their 
                                                          
57
  Have similar provision to s 17 of the Government Owned Corporations Act 1993 (Qld). 
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constitutional responsibilities. The effort to ensure proper accountability is not 
assisted in having inconsistencies in the legal framework and corporate governance 
practice and having roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in governance 
unspecified. 
 
Steps forward are firstly to create a PPCSOE, which must ensure that SOEs meet all 
their legal responsibilities, one of which is to ensure that half-yearly and annual 
reports of SOEs are presented in Parliament, published in national newspapers, and 
submitted to the Department of Treasury. Second, entitled person under the 
Companies Act must be amended to include members of the public so that they can 
take action, especially in situations where non-compliance with community service 
obligations directly affects them. Third, create a criminal offence for intentional 
breach of duty of good faith. Finally, PNG must adopt generic corporatisation 
legislation that must provide for governance and accountability mechanisms, 
including the role of the Ombudsman Commission and PAC in SOEs and which will 
clearly specify the roles of relevant ministers, IPBC, board, directors and CEO in 
SOEs. In doing so the legislation would provide for internal and external 
accountability mechanisms, prevent relevant ministers from dealing directly with 
SOEs, or where the minister still assumes control, provide for ministerial 
responsibility to apply to SOEs so as to ensure that SOEs remain within the purview 
of public institutions such as PPCSOE, the Auditor General and the Ombudsmen 
Commission. 
 
 320 
CHAPTER 16: 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
16.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance has become a buzzword in the last 25 years. It has gained 
prominence due to separation of ownership and control (chapter 2). Corporate 
governance has become the talk of the governments, policy makers, organizations and 
international bodies such as OECD and the World Bank. Much of the literature on 
corporate governance is focused on private sector corporations, and literatures on 
public sector corporations is mainly focused on public sectors in developed or 
industrialised countries. Problems in corporate governance arise when managers 
administer corporations in a manner which is not promoting the interest of the 
owners. It is illegal and morally wrong, as fiduciaries to use corporations to pursue 
self-interest; in other words, to pursue interests that are not in the best interest of the 
corporation. Apart from pursuing the interests of shareholders corporations have 
relationships with other stakeholders such as creditors, customers, employees and 
suppliers whose interest must also be taken into account - not to mention 
communities that are affected by their activities.  
 
In light of the different stakeholders in a company, and different interests that have to 
be taken into account, definitions of corporate governance differ. There is no single 
definition that is collectively accepted (chapter 3). The narrow definition only defines 
the interest and relationship of shareholders with the management whereas the broad 
definition encapsulates interest of the shareholders and other stakeholders, and their 
relationships with the management. Like Papua New Guinea (chapter 10), laws in 
New Zealand (NZ), Australia and the UK promote shareholders‟ interests and their 
short term interests (chapter 4). On the other hand German and Japanese models of 
corporate governance promote the interests of shareholders, and other stakeholders 
and their longer term interests (chapter 4). Given these situations definitional ambit of 
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corporate governance differs from one society to another and one organization to 
another to cater for the reality or the practice. 
 
Unlike private sector corporations, the State is the sole shareholder in state owned 
enterprise (SOE) or has the controlling interest. The State is represented through 
government and other public bodies (chapter 5). Its role is not only restricted to 
regulation and policy-making but extends to welfarism. Public bodies are state agents 
that exercise and perform the delegated powers and functions of the Government. A 
state has multiple interests which are reflected in the broad objectives of SOEs that 
vary from commercial to non-commercial. Stakeholders in SOEs include members of 
the public, suppliers, customers and employees. In order to understand corporate 
governance in SOEs in a particular society, laws and practice need to be examined.   
 
In the context of Papua New Guinea (PNG) the Government controls more than 50 
per cent of the economy and uses SOEs to participate in it. Since Independence in 
1975, SOEs have been increasingly facing problems in governance and 
accountability. Some corporate governance problems identified in PNG include 
situations where procedures are not complied with in appointing and terminating 
directors and chief executive officers (CEOs); directors and CEOs are involved in 
self-interested activities; appointment of political associates and family members as 
directors and managers which borders on nepotism, or the appointment of persons to 
management positions who do not have skill, knowledge or experience. These issues 
make the study of corporate governance in SOEs important. And yet there is no 
literature on corporate governance in SOEs to identify and address these issues.  
 
In this research I have attempted as much as possible to fill the void in the literature, 
document empirical evidence on corporate governance in SOEs and specifically 
identify how relevant Ministers, directors and CEOs are held accountable in SOEs, 
and identify whether problems in corporate governance is one of the factors that 
contribute to the quality and efficiency of services.  
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16.2  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR 
CORPORATIONS 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the narrow and broad definitions of corporate governance in the 
private sector. It is stated that the definition depends on the laws in a particular 
jurisdiction and/or practice in a particular organization and whether managers owe 
their obligation to shareholders only or shareholders and other stakeholders of the 
company. Corporate governance arises out of the agency theory; hence the theory is 
at the heart of it. In chapter 2 agency theory was discussed in connection with the 
doctrine of separation of ownership and control, which creates the agent and principal 
relationship. In such situations agents as humans would always attempt to pursue 
interests other than that of shareholders, hence different jurisdictions put in 
mechanisms in an attempt to align the interests of the owners and the managers. In 
the private sector the alignment of the two interests is done through external markets, 
and monitoring and bonding devices. There is an agency cost for aligning the two 
interests. Chapters 2 and 7 highlight that the external markets are costless in terms of 
agency cost. Chapter 4 looks specifically at corporate governance in NZ, Australia 
and other jurisdiction. Generally, Australia and NZ along with the UK have a system 
of self-regulation, sometimes called an outsider-based system of corporate 
governance. Their private sector corporations are subject to external markets. On the 
contrary the Japanese and German models have an insider system; hence external 
markets do not play a significant and effective role in disciplining managers. The 
insider system of corporate governance is based on majority/concentrated 
shareholding and stakeholders who perform important roles in corporations, 
particularly decision making at the board level. Therefore, the objectives are long-
term viability of the company rather than short-term, and the company takes into 
account the interests of other stakeholders rather than just the shareholders. 
 
The principles of corporate governance in the public sector are intended to replicate 
that of the private sector (chapter 6).  In the public sector the State is the shareholder 
instead of private individuals as in private sector corporations. Chapter 5 discusses 
the role of the State and it is unequivocal from the discussion that the role of the State 
today is not restricted to military might, conquest of other territories, or strict 
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regulation, but extends to providing social and economic welfare for society.  This 
makes the State depart from its traditional role, using different mechanisms such as 
SOEs to participate in regulation, policy, trade and other commercial and non-
commercial activities. 
 
As the State becomes more involved in these commercial and non-commercial 
activities through various institutions and organizations efficiency and profitability 
historically tend to suffer. This makes the statement that “one cannot serve two 
masters” become true. That means a government that pursues too many commercial 
and non-commercial objectives will be less efficient and effective compared with a 
government which focuses on one objective. Too many objectives would spread out 
resources, time and effort, hence efficiency would suffer. Further, government is the 
main and sole shareholder in SOEs. With multiple interests, a government can direct 
SOEs to be involved in a broad array of activities, whether commercial or community 
service or even self-interested activities if there are ineffective accountability 
mechanisms. Therefore, the corporatisation process was undertaken to separate state 
interests from the activities of SOEs. Corporatisation establishes a clear hierarchical 
structure, clear and defined objectives, defines the roles of stakeholders in 
governance, and provides effective accountability (chapter 6). As discussed in chapter 
6 and highlighted in chapter 7 the corporatisation process in NZ, Queensland and 
New South Wales was aimed at separating state control from the activities of SOEs 
and making SOEs become more like private sector entities so that they operate in an 
efficient and/or profitable manner. However, it is seen in chapter 7 discussing 
“corporate governance in public sector” that the State generally controls SOEs. This 
is also true for Papua New Guinea. 
 
The positive outcomes of corporatisation are the establishment of the legal framework 
of SOEs, and clear provisions on governance and accountability under the State-
Owned Enterprise Act 1986 (SOE Act) for commercial entities and the Crown 
Entities Act 2004 (CE Act) for non-commercial entities in NZ, the Government 
Owned Corporation Act 1993 (GOC Act) for Queensland and the State Owned 
Corporation Act 1989 (SOC Act) for New South Wales (NSW). Further, the GOC 
 324 
Act and SOC Act perform not only a regulative role but also a facilitative role in 
providing the corporatisation process.
1
  
 
Chapter 7 concluded that corporatised entities would never achieve the efficiency 
and/or profitability similar to that of the private sector. However, SOEs must not be 
dismissed as a mere hybrid system created by a “nothing to do government” in order 
to have some form of control over the private sector and society generally. 
Jurisdictions that have similar models of governance to SOEs in the private sector 
have recorded success in terms of efficiency and profitability. For example, much of 
the corporate governance structure in SOEs reflects the German and Japanese models 
in private sector corporations as discussed in chapter 4. The commonalities with the 
German and Japanese models that are shared by SOEs in NZ and Australia are 
concentrated shareholding, stakeholder representation on boards and that the 
objectives of corporations not only focus on shareholders‟ interests but on other 
stakeholders. It must also be noted that the success of corporations in these 
jurisdiction does not only depend on the type of model adopted but on other factors 
such as regulation, history, culture and business environment. 
 
There are many differences in ensuring accountability and aligning the interest of 
shareholders with that of managers in private and public sector corporations. Chapter 
2 pointed out three ways of aligning the interest of shareholders and managers. These 
are through bonding, monitoring and external markets. The common strategy in 
bonding is through pay for performance. The external markets include the managerial 
market, product market, share market and market for corporate control. As discussed 
in chapter 7, bonding and external markets do not apply in SOEs. Without the 
bonding device and external markets, SOEs rely on monitoring by government. It is 
noted in chapter 7 that there are problems associated with government monitoring of 
SOEs.  
 
Like NZ and Australia, accountability in SOEs in PNG is not maintained through 
external markets or bonding. Government is required to perform an important role in 
                                                          
1
  Government Owned Corporation Act, 1993, Chapter 2. 
 325 
ensuring accountability through monitoring; however this becomes a major cause of 
problems in corporate governance. In order to adopt an appropriate model of 
corporate governance of a society one must take into account and consider the 
political and socio-economic circumstances, and the history, culture and prevailing 
ideologies of the society. PNG is connected to NZ and Australia in many respects.  
 
Before Independence PNG was under Australian administration and most of the 
Australian - era laws were adopted immediately after Independence. Some of the laws 
such as the current Companies Act 1997 and Securities Act 1997 were adopted from 
NZ (chapter 10). PNG, NZ and Australia inherited the common law system from 
England and they all practice liberal democracy (chapter 8). These factors must also 
be balanced and guided by cultural influences, and the political and socio-economic 
circumstances of the country. PNG‟s culture is socialist oriented where sharing and 
caring for one another is a norm. This practice is reflected on a large scale at the 
national political level. 
 
Most voters expect that these successful candidates will use political office to extract 
resources from the government and deliver them back to their supporters… to distribute the 
rewards of office to maintain support for the next election. … Rent-seeking has flourished … 
Political time horizons are short, with most parliamentarians lasting only a single term in 
office, so productive investments are curtailed as newly elected politicians focus their 
energies on short-term wealth distribution to shore up their supporter base rather than long-
term wealth creation. 
2
 
 
When politicians cannot find enough resources to provide for their people and large 
group of supporters they become involved in corrupt practices. They put their 
associates into public bodies such as SOEs to reward their loyalty and to assist with 
their self-interested activities or to advance their political ambitions. This practice is 
wide spread from government departments to public bodies and other governmental 
agencies.  
 
In chapter 8 I tried to show that politics has a greater influence in society and with 
weak state institutions corruption becomes systematic. This results in the country 
facing many dilemmas of development due to the inevitable consequence of corrupt 
practices (chapter 9). Chapters 12 and 13 recorded the primary data on corporate 
                                                          
2
  Reilly, B., Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific, (2007) 65 – 66. 
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governance, applying the data collection methodology discussed in chapter 11. The 
data uncovers many and varying problems in corporate governance in SOEs. 
 
16.3 OUTCOMES OF THE STUDY 
 
The case studies presented in Part V document corporate governance practice and 
chapter 14 provides the legal framework. They are presented to answer three research 
questions posed in chapter 1. The main question is: what is the position of corporate 
governance in law and practice? Generally, the study reveals inconsistencies between 
the laws and practices of corporate governance, confusion and lack of understanding 
over roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in governance, and lack of 
accountability of different stakeholders in SOEs. Clearly, there is little or no 
separation between ownership and control. Three specific research questions were 
asked in chapter 1 to look at the position of corporate governance in PNG‟s SOEs. 
 
First, how is the Government accountable for its involvement in SOEs? In the 
hierarchical structure of SOEs, management is accountable to the board and the board 
is accountable to the Government and IPBC with respect to state companies. In 
practice the relevant Ministers can at anytime intervene and interfere in the processes 
and activities of the board and management, and provide directions from time to time. 
The roles of relevant Ministers are specified in some SOEs and not others. The 
Ministers are not given legislative guidance on their involvement in SOEs. Where 
they are provided Ministers either act beyond or contrary to their legal duties. Further, 
often the relevant Ministers are not held accountable for their conduct in SOEs. 
Parliament rarely debates issues with regard to SOEs and it is not clear whether 
public institutions such as the Ombudsmen Commission can investigate the roles of 
relevant Ministers. The study shows, in answer to the question, that the Government 
is not accountable for its role in SOEs. 
 
Second, how are directors and CEOs held accountable? Accountability of different 
stakeholders in governance of SOEs is also questionable.  The roles and 
responsibilities of the board, chairperson, directors, and CEOs are provided in some 
SOEs and not others. Where they are provided these stakeholders do not understand 
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what they are. Some SOEs, mainly statutory corporations only implement 
government policies. There is no realistic yardstick to measure the performance of 
these SOEs in six months or one year. Others have corporate plans that are reviewed 
every three years. Thus, SOEs are not bound to achieve specific objectives in a short 
term. In such circumstances SOEs can do nothing and yet would not be held 
responsible for inaction. Further, SOEs except for the National Broadcasting 
Corporation (NBC), do not submit annual reports to the Department of Treasury. 
There is no requirement for specific information to be reported in SOEs apart from 
the general requirement under the Companies Act. And there is confusion over 
whether SOEs are subject to investigation by the Public Accounts Committee, or the 
Ombudsman Commission, or are answerable to the Department of Treasury, apart 
from the NBC, which submits annual reports to Treasury. From the case studies none 
of the public institutions have examined or investigated the SOEs. However, laws, 
namely the PNG Constitution and the Public Finances (Management) Act 1995, are 
very clear that SOEs are public bodies and therefore must be subjected to public 
scrutiny. With these weak internal and external accountability mechanisms directors 
and CEOs only have to please the relevant Ministers to maintain their jobs. Hence, 
directors and CEOs move in and out when there is a change of government. 
 
The third question is whether corporate governance is a factor that affects the quality 
and efficiency of services. This question cannot be conclusively answered. On one 
hand, it is clear from the study that the main objectives of statutory corporations are 
to implement government policies - mainly non-commercial objectives, although 
profitability is also the important focus in some. The reason for establishing a 
statutory corporation is to create an autonomous entity that is separate from the 
Government so that there is efficiency in the production and delivery services. 
Chapters 12 shows that quality and efficiency of services by statutory corporations 
are generally rated poor. On the other hand, state companies are required to be 
efficient and profitable in pursuing both commercial and non-commercial objectives. 
State companies, except for Telikom PNG Ltd, do not expressly provide for 
community service obligations. From past reports state companies have generated 
substantial profits; however, chapter 13 shows that the quality and efficiency of their 
services are also rated poor. Being efficient does not mean that a company would be 
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profitable. That also means that in a monopoly a corporation can be inefficient and 
yet can achieve profitability. Lack of good corporate governance partly contributes to 
inefficiency and poor quality of services. There are other factors such as a lack of 
government funding and of resources in SOEs that may support and assist in causing 
these problems. These issues are not examined in this study. 
 
16.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
There are several limitations to this research that needs to be highlighted. First, my 
earlier objective was to engage the views of many former directors and CEOs. Most 
of them have retired or gained employment with organizations outside of Port 
Moresby. Without their address and contact numbers, I was unable to contact them. 
The reason for engaging this category of participants is that they are no longer 
employed with SOEs and would provide accurate information and express honest 
views on the issues. I was able to find some in Port Moresby who provided useful 
information for purposes of synthesising and analysis. Second, there is total lack of 
literature on corporate governance in PNG or if there is any then I am not aware of it. 
Much of the data collected is based on statutes, annual reports, annual returns, 
minutes of board meetings, corporate plans for state companies and data information 
through interviews. And thirdly, current directors and CEOs are politically appointed 
and many of them were reluctant to venture into politically sensitive discussions for 
fear of divulging information that may tarnish the reputation of the Government. 
Being aware of this limitation I have also engaged the senior managers.  
 
16.5 THE WAY FORWARD 
 
No single solution can resolve the number of issues in corporate governance which 
have been identified in this research. I have tried to provide a number of solutions in 
chapter 15 that may address each problem raised in chapters 12, 13 and 14. To 
effectively address these issues the laws and practice of corporate governance must 
be examined in totality. Chapter 14 discusses the position of corporate governance 
assessing both statutory provisions and the practices.  
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One of the glaring matters that surfaces in every case study is the role of the 
Government. The participants, especially former directors and CEOs repeatedly 
stated that there is too much Government interference and involvement in SOEs. By 
comparison relevant Ministers in NZ and Australia are used as effective monitoring 
mechanisms. In PNG relevant Ministers intervene in SOEs to advance political 
agendas or self-interest. Their roles as effective monitoring devices are substituted in 
pursuance of other agendas using SOEs. In such circumstances where a relevant 
Minister has conflicting agendas, what hope do SOEs have of achieving their aims of 
efficiency and/or profitability? Particularly, in a situation where the relevant Minister 
is the only monitoring instrument and connives with the board and management to 
pursue self-interests or allow management to pursue self-interests. The relevant 
Minister is assisted by associates of the Government sitting on the board and 
management to facilitate the achievement of these conflicting agendas to thrive. It 
seems that shareholders are less interested in an SOE achieving its objectives, and are 
using it to pursue other objectives. The lack of proper monitoring is also facilitated by 
the following factors: the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in the governance 
of SOEs are not clearly specified, there is confusion over whether SOEs are subject to 
public institutions for accountability, state institutions are weak, and SOEs have 
multiple objectives that are not clearly specified.  
 
Clearly, there are major issues with corporate governance. The overall framework of 
corporate governance needs to be re-examined and developed to address the current 
state of affairs. This requires major improvements in external and internal 
accountability mechanisms. Chapter 15 discusses different solutions to provide a way 
forward on how to monitor relevant Ministers, IPBC, directors and CEOs. 
Accountability as discussed in chapter 15 is about answerability and responsibility for 
illegal behaviour or wrongful acts. Clear external and internal accountability 
mechanisms would ensure that stakeholders in SOEs are answerable for their conduct 
and will be penalised accordingly if found guilty. The way forward is to look to NZ 
and Australia with whom PNG shares a common history, including the legal history, 
and ideologies. 
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Literature on corporate governance largely focuses on how to align the interests of the 
owners and the controllers in corporations (chapter 2). In SOEs it is the converse. The 
experience in NZ and Australia shows that their legislative framework has achieved 
the objectives of corporatisation; however government still maintains control of SOEs 
(chapters 6 and 7). These are two developed countries with stable political systems 
and vibrant state institutions, and they have a vigilant and investigative media that 
holds ministers accountable for their public duties. The system ensures that relevant 
Ministers are transparent and accountable. On the contrary PNG has an unstable and 
unpredictable political system, and weak state institutions. Hence, given such an 
environment, the Government must not control SOEs. The effort should be made to 
separate the activities of SOEs from the Government, create an autonomous board 
and empower it to monitor and discipline managers through appointment and 
termination. Further, clearly provide the roles and responsibilities of boards, directors 
and CEOs, and set out the objectives and the goals to be achieved every twelve 
months. The reporting process of each SOE must be established, including guidelines 
on what is to be reported. The roles of public institutions that are responsible for 
monitoring SOEs to ensure accountability must be clearly stated. In adopting these 
measures, there is a clear hierarchical structure, SOEs become independent from 
government and clear internal and external accountability mechanisms are 
established. These issues can properly be addressed in generic corporatisation 
legislation to ensure clarity, consistency and uniformity.  
 
16.6 FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
First, it must be reemphasized and made absolutely clear before concluding that 
corporate governance in SOEs will never replicate corporate governance in the 
private sector. The latter will remain supreme unless SOEs are privatised. Whether 
PNG should be directed toward privatization is an issue that is beyond the scope of 
this study, however it would be an interesting research topic in the future, as to date, 
nothing substantive has been written on privatization in PNG. Second, future research 
should also look at whether the introduction of competition in product and factor 
markets would improve corporate governance in SOEs in PNG. Currently, SOEs that 
are the subject of these case studies have a monopoly over their markets. It would be 
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interesting to see whether competition would be feasible and could improve corporate 
governance. Third, future research should examine whether introducing different 
forms of ownership in SOEs, with the State maintaining 51 per cent interest, would 
improve corporate governance in SOEs. Finally, on a related issue, there is need for 
further research into corporate governance in the private sector. There is lack of 
substantive research like this on corporate governance in private sector corporations 
in PNG. These are some of the areas of research that can be pursued in the future. 
 
16.7 CONCLUSION 
 
What this study shows is that a successful system of corporate governance derived 
from the private sector cannot adequately cope with the diversity and complexity of 
ownership and ownership interests and board compositions and functions at the 
public sector level. Further, an elegantly successful system of corporate governance 
in the public sector in one society cannot adequately cope with the diversity and 
complexity of ownership and ownership interests and the board and management 
compositions and functions in another society. In order to adopt an alternative 
system, there needs to be an understanding of corporate governance from the legal 
point of view and also from a practical standpoint to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses in a given sector. In addition, the process of selecting an alternative 
system must be guided by the ideologies, culture, political and socio-economic 
circumstances of the society. After looking at the legal position and practice on 
corporate governance, political and socio-economic circumstances and the national 
goals under PNG Constitution, it is clear that SOEs are important for PNG‟s 
developing economy and they can play an important role in developmental 
endeavours to achieve goals envisaged by the “National Goals and Directives 
Principles” in the national Constitution. At this juncture there is a need to separate 
activities of SOEs from the Government and provide for clear and consistent internal 
and external accountability mechanisms. Clarity and consistency can only be 
achieved through generic corporatisation legislation. The suggestions for 
improvement of corporate governance must not be seen as a final solution to bring an 
end to corporate governance woes but to minimize the effects of bad governance.  
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As Professor John Farrar stated: 
 
Good corporate governance does not guarantee good performance but its absence usually 
indicates present or future problems.
3
 
                                                          
3
  Farrar, J. H., Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles and Practice, (3
rd
 edn., 2008)  xxxix. 
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Appendix C: Letter to the Director of the Centre for Human 
Resource Development – University of Papua New 
Guinea 
 
Mange John Matui 
The School of Law 
The University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton 
New Zealand 
 
Telephone: +64 7 838 4190 
Facsimile: +64 7 838 4171 
Email:    mjm58@waikato.ac.nz 
Website: www.waikato.ac.nz/law 
 
Dr. Bernard Minol  
The Director 
Centre for Human Resource Development 
University of Papua New Guinea 
P. O. Box 320 
University 
National Capital District 
Papua New Guinea 
 
27
th
 March 2008 
 
Dear Dr. Minol, 
 
Re: CONDUCTING RESEARCH IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
 
As you are well aware from our previous communications that I have spent one year at the 
University of Waikato, and have written detailed “research proposal” which I have submitted 
with “ethics application form”. The research proposal and the ethics application have been 
approved (see attachment) and I will be leaving New Zealand for Papua New Guinea in April 
2008. As a member of staff of University of Papua New Guinea I am required to inform your 
office about the nature of the study and how I am conducting the research in the country. 
Further, I am aware that I have to meet certain requirements to conduct research in Papua 
New Guinea. 
 
I have met the ethics requirements of the University of Waikato. I need to be informed of any 
requirements that I need to meet to conduct research in the country before arrival as I have 
limited time, given five case studies that I have to conduct. I am planning on engaging three 
law students from University of Papua New Guinea to assist me with the research, and need 
financial assistance to engage these students. We will further discuss the issue of funding 
when I arrive in the country. I will also need a letter of support from your office and any 
other support that I may need from time to time while conducting research in Papua New 
Guinea. 
 
The focus of the research is on corporate governance in state-owned enterprises in Papua 
New Guinea and I will be doing five case studies for six months, which includes conducting 
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interviews and document analysis. Professor John Farrar is my supervisor from the 
University of Waikato. He can be contacted on the following address. 
 
Professor John Farrar 
Chief Supervisor 
School of Law 
The University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton 3240 
New Zealand 
Telephone: 64 7 856 2889 
Fax: 64 7 838 4417 
 
I will contact you after receipt of this letter to discuss the above matters. You can also contact 
me on the above address. 
 
Thank you for your time and consideration. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
……………………………. 
Mange John Matui 
PhD Student 
School of Law  
The University of Waikato 
New Zealand 
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Appendix D: Supporting Letter from the Director of the Centre for 
Human Resource Development – University of PNG 
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Appendix E: Letter to the Chairperson of Independent Public 
Business Corporation of Papua New Guinea 
 
Mange John Matui 
The School of Law 
The University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton 
New Zealand 
Telephone: +64 7 838 4190 
Facsimile: +64 7 838 4171 
Email:    mjm58@waikato.ac.nz 
Website: www.waikato.ac.nz/law 
 
The Chairperson 
Independent Public Business Corporation of PNG 
P.O. Box 320 
Port Moresby  
National Capital District 
Papua New Guinea 
Telephone: 675 321 2977 
Facsimile: 675 321 2916 
 
24
th
 April 2008 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
Re: SEEKING CONSENT TO DO CASE STUDY RESEARCH IN STATE 
COMPANIES 
 
My name is Mange John Matui, a PhD student from the School of Law, University of 
Waikato, New Zealand. One of the requirements of my study is collecting empirical data on 
corporate governance practice in state owned enterprises. State-owned enterprises, 
particularly state companies, come under the control and management of the Independent 
Public Business Corporation of which you are the Chairperson. And it is selected as one of 
the case studies. This letter is written with the aim of seeking your permission to conduct 
research in Telikom Ltd, PNG Power Ltd and NCD Water and Sewerage Ltd (Eda Ranu). I 
also need your assistance in formally informing the management of the three state-owned 
enterprises of my presence in their offices in the coming weeks and to ask for their support 
and assistance. 
 
The overall study is on corporate governance in SOEs. The thesis is entitled: DEVELOPING A 
NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME FOR STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISE IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA.  The aim of the study is to document corporate 
governance practice in SOEs in Papua New Guinea and identify factors that affect good 
corporate governance so that out of this research recommendations can be made for 
improvement in governance and accountability in state companies. State-owned enterprises 
perform an important role of providing goods and services to the people of Papua New 
Guinea and yet after 35 years of independence, one of state-owned enterprises‟ important 
aspects, corporate governance has never been examined and discussed. This is also generally 
true for corporate governance in the private sector. In my experience of teaching corporate 
law and business law at the University of Papua New Guinea corporate governance is never 
discussed although many issues in corporations relate to corporate governance. With your 
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assistance and support this research will document corporate governance in three state 
companies and provide recommendations on how to improve governance and accountability 
in them. The study can be used as a model for other state companies with similar structure 
and applying the same law as the three state companies. 
 
I will be in the country for six months. During this time I will be collecting and transcribing 
the data. There will be two method of data collection used. First, in a semi-structured 
interview, the senior managers, directors and chief executive officers will be interviewed 
using semi-structured questions, which will be issued prior to the meeting. A letter will be 
sent to each of the participants explaining the nature of the research and seeking their 
permission to participate, and attached to the letter will be the consent form and “guideline 
questions”. As the name suggest, “guideline questions” will be used as a guide to inform the 
participants as to the type of questions that will be asked and the type of information 
required. The participants will also be asked to answer questions on paper and submit before 
the interview. The interview will take 40 minutes to one hour. Before the interview I will 
collect the signed consent form from the interviewees and any questions that are answered on 
paper before the interview. Second, documents such as annual reports and company 
constitution and other relevant documents pertaining to corporate governance will be 
collected, examined and analyzed during the course of the research. Before getting access to 
the documents I shall seek permission from the chairpersons, chief executive officers and the 
authorities who are in custody of the relevant documents. The objective in using the two 
methods of data collection is to collect an accurate account of corporate governance so that 
proper recommendations can be made for improvement.  
 
As a researcher, I shall respect the norms and practices of individual organizations, the 
participants and the authorities. Also, confidentiality and privacy of the organizations and 
participants is paramount. The names of the participants will not be used in the report; instead 
code names will be used to protect their privacy. Each state company will be identified by 
name so that relevant laws can be discussed that relate to each of them and so that 
recommendation that will be made can be adopted by them. Given the fact also that state-
owned enterprises are public entities, the people of Papua New Guinea and relevant 
government institutions would be interested in the report and want to know what can be done 
about corporate governance in these selected state-owned enterprises and other state-owned 
enterprises. After data collection, the notes from interviews and the audiotapes will be 
transcribed and the transcript will be submitted to participants for confirmation. The 
confirmation process will ensure accuracy of the data information and provide an opportunity 
for the participants to make changes to expressions that do not truly and clearly convey their 
intentions. 
 
I can be contacted at the following address in Papua New Guinea: 
Centre for Human Resource Development 
P.O. Box 320 
University  
National capital District 
Telephone: 326 7567 
Facsimile: 326 7187 
Email: mjm58@waikato.ac.nz 
 
If you have any issues or queries, you may want to deal directly with my supervisor or the 
Post Graduate Office, University of Waikato, you can contact them at the following 
addresses: 
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Professor John Farrar  Postgraduate Studies Office 
Chief Supervisor  Student and Academic Services Division 
School of Law  The University of Waikato 
The University of Waikato  Private Bag 3105 
Private Bag 3105  Hamilton 3240 
Hamilton 3240  New Zealand 
New Zealand  Telephone: 64 7 858 5194 
Telephone: 64 7 856 2889  Fax: 64 7 838 4130 
Fax: 64 7 838 4417 
 
I have enclosed with this letter, a document of “guideline questions” for semi-structured 
interview, a letter from the Director of Centre for Human Resource Development – 
University of Papua New Guinea, a letter from my chief supervisor and an approval letter 
from the School of Law Ethics Committee for your information. I will contact you in the near 
future after receipt of this letter. 
 
Thank you for your time and consideration. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
……………………………. 
Mange John Matui 
PhD Student 
School of Law 
The University of Waikato  
New Zealand 
 
Attachments: 
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Appendix F: Letter from the Chairman of Independent Public 
Business Corporation to the Chief Executive Officers of 
State Companies 
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Appendix G: Sample Letter to Chairpersons of Statutory 
Corporations 
 
Mange John Matui 
The School of Law 
The University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton 
New Zealand 
Telephone: +64 7 838 4190 
Facsimile: +64 7 838 4171 
Email:    mjm58@waikato.ac.nz 
Website: www.waikato.ac.nz/law 
 
The Chairperson 
National Broadcasting Corporation 
P.O. Box 1359 
Boroko  
National Capital District 
Papua New Guinea 
Telephone: 675 325 5233 
Facsimile: 675 325 6296 
 
24
th
 April 2008 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
Re: SEEKING YOUR CONSENT TO DO CASE STUDY RESEARCH IN NATIONAL 
BROADCASTING CORPORATION 
 
My name is Mange John Matui, a PhD student from the School of Law, University of 
Waikato, New Zealand. One of the requirements of my study is collecting empirical data on 
corporate governance practice in state-owned enterprises. National Broadcasting Corporation 
is a state-owned enterprise (SOE), which comes under the category of statutory corporation 
and it is selected as one of the case studies. Since you are the chairperson of the National 
Broadcasting Corporation, this letter is written to you with an aim of seeking your permission 
to conduct research in the National Broadcasting Corporation. I also need your assistance to 
formally informing the management of my presence in their offices in the coming weeks and 
ask for their support and assistance. 
 
The overall study is on corporate governance in SOEs. The thesis is entitled: DEVELOPING A 
NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME FOR STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IN PAPUA 
NEW GUINEA.  The aim of the study is to document corporate governance practice in SOEs in 
Papua New Guinea and identify factors that affect good corporate governance so that out of 
this research recommendations can be made for improvement in governance and 
accountability in the National Broadcasting Corporation. SOEs perform an important role of 
providing goods and services to the people of Papua New Guinea and yet after 35 years of 
independence, one of the SOE‟s important aspects, corporate governance has never been 
examined and discussed. This is also generally true for corporate governance in the private 
sector. In my experience teaching corporate law and business law at the University of Papua 
New Guinea corporate governance is never discussed although many issues in corporations 
relate to corporate governance. With your assistance and support this research will document 
corporate governance in National Broadcasting Corporation and recommendations on how to 
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improve governance and accountability in it. The study can be used as a model for other state 
companies with similar structure and applying the same law as National Broadcasting 
Corporation. 
 
I will be in the country for six months. During this time I will be collecting and transcribing 
the data. There will be two method of data collection used. First, in semi-structured 
interview, the senior managers, directors and chief executive officers will be interviewed 
using semi-structured questions, which will be issued prior to the meeting. A letter will be 
sent to each of the participants explaining the nature of the research and seeking their 
permission to participate, and attached to the letter will be the consent form and “guideline 
questions”. As the name suggest, “guideline questions” will be used as a guide to inform the 
participants as to the type of questions that will be asked and the type of information 
required. The participants will also be asked to answer questions on paper and submit before 
the interview. The interview will take 40 minutes to one hour. Before the interview I will 
collect the signed consent form from the interviewees and any questions that are answered on 
paper before the interview. Second, documents such as annual reports and company 
constitution and other relevant documents pertaining to corporate governance will be 
collected, examined and analyzed during the course of the research. Before getting access to 
the documents I shall seek permission from the chairperson, chief executive officers and the 
authorities who are in custody of the relevant documents. The objective in using the two 
methods of data collection is to collect an accurate account of corporate governance so that 
proper recommendations can be made for improvement.  
 
As a researcher, I shall respect the norms and practices of the organizations, participants and 
the authorities. Also confidentiality and privacy of the organization and participants is 
paramount. The names of the participants will not be used in the report; instead code names 
will be used to protect their privacy. The National Broadcasting Corporation will be 
identified by name so that relevant laws can be discussed that relate to it, and then 
recommendation that will be made can be adopted by the organization. Given the fact also 
that National Broadcasting Corporation is one of the  public entities the people of Papua New 
Guinea and relevant government institutions would be interested in the report and want to 
know what can be done about corporate governance in the National Broadcasting 
Corporation and other SOEs that have similar structure and apply the same laws. After data 
collection, the notes from interviews and the audiotapes will be transcribed and the transcript 
will be submitted to participants for confirmation. The confirmation process will ensure 
accuracy of the data information and provide an opportunity for the participants to make 
changes to expressions that do not truly and clearly convey their intentions. 
 
I can be contacted at the following address in Papua New Guinea: 
Centre for Human Resource Development 
P.O. Box 320 
University  
National capital District 
Telephone: 326 7567 
Facsimile: 326 7187 
Email: mjm58@waikato.ac.nz 
 
If you have any issues or queries, you may want to deal directly with my supervisor or the 
Post Graduate Office, University of Waikato, you can contact them at the following 
addresses: 
 
Professor John Farrar  Postgraduate Studies Office 
Chief Supervisor  Student and Academic Services Division 
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School of Law  The University of Waikato 
The University of Waikato  Private Bag 3105 
Private Bag 3105  Hamilton 3240 
Hamilton 3240  New Zealand 
New Zealand  Telephone: 64 7 858 5194 
Telephone: 64 7 856 2889  Fax: 64 7 838 4130 
Fax: 64 7 838 4417 
 
I have enclosed with this letter, a document of “guideline questions” for semi-structured 
interview, a letter from the director of Centre for Human Resource Development - University 
of Papua New Guinea, a letter from my chief supervisor and an approval letter from the 
School of Law Ethics Committee for your information. I will contact you in the near future 
after receipt of this letter to get your authorization in conducting the interview. 
 
Thank you for your time and consideration. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
……………………………. 
Mange John Matui 
PhD Student 
School of Law 
The University of Waikato  
New Zealand 
 
 
Attachments: 
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Appendix H: Sample Letter to Senior Managers, and current 
Directors and Chief Executive Officers of State Owned 
Enterprises 
 
Mange John Matui 
The School of Law 
The University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton 
New Zealand 
Telephone: +64 7 838 4190 
Facsimile: +64 7 838 4171 
Email:     mjm58@waikato.ac.nz 
Website: www.waikato.ac.nz/law 
 
Mr……………………… 
The Director 
Telikom Ltd 
P.O. Box 613 
Waigani 
National Capital District 
Papua New Guinea 
Telephone: 675 300 4813 
Facsimile: 675 325 0821 
 
7
th
 May 2008 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
Re: LETTER OF INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES 
 
My name is Mange John Matui, a PhD student from the School of Law, University of 
Waikato, New Zealand. This is my second year of study at the University. One of the 
requirements of my study is collecting empirical data on corporate governance practice in 
state-owned enterprises. I have obtained permission from the chairman of Independent 
Business Corporation and he has advised me of sending an internal memo advising the 
management of Telikom PNG Ltd of the nature of my study and asked for your participation 
in this research. You are selected as one of the participants in this research to take part in an 
interview. 
 
You may have already been aware that corporate governance is an area that has never been 
discussed in Papua New Guinea, particularly in state-owned enterprises. The world has 
witnessed collapse of large corporations around the world, largely in the USA and Europe. 
Next door, in Australia, our daily newspapers reported collapse of HIH because of poor 
governance or lack of accountability. Papua New Guinea also has many issues relating to 
directors, chief executive officers and the board but they were never discussed and analyzed 
from the perspective of corporate governance. Government in Papua New Guinea controls 
more than 50 per cent of the economy and state-owned enterprises perform vital role and in 
the frontline in the production and delivery of goods and services to the people of Papua New 
Guinea. The aim of this study is to document corporate governance practice in the selected 
state-owned enterprises and identify factors that affect good corporate governance. After 
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identifying these factors, recommendations can be made, and hopefully appropriate policies 
and legislations can be developed to address some of the issues. Further, given the fact that 
this is the first study with regard to corporate governance in Papua New Guinea the aim of 
this study is to spread the message about corporate governance and bring this message to the 
notice of management and the board of state owned-enterprises. Your participation will help 
towards understanding of corporate governance and its concomitant problems. 
 
You will assist with the research in the following way. First, you will be interviewed face-to-
face using the semi-structured interview method. In the process of interview you will firstly 
be issued with “guideline questions” to make you aware of the type of information that I will 
be discussing with you. You can also answer the questions on paper, and when you come for 
interview, hand over written answers to me. I will ask questions in line with the questions 
that are given to you and I will probe further on any related issues that you raise in the 
interview. The interview will take 40 minutes to one hour and it will be tape recorded. I will 
take some notes as we converse. Second, I will also be asking you about any documents 
relating to corporate governance that is under your custody or in the custody of any person 
within the organization or outside, which can assist with further understanding the issues. 
Before having access to these documents I will seek your permission or permission of anyone 
in authority. I hope that through the interview and analysis of the documents of the 
organization, I will document and report an accurate account of the status of corporate 
governance in your organization and suggest ways, based on the findings, on how to improve 
corporate governance in your organization and state-owned enterprises generally. This letter 
serves to seek your permission to conduct an interview with you at the time and place of you 
convenience. 
 
Ethical virtues and rules are paramount in this research. The University of Waikato Human 
Resource Ethics Regulations (2005) is adhered to strictly in conducting this research. You 
and the organization that you work for will be respected in the conduct of the research. Your 
name will be treated as confidential and will not be disclosed under any circumstances. The 
research will take six months in Papua New Guinea. This time period provides me with an 
opportunity of transcribing the written note taken through the interview and the audiotape 
recording of our conversation and a copy of the transcript will be sent to you for 
confirmation. You will confirm the transcript for its accuracy and ensure that issues 
expressed in writing are your words and views. After the completion of the report a copy of 
the report will be sent to your organization. 
 
I can be contacted at the following address in Papua New Guinea: 
Centre for Human Resource Development 
P.O. Box 320 
University  
National capital District 
Telephone: 326 7567 
Facsimile: 326 7187 
Email: mjm58@waikato.ac.nz 
 
If you have any issues or queries, you may want to deal directly with my supervisor or the 
Post Graduate Office, University of Waikato, you can contact them at the following 
addresses: 
 
Professor John Farrar  Postgraduate Studies Office 
Chief Supervisor  Student and Academic Services Division 
School of Law  The University of Waikato 
The University of Waikato  Private Bag 3105 
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Private Bag 3105  Hamilton 3240 
Hamilton 3240  New Zealand 
New Zealand  Telephone: 64 7 858 5194 
Telephone: 64 7 856 2889  Fax: 64 7 838 4130 
Fax: 64 7 838 4417 
 
I have enclosed with this letter, a document of “guideline questions” for semi-structured 
interview, a letter from the director of Centre for Human Resource Development - University 
of Papua New Guinea, a letter from my supervisor and an approval letter from the School of 
Law Ethics Committee for your information. I will contact you in the near future after receipt 
of this letter to schedule a time for interview. 
 
Thank you for your time and consideration. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
……………………………. 
Mange John Matui 
PhD Student 
School of Law 
The University of Waikato  
New Zealand 
 
Attachments: 
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Appendix I: Sample Letter to former Directors and Chief Executive 
Officers of State Owned Enterprises 
 
Mange John Matui 
The School of Law 
The University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton 
New Zealand 
Telephone: +64 7 838 4190 
Facsimile: +64 7 838 4171 
Email:     mjm58@waikato.ac.nz 
Website: www.waikato.ac.nz/law 
 
Mr……………………… 
The Former Director 
Telikom PNG Ltd 
P.O. Box 320 
Port Moresby  
National Capital District 
Papua New Guinea 
Telephone: 675 321 2977 
Facsimile: 675 321 2916 
 
20
th
 April 2008 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
Re: LETTER OF INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES 
 
My name is Mange John Matui, a PhD student from the School of Law, University of 
Waikato, New Zealand. This is my second year of study at the University. One of the 
requirements of my study is collecting empirical data on corporate governance practice in 
state owned enterprises. You are one of the former directors of Telikom PNG Ltd selected as 
a participant in this research to take part in an interview. 
 
You may have already been aware that corporate governance is an area that has never been 
discussed in Papua New Guinea, particularly the corporate governance in state-owned 
enterprises. The world has witnessed collapse of large corporations around the world, largely 
in the USA and Europe. Next door, in Australia, our daily newspapers reported collapse of 
HIH because of poor governance and a lack of accountability. Papua New Guinea also has 
many issues relating to directors, chief executive officers and the board but they are never 
discussed and analyzed from the perspective of corporate governance. Papua New Guinea 
Government controls more than 50 per cent of the economy and the Government uses state-
owned enterprises at the frontline performing vital role in the production and delivery of 
goods and services to the people. The aim of this study is to document corporate governance 
practice in the selected state-owned enterprises and identify factors that affect good corporate 
governance. From the findings, recommendations will be made so that appropriate policies 
and legislations can be developed to address some of the issues. Further, given the fact that 
this is the first study with regard to corporate governance in Papua New Guinea, the aim is to 
spread the message about corporate governance and bring this message to the notice of the 
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management and the boards of state-owned enterprises. Your participation will help towards 
understanding of corporate governance and identification of its concomitant problems. 
 
You will assist with the research in the following way. First, you will be interviewed face-to-
face using semi-structured interview method. In this process of interview you will be issued 
with “guideline questions” to enable you to be aware of the type of information that I will be 
discussing with you. You can also answer the questions on paper and when you come for 
interview, hand over the written answers to me. I will ask questions in line with the 
“guideline questions” and will probe further on any related issues that are raised in the 
interview. The interview will take 40 minutes to one hour and it will be tape recorded. I will 
also take some notes as we converse. Second, I will be asking you about any documents 
relating to corporate governance that you may have or direct me to, which can assist with 
further understanding the issues. I hope that through the interview and analysis of documents 
of the organization, I will document and report an accurate account of corporate governance 
in Telikom PNG Ltd and suggest ways, based on the findings, on how to improve corporate 
governance in the organization and state-owned enterprises generally. This letter serves to 
seek your permission to conduct an interview with you at the time and place of you 
convenience. 
 
Ethical virtues and rules are paramount in this research. The University of Waikato Human 
Resource Ethics Regulations (2005) is adhered to strictly in conducting this research. You 
and the organization that you have worked for will be respected in the conduct of this 
research. Your name will be treated as confidential and will not be disclosed under any 
circumstances. The research will take six months in Papua New Guinea. This period of time 
provides me with an opportunity of transcribing the written notes taken through the interview 
and the audiotape recording of our conversation, and a copy of the transcript will be sent to 
you for confirmation. You will confirm the transcript for its accuracy and ensure that issues 
expressed in writing are your words and views. After the completion of the report, a copy 
will be sent to your organization. 
 
I can be contacted at the following address in Papua New Guinea: 
Centre for Human Resource Development 
P.O. Box 320 
University  
National capital District 
Telephone: 326 7567 
Facsimile: 326 7187 
Email: mjm58@waikato.ac.nz 
 
If you have any issues or queries, you may want to deal directly with my supervisor or the 
Post Graduate Office, University of Waikato, you can contact them at the following 
addresses: 
 
Professor John Farrar   Postgraduate Studies Office 
Chief Supervisor   Student and Academic Services Division 
School of Law   The University of Waikato 
The University of Waikato   Private Bag 3105 
Private Bag 3105   Hamilton 3240 
Hamilton 3240   New Zealand 
New Zealand   Telephone: 64 7 858 5194 
Telephone: 64 7 856 2889   Fax: 64 7 838 4130 
Fax: 64 7 838 4417 
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I have enclosed with this letter, a document of “guideline questions” for semi-structured 
interview, a letter from the director of Centre for Human Resource Development - University 
of Papua New Guinea, a of my supervisor and an approval letter from the School of Law 
Ethics Committee for your information. I will contact you in the near future after receipt of 
this letter to schedule a time for interview. 
 
Thank you for your time and consideration. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
 
…………………………… 
Mange John Matui 
PhD Student 
School of Law 
The University of Waikato  
New Zealand 
 
 
Attachments: 
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Appendix J: Sample Letter to the Customers of State owned 
Enterprises 
 
Mange John Matui 
The School of Law 
The University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
Hamilton 
New Zealand 
Telephone: +64 7 838 4190 
Facsimile: +64 7 838 4171 
Email:    mjm58@waikato.ac.nz 
Website: www.waikato.ac.nz/law 
 
Mr……………………………………. 
The Current/Former Customer of NHC 
Gerehu Suburb 
Port Moresby 
National Capital District 
Papua New Guinea 
 
20
th
 April 2008 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
Re:  LETTER OF INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES 
 
My name is Mange John Matui, a PhD student from the School of Law, University of 
Waikato, New Zealand. This is my second year of study at the University. One of the 
requirements of my study is to collect empirical data on corporate governance practice in 
state-owned enterprises. The quality and efficiency of services that are provided by state-
owned enterprises is an important component of this study. You are selected as one of the 
participants in this research to take part in an interview that will last five to ten minutes. You 
will be interviewed about the quality and efficiency of services that you experience as a 
customer of the National Housing Corporation. 
 
Ethical virtues and rules are paramount in this research. The University of Waikato Human 
Resource Ethics Regulations (2005) are adhered to strictly in conducting this research. Your 
privacy will be respected in the conduct of the research. Your name will be treated as 
confidential and will not be disclosed under any circumstances. A code name will be used if 
any of your statements are quoted in the report. After the interview I will restate the 
information to you for confirmation.  
 
I can be contacted at the following address in Papua New Guinea: 
Centre for Human Resource Development 
P.O. Box 320 
University  
National capital District 
Telephone: 326 7567 
Facsimile: 326 7187 
Email: mjm58@waikato.ac.nz 
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If you have any issues or queries, you may want to deal directly with my supervisor or the 
Post Graduate Office, University of Waikato, you can contact them at the following 
addresses: 
 
Professor John Farrar   Postgraduate Studies Office 
Chief Supervisor   Student and Academic Services Division 
School of Law   The University of Waikato 
The University of Waikato   Private Bag 3105 
Private Bag 3105   Hamilton 3240 
Hamilton 3240   New Zealand 
New Zealand   Telephone: 64 7 858 5194 
Telephone: 64 7 856 2889   Fax: 64 7 838 4130 
Fax: 64 7 838 4417 
 
Thank you for your time, consideration and assistance. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
 
……………………………. 
Mange John Matui 
PhD Student 
School of Law 
The University of Waikato  
New Zealand 
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Appendix K: Written Consent Form for Senior Managers, and 
former and current Directors and Chief Executive 
Officers of State Owned Enterprises 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Re:      DEVELOPING A NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME FOR 
STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
 
Put a tick (√) to the box. 
 
a. I have read the letter given to me for this study in which the details and the 
nature of the study explained to me.  My questions about the study have been 
answered to my satisfaction and I understand that I may ask further questions 
at any time. 
 
 
b. I also understand that I am free to withdraw from participating at any time or 
to decline to answer any particular question in the questionnaire or during the 
interview.   
 
c. I agree to provide information to the researchers on the understanding that it 
is completely confidential and my privacy is protected, unless my permission 
is given for the disclosure of my name. 
 
d. I wish to participate in this study under the conditions set out on the letter. 
 
 
I (state your full name) …………………………… of  (state the name of the state owned 
enterprise)…………………………………. and my (former or current) position with the 
state owned enterprise is (state your  position) ………………… and I have read and 
understood the information provided about the study in the letter and I agree to have an 
interview and have my conversation tape – recorded. 
 
 
Signed:       ______________________________________________ 
 
 
Name: ______________________________________________ 
 
 
Date: ______________________________________________ 
 
                                                          

  Indicate whether you are a former or current director or chief executive officer. This does not apply 
to senior managers. 
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Appendix L: Written Consent Form for Customers 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Re:      DEVELOPING A NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME FOR 
STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
 
 
Put a tick (√) to the box. 
 
a. I have read the letter given to me for this study in which the details and the 
nature of the study explained to me.  My questions about the study have been 
answered to my satisfaction and I understand that I may ask further questions 
at any time. 
 
 
b. I also understand that I am free to withdraw from participating at any time or 
to decline to answer any particular question in the questionnaire or during the 
interview.   
 
c. I agree to provide information to the researchers on the understanding that it 
is completely confidential and my privacy is protected, unless my permission 
is given for the disclosure of my name. 
 
d. I wish to participate in this study under the conditions set out on the letter. 
 
 
I (state your full name) …………………………… of (state the suburb where you 
live)…………………………………. and I (was or am) using the services of (state the state 
owned enterprise)………………… and I have read and understood the information provided 
about the study in the letter and I agree to have an interview and provide information for this 
study. 
 
 
Signed:       ______________________________________________ 
 
 
Name: ______________________________________________ 
 
 
Date: ______________________________________________ 
 
                                                          

  State whether you were or are currently using the services of the state owned enterprise. 
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Appendix M: Sample Semi-Structured Interview Questions for 
Current and Former Management 
 
QUESTIONS FOR CURRENT AND FORMER MANAGEMENT 
 
Re:   DEVELOPING A NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME FOR 
STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
 
 
SECTION A:              PERSONAL DETAILS 
 
 
1. Name:………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. Indicate whether you are a current or former Director/Chief Executive Officer or 
Senior Manger:……………………………………………………………………….. 
 
3. Interview Number:…………………………………………………………………… 
 
4. State-owned Enterprise (Name):……………………………………………………… 
 
5. Date of the Interview:………………………………………………………………… 
 
6. Time of the Interview:……………………………………………………………....... 
 
SECTION B:            CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
1. Have you heard of corporate governance? 
 
2. How did you know about corporate governance? 
 
3. Explain what you know about corporate governance? 
 
SECTION C:           THE RESPONSIBLE MINISTER 
 
 
1. What are the roles and responsibilities of the relevant minister(s) for state owned 
enterprise?  
 
2. What are the roles and responsibilities of Independent Public Business Corporation? 
 
3. Who is the relevant Minister answerable to for his or her dealings with the state 
owned enterprise? 
 
4. Can the relevant minister be penalised for his or her wrongful conduct dealing with 
the state owned enterprise? 
 
5. Who penalises the relevant Minister for wrongful conduct in dealing with the state 
owned enterprise? 
 
6. What information can state owned enterprise submit to the minister? 
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7. What information is the relevant minister allowed to have access to in the state 
owned enterprise? 
 
SECTION D:      THE DIRECTORS  
 
1. Who appoints and removes directors? 
 
2. What are the roles and responsibilities of a director? 
 
3. Who is the director answerable to for his or her dealings with the state owned 
enterprise? 
 
4. Who penalises the director for wrongful conduct in performing his or her roles and 
responsibilities? 
 
5. What kinds of information must the directors receive from the corporation? 
 
SECTION E:       THE BOARD 
 
1. Who makes up the board? 
 
2. What are the roles and responsibilities of the Board? 
 
3. What kind of information does board receive from the corporation? 
 
4. How does the board receive information about the business and affairs of the 
company? 
 
5. Who is the board answerable to?  
 
Chairperson 
 
6. Who appoints and removes the chairperson? 
 
7. What are the roles and responsibilities of the chairperson? 
 
6. Who is the chairperson answerable to? 
 
8. Who penalises the chairperson for wrongful conduct in performing his or her roles 
and responsibilities? 
 
SECTION F:      THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (CEO) 
 
 
1. Who appoints and removes the CEO? 
 
2. What are the roles and responsibilities of CEO? 
 
3. Who is the CEO answerable to for his or her dealings with the state owned 
enterprise? 
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4. Who penalises the CEO for wrongful conduct in performing his or her roles and 
responsibilities? 
 
SECTION G:       GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS 
 
1. Does Department of Treasury deal with the state-owned enterprise and if so then in 
what capacity? 
 
2. Does the Ombudsman Commission deal with the state-owned enterprise and if so 
then in what capacity? 
 
3. Does Auditor General deal with the state-owned enterprise and if so then in what 
capacity? 
 
4. Does Public Accounts Committee deal with the state-owned enterprise and if so then 
in what capacity? 
 
5. Do other government departments and institutions deal with state owned enterprise? 
(name them and their relations/dealings with the state owned enterprise) 
 
SECTION H:         REPORTING 
 
1. How many reports does the state own enterprise provide in a year? 
 
2. Who must the state owned enterprise provide the report(s) to? 
 
3. Are there specific matters that the state owned enterprise must report on? 
 
SECTION I:          OBJECTIIVES 
 
1. Does the State-owned enterprise pursue; 
a. Commercial obligations only? 
b. Non-commercial obligations only? 
c. Commercial and non – commercial obligations? 
 
2. If one of the objectives of state owned enterprise is commercial, as it made profit in 
the last three years? 
 
3. Does the state owned enterprise have a corporate plan? 
 
4. How often is the corporate plan reviewed? 
 
 
Thank you for your participation in this research. 
 
 
Time the interview ends:………………………………………………………………… 
 
The information provided in the interview will be transcribed and the script will be return to 
you for confirmation. 
 
 
 392 
Mange John Matui 
Interviewer 
PhD Student 
School of Law 
The University of Waikato 
New Zealand 
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Appendix N: Sample Interview questions for Customers 
 
QUESTIONS FOR CUSTOMERS 
 
Re:    DEVELOPING A NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME FOR 
STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
 
PART A:        PERSONAL DETAILS 
 
1. Customer 
(Name):……………………………………………………………….……………… 
 
2. State Owned Enterprise (Name):…………………………………………………….. 
 
3. Indicate whether you are a current or former User of the services:………………….. 
 
4. Interview Number:…………………………………………………………………… 
 
5. Location (Suburb):……………………………………………………………………. 
 
6. Date of the Interview:………………………………………………………………… 
 
7. Starting time of the Interview:……………………………………………………....... 
 
PART B:      QUALITY AND EFFCIENCY OF SERVICES 
 
1. Are you using or have used the services of the state owned enterprise? 
Yes:                                No: 
2. Are you satisfied with the services provided by the state owned enterprise? 
Yes:                                 No:                
3. How would you rate the efficiency and quality of the services provided by the state 
owned enterprise? (tick the box that you agree with) 
a. Very Good     
b. Good 
c. Poor 
 
Thank you for your participation in this research. 
 
Time interview ends:………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Mange John Matui 
Interviewer 
PhD Student 
School of Law 
The University of Waikato 
New Zealand 
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Appendix O: Sample Transcript, and Interview Protocol and Coding 
of the Interviews with former and current 
Management of State Owned Enterprises 
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Appendix P: Sample Transcript and Coding for Interviews 
with Customers of State Owned Enterprises 
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Appendix Q: An explanation of the Codes used in the Research and 
the Reports  
 
State-Owned 
Enterprises 
Current 
directors; 
 
Current Chief 
Executive 
Officers 
Former 
Directors; 
 
Former Chief 
Executive 
officers 
Senior 
Mangers 
Customers 
of State-
Owned 
Enterprises 
National 
Housing 
Corporation 
(NHC) 
NHC – CD1 
NHC - CCEO 
NHC – FD1 
NHC – FCEO1 
NHC – SM1 NHC – C1 
National 
Broadcasting 
Corporation 
(NBC) 
NBC – CD1 
NBC - CCEO 
NBC – FD1 
NBC – FCEO1 
NBC – SM1 NBC – C1 
PNG Power 
Ltd (PNGP) 
PNGP – CD1 
PNGP - CCEO 
PNGP – FD 
PNGP – FCEO1 
PNGP – 
SM1 
PNGP – C1 
Telikom PNG 
Ltd (T) 
T – CD1 
T - CCEO 
T – FD1 
T – FCEO1 
T – SM1 T – C1 
Eda Ranu 
(ER) 
ER – CD1 
ER - CCEO 
ER – FD1 
ER – FCEO1 
ER – SM1 ER – C1 
 
 
Eda Ranu is the trading name for NCD Water & Sewerage Ltd. The trading name is 
used throughout the thesis, hence Eda Ranu is used in coding.  
 
Coding reference for state owned enterprises 
 
1. NHC refers to National Housing Corporation 
2. NBC refers to National Broadcasting Corporation 
3. PNGP refers to PNG Power Ltd 
4. T refers to Telikom PNG Ltd 
5. ER refers to Eda Ranu 
 
Note that state owned enterprises have been identified by their name rather than code 
name in the thesis. This is for the purpose of discussing the relevant laws that apply 
to them.  
 
Coding reference of the participants 
 
1. CD refers to current directors 
2. CCEO refers to current chief executive officer 
3. FD refers to former director 
4. FCEO refers to former chief executive officer 
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5. SM refers to senior managers 
6. C refers to customers 
 
Notice in the table that numbers are used after the initials. For example, NHC – CD1 
represents the first current director in National Housing Corporation. The second 
director interviewed has NHC – CD2 as the code name. The code name T – FCEO1 
means that the first former chief executive officer of Telikom PNG Ltd. The second 
former chief executive officer of Telikom PNG Ltd has the code name T – FCEO2. 
The current chief executive officer has the reference CCEO. For example ER – 
CCEO means current chief executive officer of Eda Ranu. They do not have numbers 
because there is only one current chief executive officer in each state-owned 
enterprise. Customers have the code name beginning with the SOE‟s initials followed 
by C and a number. For example, the first customer interviewed in NBC has the code 
name NBC – C1 and the last customer in the NBC interviewed has the code name 
NBC – C90. Thirty customers from each of the three suburbs in Port Moresby were 
selected for each state-owned enterprise. Altogether there were 90 customers for each 
state-own enterprise. 
 
The thesis has used some direct quotes made by the participants. The quotes are 
represented by the relevant code names. For example the code name PNGP – SM3 
beside a quote represents a quote stated by the senior manager three in PNG Power 
Ltd. 
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Appendix R: The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
1
 
                        (Revised Text, April 2004) 
 
I. Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance 
Framework 
 
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient markets, 
be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities 
among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities. 
 
A. The corporate governance framework should be developed with a view to its impact on 
overall economic performance, market integrity and the incentives it creates for market 
participants and the promotion of transparent and efficient markets. 
B. The legal and regulatory requirements that affect corporate governance practices in a 
jurisdiction should be consistent with the rule of law, transparent and enforceable. 
C. The division of responsibilities among different authorities in a jurisdiction should be 
clearly articulated and ensure that the public interest is served. 
D. Supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities should have the authority, integrity 
and resources to fulfil their duties in a professional and objective manner. 
Moreover, their rulings should be timely, transparent and fully explained. 
 
II. The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
 
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights. 
 
A. Basic shareholder rights should include the right to: 1) secure methods of ownership 
registration; 2) convey or transfer shares; 3) obtain relevant and material information on 
the corporation on a timely and regular basis; 4) participate and vote in general 
shareholder meetings; 5) elect and remove members of the board; and 6) share in the 
profits of the corporation. 
B. Shareholders should have the right to participate in, and to be sufficiently informed on, 
decisions concerning fundamental corporate changes such as: 1) amendments to the 
statutes, or articles of incorporation or similar governing documents of the company; 2) 
the authorisation of additional shares; and 3) extraordinary transactions, including the 
transfer of all or substantially all assets, that in effect result in the sale of the company. 
C. Shareholders should have the opportunity to participate effectively and vote in general 
shareholder meetings and should be informed of the rules, including voting procedures 
that govern general shareholder meetings: 
1. Shareholders should be furnished with sufficient and timely information concerning the 
date, location and agenda of general meetings, as well as full and timely information 
regarding the issues to be decided at the meeting. 
2. Shareholders should have the opportunity to ask questions to the board, including 
questions relating to the annual external audit, to place items on the agenda of general 
meetings, and to propose resolutions, subject to reasonable limitations. 
3. Effective shareholder participation in key corporate governance decisions, such as the 
nomination and election of board members, should be facilitated. Shareholders should 
be able to make their views known on the remuneration policy for board members and 
                                                          
1
  OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, (revised edition, 2004) [Preamble] < 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf > at 15 July 2010  
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key executives. The equity component of compensation schemes for board members 
and employees should be subject to shareholder approval. 
4. Shareholders should be able to vote in person or in absentia, and equal effect should be 
given to votes whether cast in person or in absentia. 
D. Capital structures and arrangements that enable certain shareholders to obtain a degree of 
control disproportionate to their equity ownership should be disclosed. 
E. Markets for corporate control should be allowed to function in an efficient and transparent 
manner. 
1. The rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate control in the capital 
markets, and extraordinary transactions such as mergers, and sales of substantial 
portions of corporate assets, should be clearly articulated and disclosed so that 
investors understand their rights and recourse. Transactions should occur at transparent 
prices and under fair conditions that protect the rights of all shareholders according to 
their class. 
2. Anti-take-over devices should not be used to shield management and the board from 
accountability. 
F. The exercise of ownership rights by all shareholders, including institutional investors, 
should be facilitated. 
1. Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose their overall 
corporate governance and voting policies with respect to their investments, including 
the procedures that they have in place for deciding on the use of their voting rights. 
2. Institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should disclose how they manage 
material conflicts of interest that may affect the exercise of key ownership rights 
regarding their investments. 
G. Shareholders, including institutional shareholders, should be allowed to consult with each 
other on issues concerning their basic shareholder rights as defined in the Principles, 
subject to exceptions to prevent abuse. 
 
III. The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have 
the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 
 
A. All shareholders of the same series of a class should be treated equally. 
1. Within any series of a class, all shares should carry the same rights. All investors should 
be able to obtain information about the rights attached to all series and classes of shares 
before they purchase. Any changes in voting rights should be subject to approval by 
those classes of shares which are negatively affected. 
2. Minority shareholders should be protected from abusive actions by, or in the interest of, 
controlling shareholders acting either directly or indirectly, and should have effective 
means of redress. 
3. Votes should be cast by custodians or nominees in a manner agreed upon with the 
beneficial owner of the shares. 
4. Impediments to cross border voting should be eliminated. 
5. Processes and procedures for general shareholder meetings should allow for equitable 
treatment of all shareholders. Company procedures should not make it unduly difficult 
or expensive to cast votes. 
B. Insider trading and abusive self-dealing should be prohibited. 
C. Members of the board and key executives should be required to disclose to the board 
whether they, directly, indirectly or on behalf of third parties, have a material interest in 
any transaction or matter directly affecting the corporation. 
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IV. The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
 
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders 
established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation 
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of 
financially sound enterprises. 
 
A. The rights of stakeholders that are established by law or through mutual agreements are to 
be respected. 
B. Where stakeholder interests are protected by law, stakeholders should have the 
opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights. 
C. Performance-enhancing mechanisms for employee participation should be permitted to 
develop. 
D. Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they should have 
access to relevant, sufficient and reliable information on a timely and regular basis. 
E. Stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative bodies, should be 
able to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practices to the board 
and their rights should not be compromised for doing this. 
F. The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an effective, efficient 
insolvency framework and by effective enforcement of creditor rights. 
 
V. Disclosure and Transparency 
 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is 
made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, 
performance, ownership, and governance of the company. 
 
A. Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on: 
1. The financial and operating results of the company. 
2. Company objectives. 
3. Major share ownership and voting rights. 
4. Remuneration policy for members of the board and key executives, and information 
about board members, including their qualifications, the selection process, other 
company directorships and whether they are regarded as independent by the board. 
5. Related party transactions. 
6. Foreseeable risk factors. 
7. Issues regarding employees and other stakeholders. 
8. Governance structures and policies, in particular, the content of any corporate 
governance code or policy and the process by which it is implemented. 
B. Information should be prepared and disclosed in accordance with high quality standards of 
accounting and financial and non-financial disclosure. 
C. An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, competent and qualified, auditor 
in order to provide an external and objective assurance to the board and shareholders that 
the financial statements fairly represent the financial position and performance of the 
company in all material respects. 
D. External auditors should be accountable to the shareholders and owe a duty to the 
company to exercise due professional care in the conduct of the audit. 
E. Channels for disseminating information should provide for equal, timely and cost efficient 
access to relevant information by users. 
F. The corporate governance framework should be complemented by an effective approach 
that addresses and promotes the provision of analysis or advice by analysts, brokers, rating 
agencies and others, that is relevant to decisions by investors, free from material conflicts 
of interest that might compromise the integrity of their analysis or advice. 
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VI. The Responsibilities of the Board 
 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the 
company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s 
accountability to the company and the shareholders. 
 
A. Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and 
care, and in the best interest of the company and the shareholders. 
B. Where board decisions may affect different shareholder groups differently, the board 
should treat all shareholders fairly. 
C. The board should apply high ethical standards. It should take into account the interests of 
stakeholders. 
D. The board should fulfil certain key functions, including: 
1. Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk policy, annual 
budgets and business plans; setting performance objectives; monitoring 
implementation and corporate performance; and overseeing major capital expenditures, 
acquisitions and divestitures. 
2. Monitoring the effectiveness of the company‟s governance practices and making 
changes as needed. 
3. Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key executives and 
overseeing succession planning. 
4. Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the 
company and its shareholders. 
5. Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and election process. 
6. Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of management, board members 
and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets and abuse in related party 
transactions. 
7. Ensuring the integrity of the corporation‟s accounting and financial reporting systems, 
including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of control are in place, in 
particular, systems for risk management, financial and operational control, and 
compliance with the law and relevant standards. 
8. Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications. 
E. The board should be able to exercise objective independent judgement on corporate 
affairs. 
1. Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-executive board members 
capable of exercising independent judgement to tasks where there is a potential for 
conflict of interest. Examples of such key responsibilities are ensuring the integrity of 
financial and non-financial reporting, the review of related party transactions, 
nomination of board members and key executives, and board remuneration. 
2. When committees of the board are established, their mandate, composition and working 
procedures should be well defined and disclosed by the board. 
3. Board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their 
responsibilities. 
F. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should have access to accurate, 
relevant and timely information. 
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Appendix S: OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-
Owned Enterprises (2005)
1
 
 
I. Ensuring an Effective Legal and Regulatory Framework for State-
Owned Enterprises 
 
The legal and regulatory framework for state-owned enterprises should ensure a level-
playing field in markets where state-owned enterprises and private sector companies 
compete in order to avoid market distortions. The framework should build on, and be fully 
compatible with, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
 
A. There should be a clear separation between the state‟s ownership function and other state 
functions that may influence the conditions for state-owned enterprises, particularly with 
regard to market regulation. 
B. Governments should strive to simplify and streamline the operational practices and the 
legal form under which SOEs operate. Their legal form should allow creditors to press 
their claims and to initiate insolvency procedures. 
C. Any obligations and responsibilities that an SOE is required to undertake in terms of 
public services beyond the generally accepted norm should be clearly mandated by laws 
or regulations. Such obligations and responsibilities should also be disclosed to the 
general public and related costs should be covered in a transparent manner. 
D. SOEs should not be exempt from the application of general laws and regulations. 
Stakeholders, including competitors, should have access to efficient redress and an even-
handed ruling when they consider that their rights have been violated. 
E. The legal and regulatory framework should allow sufficient flexibility for adjustments in 
the capital structure of SOEs when this is necessary for achieving company objectives. 
F. SOEs should face competitive conditions regarding access to finance. Their relations with 
state-owned banks, state-owned financial institutions and other state-owned companies 
should be based on purely commercial grounds. 
 
II. The State Acting as an Owner 
 
The state should act as an informed and active owner and establish a clear and consistent 
ownership policy, ensuring that the governance of state-owned enterprises is carried out in 
a transparent and accountable manner, with the necessary degree of professionalism and 
effectiveness. 
 
A. The government should develop and issue an ownership policy that defines the overall 
objectives of state ownership, the state‟s role in the corporate governance of SOEs, and 
how it will implement its ownership policy. 
B. The government should not be involved in the day-to-day management of SOEs and allow 
them full operational autonomy to achieve their defined objectives. 
C. The state should let SOE boards exercise their responsibilities and respect their 
independence. 
D. The exercise of ownership rights should be clearly identified within the state 
administration. This may be facilitated by setting up a co-ordinating entity or, more 
appropriately, by the centralisation of the ownership function. 
                                                          
1
  OECD, OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, (2005) in 
OECD, < 
http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,3343,en_2649_34847_34046561_1_1_1_37439,00&&en-
USS_01DBC.html > at 15 July 2010 
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E. The co-ordinating or ownership entity should be held accountable to representative bodies 
such as the Parliament and have clearly defined relationships with relevant public bodies, 
including the state supreme audit institutions. 
F. The state as an active owner should exercise its ownership rights according to the legal 
structure of each company. Its prime responsibilities include: 
1. Being represented at the general shareholders meetings and voting the state shares. 
2. Establishing well structured and transparent board nomination processes in fully or 
majority owned SOEs, and actively participating in the nomination of all SOEs‟ 
boards. 
3. Setting up reporting systems allowing regular monitoring and assessment of SOE 
performance. 
4. When permitted by the legal system and the state‟s level of ownership, maintaining 
continuous dialogue with external auditors and specific state control organs. 
5. Ensuring that remuneration schemes for SOE board members foster the long term 
interest of the company and can attract and motivate qualified professionals. 
 
III. Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
 
The state and state-owned enterprises should recognise the rights of all shareholders and 
in accordance with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance ensure their equitable 
treatment and equal access to corporate information. 
 
A. The co-ordinating or ownership entity and SOEs should ensure that all shareholders are 
treated equitably. 
B. SOEs should observe a high degree of transparency towards all shareholders. 
C. SOEs should develop an active policy of communication and consultation with all 
shareholders. 
D. The participation of minority shareholders in shareholder meetings should be facilitated in 
order to allow them to take part in fundamental corporate decisions such as board election. 
 
IV. Relations with Stakeholders 
 
The state ownership policy should fully recognise the state-owned enterprises’ 
responsibilities towards stakeholders and request that they report on their relations with 
stakeholders. 
 
A. Governments, the co-ordinating or ownership entity and SOEs themselves should 
recognise and respect stakeholders‟ rights established by law or through mutual 
agreements, and refer to the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in this regard. 
B. Listed or large SOEs, as well as SOEs pursuing important public policy objectives, should 
report on stakeholder relations. 
C. The board of SOEs should be required to develop, implement and communicate 
compliance programmes for internal codes of ethics. These codes of ethics should be 
based on country norms, in conformity with international commitments and apply to the 
company and its subsidiaries. 
 
V. Transparency and Disclosure 
 
State-owned enterprises should observe high standards of transparency in accordance with 
the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
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A. The co-ordinating or ownership entity should develop consistent and aggregate reporting 
on state-owned enterprises and publish annually an aggregate report on SOEs. 
B. SOEs should develop efficient internal audit procedures and establish an internal audit 
function that is monitored by and reports directly to the board and to the audit committee 
or the equivalent company organ. 
C. SOEs, especially large ones, should be subject to an annual independent external audit 
based on international standards. The existence of specific state control procedures does 
not substitute for an independent external audit. 
D. SOEs should be subject to the same high quality accounting and auditing standards as 
listed companies. Large or listed SOEs should disclose financial and non-financial 
information according to high quality internationally recognised standards. 
E. SOEs should disclose material information on all matters described in the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance and in addition focus on areas of significant concern 
for the state as an owner and the general public. Examples of such information include: 
1. A clear statement to the public of the company objectives and their fulfilment. 
2. The ownership and voting structure of the company. 
3. Any material risk factors and measures taken to manage such risks. 
4. Any financial assistance, including guarantees, received from the state and 
commitments made on behalf of the SOE. 
5. Any material transactions with related entities. 
 
VI. The Responsibilities of the Boards of State-Owned Enterprises 
 
The boards of state-owned enterprises should have the necessary authority, competencies 
and objectivity to carry out their function of strategic guidance and monitoring of 
management. They should act with integrity and be held accountable for their actions. 
 
A. The boards of SOEs should be assigned a clear mandate and ultimate responsibility for the 
company‟s performance. The board should be fully accountable to the owners, act in the 
best interest of the company and treat all shareholders equitably. 
B. SOE boards should carry out their functions of monitoring of management and strategic 
guidance, subject to the objectives set by the government and the ownership entity. They 
should have the power to appoint and remove the CEO. 
C. The boards of SOEs should be composed so that they can exercise objective and 
independent judgement. Good practice calls for the Chair to be separate from the CEO. 
D. If employee representation on the board is mandated, mechanisms should be developed to 
guarantee that this representation is exercised effectively and contributes to the 
enhancement of the board skills, information and independence. 
E. When necessary, SOE boards should set up specialised committees to support the full 
board in performing its functions, particularly in respect to audit, risk management and 
remuneration. 
F. SOE boards should carry out an annual evaluation to appraise their performance. 
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Appendix T: Corporate Governance Guidelines for Government 
Owned Corporations (February 2009)
1
 
 
Corporate Governance Principles 
 
Principle 1: Foundations of management and oversight 
 
Recommendations 
 The board should have a formal statement or board charter which clearly defines the 
roles and responsibilities of the board and individual directors and the matters which 
are delegated to management. This also applies to any committees established by the 
board. 
 A board handbook should be available to facilitate board operations and induction 
and self-evaluation processes. 
 Appropriate induction processes should be developed for new members in relation to 
their board and committee functions and for senior executives to allow them to 
participate fully and actively in management decision-making at the earliest 
opportunity. 
 A register of committees and their functions should be maintained. 
 The process for performance evaluation of the chief executive officer and senior 
executives should be disclosed. 
 
Commentary 
Clear definition of the roles and responsibilities of the board and management will assist the 
board to effectively perform the role required by section 88 of the GOC Act (Role of board). 
It will enable the board to provide strategic guidance for the GOC and effective oversight of 
management. It will also enhance the accountability of the board and management to the 
GOC and the shareholding Ministers. 
 
The members of the board and any committees established by the board should also be 
clearly aware of their roles and responsibilities and fully understand the GOC‟s business and 
corporate expectations. 
 
Reporting 
A summary of the formal statement or board charter should be made publicly available, 
preferably on the GOC‟s website in a clearly marked corporate governance section. The 
corporate governance section of the annual report should disclose whether a performance 
evaluation for the chief executive officer and senior executives has taken place in the 
reporting period and how it was conducted. 
 
Principle 2: Structure the board to add value 
 
Recommendations 
 A majority of the board should be independent directors. 
 The board should develop and implement a plan for identifying, assessing and 
enhancing directors‟ competencies. 
 Disclose the process for performance evaluation of the board, committees and 
individual directors. 
                                                          
1
  Queensland Government, Office of Government Owned Corporation., “Corporate Governance 
Guidelines for Government Owned Corporation,” (February 2009)  in Queensland Government, < 
http://www.ogoc.qld.gov.au/goc-policies/index.shtml > at 17 July 2010 
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 The board and committees regularly review their information needs (quality, quantity 
and timeliness) to ensure the information they receive is appropriate for the effective 
discharge of their duties. 
 Develop and implement appropriate, formal self-evaluation processes for the board 
and committees. 
 
Commentary 
GOC directors are appointed by the Governor in Council under the GOC Act. In this regard 
the board does not play a formal role in setting the composition or size of the board. All GOC 
directors appointed by the Governor in Council are non-executive directors. 
 
The board should continue to regularly assess the ongoing independence of each director and 
the board generally to ensure that they continue to exercise unfettered and independent 
judgement. The board must ensure that the interests of the shareholding Ministers and the 
public are properly protected and that individual vested interests do not have the opportunity 
to influence decision making against the interests of the GOC as a whole. 
 
For GOCs the issue of independence is most relevant in situations where directors are a 
material supplier or customer of the GOC or its subsidiaries, or have a material contractual 
relationship with the GOC or its subsidiaries other than as a director. However, assessment of 
the independence of a director, including materiality thresholds, is ultimately a matter for the 
board to determine. The key issue is whether the director‟s independent judgement is 
impaired by the material relationship. The board should be able to explain to shareholding 
Ministers its reasoning in relation to the determination of independence, including disclosure 
of specific relationships and detailed discussion of how materiality (or immateriality) is 
determined. 
 
GOC boards should have arrangements in place for determining materiality thresholds and 
for assessing a director‟s independence in light of interests disclosed by them. 
 
GOC directors should be equipped with the knowledge and information they need to 
discharge their responsibilities effectively. Individual and collective performance should be 
reviewed at regular periods not exceeding two years. Board evaluations should be carried out 
under the responsibility of the chair and according to best practice. The evaluation should 
address whether the objectives of the board or committee are being met in a cost effective 
manner. The board should have access to continuing education and training to maintain, 
update and enhance their skills, knowledge and experience. 
 
In general, the chair should continuously monitor the performance of individual directors, the 
board and committees. 
 
Internal reporting frameworks should be sufficiently comprehensive to support the 
monitoring and review functions of the board and committees. 
 
Given the appointment of new directors of GOCs is undertaken by the Governor in Council, a 
nomination committee (Recommendation 2.4 of the ASX Principles) is not considered 
necessary as most of the functions of such a committee are not vested in the board. However, 
the board should still continually assess the skills of the board and develop strategies to 
enhance them where appropriate, having regard to the nature of the GOC‟s business. GOC 
boards should also make shareholding Ministers aware of skills shortages that have been 
identified and are encouraged to provide nominees with the necessary skills to address such 
shortages. 
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Reporting 
The corporate governance section of the annual report should disclose: 
 the skills, experience and expertise relevant to the position of director held by each 
director in office at the date of the report; 
 the names of the directors considered by the board to be independent and the GOC‟s 
materiality thresholds; 
 a statement as to whether there is a procedure agreed by the board to take 
independent professional advice at the expense of the GOC; 
 the term of office held by each director in office at the date of the report, including 
the date the director was first appointed; and 
 whether a performance evaluation for the board has taken place in the reporting 
period and how it was conducted. 
 
A description of the process for performance evaluation of the board, committees and 
individual directors should be made publicly available, preferably on the GOC‟s website in a 
clearly marked corporate governance section. 
 
Whenever a performance evaluation of the board is conducted, the GOC should provide a 
written report to shareholding Ministers of the results of the evaluation. This report should 
also cover how the GOC has rated its compliance with the broader GOC policy framework. 
 
Principle 3: Promote ethical and responsible decision-making 
 
Recommendations 
 Establish and disclose a code of conduct outlining the practices necessary to maintain 
confidence in the company‟s integrity and to guide compliance with legal and other 
obligations to stakeholders. 
 Establish and disclose the policy for trading in securities by directors, officers and 
employees. 
 Establish the code of conduct in line with the best practice guide provided in 
Appendix A. 
 
Commentary 
GOC boards and senior executives must observe the highest standards of ethical behaviour. 
The GOC should clarify the standards of ethical behaviour required and monitor and enforce 
observance of those standards. 
 
GOCs have a number of stakeholders in addition to their shareholders to which they owe 
legal and other obligations. These include employees, clients and customers and the 
community as a whole. It is important for GOCs to demonstrate their commitment to 
appropriate corporate practices that recognise these interests and to corporate social 
responsibility in general. 
 
This may be implemented through a code of conduct or appropriate alternative means such as 
policy and procedures documents. The code of conduct should deal with ethical matters as 
well as legal compliance. The code should reflect the significant public responsibility and 
high standards of conduct that GOCs should have as publicly owned enterprises. 
 
The code of conduct could be a separate code for directors and executives or included as part 
of the corporate code of conduct. 
 
The code should provide guidance as to the practices necessary to maintain confidence in the 
GOC‟s integrity, and the responsibility and accountability of individuals for reporting and 
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investigating reports of unethical practices. The code should give clear guidance as to the 
expected conduct of directors, senior executives and employees and must give consideration 
to the elements of the best practice guide as per Appendix A. It is also considered to be good 
practice for the code to be developed with the participation of employees and stakeholders. It 
should be fully supported and implemented by the board and senior executives. 
 
In drafting the code, GOCs should have regard to the suggestions in the ASX Principles and 
the recommendations of the Auditor-General. In this regard, the Auditor-General 
recommends that: 
 codes of conduct are enhanced by the incorporation of examples and scenarios to 
assist in ethical decision-making; and 
 
conduct for directors addressing matters such as potential conflicts of interest and 
confidentiality. 
 
The Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Public Sector – Guidelines and Toolkit jointly 
issued by the Crime and Misconduct Commission (Qld) and Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (NSW) should also be considered in the development of the code of 
conduct where it relates to conflicts of interest policies. 
 
Although the Public Sector Ethics Act 1995 does not apply to GOCs, the principles set out in 
that Act may be relevant. 
 
The code should also include or make reference to guidance on procurement processes and 
contain a system for ensuring compliance and for enabling employees to alert management of 
misconduct. This should be consistent with, but not necessarily limited to, the requirements 
of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
 
These matters might also be dealt with in other documents, such as policies or compliance 
programs. In that case, it may be appropriate for the code of conduct to make reference to 
those documents. 
 
A trading policy, including the application of restricted share trading registers (if used), 
should be established where directors, officers or employees of the GOC may in the course of 
their duties have access to inside information about any securities or where trading in 
securities may create a conflict of interest. This policy would supplement any legal duties 
which apply to directors, officers and employees in relation to use of information. 
 
Reporting 
The code of conduct and trading policy, or a summary of their provisions, should be made 
publicly available, preferably on the GOC‟s website in a clearly marked corporate 
governance section and communicated to employees as part of the induction process and on 
an ongoing basis. GOCs should also consider making advisers, consultants and contractors 
aware of the GOC‟s expectations as set out in the code of conduct. 
 
Principle 4: Safeguard integrity in financial reporting 
 
Recommendations 
 The board should establish an audit committee. 
 The chief executive officer and the chief financial officer (or equivalent) state in 
writing that the financial reports present a true and fair view and are in accordance 
with accounting standards. 
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Commentary 
An independent audit committee is a key element of good corporate governance. It should 
have at least three members who are all financially literate, with at least one member having 
relevant qualifications and experience (i.e. should be a qualified accountant or other finance 
professional with experience of financial and accounting matters). Some members of the 
committee should have an understanding of the industry in which the GOC operates. The 
chair of the committee should not be the chair of the board. As referred to in Principle 1, the 
committee should have a clearly defined charter setting out the roles and responsibilities of 
the committee and its members. 
 
GOCs should have structures in place to ensure the faithful and factual representation of its 
financial position. Although under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) the statement referred to 
above is only required to be made in respect of listed entities, it is recommended for GOCs as 
it encourages management accountability. 
 
Reporting 
The corporate governance section of the annual report should disclose: 
 details of the names and qualifications of those appointed to the audit committee, or 
those who perform the functions of an audit committee; and 
 the number of meetings held by the audit committee and the names of the attendees. 
 
The audit committee charter should be made publicly available, preferably on the GOC‟s 
website in a clearly marked corporate governance section. 
 
Principle 5: Make timely and balanced disclosures 
 
Recommendation 
 
requirements (including those in the GOC Act) and generally ensure the 
accountability of senior management for that compliance. 
 
Commentary 
Section 122 of the GOC Act requires GOCs to keep shareholding Ministers reasonably 
informed about the operations, financial performance and financial position of the GOC and 
its subsidiaries. This requirement has a similar rationale to the continuous disclosure 
obligations which apply to listed companies under the ASX Listing Rules. GOCs also have a 
number of specific disclosure obligations imposed on them by the GOC Act, relevant policies 
and other legislation. 
 
As well as their legal obligations, GOCs are generally accountable to their shareholding 
Ministers who are in turn accountable to Parliament. It is important that shareholding 
Ministers have sufficient information about GOCs to fulfil this obligation. GOCs should 
therefore ensure that the shareholding Ministers have access to material information 
concerning the GOC, including the operations, financial performance, financial position and 
governance of the GOC and its subsidiaries. GOCs should adopt a broad approach to 
disclosure, which may go beyond the disclosures strictly required by law. In this respect, the 
GOC‟s code of conduct (refer to Principle 3) must ensure that shareholding Ministers receive 
timely and complete advice of potential and actual breaches of the code of conduct and 
securities trading policies by GOC board members, chief and senior executives and where 
material, GOC employees. 
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GOCs should also adequately disclose material risk factors and any material changes in the 
GOC‟s risk profile. This requires the establishment of sound internal risk management 
systems as referred to in Principle 7. 
 
Reporting 
A summary of the policies and procedures to ensure compliance with disclosure requirements 
should be made publicly available, preferably on the GOC‟s website in a clearly marked 
corporate governance section. 
 
GOCs must regularly assess the information needs of stakeholders to ensure that their needs 
continue to be met by the GOC‟s public disclosures. 
 
Principle 6: Respect the rights of shareholders 
 
Recommendation 
 Design and disclose a communication strategy to promote effective communication 
with shareholding Ministers. 
 
Commentary 
Shareholding Ministers have a general right to obtain information from GOCs about their 
operations by virtue of the accountability of the GOC to the government, Parliament and the 
public via the Ministers.
2
 GOCs should respect the rights of shareholding Ministers and their 
representatives, having regard to the requirements of responsible government, and facilitate 
the effective exercise of those rights. They should communicate effectively and actively 
consult with the shareholding Ministers and give them ready access to balanced and 
understandable information about the GOC and corporate proposals. GOCs should not only 
comply with existing legal and regulatory requirements but also go beyond them where 
relevant in order to build credibility and confidence. 
 
In general it is expected that the shareholding Ministers will communicate with the chair of 
the GOC, both on a formal and informal basis. The chief executive officer and other officers 
and employees should communicate with the Office of Government Owned Corporations or 
representatives of shareholder departments. The GOC should work cooperatively with the 
Office of Government Owned Corporations and shareholder departments to ensure that the 
shareholding Ministers can be briefed in a timely manner. 
 
Reporting 
A description of the arrangements the GOC has to promote communication with shareholding 
Ministers should be made publicly available, preferably on the GOC‟s website in a clearly 
marked corporate governance section. 
 
 
Principle 7: Recognise and manage risk 
 
Recommendations 
 Establish policies on risk management and oversight. 
 Require management to design and implement a risk management and internal 
control system to manage the GOC‟s material business risks. 
 
and operational objectives. 
                                                          
2
  Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 146 ALR 1 at 88 – 89 per 
Finn J. 
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 
management‟s position on risk. 
 y across the GOC. 
 
as a separate task at set times. 
 
aggregation and reporting at a corporate level. 
 -risk fraud areas and develop 
strategies to mitigate any significant fraud risks. 
 Implement policies and procedures which include: 
 
 employee responsibilities in relation to fraud prevention and identification; 
 responsibility for fraud investigation once a fraud has been identified; 
 processes for reporting on fraud related matters to management; 
 reporting and recording processes to be followed to record allegations of fraud; 
 requirements for employee training to be conducted on fraud prevention and 
identification; and 
 a reference to the GOC‟s code of conduct for ethical behaviour. 
 
 
control activities, which identifies fraud risk, incorporates control strategies, action 
plans and a timetable for implementation, and sets out responsibilities and 
accountabilities for fraud control at all levels of the GOC. 
 
of its material business risks, allowing the board to assess the effectiveness of the 
implementation of the company‟s risk management and internal control systems 
annually. 
 The chief executive officer and the chief financial officer (or equivalent) state to the 
board that the statement given under the recommendations applying to Principle 4 is 
founded on a sound system of risk management and internal compliance and control 
which implements board policies; and the risk management and control system is 
operating efficiently and effectively in all material respects. 
 
Commentary 
It is important that GOCs should have a sound system of risk oversight and management and 
internal control. The system should be designed to identify, assess, monitor and manage risk, 
and inform shareholding Ministers of material changes to the GOC‟s risk profile. 
 
The policies should clearly set out the roles and responsibilities of the board, committees, 
management and, if applicable, internal audit in relation to risk management. 
 
Risk management and internal control systems should be implemented by senior management 
and incorporate planning for business continuity and disaster recovery. The systems should 
deal with significant business risks which are relevant to the GOC, which may include risks 
such as trading, financial (as addressed in the Code of Practice for GOCs‟ Financial 
Arrangements), security, public liability and workplace health and safety risks. 
 
GOCs should also give consideration to the establishment of an internal audit function which 
will bring a systematic and disciplined approach to improve risk management, financial 
control and governance procedures. The establishment of a risk management committee may 
also be appropriate. 
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Internal auditors should ensure that procedures are adequately implemented and be able to 
guarantee the quality of information disclosed by the GOC. Consultation between internal 
auditors and the Auditor-General as external auditor should be encouraged. 
 
In relation to systems for fraud and corruption control, the Crime and Misconduct 
Commission has produced Fraud and Corruption Control: Guidelines for best practice. 
Although GOCs are not subject to the jurisdiction of the CMC, this provides a useful guide as 
to the elements of such a system. 
 
Reporting 
A description of the GOC‟s risk management policy and internal compliance and control 
systems should be made publicly available, preferably on the GOC‟s website in a clearly 
marked corporate governance section. 
 
The corporate governance section of the annual report should also disclose that the GOC‟s 
management has reported to the board as to the effectiveness of the GOC‟s management of 
its material business risks. 
 
Principle 8: Remunerate fairly and responsibly 
 
Recommendations 
 GOCs should disclose their remuneration policies to show the broad structure and 
objectives of the policies and the link between remuneration of the chief executive 
officer and senior executives and corporate performance. 
 The board should establish a remuneration committee. 
 
Commentary 
Remuneration is an important issue for GOCs. As a result of the public ownership of GOCs, 
public accountability and transparency is required in relation to remuneration policies. 
 
When setting remuneration for chief executive officer and senior executives, GOCs should 
aim to ensure a balance between public accountability and transparency and the GOCs‟ need 
to attract and retain high calibre employees from competitive labour markets. The 
remuneration arrangements for chief and senior executives are set in accordance with 
Government approved principles, having regard to specific key criteria or standards. 
 
GOCs are also required to have a remuneration policy endorsed by shareholding Ministers 
which should include: 
 the principles used to determine the nature and amount of remuneration including the 
broad structure and objectives of the GOC‟s remuneration policy; and 
 details of how the principles establish a link or relationship between remuneration 
paid and the performance of the GOC. 
 
In accordance with Principle 1, the remuneration committee should have a formal charter 
which sets out the roles and responsibilities of committee members. 
 
Reporting 
The corporate governance section of the annual report
3
 should include the following 
information: 
                                                          
3
  To the extent that this information is already disclosed in the financial statements in accordance 
with AASB 124, that information can be incorporated in the corporate governance section by cross 
reference. 
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 disclosure of the GOC‟s remuneration policies; 
 the names of the members of the remuneration committee and their attendance at 
meetings of the committee. 
 The charter of the remuneration committee should be made publicly available, 
preferably on the GOC‟s website in a clearly marked corporate governance section. 
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Appendix U: ASX Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations
1
 
 
2
nd
 Edition 
ASX Corporate Governance Council 
 
Principle 1: Lay solid foundations for management and oversight 
 
Companies should establish and disclose the respective roles and responsibilities of board 
and management. 
 
The company‟s framework should be designed to: 
 enable the board to provide strategic guidance for the company and effective 
oversight of management 
 clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of board members and senior 
executives in order to facilitate board and senior executives‟ accountability to both 
the company and its shareholders
2
 
 ensure a balance of authority so that no single individual has unfettered powers. 
 
Recommendation 1.1: 
Companies should establish the functions reserved to the board and those delegated to senior 
executives and disclose those functions. 
 
Commentary 
 
Role of the board and management 
Boards should adopt a formal statement of matters reserved to them or a formal board charter 
that details their functions and responsibilities. There should be a formal statement of the 
areas of authority delegated to senior executives. 
 
The nature of matters reserved to the board and delegated to senior executives will depend on 
the size, complexity and ownership structure of the company, and will be influenced by its 
tradition and corporate culture, and by the skills of directors and senior executives. 
 
Disclosing the division of responsibility assists those affected by corporate decisions to better 
understand the respective accountabilities and contributions of the board and senior 
executives. 
 
That understanding can be further enhanced if the disclosure includes an explanation of the 
balance of responsibility between the chair, the lead independent director, if any, and the 
chief executive officer, or equivalent. 
 
The division of responsibility may vary with the evolution of the company. Regular review of 
the balance of responsibilities may be appropriate to ensure that the division of functions 
remains appropriate to the needs of the company. 
                                                          
1
  ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, 
(2
nd
 edn., August 2007) in ASX < 
http://www.asx.com.au/about/corporate_governance/revised_corporate_governance_principles_rec
ommendations.htm >  at 18 July 2010 
2
  Senior executives refers to the senior management team as distinct from the board, being those who 
have the opportunity to materially influence the integrity, strategy and operation of the company 
and its  financial performance. 
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Responsibilities of the board 
Usually the board will be responsible for: 
 overseeing the company, including its control and accountability systems 
 appointing and removing the chief executive officer, or equivalent 
 where appropriate, ratifying the appointment and the removal of senior 
executives 
 providing input into and final approval of management‟s development of 
corporate strategy and performance objectives 
 reviewing, ratifying and monitoring systems of risk management and internal 
control, codes of conduct, and legal compliance 
 monitoring senior executives‟ performance and implementation of strategy 
 ensuring appropriate resources are available to senior executives 
 approving and monitoring the progress of major capital expenditure, capital 
management, and acquisitions and divestitures 
 approving and monitoring financial and other reporting. 
 
Allocation of individual responsibilities 
It is also appropriate that directors clearly understand corporate expectations of them. To that 
end, formal letters upon appointment for directors setting out the key terms and conditions 
relative to that appointment are useful. 
 
Suggestions for the contents of the letter are contained in Box 1.1. 
 
Box 1.1 Content of a director’s letter upon appointment 
Companies may find it useful to consider the following matters when drafting directors‟ 
letters upon appointment: 
 term of appointment 
 time commitment envisaged 
 powers and duties of directors 
 any special duties or arrangements attaching to the position 
 circumstances in which an office of director becomes vacant 
 expectations regarding involvement with committee work 
 remuneration, including superannuation and expenses 
 requirement to disclose directors‟ interests and any matters which affect the 
director‟s independence 
 fellow directors 
 trading policy governing dealings in securities (including any share qualifications) 
and related financial instruments by directors, including notification requirements 
 induction training and continuing education arrangements 
 board policy on access to independent professional advice 
 indemnity and insurance arrangements 
 confidentiality and rights of access to corporate information 
 a copy of the constitution 
 organisational chart of management structure. 
 
 
Similarly, senior executives including the chief executive officer, or equivalent, and the chief 
financial officer, or equivalent, should have a formal job description and letter of 
appointment describing their term of office, duties, rights and responsibilities, and 
entitlements on termination. Box 8.1 (Principle 8) provides further commentary on the matter 
of termination entitlements. 
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Recommendation 1.2: 
Companies should disclose the process for evaluating the performance of senior executives. 
 
Commentary 
The performance of senior executives should be reviewed regularly against appropriate 
measures. 
 
Induction 
Induction procedures should be in place to allow new senior executives to participate fully 
and actively in management decision-making at the earliest opportunity. 
 
To be effective, new senior executives need to have a good deal of knowledge about the 
company and the industry within which it operates. An induction program should be 
available to enable senior executives to gain an understanding of: 
 the company‟s financial position, strategies, operations and risk management policies 
 the respective rights, duties, responsibilities and roles of the board and senior 
executives. 
 
Recommendation 1.3: 
Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to reporting on Principle 1. 
 
Guide to reporting on Principle 1 
The following material should be included in the corporate governance statement in the 
annual report: 
 an explanation of any departure from Recommendations 1.1, 1.2 or 1.3 
 whether a performance evaluation for senior executives has taken place in the 
reporting period and whether it was in accordance with the process disclosed. 
 
A statement of matters reserved for the board, or the board charter or the statement of areas of 
delegated authority to senior executives should be made publicly available, ideally by posting 
it to the company‟s website in a clearly marked corporate governance section. 
 
Application of Principle 1 in relation to trusts and externally managed entities 
References to “board” and “directors” should be applied as references to the board and 
directors of the responsible entity of the trust and to equivalent roles in respect of other 
externally managed entities. 
 
A trust should clarify the relationship between the responsible entity and the parent company 
where relevant, and articulate the relevant roles and responsibilities of the board and 
management of the responsible entity. 
 
Trusts should also have regard to the responsibilities of external directors and the compliance 
committee under Part 5C.5 of the Corporations Act. 
 
Principle 2: Structure the board to add value 
 
Companies should have a board of an effective composition, size and commitment to 
adequately discharge its responsibilities and duties 
 
An effective board is one that facilitates the effective discharge of the duties imposed by law 
on the directors and adds value in a way that is appropriate to the particular company‟s 
circumstances. The board should be structured in such a way that it: 
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 has a proper understanding of, and competence to deal with, the current and 
emerging issues of the business 
 exercises independent judgement 
 encourages enhanced performance of the company 
 can effectively review and challenge the performance of management. 
 
Ultimately the directors are elected by the shareholders. However, the board and its delegates 
play an important role in the selection of candidates for shareholder vote. 
 
Recommendation 2.1: 
A majority of the board should be independent directors.
3
 
 
Commentary 
 
Independent decision-making 
All directors – whether independent or not – should bring an independent judgement to bear 
on board decisions. 
 
To facilitate this, there should be a procedure agreed by the board for directors to have access 
in appropriate circumstances to independent professional advice at the company‟s expense. 
 
Non-executive directors should consider the benefits of conferring regularly without 
management present, including at scheduled sessions.
4
 Their discussions can be facilitated by 
the chair or lead independent director, if any. 
 
Independent directors 
An independent director is a non-executive director who is not a member of management and 
who is free of any business or other relationship that could materially interfere with – or 
could reasonably be perceived to materially interfere with – the independent exercise of their 
judgement. Relationships which may affect independent status are set out in Box 2.1. 
 
Directors considered by the board to be independent should be identified as such in the 
corporate governance statement in the annual report. The board should state its reasons if it 
considers a director to be independent, notwithstanding the existence of relationships listed in 
Box 2.1, and the corporate governance statement should disclose the existence of any such 
relationships. In this context, it is important for the board to consider materiality thresholds 
from the perspective of both the company and its directors, and to disclose these.
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
  A series of relationships affecting independent status are set out in Box 2.1. 
4
  At times it may be appropriate for the independent directors to meet without other directors present. 
5
  For example, a board may decide that affiliation with a business which accounts for, say, less than 
X% of the company‟s revenue is, as a category, immaterial for the purpose of determining 
independence. If the company discloses the standard it follows and makes a general statement that 
the relevant director meets that standard, investors are better informed about the board‟s reasoning 
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Box 2.1: Relationships affecting independent status
6
 
When determining the independent status of a director the board should consider whether 
the director: 
1. is a substantial shareholder of the company or an officer of, or otherwise associated 
directly with, a substantial shareholder of the company
7
 
2. is employed, or has previously been employed in an executive capacity by the company 
or another group member, and there has not been a period of at least three years 
between ceasing such employment and serving on the board 
3. has within the last three years been a principal of a material professional adviser or a 
material consultant to the company or another group member, or an employee 
materially associated with the service provided 
4. is a material supplier or customer of the company or other group member, or an officer 
of or otherwise associated directly or indirectly with a material supplier or customer 
5. has a material contractual relationship with the company or another group member other 
than as a director. 
 
Family ties and cross-directorships may be relevant in considering interests and relationships 
which may affect independence, and should be disclosed by directors to the board. 
 
Regular assessments 
The board should regularly assess whether each non-executive director is independent. Each 
non-executive director should provide to the board all information that may be relevant to 
this assessment. If a director‟s independent status changes, this should be disclosed and 
explained in a timely manner to the market. 
 
Recommendation 2.2: 
The chair should be an independent director. 
 
Commentary 
 
Role of chair 
The chair is responsible for leadership of the board and for the efficient organisation and 
conduct of the board‟s functioning. 
 
The chair should facilitate the effective contribution of all directors and promote constructive 
and respectful relations between directors and between board and management. 
 
Where the chair is not an independent director, it may be beneficial to consider the 
appointment of a lead independent director. 
 
The role of chair is demanding, requiring a significant time commitment. The chair‟s other 
positions should not be such that they are likely to hinder effective performance in the role. 
 
Recommendation 2.3: 
The roles of chair and chief executive officer should not be exercised by the same individual. 
 
 
                                                          
6
  The relationships affecting independent status in Box 2.1 are adapted from the definition of 
independence given by Corporate Governance, A Guide for Fund Managers and Corporations – 
Blue Book, Investment and Financial Services Association, 2004 at www.ifsa.com.au. 
7
  For this purpose a “substantial shareholder” is a person with a substantial holding as defined in 
section 9 of the Corporations Act. 
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Commentary 
There should be a clear division of responsibility at the head of the company. 
 
The division of responsibilities between the chair and the chief executive officer should be 
agreed by the board and set out in a statement of position or authority. 
 
The chief executive officer should not go on to become chair of the same company. A former 
chief executive officer will not qualify as an “independent” director unless there has been a 
period of at least three years between ceasing employment with the company and serving on 
the board. 
 
Recommendation 2.4: 
The board should establish a nomination committee. 
 
Commentary 
 
Purpose of the nomination committee 
A board nomination committee is an efficient mechanism for examination of the selection 
and appointment practices of the company. 
 
Ultimate responsibility for these practices, however, rests with the full board, whether or not 
a separate nomination committee exists. 
 
For smaller boards, the same efficiencies may not be derived from a formal committee 
structure. Companies without a nomination committee should have board processes in place 
which raise the issues that would otherwise be considered by the nomination committee. 
 
Charter 
The nomination committee should have a charter that clearly sets out its roles and 
responsibilities, composition, structure, membership requirements and the procedures for 
inviting non-committee members to attend meetings. 
 
The terms of reference of the nomination committee should allow it to have access to 
adequate internal and external resources, including access to advice from external consultants 
or specialists. 
 
Composition of nomination committee 
The nomination committee should be structured so that it: 
 consists of a majority of independent directors 
 is chaired by an independent director  
 has at least three members. 
 
Responsibilities 
Responsibilities of the committee should include recommendations to the board about: 
 the necessary and desirable competencies 
of directors 
 review of board succession plans 
 the development of a process for evaluation of the performance of the board, its 
committees and directors 
 the appointment and re-election of directors. 
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Selection and appointment process and re-election of directors 
A formal and transparent procedure for the selection, appointment and re-appointment of 
directors to the board helps promote investor understanding and confidence in that process. 
Important issues to be considered as part of the process include: 
 
 Director competencies – In order to be able to discharge its mandate effectively the 
board should comprise directors possessing an appropriate range of skills and 
expertise. The nomination committee should consider implementing a plan for 
identifying, assessing and enhancing director competencies. 
 
An evaluation of the range of skills, experience and expertise on the board is 
important when considering new candidates for nomination or appointment. Such an 
evaluation enables identification of the particular skills that will best increase board 
effectiveness. 
 
 Board renewal – Board renewal is critical to performance, and directors should be 
conscious of the duration of each director‟s tenure in succession planning. 
 
The nomination committee should consider whether succession plans are in place to 
maintain an appropriate balance of skills, experience and expertise on the board. 
 
 Composition and commitment of the board – The board should be of a size and 
composition that is conducive to making appropriate decisions. The board should be 
large enough to incorporate a variety of perspectives and skills, and to represent the 
best interests of the company as a whole rather than of individual shareholders or 
interest groups. It should not, however, be so large that effective decision-making is 
hindered. 
 
Individual board members should devote the necessary time to the tasks entrusted to 
them. All directors should consider the number and nature of their directorships and 
calls on their time from other commitments. 
 
In support of their candidature for directorship or re-election, non-executive directors 
should provide the nomination committee with details of other commitments and an 
indication of time involved. Prior to appointment or being submitted for re-election 
non-executive directors should specifically acknowledge to the company that they 
will have sufficient time to meet what is expected of them. 
 
The nomination committee should regularly review the time required from a non-
executive director, and whether directors are meeting that requirement. Non-
executive directors should inform the chair and the chair of the nomination 
committee before accepting any new appointments as directors. 
 
 Election of directors – The names of candidates submitted for election as directors 
should be accompanied by the following information to enable shareholders to make 
an informed decision on their election: 
– biographical details, including competencies and qualifications and 
information sufficient to enable an assessment of the independence of the 
candidate 
– details of relationships between: 
• the candidate and the company, and 
• the candidate and directors of the company 
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– directorships held8 
– particulars of other positions which involve significant time commitments 
– the term of office currently served by any directors subject to re-election 
– any other particulars required by law.9 
 
Non-executive directors should be appointed for specific terms subject to re-election and to 
the ASX Listing Rule and Corporations Act provisions concerning removal of a director. Re-
appointment of directors should not be automatic. 
 
Recommendation 2.5: 
Companies should disclose the process for evaluating the performance of the board, its 
committees and individual directors. 
 
Commentary 
The performance of the board should be reviewed regularly against appropriate measures. 
 
Induction and education 
Induction procedures should be in place to allow new directors to participate fully and 
actively in board decision-making at the earliest opportunity. 
 
To be effective, new directors need to have a good deal of knowledge about the company and 
the industry within which it operates. An induction program should be available to enable 
new directors to gain an understanding of: 
 the company‟s financial, strategic, operational and risk management position  
 the rights, duties and responsibilities of the Directors 
 the roles and responsibilities of senior Executives 
 the role of board committees. 
 
Directors should have access to continuing education to update and enhance their skills and 
knowledge. 
 
Access to information 
The board should be provided with the information it needs to discharge its responsibilities 
effectively. 
 
Senior executives should supply the board with information in a form and timeframe, and of 
a quality that enables the board to discharge its duties effectively. Directors are entitled to 
request additional information where they consider such information necessary to make 
informed decisions. 
 
The board and the company secretary 
The company secretary plays an important role in supporting the effectiveness of the board 
by monitoring that board policy and procedures are followed, and coordinating the timely 
completion and despatch of board agenda and briefing material. 
 
It is important that all directors have access to the company secretary. The appointment and 
removal of the company secretary should be a matter for decision by the board as a whole. 
                                                          
8
  These are directorships required to be disclosed by law, and any other directorships relevant to an 
assessment of independence. 
9
  The Guidelines for notices of meeting at www.asx.com.au are designed to assist communication 
with shareholders and contain guidance on framing resolutions for the election of directors. 
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The company secretary should be accountable to the board, through the chair, on all 
governance matters. 
 
Recommendation 2.6: 
Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to reporting on Principle 2. 
 
Guide to reporting on Principle 2 
The following material should be included in the corporate governance statement in the 
annual report: 
 the skills, experience and expertise relevant to the position of director held by each 
director in office at the date of the annual report 
 the names of the directors considered by the board to constitute independent directors 
and the company‟s materiality thresholds 
 the existence of any of the relationships listed in Box 2.1 and an explanation of why 
the board considers a director to be 
 independent, notwithstanding the existence of those relationships 
 a statement as to whether there is a procedure agreed by the board for directors to 
take independent professional advice at the expense of the company 
 the period of office held by each director in office at the date of the annual report 
 the names of members of the nomination committee and their attendance at meetings 
of the committee, or where a company does not have a nomination committee, how 
the functions of a nomination committee are carried out 
 whether a performance evaluation for the board, its committees and directors has 
taken place in the reporting period and whether it was in accordance with the process 
disclosed 
 an explanation of any departures from Recommendations 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 or 2.6. 
 
The following material should be made publicly available, ideally by posting it to the 
company‟s website in a clearly marked corporate governance section: 
 a description of the procedure for the selection and appointment of new directors and 
the re-election of incumbent directors 
 the charter of the nomination committee or a summary of the role, rights, 
responsibilities and membership requirements for that committee 
 the board‟s policy for the nomination and appointment of directors. 
 
Application of Principle 2 in relation to trusts and externally managed entities 
References to “board” and “directors” should be applied as references to the board and 
directors of the responsible entity of the trust and to equivalent roles in respect of other 
externally managed entities. 
 
There may be technical conflict in implementing the Recommendations that a director be 
independent and that the chair be an independent director or a lead independent director, 
where the manager or responsible entity is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a parent company 
such as a fund manager and all the directors are employees of the parent. This should be 
discussed and clarified in any explanation of departure from the Recommendations included 
in the corporate governance statement in the annual report. 
 
Principle 3: Promote ethical and responsible decision-making 
 
Companies should actively promote ethical and responsible decision-making  
 
To make ethical and responsible decisions, companies should not only comply with their 
legal obligations, but should also consider the reasonable expectations of their stakeholders 
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including: shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, consumers and the 
broader community in which they operate. It is a matter for the board to consider and assess 
what is appropriate in each company‟s circumstances. It is important for companies to 
demonstrate their commitment to appropriate corporate practices and decision making. 
 
Companies should: 
 clarify the standards of ethical behaviour required of the board, senior executives and 
all employees and encourage the observance of those standards 
 comply with their legal obligations and have regard to the reasonable expectations of 
their stakeholders 
 publish the policy concerning the issue of board and employee trading in company 
securities and in associated products, including products which operate to limit the 
economic risk of those securities. 
 
Recommendation 3.1: 
Companies should establish a code of conduct and disclose the code or a summary of the 
code as to: 
 the practices necessary to maintain confidence in the company‟s integrity 
 the practices necessary to take into account their legal obligations and the reasonable 
expectations of their stakeholders 
 the responsibility and accountability of individuals for reporting and investigating 
reports of unethical practices. 
 
Commentary 
 
Purpose of a code of conduct 
Good corporate governance ultimately requires people of integrity. Personal integrity cannot 
be regulated. However, investor confidence can be enhanced if the company clearly 
articulates acceptable practices for directors, senior executives and employees. 
 
The board has a responsibility to set the ethical tone and standards of the company. Senior 
executives have a responsibility to implement practices consistent with those standards. 
Company codes of conduct which state the values and policies of the company can assist the 
board and senior executives in this task and complement the company‟s risk management 
practices. 
 
Application of a code of conduct 
Companies should formulate policies on appropriate behaviour of directors, senior executives 
and employees. Companies should encourage the integration of these policies into company-
wide management practices. A code of conduct supported by appropriate training and 
monitoring of compliance with the code are effective ways to guide the behaviour of 
directors, senior executives and employees and demonstrate the commitment of the company 
to ethical practices. Companies should ensure that training on the code of conduct is updated 
on a regular basis. 
 
Companies should consider making advisers, consultants and contractors aware of the 
company‟s expectations as set out in the code of conduct. 
 
It is not necessary for companies to establish a separate code for directors and senior 
executives. Depending on the nature and size of the company‟s operations, the code of 
conduct for directors and senior executives may stand alone or be part of the corporate code 
of conduct. 
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Suggestions for the content of a code of conduct are set out in Box 3.1. 
 
Box 3.1: Suggestions for the content of a code of conduct 
Companies may find it useful to consider the following matters when formulating a code 
of conduct: 
1. Give a clear commitment by the board and senior executives to the code of conduct. 
This is often linked to statements about the aspirations or objectives of the company, its 
core values, and its views about the expectations of shareholders, employees, 
customers, suppliers, creditors, consumers and the broader community. 
2. Detail the company‟s responsibilities to shareholders and the financial community 
generally. This might include reference to the company‟s commitment to delivering 
shareholder value and how it will do this, and the company‟s approach to accounting 
policies and practices, and disclosure. 
3. Specify the company‟s responsibilities to shareholders, employees, customers, 
suppliers, creditors, consumers and the broader community. This might include 
reference to standards of product quality or service, commitments to fair value, fair 
dealing and fair trading, and the safety of goods produced. 
4. Describe the company‟s approach to the community. This might include environmental 
protection policies, support for community activities, and donation or sponsorship 
policies. 
5. Articulate the company‟s responsibilities to the individual. This might include the 
company‟s privacy policy, and its policy on the use of privileged or confidential 
information. 
6. Outline the company‟s employment practices. This might include reference to 
occupational health and safety, employment opportunity practices, special entitlements 
above the statutory minimum, employee security trading policies, training and further 
education support policies, practices on drug and alcohol usage and policies on outside 
employment. 
7. Describe the company‟s approach to business courtesies, bribes, facilitation payments, 
inducements and commissions. This might include how the company regulates the 
giving and accepting of business courtesies and facilitation payments, and prevents the 
offering and acceptance of bribes, inducements and commissions and the misuse of 
company assets and resources. 
8. State the measures the company follows to promote active compliance with legislation 
wherever it operates. This might include stating whether the company‟s policy is to 
comply with Australian or local legal requirements regarding employment practices, 
responsibilities to the community and responsibilities to the individual, particularly if 
the host country follows materially different standards than those prescribed by 
Australian law or international protocols. 
9. Specify how the company handles actual or potential conflicts of interest. This might 
include reference to how the company manages situations where the interest of a 
private individual interferes or appears to interfere with the interests of the company as 
a whole, and how the company prevents directors, senior executives and employees 
from taking improper advantage of property, information or position, or opportunities 
arising from these, for personal gain or to compete with the company. 
10. Identify measures the company follows to encourage the reporting of unlawful or 
unethical behaviour and to actively promote ethical behaviour. This might include 
reference to how the company protects those, such as whistleblowers, who report 
violations in good faith, and its processes for dealing with such reports.
10
 
                                                          
10
  For guidance on the provision of a whistleblowing service, see Australian Standard on 
Whistleblowing Protection Programs for Entities (AS 8004). 
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11. Describe the means by which the company monitors and ensures compliance with its 
code. 
 
Recommendation 3.2: 
Companies should establish a policy concerning trading in company securities by directors, 
senior executives and employees, and disclose the policy or a summary of that policy. 
 
Commentary 
Public confidence in the company can be eroded if there is insufficient understanding about 
the company‟s policies governing trading by “potential insiders”. The law prohibits insider 
trading, and the Corporations Act and the ASX Listing Rules require disclosure of any 
trading undertaken by directors or their related entities in the company‟s securities.11 
 
For the purpose of this policy a “potential insider” is a person likely to possess inside 
information and includes the directors, the chief executive officer, or equivalent, the chief 
financial officer, or equivalent, staff members who are involved in material transactions 
concerning the company, and any other member of staff who is likely to be in the possession 
of inside information. 
 
“Inside information” means information concerning a company‟s financial position, strategy 
or operations and any other information which a reasonable person might consider, if it were 
made public, would be likely to have a material impact on a decision to buy or sell a 
company‟s securities.12 
 
Where companies establish a trading policy, they should also introduce appropriate 
compliance standards and procedures to ensure that the policy is properly implemented. 
There should also be an internal review mechanism to assess compliance and effectiveness. 
This review may involve an internal audit function. 
 
Suggestions for the content of a trading policy are set out in Box 3.2. 
 
Box 3.2: Suggestions for the content of a trading policy 
Companies may find it useful to consider the following matters when formulating a 
trading policy: 
1. Clearly identify the directors, officers, employees or group of employees who are 
restricted from trading (“designated officers”).13 
2. Identify and raise awareness about the prohibitions under the law and the requirements 
of the policy. This should include an awareness that it is inappropriate for the 
designated officer to procure others to trade when the designated officer is precluded 
from trading, and an awareness of the need to enforce confidentiality against external 
advisers. 
3. Require designated officers to provide notification to an appropriate senior member of 
the company, for example, in the case of directors, to the chair, of intended trading, 
including entering into transactions or arrangements which operate to limit the 
economic risk of their security holdings in the company. No prior notification is needed 
                                                          
11
  See ASX Listing Rule 3.19A regarding disclosure by the company of directors‟ notifiable interests 
within five business days. Companies should note that as at July 2007 the Government proposes 
amending section 205G of the Corporations Act regarding disclosure by directors of their notifiable 
interests. The proposed amendment would reduce the timeframe for disclosure from 14 days to two 
days. There is also a proposal to remove the Listing Rule. 
12
  Companies should be aware of the relevant provisions of the Corporations Act. 
13
  Anyone coming into possession of inside information has obligations to comply with the law 
relating to insider trading. 
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for participation in dividend reinvestment plans and other corporate actions open to all 
shareholders.
14
 
4. Require subsequent confirmation of the trading that has occurred. 
5. Identify whether trading windows or black-outs are used and if so, details of their 
application. 
6. Specify whether there is any discretion to permit trading by designated officers in 
specific circumstances, for example, financial hardship, details of such circumstances, 
and the basis upon which discretion is applied. 
7. Specify whether the company prohibits designated officers from trading in financial 
products issued or created over the company‟s securities by third parties, or trading in 
associated products. 
8. Specify that the company prohibits designated officers from entering into transactions 
in associated products which operate to limit the economic risk of security holdings in 
the company over unvested entitlements. 
9. Specify whether the policy applies to the securities of other companies of which the 
designated officer has inside knowledge because of their position in the company. 
 
Where a company makes any representations about the alignment of a director‟s or senior 
executive‟s interests, the company should take into account the extent to which that director 
or senior executive has an economic interest in the relevant securities.
15
 
 
Recommendation 3.3: 
Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to reporting on Principle 3. 
 
Guide to reporting on Principle 3 
An explanation of any departure from Recommendations 3.1, 3.2 or 3.3 should be included in 
the corporate governance statement in the annual report. 
 
The following material should be made publicly available, ideally by posting it to the 
company‟s website in a clearly marked corporate governance section: 
 any applicable code of conduct or a summary 
 the trading policy or a summary. 
 
Application of Principle 3 in relation to trusts and externally managed entities 
References to “directors” and “employees” of a company should be applied as references to 
directors and employees of the responsible entity, and the relevant trading is in securities of 
the trust and to equivalent roles in respect of other externally managed entities. The trading 
policy should refer to the securities or units of the listed entity. 
 
Principle 4: Safeguard integrity in financial reporting 
 
Companies should have a structure to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of 
their financial reporting  
 
This requires companies to put in place a structure of review and authorisation designed to 
ensure the truthful and factual presentation of the company‟s financial position. The structure 
would include, for example: 
 review and consideration of the financial statements by the audit committee 
                                                          
14
  The recommended disclosure is of the designated officer‟s effective exposure under their security 
holdings as a result of these transactions or arrangements. 
15
  This will prevent the company making misleading representations about alignment of interests. 
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 a process to ensure the independence and competence of the company‟s external 
auditors. 
 
Such a structure does not diminish the ultimate responsibility of the board to ensure the 
integrity of the company‟s financial reporting. 
 
Recommendation 4.1: 
The board should establish an audit committee. 
 
Commentary 
 
Purpose of the audit committee 
A board audit committee is an efficient mechanism for focusing on issues relevant to the 
integrity of the company‟s financial reporting. 
 
Ultimate responsibility for the integrity of a company‟s financial reporting rests with the full 
board, whether or not a separate audit committee exists.
16
 
 
For smaller boards, the same efficiencies may not be derived from a formal committee 
structure. Companies without an audit committee should have board processes in place which 
raise the issues that would otherwise 
be considered by the audit committee. If there is no audit committee, it is particularly 
important that companies disclose how their alternative approach assures the integrity of the 
financial statements of the company and the independence of the external auditor, and why an 
audit committee is not considered appropriate. 
 
Importance of the audit committee 
The existence of an independent audit committee is recognised internationally as an 
important feature of good corporate governance. 
 
ASX Listing Rule 12.7 requires that an entity included in the S&P All Ordinaries Index at the 
beginning of its financial year have an audit committee during that year. If an entity is in the 
top 300 of that Index it must follow the Recommendations below on the composition, 
operation and responsibilities of the audit committee.
17
 
 
Recommendation 4.2: 
The audit committee should be structured so that it: 
 consists only of non-executive directors 
 consists of a majority of independent directors18 
 is chaired by an independent chair, who is not chair of the board 
 has at least three members. 
 
Commentary 
 
Composition of the audit committee 
The audit committee should be of sufficient size, independence and technical expertise to 
discharge its mandate effectively. 
 
                                                          
16
  It is desirable that all members of the board be financially literate. 
17
  See note 2. 
18
  For further guidance on the concept of an independent director, refer to Box 2.1 and to 
Recommendation 2.1. 
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Importance of independence  
The ability of the audit committee to exercise independent judgement is vital. International 
practice is moving towards an audit committee comprised of only independent directors.
19
 
 
Technical expertise 
The audit committee should include members who are all financially literate (that is, be able 
to read and understand financial statements); at least one member should have relevant 
qualifications and experience (that is, should be a qualified accountant or other finance 
professional with experience of financial and accounting matters); and some members should 
have an understanding of the industry in which the entity operates. 
 
Recommendation 4.3: 
The audit committee should have a formal charter. 
 
Commentary 
 
Charter 
The charter should clearly set out the audit committee‟s role and responsibilities, 
composition, structure and membership requirements and the procedures for inviting non-
committee members to attend meetings. 
 
The audit committee should be given the necessary power and resources to meet its charter. 
This will include rights of access to management, rights to seek explanations and additional 
information and access to auditors, internal and external, without management present. 
 
Responsibilities 
The audit committee should review the integrity of the company‟s financial reporting and 
oversee the independence of the external auditors. 
 
Meetings 
The audit committee should meet often enough to undertake its role effectively. The audit 
committee should keep minutes of its meetings and these should ordinarily be included in the 
papers for the next full board meeting after each audit committee meeting. 
 
Reporting 
The audit committee should report to the board.  
 
The report should contain all matters relevant to the committee‟s role and responsibilities, 
including: 
 assessment of whether external reporting is consistent with committee members‟ 
information and knowledge and is adequate for shareholder needs 
 assessment of the management processes supporting external reporting 
 procedures for the selection and appointment of the external auditor and for the 
rotation of external audit engagement partners 
 recommendations for the appointment or, if necessary, the removal of the external 
auditor 
 assessment of the performance and independence of the external auditors. Where the 
external auditor provides non audit services, the report should state whether the audit 
                                                          
19
  For example, IFSA adopts this position, see Corporate Governance, A Guide for Fund Managers 
and Corporations – Blue Book, Investment and Financial Services Association, 2004 at 
www.ifsa.com.au. 
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committee is satisfied that provision of those services has not compromised the 
auditor‟s independence 
 assessment of the performance and objectivity of the internal audit function 
 the results of the committee‟s review of risk management and internal control 
systems. Principle 7 provides further guidance on this matter 
 recommendations for the appointment or, if necessary, the dismissal of the head of 
internal audit . 
 
Recommendation 4.4: 
Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to reporting on Principle 4. 
 
Guide to reporting on Principle 4 
The following material should be included in the corporate governance statement in the 
annual report: 
 the names and qualifications of those appointed to the audit committee and their 
attendance at meetings of the committee, or, where a company does not have an audit 
committee, how the functions of an audit committee are carried out 
 the number of meetings of the audit committee 
 explanation of any departures from Recommendations 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 or 4.4. 
 
The following material should be made publicly available, ideally by posting it to the 
company‟s website in a clearly marked corporate governance section: 
 the audit committee charter 
 information on procedures for the selection and appointment of the external auditor, 
and for the rotation of external audit engagement partners. 
 
Application of Principle 4 in relation to trusts and externally managed entities 
References to “board” and “directors” should be applied as references to the board and 
directors of the responsible entity of the trust and to equivalent roles in respect of other 
externally managed entities. 
 
It is recognised that for a trust to convene an audit committee as required by the 
Recommendations, and to convene a compliance committee as may be required by the law, 
may create an overlap and an administrative burden – the two committees will serve 
substantively similar purposes. Trusts that are required under the law to convene a 
compliance committee may wish to consider using the compliance committee to also serve 
the function of the audit committee, with any necessary adaptations in accordance with the 
Recommendations. 
 
Principle 5: Make timely and balanced disclosure 
 
Companies should promote timely and balanced disclosure of all material matters concerning 
the company. 
 
 
Companies should put in place mechanisms designed to ensure compliance with the ASX 
Listing Rule requirements such that: 
 all investors have equal and timely access to material information concerning the 
company – including its financial position, performance, ownership and governance 
 company announcements are factual and presented in a clear and balanced way. 
“Balance” requires disclosure of both positive and negative information. 
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Recommendation 5.1: 
Companies should establish written policies designed to ensure compliance with ASX Listing 
Rule disclosure requirements and to ensure accountability at a senior executive level for that 
compliance and disclose those policies or a summary of those policies. 
 
Commentary 
There should be vetting and authorisation processes designed to ensure that company 
announcements: 
 are made in a timely manner 
 are factual 
 do not omit material information 
 are expressed in a clear and objective manner that allows investors to assess the 
impact of the information when making investment decisions. 
 
Suggestions for the content of these policies are set out in Box 5.1. 
 
Box 5.1: Continuous disclosure policies 
Companies may find it useful to consider the following matters when formulating 
continuous disclosure policies: 
 the type of information that needs to be disclosed 
 internal notification and decision-making concerning the disclosure obligation 
 the roles and responsibilities of directors, officers and employees of the company 
in the disclosure context; in particular, who has primary responsibility for ensuring 
that the company complies with its disclosure obligations and who is primarily 
responsible for deciding what information will be disclosed 
 promoting understanding of compliance 
 monitoring compliance 
 measures for seeking to avoid the emergence of a false market in the company‟s 
securities 
 safeguarding confidentiality of corporate information to avoid premature 
disclosure 
 media contact and comment 
 external communications such as analyst briefings and responses to shareholder 
questions. 
 
Commentary on financial results 
Companies should include commentary on their financial results to enhance the clarity and 
balance of reporting. This commentary should include information needed by an investor to 
make an informed assessment of the entity‟s activities and results. 
 
ASX Listing Rule 4.10.17 requires a company‟s annual report to include a review of 
operations and activities. Although not specifying the contents of that report, the rule 
endorses the Group of 100 publication, Guide to Review of Operations and Financial 
Condition, which is reproduced in ASX Guidance Note 10 – Review of Operations and 
Activities. 
 
Eliminating surprise 
Shareholders‟ concerns about executive payments are often exacerbated by a lack of 
information concerning core entitlements when they are agreed. This can be alleviated if, for 
example, the nature of the termination entitlements of the chief executive officer, or 
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equivalent, is disclosed to the market at the time they are agreed as well as at the time the 
actual payment is settled.
20
 
 
Recommendation 5.2: 
Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to reporting on Principle 5. 
 
Guide to reporting on Principle 5 
An explanation of any departures from Recommendations 5.1 or 5.2 should be included in 
the corporate governance statement in the annual report. The policies or a summary of those 
policies designed to guide compliance with Listing 
Rule disclosure requirements should be made publicly available, ideally by posting them to 
the company‟s website in a clearly marked corporate governance section. 
 
Principle 6: Respect the rights of shareholders 
 
Companies should respect the rights of shareholders and facilitate 
the effective exercise of those rights. 
 
Companies should empower their shareholders by: 
 communicating effectively with them 
 giving them ready access to balanced and understandable information about the 
company and corporate proposals 
 making it easy for them to participate in general meetings. 
 
Recommendation 6.1: 
Companies should design a communications policy for promoting effective communication 
with shareholders and encouraging their participation at general meetings and disclose their 
policy or a summary of that policy. 
 
Commentary 
Publishing the company‟s policy on shareholder communication will help investors 
understand how to obtain access to relevant information about the company and its corporate 
proposals. 
 
Electronic communication 
Companies should consider how best to take advantage wherever practicable of new 
technologies that provide: 
 opportunities for more effective communications with shareholders 
 improved access for shareholders unable to be physically present at meetings. 
 
See Box 6.1 for suggestions on how to improve shareholder participation and enhance market 
awareness through electronic means. 
 
Meetings 
Companies should consider how to use general meetings effectively to communicate with 
shareholders and allow reasonable opportunity for informed shareholder participation. 
 
                                                          
20
  Companies should note that entering into employment agreements with senior executives, or 
obligations under those agreements falling due, may trigger a continuous disclosure obligation 
under Listing Rule 3.1. See Companies Update 1 May 2003 Continuous Disclosure and Chief 
Executive Officer Remuneration at www.asx.com.au. 
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The ASX Corporate Governance Council has developed guidelines for improving 
shareholder participation through the design and content of notices and through the conduct 
of the meeting itself.
21
 
 
Communication with beneficial owners 
Companies may wish to consider allowing beneficial owners to choose to receive shareholder 
materials directly, for example, by electronic means. 
 
Website 
All companies should have a website and are encouraged to communicate with shareholders 
via electronic methods. If a company does not have a website it must make relevant 
information available to shareholders by other means, for example, a company may provide 
the information on request by email, facsimile or post. 
 
Box 6.1: Using electronic communications effectively 
Companies should use their websites to complement the official release of material 
information to the market. This will enable broader access to company information by 
investors and stakeholders. Measures companies may consider include: 
 placing all relevant announcements made to the market, and related information 
(for example, information provided to analysts or media during briefings), on the 
company website after they have been released to ASX 
 webcasting or teleconferencing analyst or media briefings and general meetings, 
or posting a transcript or summary of the transcript to the website 
 placing the full text of notices of meeting and explanatory material on the website 
– see Guideline 12 in the Guidelines for notices of meeting at www.asx.com.au 
 providing information about the last three years‟ press releases or announcements 
plus at least three years of financial data on the website 
 providing information updates to investors by email. 
 
Recommendation 6.2: 
Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to reporting on Principle 6. 
 
Guide to reporting on Principle 6 
An explanation of any departure from Recommendations 6.1 or 6.2 should be included in the 
corporate governance statement in the annual report. The company should describe how it 
will communicate with its shareholders publicly, ideally by posting this information on the 
company‟s website in a clearly marked corporate governance section. 
 
Application of Principle 6 in relation to trusts and externally managed entities 
The annual general meeting is the central forum by which companies can effectively 
communicate with shareholders, provide them with access to information about the company 
and corporate proposals, and enable their participation in decision-making. The Corporations 
Act does not, however, require trusts to hold annual general meetings, although they may do 
so. Trusts should consider the range of means by which they may achieve the same ends, 
including the possibility of convening general meetings. 
 
 
                                                          
21
  Guidelines for improving shareholder participation through the design and content of notices and 
the conduct of the meeting itself are at www.asx.com.au. They are guidelines only and not 
reporting requirements. 
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Listed entities that are not required to comply with section 250RA of the Corporations Act 
should consider the range of means by which they may achieve the same ends.
22
 This applies 
not only to trusts and externally managed entities but also to entities such as foreign 
incorporated entities. Any such entity should include in its annual report a statement 
disclosing the extent to which it has achieved the aims of the provisions of section 250RA 
during the reporting period and give reasons for not doing so. 
 
Principle 7: Recognise and manage risk 
 
Companies should establish a sound system of risk oversight and management and internal 
control.
23
 
 
Risk management is the culture, processes and structures that are directed towards taking 
advantage of potential opportunities while managing potential adverse effects.
24
 
 
Risk management should be designed to: 
 identify, assess, monitor and manage risk 
 identify material changes to the company‟s risk profile.25 
 
Risk management can enhance the environment for identifying and capitalising on 
opportunities to create value and protect established value. 
 
The company should address risks that could have a material impact on its business (material 
business risks), as identified by the company‟s risk management system. The board should 
regularly review and approve the risk management and oversight policies. 
 
Recommendation 7.1: 
Companies should establish policies for the oversight and management of material business 
risks and disclose a summary of those policies.
26
 
 
Commentary 
Each company will need to determine the material business risks it faces. When establishing 
and implementing its approach to risk management a company should consider all material 
business risks. These risks may include but are not limited to: operational, environmental, 
sustainability, compliance, strategic, ethical conduct, reputation or brand, technological, 
product or service quality, human capital, financial reporting and market-related risks.
27
 
 
                                                          
22
  Section 250RA [Auditor required to attend listed company‟ AGM] of the Corporations Act makes 
it an offence for the lead auditor not to attend a listed company‟s AGM, or arrange to be 
represented by a suitably qualified member of the audit team who is in a position to answer 
questions about the audit. 
23
  For the purposes of Principle 7 a reference to a “company” will also include references to a 
“subsidiary” and an “associate” as defined in AASB 128 Investments in Associates. 
24
  There is a range of guidance available on risk management. Frameworks for risk management 
include the Australian/ New Zealand Standard for Risk Management – ANZ 4360 at 
www.standards.org.au and COSO Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework, 
published by the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission at 
www.coso.org. 
25
  Companies should be aware of their obligations under section 299A of the Corporations Act 
[Annual directors‟ report – Additional requirement for listed public companies]. 
26
  The ASX Corporate Governance Council has issued Supplementary Guidance to Principle 7 which 
is at www.asx.com.au. 
27
  Financial reporting risk is the risk of a material error in the financial statements. 
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The board is responsible for reviewing the company‟s policies on risk oversight and 
management and satisfying itself that management has developed and implemented a sound 
system of risk management and internal control.
28
 
 
Risk management policies 
Risk management policies should reflect the company‟s risk profile and should clearly 
describe all elements of the risk management and internal control system and any internal 
audit function. 
 
When developing risk management policies the company should take into account its legal 
obligations.
29
  A company should also consider the reasonable expectations of its 
stakeholders. Stakeholders can include: shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, 
creditors, consumers and the broader community in which the company operates. 
 
Failure to consider the reasonable expectations of stakeholders can threaten a company‟s 
reputation and the success of its business operations. Effective risk management involves 
considering factors which bear upon the company‟s continued good standing with its 
stakeholders. 
 
A company‟s risk management policies should clearly describe the roles and accountabilities 
of the board, audit committee, or other appropriate board committee, management and any 
internal audit function. 
 
Recommendation 7.2: 
The board should require management to design and implement the risk management and 
internal control system to manage the company‟s material business risks and report to it on 
whether those risks are being managed effectively. The board should disclose that 
management has reported to it as to the effectiveness of the company‟s management of its 
material business risks. 
 
Commentary 
 
Risk management and internal control system 
Internal controls are an important element of risk management. Management should design, 
implement and review the company‟s risk management and internal control system. 
 
As part of its oversight for the risk management and internal control system, the board should 
review the effectiveness of the implementation of that system at least annually. The board 
retains responsibility for assessing the effectiveness of the company‟s systems for 
management of material business risks. It may be appropriate in the company‟s 
circumstances for the board to make additional enquiries and to request assurances regarding 
the management of material business risks. 
 
 
 
                                                          
28
  There is a range of guidance available on internal control. Frameworks for internal control include 
the COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework at www.coso.org. Additional guidance is 
available through the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales – Internal Control, 
Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code at ww.icaew.co.uk and Australian/New Zealand 
Standard for Compliance – ANZ 3806 at www.standards.org.au. 
29
  Legal obligations include but are not limited to requirements dealing with trade practices and fair 
dealing laws, environmental law, privacy law, employment law, occupational health and safety and 
equal employment and opportunity laws. 
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Internal audit function 
An internal audit function will generally carry out the analysis and independent appraisal of 
the adequacy and effectiveness of the company‟s risk management and internal control 
system. A company should therefore consider having an internal audit function.
30
 An 
alternative mechanism may be used to achieve the same outcome depending on the 
company‟s size and complexity and the types of risk involved. 
 
The internal audit function should be independent of the external auditor. The internal audit 
function and the audit committee should have direct access to each other and should have all 
necessary access to management and the right to seek information and explanations. 
 
Risk management committee 
A board committee is an efficient mechanism for focusing the company on appropriate risk 
oversight, risk management and internal control. The appropriate committee may be the audit 
committee, a risk management committee or another relevant committee. 
 
Ultimate responsibility for risk oversight and risk management rests with the full board, 
whether or not a separate risk management committee exists. 
 
For smaller boards, the same efficiencies may not be derived from a formal committee 
structure. Companies without a risk management committee should have board processes in 
place which raise the issues that would otherwise be considered by a risk management 
committee. 
 
Recommendation 7.3: 
The board should disclose whether it has received assurance from the chief executive officer 
(or equivalent) and the chief financial officer (or equivalent) that the declaration provided in 
accordance with section 295A of the Corporations Act is founded on a sound system of risk 
management and internal control and that the system is operating effectively in all material 
respects in relation to financial reporting risks. 
 
Commentary 
Unlike Recommendation 7.2, this Recommendation only addresses financial reporting risks 
directly because the Corporations Act requires a declaration in relation to a listed entity‟s 
financial statements by the chief executive officer and/or the chief financial officer.
31
 
 
The integrity of the company‟s financial reporting depends upon the existence of a sound 
system of risk oversight and management and internal control. The requirement to provide 
this assurance encourages management accountability in this area. 
 
                                                          
30
  Guidance on the internal audit function is found in the Technical Information and Guidance section 
at www.iia.org.au. 
31
  Section 295A [Declaration in relation to listed entity‟s financial statements by chief executive 
officer and chief financial officer] in Part 2M – Financial Reporting of the Corporations Act. The 
directors‟ declaration under s295(4) can now only be made once the directors have received a 
declaration from the CEO and CFO, or equivalents that: (a) the financial records have been 
properly maintained, (b) the financial statements comply with accounting standards and (c) the 
financial statements and notes give a true and fair view. Any company not required to comply with 
section 295A of the Corporations Act should consider the range of means by which it may achieve 
the same ends and should include in its annual report a statement disclosing the extent to which it 
has achieved the aims of the provisions of section 295A during the reporting period and provide 
reasons for not doing so. 
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The assurance under this Recommendation forms part of the process by which the board 
determines the effectiveness of its risk management and internal control systems in relation to 
financial reporting risks.
32
 
 
Recommendation 7.4: 
Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to reporting on Principle 7. 
 
Guide to reporting on Principle 7 
The following material should be included in the corporate governance statement in the 
annual report: 
 explanation of any departures from Recommendations 7.1, 7.2 7.3 or 7.4 
 whether the board has received the report from management under Recommendation 
7.2 
 whether the board has received assurance from the chief executive officer (or 
equivalent) and the chief financial officer (or equivalent) under Recommendation 7.3. 
 
The following material should be made publicly available, ideally by posting it to the 
company‟s website in a clearly marked corporate governance section: 
 a summary of the company‟s policies on risk oversight and management of material 
business risks. 
 
Application of Principle 7 in relation to trusts and externally managed entities 
References to “board” and “directors” should be applied as references to the board and 
directors of the responsible entity of the trust and to equivalent roles in respect of other 
externally managed entities. 
 
Principle 8: Remunerate fairly and responsibly 
 
Companies should ensure that the level and composition of remuneration is sufficient and 
reasonable and that its relationship to performance is clear. 
 
The awarding of remuneration is a key area of focus for investors. When setting the level and 
structure of remuneration, a company needs to balance its desire to attract and retain senior 
executives and directors against its interest in not paying excessive remuneration. It is 
important that there be a clear relationship between performance and remuneration, and that 
the policy underlying executive remuneration be understood by investors.
33
 
 
Recommendation 8.1: 
The board should establish a remuneration committee. 
 
Commentary 
 
Purpose of the remuneration committee 
A board remuneration committee is an efficient mechanism for focusing the company on 
appropriate remuneration policies. 
 
                                                          
32
  The G100 has published guidance to assist companies to meet their obligations under Principle 7 in 
Principle 7 – Guide to Compliance with ASX Principle 7 – Recognise and Manage Risk at 
www.groupof100.com.au. 
33
  Note the requirements relating to disclosure of remuneration policy and details in Section 300A of 
the Corporations Act. 
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Ultimate responsibility for a company‟s remuneration policy rests with the full board, 
whether or not a separate remuneration committee exists. 
 
For smaller boards, the same efficiencies may not be derived from a formal committee 
structure. Companies without a remuneration committee should have board processes in 
place which raise the issues that would otherwise be considered by the remuneration 
committee. 
 
Charter 
The remuneration committee should have a charter that clearly sets out its role and 
responsibilities, composition, structure and membership requirements and the procedures for 
non-committee members to attend meetings. 
 
The terms of reference of the remuneration committee should allow it to have access to 
adequate internal and external resources, including access to advice from external consultants 
or specialists. 
 
Composition of remuneration committee 
The remuneration committee should be structured so that it: 
 consists of a majority of independent directors 
 is chaired by an independent director 
 has at least three members. 
 
Responsibilities of the remuneration committee 
The responsibilities of the remuneration committee should include a review of and 
recommendation to the board on: 
 the company‟s remuneration, recruitment, retention and termination policies and 
procedures for senior executives 
 senior executives‟ remuneration and incentives 
 superannuation arrangements 
 the remuneration framework for directors.34 
 
Remuneration policy 
The company should design its remuneration policy in such a way that it: 
 motivates senior executives to pursue the long-term growth and success of the 
company 
 demonstrates a clear relationship between senior executives‟ performance and 
remuneration. 
 
The remuneration committee may seek input from individuals on remuneration policies, but 
no individual should be directly involved in deciding their own remuneration. 
 
The remuneration committee should ensure that the board is provided with sufficient 
information to ensure informed decision-making. 
 
Recommendation 8.2: 
Companies should clearly distinguish the structure of non-executive directors‟ remuneration 
from that of executive directors and senior executives. 
 
 
                                                          
34
  The remuneration framework for directors is often addressed by the nomination committee rather 
than the remuneration committee. 
 446 
Commentary 
Executive directors‟ and senior executives‟ remuneration packages should involve a balance 
between fixed and incentive pay, reflecting short and long-term performance objectives 
appropriate to the company‟s circumstances and goals. 
 
The Corporations Act requires companies to make detailed disclosure of executive 
remuneration policies in their remuneration reports which are subject to an advisory vote by 
shareholders. Under the Listing Rules and the 
Corporations Act companies are not generally required to obtain shareholder approval for 
equity-based incentive plans for senior executives who are not directors. 
 
However, companies may find it useful to submit to shareholders proposed equity-based 
incentive plans which will involve the issue of new shares to senior executives prior to 
implementing them. This communication is directed at providing the board with a timely 
assurance that a plan is reasonable.
35
 Companies may also consider reporting to shareholders 
on whether equity-based remuneration payments involving the issue of new shares to senior 
executives are made pursuant to plans approved by shareholders. 
 
Guidelines on an appropriate framework for determining executive directors‟ and senior 
executives‟ remuneration packages are contained in Box 8.1. 
 
Box 8.1: Guidelines for executive remuneration packages 
Most executive remuneration packages will involve a balance between fixed and incentive 
pay.
36
 Companies may find it useful to consider the following components in formulating 
packages: 
1. Fixed remuneration. This should be reasonable and fair, taking into account the 
company‟s legal and industrial obligations and labour market conditions, and should be 
relative to the scale of business. It should reflect core performance requirements and 
expectations. 
2. Performance-based remuneration. Performance-based remuneration linked to clearly 
specified performance targets can be an effective tool in promoting the interests of the 
company and shareholders. Incentive schemes should be designed around appropriate 
performance benchmarks that measure relative performance and provide rewards for 
materially improved company performance. 
3. Equity-based remuneration. Appropriately designed equity-based remuneration, 
including stock options, can be an effective form of remuneration when linked to 
performance objectives or hurdles. Equity-based remuneration has limitations and can 
contribute to „short-termism‟ on the part of senior executives. Accordingly, it is 
important to design appropriate schemes. The terms of such schemes should clearly 
prohibit entering into transactions or arrangements which limit the economic risk of 
participating in unvested entitlements under these schemes.
37
 The exercise of any 
entitlements under these schemes should be timed to coincide with any trading 
                                                          
35
  Under Section 211 of the Corporations Act benefits that are “reasonable remuneration” are an 
exception to the requirement for member approval for financial benefits to related parties under 
Section 208 of the Act. 
36
  Companies should note that entering into employment agreements with senior executives, or 
obligations under those agreements falling due, may trigger a continuous disclosure obligation 
under Listing Rule 3.1. See Companies Update 1 May 2003 Continuous Disclosure and Chief 
Executive Officer Remuneration at www.asx.com.au. 
37
  Where a company makes any representations about the alignment of a senior executive‟s interests, 
the company should take into account the extent of that senior executive‟s alignment of interest 
based on any disclosure under the company trading policy. 
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windows under any trading policy established by the company. 
4. Termination payments. Termination payments, if any, for chief executive officers 
should be agreed in advance, including detailed provisions in case of early termination. 
There should be no payment for removal for misconduct. Agreements should clearly 
articulate performance expectations. Companies should consider the consequences of 
an appointment not working out, and the costs and other impacts of early termination. 
 
Box 8.2 contains guidelines for appropriate practice in non-executive director remuneration. 
 
Box 8.2: Guidelines for non-executive director remuneration 
Companies may find it useful to consider the following when considering non-executive 
director remuneration: 
1. Non-executive directors should normally be remunerated by way of fees, in the form of 
cash, non-cash benefits, superannuation contributions or salary sacrifice into equity; 
they should not normally participate in schemes designed for the remuneration of 
executives. 
2. Non-executive directors should not receive options or bonus payments. 
3. Non-executive directors should not be provided with retirement benefits other than 
superannuation. 
 
Recommendation 8.3: 
Companies should provide the information indicated in the Guide to reporting on Principle 8. 
 
Guide to reporting on Principle 8 
The following material or a clear cross-reference to the location of the material should be 
included in the corporate governance statement in the annual report: 
 the names of the members of the remuneration committee and their attendance at 
meetings of the committee, or where a company does not have a remuneration 
committee, how the functions of a remuneration committee are carried out 
 the existence and terms of any schemes for retirement benefits, other than 
superannuation, for non-executive directors 
 an explanation of any departures from Recommendations 8.1, 8.2 or 8.3. 
 
The following material should be made publicly available, ideally by posting it to the 
company‟s website in a clearly marked corporate governance section: 
 the charter of the remuneration committee or a summary of the role, rights, 
responsibilities and membership requirements for that committee 
 a summary of the company‟s policy on prohibiting entering into transactions in 
associated products which limit the economic risk of participating in unvested 
entitlements under any equity-based remuneration schemes. 
 
Application of Principle 8 in relation to trusts and externally managed entities 
Under the Corporations Act, remuneration and indemnity for costs and expenses of the 
responsible entity is required to be disclosed in a trust‟s constitution. This may overlap to an 
extent with the Recommendations and should be taken into account by trusts. 
 
Externally managed entities should disclose a summary of any management agreement terms 
relating to management fees or the equivalent, including performance fees, including a clear 
cross-reference to the location of this material. 
 
Listed entities that are not required to comply with section 300A of the Corporations Act or 
AASB 124 Related Party Disclosures should consider the range of means by which they may 
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achieve the same ends and should provide a clear cross-reference to the location of this 
material.
38
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
  Section 300A [Annual Directors‟ Report – Specific information to be provided by listed companies 
– particularly Disclosure of remuneration policy and details] and AASB 124 Related Party 
Disclosures. 
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Appendix V: The UK Corporate Governance Code (The Combined 
Code – 2010)1 
 
Code of Best Practice 
 
SECTION A: LEADERSHIP 
 
A.1 The Role of the Board 
 
Main Principle 
Every company should be headed by an effective board which is collectively responsible for 
the long-term success of the company. 
 
Supporting Principles 
The board‟s role is to provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a framework 
of prudent and effective controls which enables risk to be assessed and managed. The board 
should set the company‟s strategic aims, ensure that the necessary financial and human 
resources are in place for the company to meet its objectives and review management 
performance. The board should set the company‟s values and standards and ensure that its 
obligations to its shareholders and others are understood and met. 
 
All directors must act in what they consider to be the best interests of the company, consistent 
with their statutory duties.
2
 
 
Code Provisions 
 
A.1.1 The board should meet sufficiently regularly to discharge its duties effectively. There 
should be a formal schedule of matters specifically reserved for its decision. The 
annual report should include a statement of how the board operates, including a high 
level statement of which types of decisions are to be taken by the board and which are 
to be delegated to management. 
A.1.2 The annual report should identify the chairman, the deputy chairman (where there is 
one), the chief executive, the senior independent director and the chairmen and 
members of the board committees.
3
 It should also set out the number of meetings of the 
board and its committees and individual attendance by directors. 
A.1.3 The company should arrange appropriate insurance cover in respect of legal action 
against its directors. 
 
A.2 Division of Responsibilities 
 
Main Principle 
 
There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company between the 
running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the company‟s 
business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of decision. 
 
                                                          
1
  Financial Reporting Council, “The UK Corporate Governance Code,” (June 2010) in Financial 
Reporting Council, < http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/reviewCombined.cfm > at 15 July 2010 
2
  For directors of UK incorporated companies, these duties are set out in the sections 170 to 177 of 
the Companies Act 2006. 
3
  Provisions A.1.1 and A.1.2 overlap with FSA Rule DTR 7.2.7 R; Provision A.1.2 also overlaps 
with DTR 7.1.5 R (see Schedule B). 
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Code Provision 
 
A.2.1 The roles of chairman and chief executive should not be exercised by the same 
individual. The division of responsibilities between the chairman and chief executive 
should be clearly established, set out in writing and agreed by the board. 
 
A.3 The Chairman 
 
Main Principle 
The chairman is responsible for leadership of the board and ensuring 
its effectiveness on all aspects of its role. 
 
Supporting Principle 
The chairman is responsible for setting the board‟s agenda and ensuring that adequate time is 
available for discussion of all agenda items, in particular strategic issues. The chairman 
should also promote a culture of openness and debate by facilitating the effective contribution 
of nonexecutive directors in particular and ensuring constructive relations between executive 
and non-executive directors. 
 
The chairman is responsible for ensuring that the directors receive accurate, timely and clear 
information. The chairman should ensure effective communication with shareholders. 
 
Code Provision 
 
A.3.1 The chairman should on appointment meet the independence criteria set out in B.1.1 
below. A chief executive should not go on to be chairman of the same company. If, 
exceptionally, a board decides that a chief executive should become chairman, the 
board should consult major shareholders in advance and should set out its reasons to 
shareholders at the time of the appointment and in the next annual report.
4
 
 
A.4 Non-executive Directors 
 
Main Principle 
As part of their role as members of a unitary board, non-executive directors should 
constructively challenge and help develop proposals on strategy. 
 
Supporting Principle 
Non-executive directors should scrutinise the performance of management in meeting agreed 
goals and objectives and monitor the reporting of performance. They should satisfy 
themselves on the integrity of financial information and that financial controls and systems of 
risk management are robust and defensible. They are responsible for determining appropriate 
levels of remuneration of executive directors and have a prime role in appointing and, where 
necessary, removing executive directors, and in succession planning. 
 
Code Provisions 
 
A.4.1 The board should appoint one of the independent non-executive directors to be the 
senior independent director to provide a sounding board for the chairman and to serve 
as an intermediary for the other directors when necessary. The senior independent 
                                                          
4
  Compliance or otherwise with this provision need only be reported for the year in which the 
appointment is made. 
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director should be available to shareholders if they have concerns which contact 
through the normal channels of chairman, chief executive or other executive directors 
has failed to resolve or for which such contact is inappropriate. 
A.4.2 The chairman should hold meetings with the non-executive directors without the 
executives present. Led by the senior independent director, the non-executive directors 
should meet without the chairman present at least annually to appraise the chairman‟s 
performance and on such other occasions as are deemed appropriate. 
A.4.3 Where directors have concerns which cannot be resolved about the running of the 
company or a proposed action, they should ensure that their concerns are recorded in 
the board minutes. On resignation, a nonexecutive director should provide a written 
statement to the chairman, for circulation to the board, if they have any such concerns. 
 
SECTION B: EFFECTIVENESS 
 
B.1 The Composition of the Board 
 
Main Principle 
The board and its committees should have the appropriate balance of skills, experience, 
independence and knowledge of the company to enable them to discharge their respective 
duties and responsibilities effectively. 
 
Supporting Principles 
The board should be of sufficient size that the requirements of the business can be met and 
that changes to the board‟s composition and that of its committees can be managed without 
undue disruption, and should not be so large as to be unwieldy. 
 
The board should include an appropriate combination of executive and non-executive 
directors (and, in particular, independent non-executive directors) such that no individual or 
small group of individuals can dominate the board‟s decision taking. 
 
The value of ensuring that committee membership is refreshed and that undue reliance is not 
placed on particular individuals should be taken into account in deciding chairmanship and 
membership of committees. 
 
No one other than the committee chairman and members is entitled to be present at a meeting 
of the nomination, audit or remuneration committee, but others may attend at the invitation of 
the committee. 
 
Code Provisions 
 
B.1.1 The board should identify in the annual report each non-executive director it considers 
to be independent.
5
 The board should determine whether the director is independent in 
character and judgement and whether there are relationships or circumstances which 
are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the director‟s judgement. The board 
should state its reasons if it determines that a director is independent notwithstanding 
the existence of relationships or circumstances which may appear relevant to its 
determination, including if the director: 
 
 has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years; 
                                                          
5
  A.3.1 states that the chairman should, on appointment, meet the independence criteria set out in this 
provision, but thereafter the test of independence is not appropriate in relation to the chairman. 
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 has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the 
company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a 
body that has such a relationship with the company; 
 has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from a 
director‟s fee, participates in the company‟s share option or a performance-related 
pay scheme, or is a member of the company‟s pension scheme; 
 has close family ties with any of the company‟s advisers, directors or senior 
employees; 
 holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through 
involvement in other companies or bodies; 
 represents a significant shareholder; or 
 has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their first election. 
 
B.1.2 Except for smaller companies,
6
 at least half the board, excluding the chairman, should 
comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to be independent. A 
smaller company should have at least two independent non-executive directors. 
 
B.2 Appointments to the Board 
 
Main Principle 
There should be a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure for the appointment of new 
directors to the board. 
 
Supporting Principles 
The search for board candidates should be conducted, and appointments made, on merit, 
against objective criteria and with due regard for the benefits of diversity on the board, 
including gender. 
 
The board should satisfy itself that plans are in place for orderly succession for appointments 
to the board and to senior management, so as to maintain an appropriate balance of skills and 
experience within the company and on the board and to ensure progressive refreshing of the 
board. 
 
Code Provisions 
 
B.2.1 There should be a nomination committee which should lead the process for board 
appointments and make recommendations to the board. A majority of members of the 
nomination committee should be independent non-executive directors. The chairman 
or an independent non-executive director should chair the committee, but the chairman 
should not chair the nomination committee when it is dealing with the appointment of 
a successor to the chairmanship. The nomination committee should make available its 
terms of reference, explaining its role and the authority delegated to it by the board.
7
 
B.2.2 The nomination committee should evaluate the balance of skills, experience, 
independence and knowledge on the board and, in the light of this evaluation, prepare a 
description of the role and capabilities required for a particular appointment. 
B.2.3 Non-executive directors should be appointed for specified terms subject to re-election 
and to statutory provisions relating to the removal of a director. Any term beyond six 
                                                          
6
  A smaller company is one that is below the FTSE 350 throughout the year immediately prior to the 
reporting year. 
7
  The requirement to make the information available would be met by including the information on a 
website that is maintained by or on behalf of the company. 
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years for a non-executive director should be subject to particularly rigorous review, 
and should take into account the need for progressive refreshing of the board. 
B.2.4 A separate section of the annual report should describe the work of the nomination 
committee
8
, including the process it has used in relation to board appointments. An 
explanation should be given if neither an external search consultancy nor open 
advertising has been used in the appointment of a chairman or a non-executive 
director. 
 
B.3 Commitment 
 
Main Principle 
All directors should be able to allocate sufficient time to the company to discharge their 
responsibilities effectively. 
 
Code Provisions 
 
B.3.1 For the appointment of a chairman, the nomination committee should prepare a job 
specification, including an assessment of the time commitment expected, recognising 
the need for availability in the event of crises. A chairman‟s other significant 
commitments should be disclosed to the board before appointment and included in the 
annual report. Changes to such commitments should be reported to the board as they 
arise, and their impact explained in the next annual report. 
B.3.2 The terms and conditions of appointment of non-executive directors should be made 
available for inspection.
9
 The letter of appointment should set out the expected time 
commitment. Non-executive directors should undertake that they will have sufficient 
time to meet what is expected of them. Their other significant commitments should be 
disclosed to the board before appointment, with a broad indication of the time involved 
and the board should be informed of subsequent changes. 
B.3.3 The board should not agree to a full time executive director taking on more than one 
non-executive directorship in a FTSE 100 company nor the chairmanship of such a 
company. 
 
B.4 Development 
 
Main Principle 
All directors should receive induction on joining the board and should regularly update and 
refresh their skills and knowledge. 
 
Supporting Principles 
The chairman should ensure that the directors continually update their skills and the 
knowledge and familiarity with the company required to fulfil their role both on the board 
and on board committees. The company should provide the necessary resources for 
developing and updating its directors‟ knowledge and capabilities. 
 
To function effectively, all directors need appropriate knowledge of the company and access 
to its operations and staff. 
 
                                                          
8
  This provision overlaps with FSA Rule DTR 7.2.7 R (see Schedule B). 
9
  The terms and conditions of appointment of non-executive directors should be made available for 
inspection by any person at the company‟s registered office during normal business hours and at 
the AGM (for 15 minutes prior to the meeting and during the meeting). 
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Code Provisions 
 
B.4.1 The chairman should ensure that new directors receive a full, formal and tailored 
induction on joining the board. As part of this, directors should avail themselves of 
opportunities to meet major shareholders. 
B.4.2 The chairman should regularly review and agree with each director their training and 
development needs. 
 
B.5 Information and Support 
 
Main Principle 
The board should be supplied in a timely manner with information in a form and of a quality 
appropriate to enable it to discharge its duties. 
 
Supporting Principles 
The chairman is responsible for ensuring that the directors receive accurate, timely and clear 
information. Management has an obligation to provide such information but directors should 
seek clarification or amplification where necessary. 
 
Under the direction of the chairman, the company secretary‟s responsibilities include 
ensuring good information flows within the board and its committees and between senior 
management and nonexecutive directors, as well as facilitating induction and assisting with 
professional development as required. 
 
The company secretary should be responsible for advising the board through the chairman on 
all governance matters. 
 
Code Provisions 
 
B.5.1 The board should ensure that directors, especially non-executive directors, have access 
to independent professional advice at the company‟s expense where they judge it 
necessary to discharge their responsibilities as directors. Committees should be 
provided with sufficient resources to undertake their duties. 
B.5.2 All directors should have access to the advice and services of the company secretary, 
who is responsible to the board for ensuring that board procedures are complied with. 
Both the appointment and removal of the company secretary should be a matter for the 
board as a whole. 
 
B.6 Evaluation 
 
Main Principle 
The board should undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its own performance 
and that of its committees and individual directors. 
 
Supporting Principles 
The chairman should act on the results of the performance evaluation by recognising the 
strengths and addressing the weaknesses of the board and, where appropriate, proposing new 
members be appointed to the board or seeking the resignation of directors. 
 
Individual evaluation should aim to show whether each director continues to contribute 
effectively and to demonstrate commitment to the role (including commitment of time for 
board and committee meetings and any other duties). 
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Code Provisions 
 
B.6.1 The board should state in the annual report how performance evaluation of the board, 
its committees and its individual directors has been conducted. 
B.6.2 Evaluation of the board of FTSE 350 companies should be externally facilitated at least 
every three years. A statement should be made available of whether an external 
facilitator has any other connection with the company.
10
 
B.6.3 The non-executive directors, led by the senior independent director, should be 
responsible for performance evaluation of the chairman, taking into account the views 
of executive directors. 
 
B.7 Re-election 
 
Main Principle 
All directors should be submitted for re-election at regular intervals, subject to continued 
satisfactory performance. 
 
Code Provisions 
 
B.7.1 All directors of FTSE 350 companies should be subject to annual election by 
shareholders. All other directors should be subject to election by shareholders at the 
first annual general meeting after their appointment, and to re-election thereafter at 
intervals of no more than three years. Nonexecutive directors who have served longer 
than nine years should be subject to annual re-election. The names of directors 
submitted for election or re-election should be accompanied by sufficient biographical 
details and any other relevant information to enable shareholders to take an informed 
decision on their election. 
B.7.2 The board should set out to shareholders in the papers accompanying a resolution to 
elect a non-executive director why they believe an individual should be elected. The 
chairman should confirm to shareholders when proposing re-election that, following 
formal performance evaluation, the individual‟s performance continues to be effective 
and to demonstrate commitment to the role. 
 
SECTION C: ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
C.1 Financial and Business Reporting 
 
Main Principle 
 
The board should present a balanced and understandable assessment of the company‟s 
position and prospects. 
Supporting Principle 
 
The board‟s responsibility to present a balanced and understandable assessment extends to 
interim and other price-sensitive public reports and reports to regulators as well as to 
information required to be presented by statutory requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
  See footnote 7 
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Code Provisions 
 
C.1.1 The directors should explain in the annual report their responsibility for preparing the 
annual report and accounts, and there should be a statement by the auditor about their 
reporting responsibilities
11
. 
C.1.2 The directors should include in the annual report an explanation of the basis on which 
the company generates or preserves value over the longer term (the business model) 
and the strategy for delivering the objectives of the company
12
. 
C.1.3 The directors should report in annual and half-yearly financial statements that the 
business is a going concern, with supporting assumptions or qualifications as 
necessary
13
. 
 
C.2 Risk Management and Internal Control14 
 
Main Principle 
The board is responsible for determining the nature and extent of the significant risks it is 
willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. The board should maintain sound risk 
management and internal control systems. 
 
Code Provision 
 
C.2.1 The board should, at least annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness of the 
company‟s risk management and internal control systems and should report to 
shareholders that they have done so.
15
 The review should cover all material controls, 
including financial, operational and compliance controls. 
 
C.3 Audit Committee and Auditors16 
 
Main Principle 
The board should establish formal and transparent arrangements for considering how they 
should apply the corporate reporting and risk management and internal control principles and 
for maintaining an appropriate relationship with the company‟s auditor. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
  The requirement may be met by the disclosures about the audit scope and the responsibilities of the 
auditor included, or referred to, in the auditor‟s report pursuant to the requirements in paragraph 16 
of ISA (UK and Ireland) 700, „„The Auditor‟s Report on Financial Statements‟‟. Copies are 
available at: http://www.frc.org.uk/apb/publications/pub2102.html. 
12
  It would be desirable if the explanation were located in the same part of the annual report as the 
Business Review required by Section 417 of the Companies Act 2006. Guidance as to the matters 
that should be considered in an explanation of a business model is provided in paragraphs 30 to 32 
of the Accounting Standard Board‟s Reporting Statement: Operating And Financial Review. 
Copies are available at: http://www.frc.org.uk/asb/publications/documents.cfm?cat=7. 
13
  „Going Concern and Liquidity Risk: Guidance for Directors of UK Companies 2009‟ suggests 
means of applying this part of the Code. Copies are available at: 
www.frc.org.uk/corporate/goingconcern.cfm. 
14
  The Turnbull guidance suggests means of applying this part of the Code. Copies are available at 
www.frc.org.uk/corporate/internalcontrol.cfm. 
15
  In addition FSA Rule DTR 7.2.5 R requires companies to describe the main features of the internal 
control and risk management systems in relation to the financial reporting process. 
16
  The FRC Guidance on Audit Committees suggests means of applying this part of the Code. Copies 
are available at: http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/auditcommittees.cfm. 
 457 
Code Provisions 
 
C.3.1 The board should establish an audit committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller 
companies
17
 two, independent non-executive directors. In smaller companies the 
company chairman may be a member of, but not chair, the committee in addition to the 
independent non-executive directors, provided he or she was considered independent 
on appointment as chairman. The board should satisfy itself that at least one member of 
the audit committee has recent and relevant financial experience
18
. 
C.3.2 The main role and responsibilities of the audit committee should be set out in written 
terms of reference
19
 and should include: 
 to monitor the integrity of the financial statements of the company and any formal 
announcements relating to the company‟s financial performance, reviewing 
significant financial reporting judgements contained in them; 
 to review the company‟s internal financial controls and, unless expressly addressed 
by a separate board risk committee composed of independent directors, or by the 
board itself, to review the company‟s internal control and risk management systems; 
 to monitor and review the effectiveness of the company‟s internal audit function; 
 to make recommendations to the board, for it to put to the shareholders for their 
approval in general meeting, in relation to the appointment, re-appointment and 
removal of the external auditor and to approve the remuneration and terms of 
engagement of the external auditor; 
 to review and monitor the external auditor‟s independence and objectivity and the 
effectiveness of the audit process, taking into consideration relevant UK professional 
and regulatory requirements; 
 to develop and implement policy on the engagement of the external auditor to supply 
non-audit services, taking into account relevant ethical guidance regarding the 
provision of non-audit services by the external audit firm, and to report to the board, 
identifying any matters in respect of which it considers that action or improvement is 
needed and making recommendations as to the steps to be taken. 
 
C.3.3 The terms of reference of the audit committee, including its role and the authority 
delegated to it by the board, should be made available
20
. A separate section of the 
annual report should describe the work of the committee in discharging those 
responsibilities
21
. 
C.3.4 The audit committee should review arrangements by which staff of the company may, 
in confidence, raise concerns about possible improprieties in matters of financial 
reporting or other matters. The audit committee‟s objective should be to ensure that 
arrangements are in place for the proportionate and independent investigation of such 
matters and for appropriate follow-up action. 
C.3.5 The audit committee should monitor and review the effectiveness of the internal audit 
activities. Where there is no internal audit function, the audit committee should 
consider annually whether there is a need for an internal audit function and make a 
recommendation to the board, and the reasons for the absence of such a function 
should be explained in the relevant section of the annual report. 
C.3.6 The audit committee should have primary responsibility for making a recommendation 
on the appointment, reappointment and removal of the external auditor. If the board 
does not accept the audit committee‟s recommendation, it should include in the annual 
                                                          
17
  See footnote 6 
18
  This provision overlaps with FSA Rule DTR 7.1.1 R (see Schedule B). 
19
  This provision overlaps with FSA Rules DTR 7.1.3 R (see Schedule C). 
20
  See footnote 7 
21
  This provision overlaps with FSA Rules DTR 7.1.5 R and 7.2.7 R (see Schedule B). 
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report, and in any papers recommending appointment or re-appointment, a statement 
from the audit committee explaining the recommendation and should set out reasons 
why the board has taken a different position. 
C.3.7 The annual report should explain to shareholders how, if the auditor provides non-audit 
services, auditor objectivity and independence is safeguarded. 
 
SECTION D: REMUNERATION 
 
D.1 The Level and Components of Remuneration 
 
Main Principle 
Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the 
quality required to run the company successfully, but a company should avoid paying more 
than is necessary for this purpose. A significant proportion of executive directors‟ 
remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual 
performance. 
 
Supporting Principle 
The performance-related elements of executive directors‟ remuneration should be stretching 
and designed to promote the long-term success of the company. 
 
The remuneration committee should judge where to position their company relative to other 
companies. But they should use such comparisons with caution in view of the risk of an 
upward ratchet of remuneration levels with no corresponding improvement in performance. 
 
They should also be sensitive to pay and employment conditions elsewhere in the group, 
especially when determining annual salary increases. 
 
Code Provisions 
 
D.1.1 In designing schemes of performance-related remuneration for executive directors, the 
remuneration committee should follow the provisions in Schedule A to this Code. 
D.1.2 Where a company releases an executive director to serve as a nonexecutive director 
elsewhere, the remuneration report
22
 should include a statement as to whether or not 
the director will retain such earnings and, if so, what the remuneration is. 
D.1.3 Levels of remuneration for non-executive directors should reflect the time commitment 
and responsibilities of the role. Remuneration for nonexecutive directors should not 
include share options or other performance-related elements. If, exceptionally, options 
are granted, shareholder approval should be sought in advance and any shares acquired 
by exercise of the options should be held until at least one year after the non-executive 
director leaves the board. Holding of share options could be relevant to the 
determination of a non-executive director‟s independence (as set out in provision 
B.1.1). 
D.1.4 The remuneration committee should carefully consider what compensation 
commitments (including pension contributions and all other elements) their directors‟ 
terms of appointment would entail in the event of early termination. The aim should be 
to avoid rewarding poor performance. They should take a robust line on reducing 
compensation to reflect departing directors‟ obligations to mitigate loss. 
                                                          
22
  As required for UK incorporated companies under the Large and Medium-Sized Companies and 
Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008. 
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D.1.5 Notice or contract periods should be set at one year or less. If it is necessary to offer 
longer notice or contract periods to new directors recruited from outside, such periods 
should reduce to one year or less after the initial period. 
 
D.2 Procedure 
 
Main Principle 
There should be a formal and transparent procedure for developing policy on executive 
remuneration and for fixing the remuneration packages of individual directors. No director 
should be involved in deciding his or her own remuneration. 
 
Supporting Principles 
The remuneration committee should consult the chairman and/or chief executive about their 
proposals relating to the remuneration of other executive directors. The remuneration 
committee should also be responsible for appointing any consultants in respect of executive 
director remuneration. Where executive directors or senior management are involved in 
advising or supporting the remuneration committee, care should be taken to recognise and 
avoid conflicts of interest. 
 
The chairman of the board should ensure that the company maintains contact as required with 
its principal shareholders about remuneration. 
 
Code Provisions 
 
D.2.1 The board should establish a remuneration committee of at least three, or in the case of 
smaller companies
23
 two, independent non-executive directors. In addition the 
company chairman may also be a member of, but not chair, the committee if he or she 
was considered independent on appointment as chairman. The remuneration committee 
should make available its terms of reference, explaining its role and the authority 
delegated to it by the board.
24
 Where remuneration consultants are appointed, a 
statement should be made available
25
 of whether they have any other connection with 
the company. 
D.2.2 The remuneration committee should have delegated responsibility for setting 
remuneration for all executive directors and the chairman, including pension rights and 
any compensation payments. The committee should also recommend and monitor the 
level and structure of remuneration for senior management. The definition of „senior 
management‟ for this purpose should be determined by the board but should normally 
include the first layer of management below board level. 
D.2.3 The board itself or, where required by the Articles of Association, the shareholders 
should determine the remuneration of the non-executive directors within the limits set 
in the Articles of Association. Where permitted by the Articles, the board may however 
delegate this responsibility to a committee, which might include the chief executive. 
D.2.4 Shareholders should be invited specifically to approve all new long-term incentive 
schemes (as defined in the Listing Rules
26
) and significant changes to existing 
schemes, save in the circumstances permitted by the Listing Rules. 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
  See footnote 6 
24
  This provision overlaps with FSA Rule DTR 7.2.7 R (see Schedule B). 
25
  See footnote 7 
26
  Listing Rules LR 9.4; available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/LR/9/4. 
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SECTION E: RELATIONS WITH SHAREHOLDERS 
 
E.1 Dialogue with Shareholders 
 
Main Principle 
There should be a dialogue with shareholders based on the mutual understanding of 
objectives. The board as a whole has responsibility for ensuring that a satisfactory dialogue 
with shareholders takes place
27
. 
 
Supporting Principles 
Whilst recognising that most shareholder contact is with the chief executive and finance 
director, the chairman should ensure that all directors are made aware of their major 
shareholders‟ issues and concerns. 
 
The board should keep in touch with shareholder opinion in whatever ways are most practical 
and efficient. 
 
Code Provisions 
 
E.1.1 The chairman should ensure that the views of shareholders are communicated to the 
board as a whole. The chairman should discuss governance and strategy with major 
shareholders. Non-executive directors should be offered the opportunity to attend 
scheduled meetings with major shareholders and should expect to attend meetings if 
requested by major shareholders. The senior independent director should attend 
sufficient meetings with a range of major shareholders to listen to their views in order 
to help develop a balanced understanding of the issues and concerns of major 
shareholders. 
E.1.2 The board should state in the annual report the steps they have taken to ensure that the 
members of the board, and, in particular, the nonexecutive directors, develop an 
understanding of the views of major shareholders about the company, for example 
through direct face-to-face contact, analysts‟ or brokers‟ briefings and surveys of 
shareholder opinion. 
 
E.2 Constructive Use of the AGM 
 
Main Principle 
The board should use the AGM to communicate with investors and to encourage their 
participation. 
 
Code Provisions 
 
E.2.1 At any general meeting, the company should propose a separate resolution on each 
substantially separate issue, and should, in particular, propose a resolution at the AGM 
relating to the report and accounts. For each resolution, proxy appointment forms 
should provide shareholders with the option to direct their proxy to vote either for or 
against the resolution or to withhold their vote. The proxy form and any announcement 
of the results of a vote should make it clear that a ‟vote withheld‟ is not a vote in law 
and will not be counted in the calculation of the proportion of the votes for and against 
the resolution. 
                                                          
27
  Nothing in these principles or provisions should be taken to override the general requirements of 
law to treat shareholders equally in access to information. 
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E.2.2 The company should ensure that all valid proxy appointments received for general 
meetings are properly recorded and counted. For each resolution, where a vote has 
been taken on a show of hands, the company should ensure that the following 
information is given at the meeting and made available as soon as reasonably 
practicable on a website which is maintained by or on behalf of the company: 
 the number of shares in respect of which proxy appointments have been validly 
made; 
 the number of votes for the resolution; 
 the number of votes against the resolution; and 
 the number of shares in respect of which the vote was directed to be withheld. 
E.2.3 The chairman should arrange for the chairmen of the audit, remuneration and 
nomination committees to be available to answer questions at the AGM and for all 
directors to attend. 
E.2.4 The company should arrange for the Notice of the AGM and related papers to be sent to 
shareholders at least 20 working days before the meeting. 
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Appendix W: Corporate Governance in New Zealand 
Principles and Guidelines
1
  
 
Principles for Corporate Governance 
 Directors should observe and foster high ethical standards.  
 There should be a balance of independence, skills, knowledge, experience, and 
perspectives among directors so that the board works effectively.  
 The board should use committees where this would enhance its effectiveness in key 
areas while retaining board responsibility.  
 The board should demand integrity both in financial reporting and in the timeliness 
and balance of disclosures on entity affairs.  
 The remuneration of directors and executives should be transparent, fair, and 
reasonable.  
 The board should regularly verify that the entity has appropriate processes that 
identify and manage potential and relevant risks.  
 The board should ensure the quality and independence of the external audit process.  
 The board should foster constructive relationships with shareholders that encourage 
them to engage with the entity.  
 The board should respect the interests of stakeholders within the context of the 
entity's ownership type and its fundamental purpose.  
 
Principles and Guidelines 
 
1. Ethical Standards 
 
Principle 
Directors should observe and foster high ethical standards. 
 
Guidelines 
1.1 The board of every entity should adopt a written code of ethics for the entity that sets out 
explicit expectations for ethical decision making and personal behaviour in respect of:  
 conflicts of interest, including any circumstances where a director may 
participate in board discussion and voting on matters in which he or she has a 
personal interest;  
 proper use of an entity's property and/or information; including safeguards 
against insider trading in the entity's securities;  
 fair dealing with customers, clients, employees, suppliers, competitors, and 
other stakeholders;  
 giving and receiving gifts, facilitation payments, and bribes;  
 compliance with laws and regulations; and  
 reporting of unethical decision making and/or behaviour.  
 
1.2 Every code of ethics should include measures for dealing with breaches of the code.  
1.3 Every entity should communicate its code of ethics to its employees and provide 
employee training. Whistle blowing procedures should be provided.  
1.4 Every board should have a system to implement and review the entity's code of ethics. 
The board should monitor adherence to the code and hold directors, executives, and 
other personnel accountable for unethical behaviour.  
                                                          
1
  Securities Commission, NZ., Corporate Governance in New Zealand, Principles and Guidelines – 
A Handbook for Directors, Executives, and Advisers, (16
th
 March 2004) < http://www.sec-
com.govt.nz/publications/list.shtml > at 18 July 2010. 
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1.5 Every entity should publish its code of ethics. Annual reports should include information 
about the steps taken to implement the code and monitor compliance, including as 
appropriate any serious instances of unethical behaviour and the action taken. 
 
2. Board composition and performance 
 
Principle 
There should be a balance of independence, skills, knowledge, experience, and perspectives 
among directors so that the board works effectively. 
 
Guidelines 
2.1. Every issuer's board should have an appropriate balance of executive and non-executive 
directors, and should include directors who meet formal criteria for "independent 
directors".  
2.2. All directors should, except as permitted by law and disclosed to shareholders, act in the 
best interests of the entity, ahead of other interests.  
2.3. Every board should have a formal charter that sets out the responsibilities and roles of 
the board and directors, including any formal delegations to management.  
2.4. The chairperson should be formally responsible for fostering a constructive governance 
culture and applying appropriate governance principles among directors and with 
management.  
2.5. The chairperson of a publicly owned entity should be independent. No director of a 
publicly owned entity should simultaneously hold the roles of board chairperson and 
chief executive (or equivalent). Only in exceptional circumstances should the chief 
executive go on to become the chairperson.  
2.6. Directors should be selected and appointed through rigorous, formal processes designed 
to give the board a range of relevant skills and experience.  
2.7. Directors should be selected and appointed only when the board is satisfied that they will 
commit the time needed to be fully effective in their role.  
2.8. The board should set out in writing its specific expectations of non-executive directors 
(including those who are independent).  
2.9. The board should allocate time and resources to encouraging directors to acquire and 
retain a sound understanding of their responsibilities, and this should include appropriate 
induction training for new appointees.  
2.10. The board should have rigorous, formal processes for evaluating its performance, along 
with that of board committees and individual directors. The chairperson should be 
responsible to lead these processes.  
2.11. Annual reports of all entities should include information about each director, identify 
which directors are independent, and include information on the board's appointment, 
training and evaluation processes. 
 
3. Board Committees 
 
Principle 
The board should use committees where this would enhance its effectiveness in key areas 
while retaining board responsibility. 
Guidelines 
3.1 Every board committee should have a clear, formal charter that sets out its role and 
delegated responsibilities while safeguarding the ultimate decision making authority of 
the board as a whole.  
3.2 Where issuers have board committees, the charter and membership of each should be 
published for investors.  
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3.3 Proceedings of committees should be reported back to the board to allow other directors 
to question committee members.  
3.4 Each publicly owned company should establish an audit committee of the board with 
responsibilities to: recommend the appointment of external auditors; to oversee all 
aspects of the entity-audit firm relationship; and to promote integrity in financial 
reporting. The audit committee should comprise:  
 all non-executive directors, a majority of whom are independent;  
 at least one director who is a chartered accountant or has another recognised 
form of financial expertise; and  
 a chairperson who is independent and who is not the chairperson of the 
board.  
 
4. Reporting and Disclosure 
 
Principle 
The board should demand integrity both in financial reporting and in the timeliness and 
balance of disclosures on entity affairs. 
 
Guidelines 
4.1 All boards should have a rigorous process for assuring directors of the quality and 
integrity of entity financial reports including their relevance, reliability, comparability, 
and timeliness.  
4.2 Annual reports of all entities should, in addition to all information required by law, 
include sufficient meaningful information to enable investors and stakeholders to be well 
informed on the affairs of the entity.  
4.3 All issuers should have an effective system of internal control for reliable financial 
reporting.  
4.4 The chief executive, the chief financial officer (or equivalent officers), and at least one 
other director of publicly owned entities should certify in the published financial reports 
that these comply with generally accepted accounting standards and present a true and 
fair view of the financial affairs of the entity.  
4.5 Each listed entity should have a clear and robust internal process for compliance with the 
continuous disclosure regime, which should include board examination of continuous 
disclosure issues at each board meeting.  
4.6 Every entity should make its code of ethics, board committee charters and other standing 
documents important to corporate governance readily available to interested investors 
and stakeholders.  
4.7 Boards of issuers should report annually to investors on how the entity is implementing 
the Principles and explain any significant departure from guidelines supporting each 
Principle. 
 
5. Remuneration 
 
Principle 
The remuneration of directors and executives should be transparent, fair, and reasonable.  
 
Guidelines 
5.1 The board should have a clear policy for setting remuneration of executives (including 
executive directors) and non-executive directors at levels that are fair and reasonable in a 
competitive market for the skills, knowledge and experience required by the entity.  
5.2 Publicly owned entities should disclose their remuneration policy in annual reports.  
5.3 Executive (including executive director) remuneration should be clearly differentiated 
from non-executive director remuneration.  
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5.4 Executive (including executive director) remuneration packages should include an 
element that is dependent on entity and individual performance.  
5.5 No non-executive director should receive a retirement payment unless eligibility for such 
payment has been agreed by shareholders and publicly disclosed during his or her term 
of board service. 
 
6. Risk Management 
 
Principle 
The board should regularly verify that the entity has appropriate processes that identify and 
manage potential and relevant risks. 
 
Guidelines 
6.1 The board should require the entity to operate rigorous processes for risk management 
and internal control.  
6.2 The board should receive regular reports on the operation of risk management and 
internal control processes.  
6.3 Boards of issuers should report annually to investors and stakeholders on risk 
identification and management and on relevant internal controls. 
 
7. Auditors 
 
Principle 
The board should ensure the quality and independence of the external audit process. 
 
Guidelines 
7.1 The board should inform itself fully on the responsibilities of external auditors and be 
rigorous in its selection of auditors on professional merit.  
7.2 The board should satisfy itself that there is no relationship between the auditor and the 
entity or any related person that could compromise the independence of the auditor, and 
should require confirmation of this from the auditor.  
7.3 The board should facilitate full and frank dialogue among its audit committee, the 
external auditors, and management.  
7.4 No issuer's audit should be led by the same audit partner for more than five consecutive 
years (i.e. lead and engagement audit partners should be rotated from the engagement 
after a maximum of five years).  
7.5 Boards of issuers should report annually to shareholders and stakeholders on the amount 
of fees paid to the auditors, and should differentiate between fees for audit and fees for 
individually identified non-audit work (i.e., separating each category of non-audit work 
undertaken by the auditors, and disclosing the fees payable for this).  
7.6 Boards of issuers should explain in the annual report what non-audit work was 
undertaken and why this did not compromise auditor independence. 
 
8. Shareholder Relations 
 
Principle 
The board should foster constructive relationships with shareholders that encourage them to 
engage with the entity. 
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Guidelines 
8.1 Publicly owned entities should have clear published policies for shareholder relations and 
regularly review practices, aiming to clearly communicate the goals, strategies and 
performance of the entity.  
8.2 Publicly owned entities should maintain an up-to-date website, providing:  
 a comprehensive description of its business and structure;  
 a commentary on goals, strategies and performance; and  
 key corporate governance documents;  
 all information released to the stock exchange (for listed entities), including 
reports to shareholders.  
8.3 Publicly owned entities should encourage shareholders to take part in annual and special 
meetings by holding these in locations and at times that are convenient to shareholders.  
8.4 The board should facilitate questioning of external auditors by shareholders during the 
annual meeting. 
 
9. Stakeholder Interests 
 
Principle 
The board should respect the interests of stakeholders within the context of the entity's 
ownership type and its fundamental purpose. 
 
Guidelines 
9.1 The board should have clear policies for the entity's relationships with significant 
stakeholders, bearing in mind distinctions between public, private and Crown ownership.  
9.2 The board should regularly assess compliance with these policies to ensure that conduct 
towards stakeholders complies with the code of ethics and the law and is within broadly 
accepted social, environmental, and ethical norms, generally subject to the interests of 
shareholders.  
9.3 Public sector entities should report annually to inform the public of their activities and 
performance, including on how they have served the interests of their stakeholders. 
 
 
 
